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Abstract 
Social anxiety is deeply entangled with an individual’s social and interpersonal 
environments, provoking distress for those who experience social interactions and spaces 
as threatening. Social anxieties rupture the fabrics, places and spaces of everyday life and 
are fundamentally geographical, bound up in an intimate social geography of experience 
where anxiety, fear, embarrassment and shame occur across a range of social settings. This 
thesis examines the everyday lived geographies of people experiencing often debilitating 
and distressing social anxieties.  
The research landscape of social anxiety is one dominated by the disorder/illness model, 
one that prioritises the presence of an organic or cognitive abnormality as the cause of 
disorder. Against these individualising biomedical understandings, I develop a novel 
conceptualisation of social anxiety as a social and spatial phenomenon. I examine the 
relationship between social anxieties and the temporalities and spatialities of everyday life 
by prioritising everyday routines, practices, interactions, situations, sites and settings 
through and in which social anxieties are embodied, enacted, sustained and managed. 
Social anxieties shape, and are shaped by, our social and spatial surroundings: first, where 
anxieties shape the perception or experience a person has of/in a particular place or space 
and second, where an interaction, site or setting shapes the intensities or contours of 
anxious experiences.  
Drawing on lived accounts of experience that were gathered through qualitative research 
methods, including an online questionnaire and semi-structured, online and telephone 
interviews, I contribute to research on the relationship between health and place by 
engaging experience-centred knowledges that takes seriously the lived reality of living, 
experiencing and managing social anxiety. The methodological approach also contributes 
to debates concerning how ‘we’ (as researchers) research experiences of health and place, 
highlighting the need for flexibility in the research process and designing research that 
fosters participation while enabling people to define the nature and limits of their 
participation. 
Through the conceptual underpinnings of psychoanalytic, anticipatory, habitual and 
emotional and affective geographies mapped against a background of critical approaches in 
health geographies, findings account for the importance of social and spatial factors in 
producing, sustaining and experiencing social anxieties. This thesis engages with lived 
accounts of mental health and illness that disrupt, challenge and nuance the medicalisation 
of mental health experiences, towards a social and spatial understanding of social anxiety. 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 2 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ 5 
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... 6 
List of Appendices ................................................................................................................ 7 
Definitions/Abbreviations .................................................................................................... 8 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... 9 
Author’s Declaration ......................................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 12 
LIFE WITH SOCIAL ANXIETY .................................................................................... 12 
SOCIAL ANXIETY, FROM DIS-EASE TO DISEASE ................................................. 15 
TERMINOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 27 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................ 28 
THESIS MAP .................................................................................................................. 28 
CHAPTER 2 SITUATING SOCIAL ANXIETY: LITERATURE, DISCIPLINES, 
PERSPECTIVES ............................................................................................................... 31 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 31 
BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ...................... 32 
BIOMEDICAL PERSPECTIVES ............................................................................... 32 
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL PERSPECTIVES .................................................... 34 
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES .............................................................. 38 
CULTURAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ................................. 38 
SOCIOLOGY AND COUNSELLING PERSPECTIVES ........................................... 41 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES ........................................................................ 44 
INTERPERSONAL PERSPECTIVES ............................................................................ 46 
REFLECTIONS ON PERSPECTIVES ........................................................................... 49 
ADVANCING A SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL ANXIETY ............................ 51 
SUBJECTIVITY AND SPACE ................................................................................... 53 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 58 
CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL ANXIETY: PSYCHOANALYSIS 
AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 60 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 60 
PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS AND GEOGRAPHIES .......................................... 60 
ANXIETY .................................................................................................................... 63 
BIG OTHER ................................................................................................................ 65 
DESIRE ........................................................................................................................ 67 
UNCANNY LITTLE OBJECT ................................................................................... 69
 
 
 
ANTICIPATORY CONCEPTS AND GEOGRAPHIES ................................................ 72 
EMOTIONAL AND AFFECTIVE GEOGRAPHIES ..................................................... 76 
(UN)HABITUAL GEOGRAPHIES ................................................................................ 82 
HOME .......................................................................................................................... 86 
(IM)MOBILITIES........................................................................................................ 87 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 88 
CHAPTER 4 RESEARCHING SOCIAL ANXIETY: METHODOLOGY, 
REFLEXIVITY, METHODS............................................................................................ 90 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 90 
RELATIONAL AND REFLEXIVE APPROACHES ..................................................... 93 
ONLINE RESEARCH ..................................................................................................... 99 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION ....................................................... 99 
THE ETHICS OF DOING ONLINE RESEARCH WITH ‘VULNERABLE’ 
POPULATIONS ............................................................................................................ 104 
DEFINING ‘VULNERABILITY’ – LABELS OR LAYERS? ................................. 104 
METHODS .................................................................................................................... 110 
ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRES ................................................................................. 110 
ONLINE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS ..................................................... 114 
TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS ................................................................................... 119 
DATA ORGANISATION AND ANALYSIS ............................................................... 121 
CHAPTER 5 INTENSITIES ........................................................................................... 126 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 126 
ANTICIPATORY GEOGRAPHIES OF SOCIAL ANXIETY ..................................... 127 
RETROACTION: STUCK IN THE AFTERMATH ................................................. 128 
RUMINATIONS ........................................................................................................ 132 
ANTICIPATION: ENCOUNTERING TIME AND SPACE .................................... 136 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 139 
CHAPTER 6 GOVERNMENTALITIES ...................................................................... 141 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 141 
MEDICAL SPACES ...................................................................................................... 143 
DIAGNOSTIC AND THERAPUETIC ENCOUNTERS .......................................... 149 
ONLINE SPACES ......................................................................................................... 160 
LURKING .................................................................................................................. 164 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 166 
CHAPTER 7 SPATIALITIES OF ANXIOUS EXPERIENCE I ................................ 168 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 168 
HOME ............................................................................................................................ 169 
SHIFTING, FRACTURING AND FRAGMENTING HOME-SPACES ................. 169 
EDUCATION SPACES ................................................................................................. 179 
 WORKSPACES ............................................................................................................. 185 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 192 
CHAPTER 8 SPATIALITIES OF ANXIOUS EXPERIENCE II ............................... 194 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 194 
FRIENDSHIPS AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS .................................................... 194 
DIFFICULTY AND UNCERTAINTY ..................................................................... 195 
FEWER OPPORTUNITIES ...................................................................................... 196 
EMOTIONAL WORK ............................................................................................... 196 
LONELINESS AND SOCIAL ISOLATION ................................................................ 198 
THIRD PLACES ............................................................................................................ 200 
CONSUMER SPACES .............................................................................................. 202 
ANXIOUS (IM)MOBILITIES....................................................................................... 205 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT ............................................................................................. 206 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 214 
CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 216 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 216 
ENHANCING AWARENESS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH . 218 
IMPACT AND KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE ............................................................. 221 
FINAL THOUGHTS ..................................................................................................... 222 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 225 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................. 255 
 
 
 
  5 
List of Tables 
Table 1: DSM-5: Diagnostic Criteria: Social Anxiety Disorder 
Table 2: DSM-4 Diagnostic Criteria: Avoidant Personality Disorder 
Table 3: Summary of Hickinbottom-Brawn’s 4 Vectors of Social Anxiety Disorder 
Table 4: Participant Recruitment Numbers for Websites 
Table 5: Outline of Questionnaire Sections  
Table 6: Guidelines for participants provided at the beginning of the interview process 
 
  
  6 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Imagine Being Allergic to People 
Figure 2: Paxil Advertisement: Should Have, Could Have, Would Have 
Figure 3: Paxil Advertisement: Empowered by Paxil 
Figure 4: The Cognitive Model of Social Anxiety Disorder 
Figure 5: Screenshot of Main Forum of Social Anxiety UK 
Figure 6: Internet Research Ethics – Considerations for Direct Communication and 
‘Special Interest Forums’ 
Figure 7: Preliminary Coding Exercise in NVivo 
Figure 8: Comparison: Feelings of Safety in GP Surgery and Therapy Room 
Figure 9: Status of Diagnosis 
Figure 10: Comparison: Feelings of Safety – Bedroom and Home 
Figure 11: Feelings of Safety at Home 
Figure 12: Feelings of Safety on Campus 
Figure 13: Participant’s Level of Education 
Figure 14: Employment Status of Participants 
Figure 15: Comparison: Feelings of Safety in Public Spaces 
Figure 16: Feelings of Safety in Shopping Centres  
Figure 17: Feelings of Safety on Public Transport 
 
FIGURES IN APPENDIX 
Table 7: Gender of Participants 
Table 8: Participants’ Age Groups 
Table 9: Participants’ Highest Level of Education Achieved 
Table 10: Living Situation of Participants 
Figure 19: Sexual Orientation of Participants 
Figure 20: Likelihood of Anxiety when Speaking to Authority Figures 
Figure 21: Likelihood of Anxiety when Being Observed 
Figure 22: Likelihood of Anxiety Giving a Presentation 
Figure 23: Likelihood of Causing Anxiety – Speaking on the Telephone 
 
 
  
  7 
List of Appendices 
Appendix 1: Letter of Support to Conduct Research with Anxiety UK 
Appendix 2: Participant Data Table 
Appendix 3: E-mail to SAUK requesting access to forum for research purposes 
Appendix 4: Questionnaire Screenshot – Showing Research Information and Consent 
Appendix 5: Questionnaire Screenshot – Mental Health Support Groups 
Appendix 6: Questionnaire Screenshot – Example of Open Questions 
Appendix 7: Questionnaire Screenshot – Example of Closed Questions 
Appendix 8: Snapshot of Interview Schedule 
Appendix 9: Consent Form 
Appendix 10: Interview Screenshot – ChatStep Platform 
Appendix 11: Research Information Sheet 
Appendix 12: Graphs/Tables of Participant’s Biographical Information 
  
  8 
Definitions/Abbreviations 
CBT – Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
CMHT – Community Mental Health Team 
DTC – Direct to Consumer 
GP – General Practitioner 
LOL – Laugh Out Loud 
NHS – National Health Service 
NICE – National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
SAD – Social Anxiety Disorder 
IR – Interview Response 
QR – Questionnaire Response 
[…] – Indicates Text Removed 
[  ] – Indicates Text Added 
  
  9 
Acknowledgements 
This is a long, but necessary, list of thanks: 
 
First and foremost, this project would not have been possible without the people who 
participated in it. I am grateful beyond measure for your willingness to discuss your 
experiences of social anxiety with me. Your stories have helped to shape the direction of 
this research and my own understanding of social anxiety. I hope I have done your words 
justice. 
 
This research, and all of the opportunities afforded to me, would not have been possible 
without the financial support of the Economic and Social Research Council for funding +3 
Award, (Award Number: ES/J500136/1), the Scottish Graduate School of Social Sciences 
Overseas Institutional Visit (OIV) Award, and the School of Geographical and Earth 
Sciences (GES), for which I am very grateful.  
 
I’m not quite sure I have the words to convey the immense gratitude and appreciation I 
have for my supervisors, Prof. Chris Philo and Dr. Cheryl McGeachan, but I will try 
nonetheless. Thank you to both of you for being incredible sources of support, both 
academically and personally, throughout this process. I am certain this would have been an 
even harder endeavour without your knowledge, guidance and never-ending support. To 
Chris, you have guided me through this process while giving me the space and freedom to 
untangle and ‘world’ social anxiety in my own way. For your ability to see the implications 
of my arguments, your vast geographical knowledge, attention to detail and keen eye for 
all grammatical, typographical and, how could we forget, formatting errors, I remain 
extremely grateful. Most of all, thank you for being genuinely enthusiastic and passionate 
about this research. To Cheryl, thank you for what seems like your unshakeable faith in my 
abilities. I am extremely grateful for your always kind and thoughtful encouragement of 
my work and for championing my writing and ideas at every turn. You have been a 
constant source of support and reassurance especially when self-doubt crept in and 
occasionally got the better of me. Thank you for your guidance and support in my research 
and in my teaching, I am beyond grateful.  
  
There are many others in GES, past and present, who have inspired, encouraged and 
supported me academically, pedagogically and personally, over the years, especially 
Hester, Hannah and Emma. Very special thanks to Ian for helping navigate those final 
stages with much needed kindness, coffee, conversation and encouragement!  
 
I owe a special thank you to Prof. Paul Kingsbury and the Geography Department of 
Simon Fraser University for hosting my OIV. Paul, I am extremely grateful for the time 
and care you took in helping me decipher Lacan and for expanding my knowledge and 
interest in all things psychoanalysis. Also, huge thanks to SFU Geography’s post-grad 
community who made my time in Vancouver (and Whistler and Seattle) all the more 
enjoyable and memorable, especially Sam, Germaine, John, Trevor, Annika and Natalia. 
 
Despite being across the pond, I can’t forget that GES is home to a very special group of 
people without whom this whole experience would have been a lot less enjoyable. Special 
thanks to Georgios, Maricela, Eleanor, Megan, Maurits, Sophie, Matthew, Grant, Fran, 
John, Chris, Charlotte, Lauren and Cris. Thanks also to the Human Geography Research 
Group and the Medical Humanities Research Centre at the University of Glasgow. 
 
My wonderful friends deserve an extra special thanks for reminding me that I have a life 
  10 
outside of the PhD: Kerrie, Sarah, Laurie, Kensie, Vikki and Sadie; I am very thankful for 
all of you. I owe an extra special thank you to Rachel Topham and Nicola Pritchard: 
Rachel, thank you for the beautiful Vancouver writing space where much of this thesis was 
laid down, good conversation, encouragement, friendship and chips! I miss you and Tom 
very much! Nicola, thank you for reading this thing from front to back and providing your 
thoughts, for being my PhD agony aunt at all hours of the day, for the long wine lunches 
and, most of all, your friendship. Thanks, hen. 
 
Thanks also to Kenny for chats and rants about life with social anxiety and that potato 
scone recipe. I’m very grateful to have crossed paths with you. To Nathalie Prevost, for 
wonderful, engaging conversations overlooking Vancouver harbour about the state of the 
world we live in. Also, to ‘The Store’, for all the chaos, laughter, singing and dancing over 
the last 3 years – 2123 East Broadway is a wild and special place.  
 
Heartfelt thanks go to my wonderful family for supporting all of my whims and 
endeavours in life. My wee maw, Maureen: you deserve so much more than a few lines of 
thanks here but thank you for everything you have done for all of us. Thank you for loving 
and supporting me, letting me find my feet in my own way but also giving me a good dose 
of reality when I needed it the most. You are one of a kind and I am extremely lucky to 
have you as a mother and a friend. To my da’, Denis: for your unwavering belief in me, for 
always encouraging me to persevere and for working through those later moments of self-
doubt with a good ear and sage advice, I am very grateful. To my big brothers, Stephen and 
Alan, I am the luckiest wee sister to have you two in my life. Thanks for always looking 
out for me, giving the best hugs and a good shake every once in a while. Naoko, thank you 
for your keen interest in my work, for the late night chats about mental health and society 
and all the food, wine and hospitality. 
 
Last, but by no means least, I owe endless amounts of thanks to Mitchell: thank you for 
dealing with, on a daily basis, the anxieties and stresses of writing up this thesis while 
finishing your own, for being a sounding board, a proof-reader, talking me up, talking me 
down, telling me “You got this!” and loving and supporting me in every which way 
possible. Thank you doesn’t seem enough but I am beyond grateful for you. It’s been a 
wild three years. I totally got it!  
 
  
  11 
Author’s Declaration 
I hereby declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contributions of others, 
this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any other 
degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.  
 
Signed: Louise Elizabeth Boyle 
  
 
 
 12 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
LIFE WITH SOCIAL ANXIETY1 
[Anxiety] is a state that comes over me all too often. It is familiar and 
anticipated but, even so, I dread it. It tortures and suffocates me with a 
profound feeling of shame in the pit of my stomach. I feel so intensely out of 
place and utterly powerless to control it. My social anxieties gnaw at the very 
core of me, telling me [that]: 
• I am undeserving of close friendships and relationship. 
• I am a burden to those who, for whatever reason, have remained 
relatively close to me. 
• I am a failure in most aspects of life, including relationships, education 
[and] career, and I haven’t succeeded in reaching any of life’s 
‘milestones’2 and so, will never amount to anything. 
It has tortured me for as long as I can remember. These crippling fears of other 
people and the judgements they impart have restricted my life in every way 
imaginable. The blush of embarrassment when attention is focused on me, the 
wave of panic as I’m put on the spot or the intense weight of anxiety that comes 
with trying to move through life, it’s all unbearable. I feel completely useless in 
my ability to gain any sort of momentum for life. This fear has driven me away 
from the world and even alienated me from myself. 
I stand on the side lines of social life, immobilised by a fear of interacting with 
or being around other people. I am terrified of what they must think about me. 
It feels like a fear of living because people are everywhere and it is impossible 
to do anything, [such as] answer the door, walk down the street, buy something 
from a shop, order food in a restaurant, go to university, get a job, travel on the 
bus, go to the gym or visit a museum without encountering other people. All of 
those situations and more are intensely uncomfortable to the point of being 
 
1 This opening section is a creative rendition of five participants’ questionnaire and interview responses 
gathered as part of this research project. Each participant uniquely captured a particular element of the 
phenomenon that is social anxiety. This rendition, weaving together these diverse elements, aims to 
represent both the individual and collective experiences of social anxiety as communicated by all who 
participated in this research project. Included here are responses from Sarah, Amelia, Dawn, Karen and 
John. Pseudonyms are used throughout this thesis (Chapter 4: ‘Researching Social Anxiety’). 
2 For several participants, ‘milestones’ include life events such as attending and/or completing university, 
going on a first holiday with a group of friends, attending ‘prom’ and/or graduation ceremonies, moving 
away from home, meeting a partner and getting a job. 
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unbearable for me. There are very few places for me to anchor to because of 
how my anxieties affect me. I feel such intense shame about not being able to 
do things that are probably second nature to most [people]. Every activity in 
this world that people take for granted is incredibly hard for someone like me. 
Because of this, I experience a real feeling of disconnection from the world 
around me and a feeling of disconnection from myself. I feel I am looking at 
myself from the outside sometimes and that’s terrifying – to feel so 
disconnected [from] everything. 
Unsurprisingly, I do not have a good relationship with myself. Every 
conversation I have, opportunity that is presented [to me] or place I go [to], 
anxiety is there. Waiting. Waiting to tell me that I will embarrass myself, be 
laughed at, be humiliated, be ignored and then rejected. It makes me doubt 
everything about myself, tells me I’m worthless, useless, pathetic and weak. I’m 
so ashamed of not being able to control this. I’m waking up every day and 
worrying about what will happen, who I will have to talk to and where I will 
have to go. Will the door go? Will the phone ring? [Then], at the end of the day 
I go over in my head every last detail of what I did, what I said, how I said it, 
what my face looked like, did I make enough eye contact and how were people 
reacting to me? I’m constantly questioning myself, doubting myself, criticising 
myself [and] then it starts all over again. This anxiety builds and builds over a 
matter of days or weeks […] I just can’t control my thoughts, or see 
[situations] clearly, everything is foggy and gets increasingly intense and my 
body doesn’t contain anything. I sweat, and blush, shake, stutter and it’s as if 
my anxiety is just oozing out for everyone to see. It’s awful. 
Yet, social interaction or, at the very least, one moment of connection without 
this crippling weight of anxiety is something I want. I endure most social 
things, try to pacify myself with alcohol and always have an exit plan. I spend 
days, weeks or months planning and preparing to enter upcoming social 
situations or even simply making an appointment to see my doctor or get a 
haircut. For me, these things are genuine accomplishments rather than 
something I do in the course of my daily life. I go through painstaking and 
meticulous levels of planning, running through every possible scenario in my 
head about what could go wrong or the potential for me to embarrass myself. I 
am stuck in this never-ending cycle of ‘what-ifs’. It is relentless and 
exhausting. 
In the beginning, my anxiety kept me safe from harsh social realities; now, I am 
trapped by it. 
In order to capture the complexity of life as it is lived with social anxiety, it feels 
appropriate to begin this thesis with the words of those who have participated in this 
research. Their experiences have not only nurtured my own understanding of social 
anxiety; they have also inspired and shaped the direction of this research immeasurably. 
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From its very beginnings, this project has been a profoundly personal one3. Therefore, 
there is also a certain personal ‘politics’ exercised in the process of acknowledging and 
‘giving voice’4 to the experiential knowledges of those people who are enduring mental 
and emotional distress; one that underlines the overriding motivation for, and justification 
of, this research and its primary objectives. 
The experience commonly understood today as ‘Social Anxiety Disorder’ (SAD) is 
embedded in a diagnostic system that constitutes a multitude of physiological symptoms 
and psychological constructs5. SAD has been considered the most ‘neglected’ of the 
‘anxiety disorders’ (Liebowitz et al., 1985; Sheeran and Zimmerman, 2002) and the 
majority of literature and research on the topic to date remains largely ignorant about the 
complexities of SAD as a lived set of experiences. Ultimately, what is neglected in the 
simplified descriptions of this complex psychic and social phenomena are the subjective 
and experiential accounts of those living with social anxiety. Where subjective accounts 
are represented, the salient memories of painful social situations, moments of self-
conscious criticism, vivid social humiliation and shame, and the embodied and messy 
realities of navigating daily life are masked, manipulated and misconstrued by statistical 
analysis in clinical trials. Therefore, it is important that the words of research participants 
are encountered first, in order that the most salient and resounding aspects of social anxiety 
are allowed to breathe, unconfined by clinical definitions or conceptual frameworks. As 
such, a central concern of this thesis is the dominance of biomedical, cognitive and 
behavioural perspectives, chiming too with recognising the lack of critical attention paid to 
wider social and cultural conditions and neoliberal and disciplinary regimes that serve to 
create and sustain social anxiety (Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013; Scott, 2006). The following 
section maps the histories and controversies surrounding the classification of social anxiety 
as a pathological and psychiatric ‘disorder’. 
 
3 This project is also a continuation of my Masters of Research project (Boyle, 2012) and related outputs 
(Boyle, 2013).  
4 The wider research and ethical implications involved in the process and practice of ‘giving voice’ are 
discussed in far more depth in Chapter 4. 
5 I attend fully to the history and diagnostic criteria in the remainder of this chapter and to the existing 
research landscape in Chapter 2: ‘Situating Social Anxiety’. 
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SOCIAL ANXIETY, FROM DIS-EASE TO DISEASE6  
The phenomena that manifest in the lived experience of social anxiety are not new, but 
what has changed significantly is the focus and emphasis on particular signs and symptoms 
of anxiety, the various permutations and combinations with which a person may present 
with anxiety and, most significantly, their social meanings. This section tracks the 
emergence of social anxiety alongside the globalisation of psychiatric practice and 
classification systems. To begin, I trace social anxiety’s gradual shift in status from a 
normal, albeit distressing, part of the human condition to one of the most prevalent7 mental 
health problems of the 21st Century. I examine the conceptual antecedents of social anxiety 
that are present in medical and philosophical texts throughout history. Then, I explore the 
120-year history of social anxiety as a ‘disorder’ by examining the conditions through 
which social unease became controversially pathologised and categorised through 
psychiatric classification. It is often said that anxiety has become modern society’s 
prevailing condition – a cultural epidemic – one that is associated with the ever increasing 
pace and demands of life. In the face of capitalism, economic collapse, threats of war and 
terrorism, climate catastrophe, natural disaster and biological hazards, which not only 
threaten the social order but humanity’s very survivability, a ‘general malaise has 
descended over us’ (Dunant and Porter, 1997, p. n.p.). Outlining the ‘contours of 
modernity’, Giddens (1991) argues that the social, political and economic climates 
surrounding late-capitalism generate anxieties and insecurities in our everyday social and 
spatial worlds. The interaction of these factors in conjunction with ‘self-reflexive’8 projects 
fuels a preoccupation with monitoring the boundaries between self and others. Bauman 
writes extensively about the increasing frailty of human bonds (2013) and the ‘liquidity’ of 
modern life (2012), arguing that, despite living in a hyper-connected world, we humans are 
now increasingly disconnected from each other and ourselves. Definitions of anxiety 
abound; it is often difficult to ground its complexity in a concrete definition, but, as 
Rachman (2004, p. 3) outlines, it is unmistakably felt as ‘the tense, unsettling anticipation 
of a threatening but vague event’, is often ‘shapeless’ and grafts ‘at a lower level of 
 
6 Combrinck-Graham’s (2014, p. 699) offer a critical discussion on the implications of human suffering (‘dis-
ease’) being classified as mental illness (‘disease’), arguing it could ‘impos[e] another layer of suffering’ 
on patients and wider society. 
7 Prevalence refers to the ‘proportion of a population who have a specific characteristic in a given time 
period’ (National Institute for Mental Health, 2017). 
8 As late-modernity is conceptualised by increasing uncertainty and instability, Giddens’ (1991) concept of 
the ‘reflexive self’ outlines how, in an attempt to obtain and maintain some sense of (self) security, people 
continually (re)construct the self in order to adjust to the rapidly changing and continuously shifting 
parameters of social, spatial and economic life. The dynamics of (self)-reflexivity and their relationship to 
social anxiety will be explored later in this thesis (see also: Boyle, 2018). 
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intensity’ and is ‘unpleasant, unsettling, persistent, pervasive, and draining, […] prolonged 
[…] disabling and even destructive’, yet also seems an unavoidable and necessary 
component of the human condition.  
Contemporary interpretations of early forms of ‘individual’ anxieties are often discussed 
alongside states of melancholy, timidity, stage fright and shyness that have long been 
associated with religion, ethics and morality. Our understanding of anxiety and phobias is 
more or less unchanged from the understandings of ancient Greece. The demands of social 
life and the public presentation of the self have been considered a source of unease and 
cause of avoidance throughout history and furnished contemporary accounts on the 
practice and performance of social life (Goffman, 1956). In the 17th century, Burton (1847, 
p. 164), in his text Anatomy of Melancholy, refers to Hippocratic texts from c. 400 BC, to 
describe a condition that is often thought to anticipate contemporary accounts of social 
anxiety: 
Many lamentable effects this fear causeth in men, as to be red, pale, tremble, 
sweat, it makes sudden cold and heat to come over all the body, palpitation of 
the heart, syncope, [etc.]. It amazeth many men that are to speak, or show 
themselves in public assemblies, or before some great personages, as Tully 
confessed of himself, that he trembled still at the beginning of his speech […]. 
It confounds voice and memory, as Lucian wittily brings in Jupiter Tragoedus, 
so much afraid of his auditory, when he was to make a speech to the rest of the 
Gods, that he could not utter a ready word, but was compelled to use Mercury’s 
help in prompting. Many men are so amazed and astonished with fear, they 
know not where they are, what they say, what they do, and that which is worst, 
it tortures them many days before with continual affrights and suspicion. It 
hinders most honourable attempts, and makes their hearts ache, sad and heavy. 
They that live in fear are never free, resolute, secure, never merry, but in 
continual pain. 
Here, Burton breaks down the all-consuming nature of social anxiety highlighting the signs 
and sensations that make anxiety visible and exacerbate distress; the sites (with a focus on 
performance situations) that trigger anxieties and hinder social life; the anticipatory 
dynamics that build and ‘torture’; and the overall implications on a person’s mental health 
and wellbeing. Burton (1847, p. 253) continues, detailing the case of a man who ‘dare not 
come in company for fear he should be misused, disgraced, overshoot himself in gesture or 
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speech or be sick; he thinks every man observes him’9. 
Themes of social and existential anxieties are also heavily present throughout 19th and 20th 
century philosophy and literature. Kierkegaard10 (2014, p. 188) captures the all-consuming 
nature of anxiety, writing that: 
[N]o Grand Inquisitor has in readiness such terrible tortures as has anxiety, and 
no spy knows how to attack more artfully the man he suspects, choosing the 
instant when he is weakest, nor knows how to lay traps where he will be caught 
and ensnared, as anxiety knows how, and no sharp-witted judge knows how to 
interrogate, to examine the accused as anxiety does, which never lets him 
escape, neither by diversion nor by noise, neither at work nor at play, neither 
by day nor at night. 
A tension arises, inescapably for some individuals, against the inherently social nature of 
being human and social life as a primary focus and cause of distress11. Psychoanalytic 
conceptualisations of anxiety argue that anxiety is an ‘essentially human condition’ and 
that, despite its often distressing and ‘paralysing effects’, it is also ‘the very condition 
through which people relate to the world’ (Salecl, 2004, p. 9). Anxiety presents as a 
negative affective state whereby other people, simply through their own being, have the 
capacity to inflict great psychological suffering on the individual.  
Sartre’s (1956) construct of ‘being-for-others’12 encapsulates the existential problems 
present in, and the relational context of, our own being, positioning others as inherently 
anxiety provoking: one is never just (socially) anxious, rather always anxious before 
another person in a specific set of circumstances. Being-for-others is a central component 
to the structure of self-hood and to our own vulnerability in that our own sense of being is 
constituted in the perceived consciousness of Others and centred on the objectifying ‘look’ 
(Davidson, 2003). Ultimately, we are a projection of what others think of us. Being-for-
others describes the awareness of being perceived by others and the anticipation of 
 
9 During the time of these early writings, women would have been less socially active but doubtless remained 
attuned to social pressures to conform to certain ideals regarding femininity (Manion, 2003). Men’s 
anxieties would have been concerned with masculinity and concealing emotions. Embarrassment and 
blushing, considered a sign of femininity and therefore weakness, were to be avoided in order to preserve 
a man’s social status and morality. 
10 Davidson (2001), in her geographical engagements with agoraphobia, invokes Kierkegaard’s existentialism 
to examine experiential accounts of anxiety and fear in consumption spaces and practices. Similar 
dynamics are examined in Chapter 8. 
11 Davidson’s (2000a, 2003) work also draws on the existential-phenomenological philosophy of Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty.  
12 The first and second constructs are being-in-itself (unconscious being) and being-for-itself (conscious, yet 
incomplete, being) (Sartre, 1956). Being-for-others is Sartre’s third concept of Being. 
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negative evaluation that comes from being the actual, potential or imagined object of 
someone else’s gaze13. It is through the ‘look’, which also instructs a painful self-
consciousness, that social and moral assessments are made regarding how I appear in the 
eyes of the Other or what am I to an ‘other’14. There are inherent risks involved in the 
self’s undesirable attributes becoming known to others. Yet, the desire for positive social 
evaluation, as much as the experience of negative evaluation, often leads to self-destructive 
behaviours, including avoidance, self-harm and even suicide (Bering and Shackelford, 
2004). 
The construction of social anxiety as a disease category has been subject to a particular set 
of historical conditions and social-cultural influences. The 120-year history of social 
anxiety as disease category has been the subject of intense debate and conflict between 
members of the psy-disciplines15 and has intensified significantly over the last four 
decades, beginning with the disorder’s inauguration into the American Psychological 
Association’s diagnostic system, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-3, 1980) and the use of direct-to-consumer (DTC) pharmaceutical drug 
advertisement in the promotion of Social Anxiety Disorder (Good and Huhmann, 2018). 
In 1903, the French psychiatrist Janet16 coined the term ‘Social Phobia’ (‘la phobia 
sociale’). Social Phobia was one of four disorders classified under ‘situational phobias’, 
and the others were related to physical situations: agoraphobia (open spaces), acrophobia 
(fear of heights), and claustrophobia (confined spaces). Social phobia denoted a fear of 
society as well as of performing or participating in social situations (Lloyd, 2006a, p. 143). 
Another French psychiatrist, Hartenberg17 and his 1901 text on shyness and timidity (‘Les 
 
13 The look does not require the physical presence of another person. 
14‘Other’, in Sartre’s writings, has similar (although not identical) connotations to the psychoanalytic 
(specifically Lacanian) notion of the ‘big Other’ (‘L’Autre’), which is discussed in-depth in Chapter 3: 
‘Conceptualising Social Anxiety’. Briefly, other here refers to another person and/or object; Other is 
hence the sum of the experiential phenomena (of others) in the social world (see Hook, 2015). 
15 The disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. 
16 Pierre Janet (1859-1974) was a French psychologist and neurologist. He is widely thought to be one of the 
founding fathers of psychology. 
17 Paul Hartenberg (1871-1949) was a French psychiatrist who completed his medical and psychiatric 
training at the Nancy School (a hypnotherapy-focused faculty of psychotherapy in France) under 
Hippolyte Bernheim (who influenced Freud and subsequently his psychoanalytic theory) and established 
a facility in Paris dedicated to the study of mental illness. 
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Timides et la timidité’)18 heavily influenced Janet’s work on social phobia. According to 
Berrios (1999, p. 91), Hartenberg (1901) described timidity as a result of ‘a combination of 
fear, shame and excessive embarrassment engendered by social situations’, believing the 
best course or treatment to be ‘re-assurance’ and ‘self-administered behavioural therapies’. 
His early observations considered situational anxiety that ranged in severity from excessive 
to pathological and, consistent with contemporary perspectives (discussed in Chapter 2), 
outlined a phenomenology of social phobia prioritising the physiological and psychological 
symptoms of disorder, laying the foundations of our understandings of the disorder today 
(Fairbrother, 2002). This phenomenology also imbues the ‘social phobic’ with a particular 
set of personality characteristics and traits, including emotional sensitivity, tendency 
towards isolation, perceptiveness, self-awareness and self-criticism. Furthermore, he noted 
that people experiencing phobia have two aims: to mask the visible signs of anxiety and to 
avoid interactions and situations that provoke the signs and symptoms of anxiety 
(Fairbrother, 2002). 
Next to nothing was written about social phobia and its associated phenomena after 
Hartenberg and Janet’s preliminary work – their work is rarely cited in psychiatric 
literature19 – and social phobia did not gain much traction in the psy-disciplines until over 
60 years later when Marks and Gelder’s20 (1966) seminal paper, and later Marks’ text on 
Fears and Phobias (1969), carved the foundations of the ‘disorder’ into the psychiatric and 
clinical landscape21. This work culminated in the creation of ‘Social Phobia’ as a clinical 
entity in the third edition of the DSM (1980)22. This earlier definition had a much 
 
18 Early work by French psychiatrists, including Janet and Hartenberg, is widely omitted from North America 
accounts of social anxiety/social phobia. Lloyd (2006a) examines the emergence of social phobia in 
France and how current practice blends psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic (namely, cognitive-
behavioural) models to create an understanding of mental and emotional life as it is communicated by 
patients in therapeutic settings. 
19 It should be noted that the French psychiatry does not adhere to the globalised model of mental illness and 
their psychiatric system remains one of the last dominated by psychoanalysis (Argentina being another). 
Social phobia or social anxiety disorder is not recognised as a ‘disorder’ in France as per DSM 
classification – Lloyd (2006b) provides an interesting assessment of this ‘clinical clash’. 
20 Isaac Marks is a psychiatrist who trained at Bethlem-Maudsley Hospital. His research focuses on the 
treatment of anxiety (including social and obsessive-compulsive) and sexual disorders and computer-
aided psychotherapies. He is a founding member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists and of the British 
Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapies. Michael Gelder (1929-2018) was founder of 
the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Oxford (1969). His work combined behavioural and 
cognitive strategies, and the use of gradual exposure, in the treatment of anxiety and panic disorders. 
21 Marks (2005 cited in Lane, 2007, p. 13) later notes that ‘psychiatrists have eroded crucial distinctions 
between normal and acute anxiety to hype their own research’. 
22 The 5th and current version of the DSM was the subject of severe controversy and criticism on several 
counts including: its tendency to medicalise everyday patterns of behaviour that would not be considered 
‘extreme’, the medicalisation of emotional states such as grief, and the heavy influence of the 
pharmaceutical industry in the categorisation of ‘disorders’ and their proposed treatment (Callard, 2014). 
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narrowing focus, outlining the phobia as a fear of, or extreme discomfort in, performance 
situations. Even by the mid-1980s the psy-disciplines still had not taken advantage of this 
‘fertile area for psychobiological and clinical investigation’, causing social anxiety to be 
viewed as the ‘neglected disorder’ (Liebowitz et al., 1985). As more people presented with 
social phobia, the focus of the phobia was found to be more ‘generalised’, Social Phobia 
was re-labelled in the DSM-4 (1994) as ‘Social Anxiety Disorder’, a change which aimed 
‘to connote a more pervasive and interfering condition’ (Kerns et al., 2013, p. 710). 
This formal, medically-sanctioned classification of social anxiety as a disorder was not 
inconsequential. The definition of disorder, and the classification of social anxiety as such, 
has been a source of severe conflict within the psy-community. The DSM-5 (2013, p. 20) 
outlines the definition of a ‘mental disorder’ as follows: 
A mental disorder is a syndrome23 characterized by clinically significant 
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation or behaviour that 
reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental 
processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders are usually 
associated with significant distress in social, occupational, or other important 
activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor 
or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially 
deviant behaviour (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are 
primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless 
the deviance or conflict results from a dysfunction in the individual, as 
described above. 
The dominant models of, and existing research on, social anxiety present various 
definitions and measurements of individual pathology (see Chapter 2). The diagnostic 
system is controversial on many counts, not least insofar as the focus on disease nosology24 
has failed to elucidate a clear biological ‘marker’ of mental illness or had a marked impact 
on improving treatment decisions and outcomes (Chapter 2). A ‘disorder’ is a socially 
constructed label describing a set of concurrent symptoms that are not necessarily 
attributed or related to a specific aetiology25 or pathogenesis26. 
Those opposed to the diagnostic classification of mental illness argue that such diagnoses 
impede treatment decisions and outcomes and increases societal stigma (Callard et al., 
2013; Timimi, 2014). While the above definition appears to acknowledge and advise 
 
23 A syndrome is a set of concurrent symptoms but may not be specific to one disease category.  
24 The branch of medical science dealing with the classification of disease.  
25 Aetiology is the cause of disease or condition.  
26 Pathogenesis refers to the development of disease.  
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against the over-pathologising specific life events and behaviours, the DSM-5 was recently 
the subject of intense criticism for medicalising experiences of grief27 and there are 
numerous situations were diagnoses are deployed as a political device28. 
DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria of Social Anxiety Disorder 
1. Significant anxiety occurs in interaction or performance-based situations when one fears being 
judged negatively by others because of their behaviour (eg, saying something “foolish”), or because 
they may appear nervous or anxious 
2. These types of situations often cause the person to feel anxious, and this anxiety should persist 
for >6 months 
3. The anxiety is excessive compared with what would be expected given the situation or cultural 
context 
4. The feared social situations often are avoided or, if unavoidable, are endured with a high degree of 
distress 
5. The person experiences several negative consequences because of anxiety or avoidance (eg, 
inability to perform in important social, educational, or occupational roles), or is highly distressed 
because of his (her) anxiety 
6. The anxiety is not due to substances, medical conditions, or symptoms of other mental disorders 
Table 1: DSM-5: Diagnostic Criteria: Social Anxiety Disorder summarised by Dalrymple and 
Zimmerman (2013, p. 23) 
The current clinical definition and criteria (Table 1) of SAD are the most definitive to date, 
outlining that the individual is: 
Fearful or anxious about, or avoidant of, social interactions and situations that 
involve the possibility of being scrutinized. These include social interactions 
such as meeting unfamiliar people, situations in which the individual may be 
observed eating or drinking, and situations in which the individual performs in 
front of others. The cognitive ideation is of being negatively evaluated by 
others, by being embarrassed, humiliated, or rejected, or offending others. 
(DSM-5, 2013, p. 190) 
What is known about SAD is that it is one of the most ‘persistent anxiety 
disorders’(National Institute for Health and Care Excellent [NICE], 2013) and the third 
 
27 In previous editions of the DSM, there was a ‘Bereavement Exclusion’ associated with the diagnostic 
criteria of major depression (MD). The exclusion dictated that a diagnosis of MD could not be given in 
the two months following death of a loved one. The BE was removed from the DSM-5 (2013) enabling a 
person experiencing grief to be diagnosed with major depression after a period of two weeks (Bandini, 
2015), which has major implications regarding opportunities for pharmaceuticalisation. Bandini (2015) 
discusses in detail the micro and macro level consequences of medicalising such aspects of the human 
condition.  
28 Moncrieff (2010, p. 370) highlights that psychiatric diagnoses have been used to shape how people 
perceive themselves and their everyday social worlds, employed to ‘legitimate activities that might 
otherwise be contested’ and mobilised as a form of social control to deal with “unruly” populations 
through institutionalisation and medication.  
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most common ‘mental illness’ after alcoholism and depression, with a lifetime prevalence, 
according to US studies, of 12% (Kessler et al., 2005). While no statistics exist for the 
adult population in the UK, one study on the mental health of young people looked after by 
local authorities in Scotland showed that 1.8% of the youth population had social anxiety 
(cf. 0.4% in England and 0.6% Wales) (Office of National Statistics, 2004); while social 
anxiety is reported to affect approximately 15 million Americans (Anxiety and Depression 
Association of America (ADAA), n.d.), 3 million Canadians (Dowbiggin, 2009), one in ten 
Australians (approx. 2.4 million people) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008), and one in 
eight Irish (approx. 600,000 people) (Social Anxiety Ireland, 2013)29. Women more 
commonly experience it than men, while women report greater clinical severity (Asher et 
al., 2017). The age of onset typically occurs in late-childhood or early -adolescence and the 
average age of onset is 13 years old (NICE, 2013). People formally diagnosed with SAD30 
experience high levels of ‘co-morbidity’31 with other mental health conditions, notably 
depression, and the condition may also resemble and/or overlap with personality disorders; 
for example, Avoidant Personality Disorder (AvPD) (Table 2). Although a greater pattern 
of avoidance of given situations is often observed in AvPD, similar ‘patterns of social 
inhibition, feelings of inadequacy, and hypersensitivity to negative evaluation’ (DSM-5, 
2013, p. 645) are observed in both SAD and AvPD. Despite the intense levels of distress 
and impairment experienced, NICE (2013) report that only half of those experiencing SAD 
will ever seek treatment and those who do will wait between 15 and 20 years before 
approaching primary care. This delay is further hindered by lack of professional 
understanding of SAD in primary care where poor recognition, inadequate assessment and 
limited awareness, or lacking availability, of suitable treatments impact treatment (NICE 
2013). 
SAD is hence widely framed as an individual pathology, and there is only a small body of 
research that attempts to relate it to wider social and cultural contexts (Hickinbottom-
Brawn, 2013; Scott, 2004) (also Chapter 2). This work does not intend to diminish the 
painful and disruptive experience of living with social anxiety, but alternatively recognises 
the limits and dangers of (over) medicalising this dimension of the human condition. It is 
only within the last century that anxiety has increasingly been constructed as the ‘ultimate 
obstacle to the subject’s wellbeing’ (Salecl, 2004, p. 84) as an entity that should be 
 
29 There is no specific publication for the Irish statistics. Social Anxiety Ireland is an online resource founded 
by Clinical Psychologist Dr. Odrhan McCarthy (Mater Hospital, Dublin). 
30 This is not to be confused with Seasonal Affective Disorder, which is also acronmyised to SAD. 
31 The presence of one or more diseases. 
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diagnosed, controlled and, ultimately, eradicated. Hacking (1998) argues that ‘transient 
illnesses’ are circumscribed by an ‘ecological niche’, that is a particular set of social, 
cultural, institutional and economic conditions that create and sustain various categories of 
illness. Such a niche is a product of four interactive vectors (i.e. forces): medical, 
observable, cultural and release. Hickinbottom-Brawn (2013) explores in-depth the four 
vectors that led to social anxiety’s psychiatric classification (an explanation of each vector 
and its role in the context of social anxiety is outlined in Table 3).  
DSM-4 Diagnostic Criteria: Avoidant Personality Disorder 
The essential features of a personality disorder are impairments in personality (self and interpersonal) 
functioning and the presence of pathological personality traits. To diagnose avoidant personality 
disorder, the following criteria must be met: 
1.Avoids occupational activities that involve significant interpersonal contact, because of fears 
of criticism, disapproval, or rejection. 
2.Is unwilling to get involved with people unless certain of being liked. 
3.Shows restraint within intimate relationships because of the fear of being shamed or ridiculed. 
4.Is preoccupied with being criticized or rejected in social situations. 
5.Is inhibited in new interpersonal situations because of feelings of inadequacy. 
6.Views self as socially inept, personally unappealing, or inferior to others. 
7.Is unusually reluctant to take personal risks or to engage in any new activities because they 
may prove embarrassing 
Table 2: DSM-4 Diagnostic Criteria: Avoidant Personality Disorder (DSM-4, 1994, p. 
np) 
These conditions comprise the very act of ‘making up people’, which Hacking (2007) 
argues refers ‘to the ways in which new scientific classification may bring into being a new 
kind of person, conceived of and experienced as a way to be a person’. 
Classifications thereby engender a ‘looping effect’, which aims to account for how systems 
of classification interact with classified people. Psychiatric discourses have a causal impact 
on the disorder with which a person is diagnosed. The history and creation of social 
anxiety as a clinical condition is a particularly intriguing, if not harrowing, example of how 
a small group of leading psychiatrists and drug company executives have re-shaped the 
clinical landscape. Lane (2007, p. 10) in his assessment of how shyness became an illness, 
brings to light how in the late-1990s a task-force of psychiatrists, pharmaceutical giants, 
public relations experts and marketing consultants embarked on a multi-million dollar 
campaign and ‘successfully turned shyness, self-consciousness and even introspection into 
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major psychiatric disorders’. The resulting anxiety epidemic was greatly aided by the 
DSM-3, which had ‘dramatically expanded the pharmaceutical market for anxiety 
disorders’ (Lane, 2007, p. 120). Barry Brand (cited in Lane, 2007, p. 105) the product 
designer for Paxil, the first DTC32 medication for SAD, states unabashedly that ‘every 
marketer’s dream is to find an unidentified or unknown market and develop it. That’s what 
we were able to do with social anxiety disorder.’ 
Vector Forces enabling SAD to thrive 
Medical taxonomy – requires medical legitimacy to 
be established through classification: 
Social fears, uncertainty, introversion and shyness 
are pathologised through diagnostic classifications. 
Cultural polarity – phenomenon’s position in the 
public consciousness: 
SAD is situated between the socio-cultural narratives 
of ‘introvert’ or ‘social misfit’ and ‘dangerous loner’ 
causing people to be wary, suspicious and avoid 
them. 
Observability – requires an increase in public 
visibility and surveillance of phenomenon 
A substantial system of awareness raising, marketing 
and advertising campaigns are put in place to increase 
public awareness of social anxiety ‘disorder’ and 
individuals (particularly young professionals) are 
targeted through DTC pharmaceutical advertising. 
Release – phenomenon may provide certain freedoms 
despite suffering: 
Diagnostic categories provide justification for 
‘abnormal’ social behaviours as well as legitimising 
distress 
Table 3: Summary of Hickinbottom-Brawn’s (2013) four Vectors of Social Anxiety 
Disorder 
Targeted marketing campaigns by pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline and public 
relations company Cohn and Wolfe were strategically and nationally advertised with the 
tag-lines ‘Imagine Being Allergic to People’ (Figure 1), and ‘Should Have, Would Have, 
Could Have’ (Figure 2). The focus of the Cohn and Wolfe marketing campaign set out to 
bring awareness of SAD into the public consciousness by focusing on the physical 
symptoms of the condition and drawing a comparison between SAD symptoms and 
allergies, intimating that symptomatic relief could be found in a pill.  
Pharmaceutical drug campaigns targeting adverse life events and workplace and social 
performance also now offer consumers the potential for empowerment by re-gaining 
control over their ‘disordered’ or ‘failing’ lives. DTC campaigns signal ‘failure’ as a 
 
32 DTC is direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals is the advertisement of pharmaceutical drugs, 
usually via visual media and print, to the general public. It is a deeply contested terrain with regards to the 
impact on patient-doctor relations, biased information and advertisements and the effective 
communication of side effects (Grow et al., 2006). 
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symptom of SAD and, on the other, demonstrate the potential to increase productivity and 
performance in careers and success in relationships via pharmaceutical means. Despite 
messages of empowerment (Figure 3), DTC campaigns therefore reinforce the 
medicalisation of failure, emotions and bodily processes, placing the responsibility for 
recovery and success firmly on the individual consumer (Chapter 6). 
 
Figure 1: Paxil Advertisement: Imagine Being Allergic to People (Lane, 2007, p. 63)  
 
Subsequent revisions of the DSM diagnostic criteria have signalled an increasing trend in 
diagnostic elasticity, where the terms ‘phobia’ and ‘anxiety’ get used interchangeably and 
entail the incorporation of ever more situations where precaution or wariness may be 
advisable, e.g. meeting strangers (Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013). Thus, the ‘medical 
taxonomy’ of social anxiety was put in place via the DSM and its increasing 
‘observability’ was ensured through DTC advertising and marketing campaigns. Both 
Hickinbottom-Brawn (2013) and Scott (2004) note that people with social anxiety have, in 
the process, become subject to particular constructions of ‘deviance’ where displays of 
shyness, embarrassment and anxiety in social interactions and settings pose a threat to the 
rules of interaction (Goffman, 1956).  
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Figure 2: Paxil Advertisement: Should Have, Could Have, Would Have (Lane, 2007, 
p.65) 
 
The medicalisation of ‘social deviance’ is here enabled by the expansion of medical power 
and knowledge into everyday life (Conrad, 1992). Consequently, social anxiety has fallen 
victim to darker narratives, particularly in media and film (Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013, p. 
734). The ‘social misfit narrative’ whereby a person’s ‘awkwardness creates awkward 
situations for us [coupled with] their inability to follow convention makes them 
unpredictable, further compounding [social] tension[s]’.  
As a result, an individual is likely to withdraw further from social and spatial life, but these 
narratives can take on a much more troubling nature, as in the ‘dangerous loner’ narrative, 
which constructs a deviant and even psychopathic individual ‘stewing over social 
disappointments and humiliations’ (Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013, p. 743). Scott (2004, p. 
134) contends that the medicalisation of shyness as a sub-clinical condition operates as ‘an 
extension of this pervasive social attitude of disapproval towards those who fail to conform 
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to certain values of contemporary Western culture.’33 
 
Figure 3: Paxil Advertisement: Empowered by Paxil (Lane, 2007, p. 67) 
TERMINOLOGY 
Throughout this thesis, I use the term ‘social anxiety’ rather than ‘Social Anxiety Disorder’ 
when referring explicitly to lived and experiential accounts. My reasons for doing so 
follow from the critical perspective sketched in outline above. First, ‘Social Anxiety 
disorder’ is used to designate the formal clinical category of disorder as outlined by the 
DSM, whereas the use of ‘social anxiety’ (with no reference to disorder) seeks to distance 
lived experience from dominant biomedical and/or clinical constructions of social anxiety 
disorder. In terms of advancing a social and spatial understanding of social anxiety, one 
that views social anxiety as more than an innate problem within the individual and seeks to 
account for the wider social and cultural conditions that enable social anxiety to thrive, it is 
important to step back from diagnostic categories that define social anxiety through a 
cluster of clinical symptoms outlined by the DSM void of personal, social and/or cultural 
considerations. 
 
33 The increase in diagnosis mimics a cultural specificity of mental illnesses that has been witnessed 
throughout history, e.g. hysteria as the ‘female malady’ (Showalter, 1987) the emergence of mania and 
depression (‘bipolar disorder’) in the 20th and 21st century and its affinity with American culture (Martin, 
2009), the ‘diagnostic legacy’ of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Summerfield, 2001) and in 
psychological formulations of psychosis (Johnstone, 2000). 
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Second, Stravynski (2007, 2014) employs the term ‘social phobia’ in his interpersonal 
model (considered in Chapter 2) as an explicit rejection of the DSM-5’s construction of 
social anxiety as a disease entity. In many ways ‘social phobia’ is a more encompassing 
term that extends beyond the narrow focus on the state of anxiousness. That said, ‘social 
anxiety’ is the terminology used most often by participants and online support groups in 
this study: it is the term or concept that they research online and maybe elsewhere, about 
which they communicate with others and through which they understand their fears and 
anxieties about social situations34. Social phobia will hence only be used to refer to early 
clinical definitions of disorder and where participants have explicitly employed the term. 
Third, ‘social anxiety’ reflects the dynamics of lived experience, acknowledging that not 
everyone (including not all of the participants in my own project) has sought or received an 
‘official’ diagnosis of ‘social anxiety disorder’ from a healthcare professional. Participants 
- whether or not they have received the diagnostic label – tend to drop the ‘disorder’ label 
when considering or relating to their own lived experience.  
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
I proceed with four broad research objectives in both my theoretical and my empirical 
work in order to examine the everyday and longer-term social and anticipatory geographies 
of people living with social anxiety: 
• To explore how social anxiety shapes everyday lives with particular reference to 
the experience of living and coping with social interactions, situations and spaces. 
• To explore the emotional and affective dimensions of anxious experiences. 
• To examine how health-seeking is a practice negotiated through a) formal agencies 
and ‘biomedical’ authorities and b) online communities and health resources. 
These objectives are explored in detail in the following Chapters. I now provide an outline 
of the content of each chapter that follows below. 
THESIS MAP 
CHAPTER 2: SITUATING SOCIAL ANXIETY: Dominated by biomedical and 
 
34 With the exception of one participant who was diagnosed in the early-1980s before the terminology was 
revised in subsequent editions of the DSM. 
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cognitive-behavioural accounts, the social and spatial landscape of social anxiety is 
scarcely mapped in the academic literature outside of these fields. In Chapter 2, strengths 
and gaps in existing research across a diversity of disciplinary fields are examined to lay 
the groundwork for advancing a social model of social anxiety. This chapter also draws on 
engagements in critical health geographies, and I attend to existing literature from the sub-
fields of mental health, chronic illness and disability geographies. 
CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL ANXIETY: I attend to the conceptual 
underpinnings of the research, particularly as informed by my engagements with the 
subfields of psychoanalytic, anticipatory, habitual and emotional-affective geographies. 
This chapter builds on the health geographies literature outlined in Chapter 2 one that 
builds into its heart alertness to questions about space and time. The key operatives of 
anticipation and habit are emboldened by a wider engagement with psychoanalytic and 
emotional-affective literatures. However, these underpinnings operate as a flexible 
framework for, rather than rigid imposition upon, the empirical materials that are the heart 
of the empirical chapters at the centre of the thesis.  
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCHING SOCIAL ANXIETY: I outline the methodological 
foundations of the thesis, attending to the methods of data collection and analysis 
employed in the research project. Given the difficulties faced by people with social anxiety 
in social interactions, I discuss the design and implementation of a mixed-method approach 
that includes online questionnaires and online and telephone interviewing, as well as 
addressing the analytical approach adopted for interpreting the data. I discuss how 
carefully considered online approaches can be implemented to enrich geographical inquiry. 
I take account of the wider politics and goals of the research through an engagement with 
feminist and psychoanalytic approaches to reflexive practice. I provide an assessment of 
the research process, practice and my own positionality. This discussion is situated within 
the wider development of qualitative approaches in human and specifically health 
geography. 
CHAPTER 5: INTENSITIES OF SOCIAL ANXIETY: I explore the emotional and 
affective ‘intensities’ of social anxiety in order to examine the various ways in which 
social anxiety is embodied and enacted as people orientate their social and spatial worlds. 
Through the intensities of participants’ experience, I consider the force and form of social 
anxiety and how, materially and discursively, these manifestations texture participants’ 
everyday lives. 
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CHAPTER 6: GOVERNMENTALITIES OF SOCIAL ANXIETY: I explore how 
dominant discourses and medical authority over mental health and illness contribute to 
societal and personal understandings of social anxiety, and how this governmentality feeds 
into the spatialities, temporalities and embodied habits through which everyday life is lived 
by people experiencing social anxiety. I examine the role played by various medical and 
‘therapeutic’ spaces, asking about their influence on how social anxiety is understood and 
managed. I explore how individuals obtain and make use of their diagnosis within, 
alongside or outwith medical/clinical treatment pathways. I pay attention to how medical 
practice and spaces not only shape the experience of diagnosis, but also lay the 
groundwork for the course of treatment, care and ‘recovery’. 
CHAPTER 7: SPATIALITIES OF ANXIOUS EXPERIENCES I: I attend to the 
spatial contingencies of living with social anxiety in order to map both the everyday spaces 
that are disrupted and the disruptive geographies of anxious experience. I pay attention to 
the formative spaces of home, education and work, taking into consideration the 
complexity of physical, material and socio-spatial factors that comprise both these 
everyday spaces and the practices that emerge through them, seeking to unpack their 
significance for a geography of social anxiety. 
CHAPTER 8: SPATIALITIES OF ANXIOUS EXPERIENCES II: This chapter 
deepens the accounts from Chapter 7 by focusing on the relational and embodied 
encounters and reactions, and the micro-textures of these encounters that comprise anxious 
experiences, by exploring longer-term impacts on familial and interpersonal relationships 
and social life. Addressing participants’ social worlds uncovers the complexity in, and 
limitations placed on, everyday social life and the broader impact over a life-course as 
opportunities for encounter, both passing and sustained, become increasingly diminished. 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION: I offer a summary of the key findings from the previous 
chapters, including critical reflections on what I have accomplished and suggestions for 
future research. I clarify the contribution of this work to the wider academic literatures and 
to the ‘real world’ understandings of social anxiety. Furthermore, some reflections are 
offered on the implications this work may have for policy and professional practice 
regarding social anxiety.  
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CHAPTER 2  
SITUATING SOCIAL ANXIETY: 
LITERATURE, DISCIPLINES, PERSPECTIVES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with biomedical and psychological science perspectives, I draw attention to the 
various ways in which social anxiety has been constructed either as an organic abnormality 
or physiological malfunction, one that can maybe be cured or prevented, or as a cognitive 
abnormality in need of correction through psychological therapies. Following this opening, 
I attend to cultural and social perspectives examining both ‘cultural and anthropological’ 
and ‘social and counselling’ frameworks. The cultural perspectives addressed here are 
more or less situated in the discipline of trans-cultural psychiatry and are broadly reflective 
of cognitive-behavioural perspectives; and, as such, they do not offer much in the way of 
critique of the biological and psychological sciences, but rather offer interesting insight 
into culturally different and culturally bound manifestations of social anxiety across 
populations and cultural groups. Anthropological perspectives start to unpick the 
biological/psychological foundations of social anxiety, however, highlighting the material 
and political constraints on, and disordering of, contemporary life. 
Social and counselling perspectives take seriously the realm of subjective and experiential 
dynamics, while starting to unpack the wider social and cultural conditions that enable 
social anxiety to flourish. Counselling perspectives, also embedded in wider psychological 
theories, offer a practice-based understanding of social anxiety focusing on experiences of 
therapy and recovery. Finally, moving into the psychoanalytic and interpersonal 
perspectives, the focus shifts to the conscious and unconscious facets of the relational self, 
signalling the need to take seriously the constitution of self-other and self-world relations. 
Throughout this chapter, I am introducing themes – some more conceptually-directed, 
others more empirically-facing – that are picked up on throughout later chapters in the 
thesis, and on occasion such links forward to later chapters are explicitly signposted. Then, 
various strands from social, counselling, psychoanalytic and interpersonal perspectives are 
further enriched with insights derived from different corners of my own disciplinary 
background of human geography and, in particular, critical geographies of health and 
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illness in order to furnish a social and spatial model of social anxiety. This model will be 
gradually developed here in Chapter 2 and throughout Chapter 3.  
BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 
PERSPECTIVES 
BIOMEDICAL PERSPECTIVES 
The aetiology of social anxiety is ‘yet to be established’ (Bandelow et al., 2004, p. 397; 
Coupland, 2001) and biological correlates ‘remain elusive’ (Dewar and Stravynski, 2001, 
p. 244)35. Despite these admissions, the widely received view is that mental ‘illness’ is 
based on the principle that cognitive and physiological ‘deviances’, like those experienced 
in social anxiety, are the product of ‘biologically-based brain diseases’ (Deacon, 2013, p. 
846). Through a biomedical lens, social anxiety is hence construed as a ‘chronic 
neurodevelopmental illness’ (Mathew et al., 2001). People living with social anxiety 
experience a vast range of bodily symptoms in anticipation of, while participating in, or 
reflecting upon troubling social interactions and situations (e.g. blushing, sweating, 
shaking, palpitations and nausea). Such physiological responses to innocuous social 
situations are viewed – arguably too easily – as symptomatic of structural abnormalities in 
the brain (Talati et al., 2013) or maladaptive functioning in physiology. Therefore, mental 
‘disorders’ such as ‘social anxiety disorder’ are indeed cast as brain diseases in that they 
are a product of the various excesses, deficits, losses, lacks, transmissions, patterns of 
wiring and misfiring of the brain’s processing structures (e.g. hyper reactivity in the 
amygdala36) that can increase the risk of psychopathology (Martin et al., 2009). To 
summarise crudely: ‘[p]eople who suffer from mental illness suffer from a sick or broken 
brain’ (Andreasen, 1985, p. 8, emphasis in original) rather than the bodily states simply 
being secondary manifestations of an underlying psychosocial condition, 
The biomedical interpretation of social anxiety as a disease entity is largely centred on 
three related principles. First, the structural and functional pathology of social anxiety lies 
 
35 There is an extensive body of work identifying various biological, psychological and environmental risk 
factors associated with the aetiology and maintenance of social anxiety (for a review see: Wong and 
Rapee, 2016), but no widely accepted aetiology exists of social anxiety as a ‘disease’. 
36 Stravynski (2014) notes that the activation of specific regions of the brain is present in all ‘fear responses’, 
as well as being present in other anxiety disorders to varying degrees. Other ‘brain areas’ that control fear 
responses are brain stem (controls heart rate, breathing), limbic systems – generally considered the 
‘emotional seat’ of the brain – (i.e. amygdala, hypothalamus, etc. effects mood and anxiety), prefrontal 
cortex (helps assess risk and danger) and motor cortex (muscle response and control). None of these areas 
can be identified as the cause of social anxiety, only that they activate during fear responses. 
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in neurobiological abnormalities and ‘faulty’ neurotransmitters, which lead to 
chemical/hormonal imbalances in the brain (Fink et al., 2009)37. Events in particular areas 
of the brain are ‘associated with quantitative changes in particular neurobiological or 
biochemical substances’ (Stravynski, 2014, p. 112). Second, that these ‘abnormalities’ are 
aligned with genetic and hereditary risk factors (Gelernter and Stein, 2008). While social 
anxiety is ‘highly hereditary’ (Torvik et al., 2016, p. 114), there is no specific, identifiable 
‘genetic architecture’, or marker, of social anxiety (Stein and Gelernter, 2014, p. 61). 
Therefore, any emphasis on the genetic aetiology of social anxiety seems short-sighted. In 
their paper regarding the genetic and environmental risk of social anxiety (and avoidant 
personality disorder), Torvik et al. (2016, p. 114) state that ‘environment is most important 
in determining whether the disorders manifest’, such as changes in career, family situation 
and social environment. The biological and genetic basis (‘cause’) of social anxiety is 
hence ‘unfounded’ (Stravynski, 2014, p. 154). Lastly, from the biomedical perspective, 
social anxiety is a disease to be diagnosed, treated and cured using pharmaceutical (i.e. 
psychotropic) and therapeutic interventions (primarily, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
[CBT]) or both. However, treatment-seeking itself is not precluded from the evident fear of 
interaction, avoidance and distress (Chapter 6). 
Psychotropic interventions dominate the mental health landscape (Deacon, 2013) and aim 
to reduce the physical symptoms and functional limitations (Muzina and El-Sayegh, 2001) 
experienced in social anxiety. Popular anxiolytic38 prescriptions for social anxiety are 
selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs), monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs) 
and benzodiazepines. Beta-blockers are generally prescribed for performance-related social 
anxieties to lessen the physiological symptoms and sensations before an event (e.g. before 
a presentation) (Muzina and El-Sayegh, 2001). Psychotherapeutic interventions like CBT 
aim to induce cognitive reframing by drawing awareness to negative thought cycles, self-
talk and mental images that fuel and intensity patterns of anxiety while learning to cultivate 
new patterns of thought and belief systems39. 
Given the weight and influence of the ‘disease model’ in the construction of social anxiety 
and the thrust of pharmaceutical psychotropic interventions in the targeting of presumed 
 
37 The primary neurotransmitters associated with social anxiety are norepinephrine, serotonin, dopamine and 
gamma- aminobutyric acid (GABA). 
38 Anxiolytics are ‘anti-anxiety’ medications. 
39 This is similar to Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) techniques. CBT tends to be conducted in a 
therapeutic environment either via one-on-one with a therapist or in a structured and facilitated group 
therapy setting. MBSR are self-help techniques. 
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organic ‘abnormalities’, the distinct lack of such a model – in the sense that a model is 
specific, observable and measurable – is alarming. Of this, Stravynski (2014, p. 141) says: 
The bulk of research surveyed is consistent with the fact that on any measure, 
socially phobic individuals are far more like their ‘normal’ counterparts than 
different from them. Startlingly, this state of affairs neither has thrown into 
doubt the view of social phobia as a neurological disease of sorts, nor 
diminished its influence. Rather, it seems acceptable, in this field of inquiry, to 
be following the inferential logic that if hypotheses have not been conclusively 
refuted, there is no pressing need to question them. 
He then adds: 
[T]he inference of malfunctioning neurobiological processes, allegedly 
implicated in social phobia from pharmacological treatments, is unwarranted. 
The unspoken presumption that the pharmacological agent directly affects a 
putative biological substrate of social phobia is speculative at best […]. On 
current evidence, it is probable that the impact of pharmacological treatments is 
wide and diffuse rather than narrow and specific. All result in functional 
improvement, by dampening the activity of the systems involved in emotional 
regulation and therefore without actually influencing any putative underlying 
neurobiological defect. This is quite likely to be the case in social phobia since 
pharmacological agents with very different pharmacological profiles have been 
shown to be equipotent in reducing anxious distress. (Stravynski, 2014, p. 141) 
On this accounting, the aetiology of social anxiety is still unspecified, yet, drawing on a 
general biomedical outlook of mental illness, it remains categorised as a distinct disease 
entity. Stravynski (2014, p. 129) concludes that research is ‘inconclusive at best’ and that 
‘no major structural or functional brain abnormalities are inherent in social phobia’. 
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL PERSPECTIVES40 
Three of the most widely cited and applied models of social anxiety are based on cognitive 
and cognitive-behavioural frameworks of social anxiety (Clark, 2001; Clark and Wells, 
1995; Rapee and Heimberg, 1997). Figure 4 shows Clark and Wells (1995) cognitive 
model of social anxiety. The cornerstone of the cognitive-behavioural framework asserts 
that abnormal cognitive processes are the primary cause of psychopathology, an approach 
that has played a significant role in how social anxiety is now conceived and understood. 
There are subtle theoretical and methodological differences between cognitive-behavioural 
 
40 ‘Cognitive’ and ‘behavioural’ approaches represent two separate approaches, the former emerging largely 
in response to the latter. Behaviourism reduces human (and animal) experience to a series of ‘stimuli-
response’’ mechanisms, largely omitting thoughts, feelings and emotions. ‘Cognitive behavioural’ (as in 
CBT) is usually reserved for therapeutic practice and there are distinct differences in methodological 
approach. Clark and Wells’ (1995) model is, first and foremost, a cognitive model, although the 
‘behavioural’ dynamics are a key factor. 
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science and therapeutic practice. Cognitive-behavioural perspectives suppose that a 
distortion and bias in the processing of social and evaluative information results in certain 
types of behavioural responses or ‘safety behaviours’ that, while practised to avoid anxiety, 
actually serve in maintaining anxiety. Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is the most 
prescribed therapeutic treatment for social anxiety and aims to direct a change in behaviour 
through ‘self-monitoring’ and gradual exposure to feared situations, which, in turn, aims to 
direct cognitive change in assumed psychological vulnerabilities (Beidel and Turner, 1986; 
cf. Rapee and Heimberg, 1997).  
Here, I address the role of cognitive science in shaping a particular understanding of social 
anxiety. According to this framework, the interaction of several ‘cognitive and 
behavioural’ processes generates and maintains social anxiety41. An individual will 
experience distress in anticipation of, or participating in, everyday social situations; for 
fear that they will be negatively perceived and evaluated by others (Stopa and Clark, 
1993). Social situations activate a series of negative beliefs about the self as a social object, 
causing them to perceive social interactions as threatening. Patterns of ‘dysfunctional’ 
thought and overarching belief systems, viewed as a direct result of distortions in an 
individual’s cognitive processes, result in psychological and emotional distress, evoking a 
‘behavioural’ response in the individual (Figure 4). The behavioural consequences of 
distress serve to reinforce negative beliefs and, in turn, maintain social anxiety. Individuals 
will then engage in ‘post-event’ processing and make predictions about future performance 
(Clark and Wells, 1995; Rapee and Heimberg, 1997). For the most part, the two key 
models offered by Clark and Wells (1995) and Rapee and Heimberg (1997) respectively 
share many commonalities, but there is one subtle distinction about the focus of the 
individual’s attention (Wong et al., 2014). In the Clark and Wells (1995) model, negative 
attention is focused towards the self and projected outwards: 
Instead of observing other people more closely in order to gain clues about what they think 
about him or her, the social phobic appears to turn attention inwards, notice how he or she 
feels, and then automatically assume that this information is relevant to others’ evaluation. 
(Clark and Wells, 1995, p. 71) 
 
41While the proponents of the cognitive model assert that the model ‘does not postulate a sequential, 
unidirectional relationship in which cognition precedes emotion’ (Clark and Steer, 1996, p.76 cited in 
Stravynski, 2014, p. 144), Stravynski notes that this is ‘precisely [the] sort of causal relationship’ that the 
model presumes, drawing on Stropa and Clark’s cognitive model of social anxiety to address his point: 
‘social phobics become anxious when anticipating or participating in social situations because they hold 
beliefs (dysfunctional assumptions) which lead them to [become anxious]’ (Stopa & Clark, 1993, p.255; 
cited in Stravynski, 2014, p.145). 
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Figure 4: The Cognitive Model of Social Anxiety Disorder (Clark and Wells, 1995) 
Rapee and Heimberg (1997, p. 746) conversely, suggest that information is taken from the 
external environment: 
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[S]ocial threat takes the form of potential negative evaluation from others. 
Thus, individuals with social phobia will scan the environment for any signs of 
impending negative evaluation, will detect such signs rapidly, and will have 
difficulty disengaging attention from them. 
Despite the authority held by cognitive approaches, the underlying nuances have proven 
problematic. The premise that dysfunctional thinking can cause psychological 
abnormalities that lead to mental illness is conceptually ‘inadequate’ (Power and 
Champion, 1986) and fails to account for the human being as a(n) emotional, bodily, 
dynamical, social and/or worldly ‘system’. Stravynski (2014, p.144) argues instead that the 
cognitive ‘outlook is in sharp contrast to considering the person as a whole being – 
involved in dynamic relationships with a human and physical environment’. Westcott 
(1987) argues that the structural maps of cognitive approaches tell us ‘almost nothing’ 
about the processes that underlie ‘cognition’ or ‘behaviour’ in general. 
In similar critiques questioning the cognitive formulation of social anxiety, Stravynski 
(2014) argues that cognitive models and research operate under one significant and 
‘crippling handicap’: the key term, cognitive, is ill defined, referring, on the one hand, to a 
‘hypothetical information processing system’, and, on the other, to the ‘products of such a 
process’. Westcott (1987) argues that cognitive approaches tell us ‘almost nothing’ about 
processes that underlie ‘cognition’ or ‘behaviour’ as they only isolate a ‘fragment’ of the 
whole human condition. Both authors therefore reject the cognitive model’s reliance on the 
conception of the human mind as an ‘information-processing system’ (Stravynski, 2014; 
Westcott, 1987). 
Cognitive models assert that cognitive ‘abnormalities’, because of errors or bias in an 
individual’s thinking and information-processing patterns, give rise to social anxiety. In a 
thorough review of cognitive literature on social anxiety, Stravynski (2014, p.144) argues 
that there are indeed significant problems with the cognitive model, concluding that the 
cognitive causation of social anxiety is ‘unfounded’. He is sceptical of the claims from 
cognitive experiments that claim people with social anxiety have different cognitive 
processes to ‘normal’ individuals42: 
[I]n some experiments socially phobic subjects showed responses that differed 
– to some degree – from those of other subjects. The source of this difference 
remains obscure. There is no evidence, however, to support the claim that it 
 
42 Stravynski compares Amin et al. (1998) Hackmann et al. (1998) cognitive model of social anxiety, arguing 
that the same ‘cognitive processes’ were found in both anxious and non-anxious subjects. 
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reflects an inherently socially phobic ‘cognitive bias’. Crucially, in absolute 
terms, no ‘cognitive’ activity – objectively measured – inherently and 
exclusively typifies social phobia […]. What they highlight of alleged 
cognitive processes remain uncertain at best. In most studies under review, 
socially phobic subjects’ responses to experimental tasks were indeed 
somewhat different from those of contrast subjects. However, since all subjects 
in those studies seem to be exhibiting the hypothetical cognitive quality to 
some extent, these results cannot be regarded as compelling proof of specific 
socially phobic cognitive processes. (Stravynski, (2014, pp.151-152) 
He is equally resistant to the idea that cognitions maintain social anxiety: 
Notwithstanding these insistent claims, no cognitive processes (or their 
configurations) uniquely characterising socially phobic individuals have been 
identified. For this reason, socially phobic individuals cannot be characterised 
or identified in terms of these processes. (Stravynski, 2014, p.152) 
Cognitive models assert that cognitive ‘abnormalities’, as a result of errors or bias in an 
individual’s thinking and information-processing patterns, give rise to social anxiety, but, 
to summarise, there is no conclusive evidence for the existence of such ‘abnormalities’, 
certainly not in the strict behavioural, stimulus-response logics of the cognitive-
behavioural model and related theories. 
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 
CULTURAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Cultural considerations of social anxiety have received increasing attention in recent years 
as psychologists recognise the ‘intricate interplay between culture and psychopathology’ 
(Heinrichs et al., 2006, p. 1187). Recent cross-national epidemiology studies (Stein et al., 
2017) have found that instances of social anxiety are lowest in lower to middle-income 
countries in Africa and East Mediterranean and highest in high-income areas in the 
Americas and Pacific regions. Cultural perspectives portray the various ways in which 
social anxiety is ‘culturally moulded […] [by] social roles embedded in social structures 
[that are] organised into a way of life’ (Stravynski, 2014, p.104). Cultural approaches have 
centred around three distinct areas of study: cross-cultural notions of 
individualism/collectivism (Hofmann et al., 2010); cross-cultural studies related to 
difference, adjustment and treatment seeking in immigrant and student populations 
(Hasenson-Atzmon et al., 2016); and culturally-bound manifestations of social anxiety 
(Greenberg et al., 2004; Kleinknecht et al., 1997). 
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CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES 
Cross-cultural studies examine the relationship between social anxiety and cultural 
conditions. Studies have focused on the influence of culture on the experience and 
expression of social anxiety, primarily between individualistic and collectivist countries 
(Stein and Matsunaga, 2001). Of significance in this area is the role played by ‘self-
construal’, meaning how a person defines themselves in relation to specific others and in 
groups, as well as in relation to actual and perceived cultural differences (Cross, 2011). 
This self-view determines that people define themselves independently of others, 
relationally with others, and/or interdependently with others. The degree to which an 
individual subscribes to a particular ‘model’ of self-other relations is largely shaped by 
culture and cultural attitudes. The impact of cultural differences is most evident in the 
divergent self-views held by collectivistic and individualistic countries: for example, 
people in North America (individualistic) would be more likely to prioritise a self-view 
that is independent of others and characterised by separateness, individuality and 
autonomy; compared with Japan (collectivist), where people are more likely to recognise 
one’s self as part of a larger social ‘unit’ (Markus and Kitayama, 1991).43 
CULTURAL DIFFERENCE STUDIES 
Others have conducted cross-cultural studies examining the relations between social 
anxiety and cultural differences, perceived cultural norms (Heinrichs et al., 2006) and 
cultural attitudes and adjustments between immigrant populations versus native 
populations (Hasenson-Atzmon et al., 2016) and student populations (Hsu and Alden, 
2008). Comparative studies between Saudi Arabia and Scotland (Al-Khodair and Freeman, 
1997) compare cultural factors affecting experience and treatment-seeking in people with 
social anxiety. The authors note that certain differences may be shaped by societal and 
cultural differences, including age at treatment-seeking, duration of illness and co-
morbidity of other mental illnesses, including agoraphobia, alcoholism and depression. The 
Scottish sample had significantly higher instances of anticipatory fears (i.e. fears about 
entering future social situations compared with being in a social situation) than the Saudi 
samples, while age of treatment-seeking was more prominently influenced by external 
factors such as social isolation and alcohol intake/dependence. The structure of Saudi 
society (‘collectivist’) and the significant role of familial support in the Saudi sample cause 
 
43 The relational model takes account of the role of close, personal and dyadic relations in the construction of 
self. The prioritising of individual-individual relationships would allegedly be more typical in Western 
cultures (Cross, 2011). 
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people to present for treatment at an earlier age, although the authors note that this early 
presentation is to ensure later conformity with strictly enforced communication rules in 
Saudi society (Al-Khodair and Freeman, 1997, p. 132).44 
CULTURE-BOUND STUDIES 
Studies on culture-bound manifestations of social anxiety have focused on taijin kyōfushō 
in Japanese cultures and aymat zibur in ultra-orthodox Jewish communities. Taijin 
kyōfushō (TKS) (literally: a fear of interpersonal relations [Tarumi et al., 2004]) has been 
documented since the 1930s and is a seemingly distinct form of social anxiety endemic to 
Japan. An individual experiencing TKS is primarily concerned that their appearance, in 
terms of body and/or behaviour, including blushing, eye contact and body odour, will 
offend or embarrass other people (Kleinknecht et al., 1997). TKS has been linked to the use 
of shame as an ‘external social sanction’ in Japanese history and culture. Cole (2013, p.65) 
explores the relationship between shame and TKS, arguing that ‘shame serves to regulate 
an individual’s behaviour in the context of the greater collective.’ Taijin kyōfushō has also 
been referred to as ‘an obsession of shame and anxiety’(Maeda and Nathan, 1999, p. 526), 
as the individual will avoid or withdraw from social situations for fear of offending other 
people and bringing shame on themselves and their family.45 
Jewish-specific manifestations of social anxiety, known as aymat zibur (literally: fear of 
the congregation), are closely tied to social relations in Jewish law. Greenberg et al. (2004) 
explore manifestations of social anxiety in young men in ultra-orthodox Jewish 
communities. Their findings relate social difficulties to performance-related religious 
situations (e.g. performing a sermon), culturally significant feelings of shame, and an 
individual’s status and authority within the Jewish community. These aspects are inter-
related in many ways: for example, opportunities for public speaking through teaching and 
prayer are important within the Jewish community and therefore associated with high 
social standing and recognition. Greenberg et al. also note, that social and religious status 
 
44 There are significant problems with cross-cultural studies that have been addressed in the discipline of 
(transcultural) psychiatry and anthropology. Bains (2005, p. 145) (drawing on Kleinmann, 1977) argues 
that ‘Western psychiatry dispenses with local illness categories, designating them the status of cultural 
phenomena, but then imposes Western categories as if they were not also culturally derived. [Kleinmann] 
encouraged psychiatry to ‘learn from anthropology that culture does considerably more than shape illness 
as an experience; it shapes the very way we conceive illness’ and that ‘a true comparative cross-cultural 
science of illness must begin with this powerful anthropological insight’. 
45 Despite Japan’s high suicide rate, suicide and suicide attempts amongst those with taijin kyōfushō and 
hikikomori (an associated disorder characterised by isolation, literally ‘‘to retreat inwards’’) are low 
(Sarchione et al., 2015). 
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within the community will govern the particular ‘psychopathology’ of a person, dictating 
whether the extent that their social anxieties interfere with religious duties is sufficient to 
be deemed problematic46. 
SOCIOLOGY AND COUNSELLING PERSPECTIVES 
Sociological and counselling perspectives are closely related as they both take account of 
the wider social and cultural conditions that enable social anxiety to flourish. The relatively 
limited cohort of qualitative accounts of social anxiety that can be identified, ones not 
inflected anthropologically, is based within these fields. The field of counselling 
psychology draws upon and speaks to both cognitive behavioural and interpersonal (see 
also below) approaches to understanding and treating social anxiety, while also 
highlighting particular social and spatial concerns regarding recovery. 
McCarthy’s (2014) doctoral dissertation explores social anxiety recovery journeys through 
narrative methods (c.f. Anderson et al., 2008). Having both lived experience of social 
anxiety and experience of treating people in therapeutic environments, McCarthy (2014, 
p.24) argues that the medicalisation of the human condition is ‘frustrating’ and so, ‘in 
practice, we are trying to strike a balance between the biomedical, positivist paradigm in 
which psychology largely operates and the humanistic tradition in counselling psychology 
which values the narratives people bring to therapy’. McCarthy employs a recovery-
oriented narrative approach in order to understand how people make sense of their 
experiences and what factors promote and/or hinder recovery, uncovering in particular how 
personal and collective strategies are prioritised, particularly against the medical vision of 
recovery in which the goal is seemingly to return to a ‘pre-illness’ state. In terms of 
collective strategies, recovery group membership and narratives are shown to legitimate 
individual experience, shape understandings of recovery and recovery journeys. What is 
most problematic for McCarthy’s participants is the dominant recovery model and, indeed, 
the term ‘recovery’ itself, which are predominantly centred around the medical model’s 
focus on alleviating symptoms (primarily through pharmaceutical interventions) at the 
expense of taking seriously the personal, social and situational attributes that sustain 
 
46 They compare the Jewish case with a study on Muslim women’s experiences of fear/agoraphobia, quoting 
El-Islam’s (1994) explanation of why so few Qatari Muslim women present at the clinic with 
agoraphobia: ‘Being bound to the home, which is a sign of severe agoraphobia in the West, is a sign of 
virtue in a Muslim housewife; the Koraan addresses women in the verse ‘stay in your homes and do not 
misbehave like the early pagans’ (El-Islam, 1994, p.139; cited in Greenberg et al. 2004). 
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anxieties47. 
Nielsen and Cairns (2009), meanwhile, employ an open-ended qualitative questionnaire to 
explore social anxiety and close relationships. Questionnaire responses were analysed 
using a hermeneutic phenomenology approach to reveal what it means to be in a close 
relationship for people with social anxiety. Participants shared a range of social and 
interpersonal difficulties, including struggling to develop close relationships, feeling like a 
burden and lapsing into over-dependence in relationships, and self-criticism of 
interpersonal skills. There were also positive relational dynamics emerging from the data, 
including close relationships with a high degree of intimacy and trust, and feelings of 
security and safety when in close proximity to participants’ friendship circles. 
Clinical studies show that women are consistently more likely to experience social anxiety 
and carry a greater burden of illness than men (McLean et al., 2011). Social anxieties in 
women are also likely to lead to an increase in substance (ab)use. As the onset of social 
anxiety is frequently associated with, and observed in, late-childhood and early-
adolescence, feminist perspectives argue that social anxiety ‘may stem from adolescent 
girls’ attempts to define their social identities and navigate a new social system of peers, 
friends and parental relations’ (Briggs and Pepperell, 2009, p. 65). Pipher (2005) notes that 
broader forms of culture have a significant impact on young adolescents, particularly 
young women, and on their views of self and identity wherein social evaluations are often 
based on appearance and defined by specific socio-cultural roles. In terms of social roles, 
Bunker (2012, p. 28) highlights that women moving into public spaces in Mexico and 
demanding control and use of space by protesting smoking in public places has led to ‘a 
growing social anxiety [in men] over the female’s lack of enclosure and perceived threats 
to patriarchal privileges’ – albeit this is a more societal social anxiety than an immediate 
mental health concern, is still highlighting the anxieties produced through social and 
spatial uncertainty. 
Further factors considered in sociological perspectives are social position, rank and 
hierarchies, and, as highlighted by Pipher (2005), the role of broader consumer and 
enterprise culture. Stravynski’s (2007, pp. 354-355) interpersonal model is instructive for 
elaborating a socio-spatial model of social anxiety, in that it is embedded within social, 
 
47 This narrative of recovery resonates with many of the participants involved in this research, but there are 
also a significant number of people who advocate for ‘recovery’ in terms of returning to a ‘pre-illness’ 
state or their ‘old self’ (although not necessarily via a medical model), highlighting the importance of 
both individual and collective approaches to recovery (Chapter 6). 
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cultural and spatial considerations: 
Social environment in the abstract denotes a variety of ways of life 
characterising various communities. It provides values (e.g. what is good, 
beautiful, [and] true). It determines worthwhile things to do, who is admirable 
and who is important. It inculcates approved practices (e.g. showing respect 
[or] reaching an agreement). It assigns social roles and designates social units. 
It structures important human activities (e.g. relations between parents and 
children, women and men, [and] neighbours). Communities, however, are often 
stratified, with quite different patterns of life […] characterising each stratum. 
Concrete people enacting the various practices of their community woven into 
the fabric of social institutions and informal structures provide the context – the 
danger – evoking socially anxious […] reactions. This is determined by the 
power embedded in their social role (defined by institutions), their place in the 
ruling hierarchy of the fact that they possess desirable characteristics, much 
admired in the community. Who is powerful, and why one needs to take them 
into account, is culturally constituted. Their powers to grant or deny what one 
wishes for (e.g. a position, a loan, but also love) or mock one’s impudence 
make them important and dangerous. 
Social rank is related to an individual’s self-perceived agreeableness and desirability in the 
social sphere and is associated with factors such as IQ, friendliness, attractiveness, being 
well liked and/or rewarding to be with (Gilbert, 2000). Featuring heavily in sociological 
understandings of human relations and interactions are the operatives of power and status 
and dominance and submission (Kemper, 2006). These power dynamics are present in 
everyday workplace cultures and education environments, as well as in psychotherapeutic 
treatments advocating compliance rather than collaboration (Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013). 
Stravynski (2007, pp. 35–36) argues that these relational dimensions between individuals 
and across groups play a significant role in social anxiety viewed from the interpersonal 
perspective. Social anxiety correlates with submissive behaviour and feelings of inferiority 
in relation to social rank (Gilbert, 2000), manifesting in feelings of shame, fear of conflict, 
humiliation, criticism and embarrassment. Social rejection and marginalisation serve to 
reinforce negative self-beliefs. Social comparisons made between the anxious self and 
other people often find the self to be inferior in some way: for example, through a lack of 
confidence and an inability to recognise or utilise one’s personal skills or resources, a 
person may engage in socially cautious or withdrawn (submissive) behaviours, including 
averted gaze and avoidance. These dimensions are significant for considering anxieties 
about social interactions, relations and spaces where power, status and dominant-
submissive dynamics may all play a key role, notably, for example, in work-places and 
education spaces (Chapter 7 and 8). Drawing on Goffman, Scott (2004, p. 134) argues that 
shyness can be understood as response to the ‘dramaturgical dilemmas of interaction […] 
that is often perceived as deviant behaviour’. 
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Furthermore, specific environments are associated with increasing social anxieties: for 
example, the just-mentioned domains of workplace culture and education environments 
‘not only make social anxiety more observable’ – that is, the observable and felt 
behaviours associated with the ‘disorder’ are recognised as unacceptable in, and un-
conducive to, particular socio-cultural environments – but also serve to maintain and 
exacerbate it. Hickinbottom-Brawn (2013, p.739) states that these environments, may be 
imbued with current neoliberal enterprise culture, often shape ideal conceptions of self as 
‘confident, bold and striving in interactions’, but such dynamics will likely instil in the 
socially anxious individual a pervasive practice of self-surveillance whereby they are 
constantly monitoring the self ‘for signs of failing to meet this ideal’. In addition, 
consumer-driven culture configures, and relies upon, certain forms of subjectivity and 
identities, provoking high levels of anxiety and moral panic in those who fall short of these 
forms. Cultural and consumer spaces are saturated with shame-based advertising for 
products and services that aim to improve the socially unacceptable aspects of self 
(Hickinbottom-Brawn, 2013). People with social anxiety already often feel out of place, or 
that they do not belong, in consumer and/or public spaces, and these crucial dynamics are 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES 
Lloyd (2006a, p. 162) notes that the definition of social anxiety outlined in the DSM-5 is 
‘of little interest to psychoanalysts’ because it works at the level of the symptom or 
syndrome (a set of symptoms)48 that tell us very little about any ‘underlying conflict or 
adaptation’ to the emergent pattern of social anxiety49. Psychoanalysis is more concerned 
with psychic structures, of which there are three: neurosis, psychosis and perversion. In 
Lacanian terms, these three structures operate in every individual to varying degrees; there 
is no ‘normal’ structure that is set against the three ‘deviant’ ones50. 
 
48 The use of medications in psychoanalysis is also considered problematic due to the ways in which 
psychotropic medicines may interact with a person’s subjectivity. As noted above, psychoanalysis is 
relatively uninterested in the specific symptoms, but, as discussed by Lakoff (2003) masking the 
symptom does not address the root cause. However, there are examples of Lacanian psychoanalytic 
practice working alongside psychotropic medications, and Lakoff (ibid.) explores the benefits and 
tensions between physician-analyst identities in a psychiatric setting in Beunos Aires. 
49 This is one of the major sticking points that psychoanalysis has with behavioural therapies which aim to 
treat the symptoms of ‘disorder’. Psychoanalysis contends that, while you can unlearn current patterns of 
behaviour, the symptom will continue to relocate unless you address the underlying psychic structures. I 
unpack these dynamics further in Chapter 3. 
50 Freud’s thinking is slightly different in that he proposed that there was a more or less ‘normal’ position 
from which neurosis, psychosis and perversion would deviate. 
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Lloyd (2006, p.174) conducts an in-depth exploration into the emergence and 
categorisation of social anxiety/social phobia in France, isolating a common theme 
emerging in the interviews with both patients and psychoanalytically-oriented clinicians: 
namely, that attention and treatment must centre on a person’s social relations and wider 
environment, rather than being reduced to the symptoms of the ‘disorder’. Psychoanalytic 
models point to a broader set of relational problems rather than the ‘circumscribed 
problems in either one of more situations’ as outlined by diagnostic criteria. Echoing Lloyd 
(2006), McEvoy et al. (2016) approach the DSM definition with caution, stating that the 
diagnostic label and associated criteria ‘suggests the presence of something in particular 
and set apart, which in actuality may relate to a simple variant or set of points within a 
normal process of relating to others’. Both Lloyd and McEvoy et al.’s comments 
communicate a concern for the clinical framework in that it does not acknowledge how, for 
example, an acute fear of scrutiny is embedded ‘in a socially complex and demanding 
society’ (McEvoy et al. 2016, p.544). 
There is, however, no singular or accepted psychoanalytic ‘model’ of social anxiety. 
Despite the centrality of the concept of anxiety in psychoanalytic writings, 
psychoanalytically-informed research specifically on the topic of social anxiety is virtually 
non-existent with the exception of two studies: one practice-focused paper outlining a 
psychodynamic model of therapeutic treatment with ‘a specific focus on shame and on 
unrealistic demands’ (Leichsenring et al., 2007); and another qualitative study by McEvoy, 
et al. (2016), who employ Winnicottian object relations theory to examine the underlying 
interpersonal ‘dynamics in the origin and maintenance of social anxiety’. The latter 
highlight the unconscious role of ‘seeing and being seen’ as a great source of distress, 
embarrassment and shame. The internalisation of the gaze plays a central function in 
identify formation and, in particular, for the infant establishing a relation between their 
inner world (‘Innenwelt’) and the outer world (‘Umwelt’) (Lacan, 1977). The link 
established between subjectivity and gaze is therefore crucial in that ‘we are beings who 
are looked at; the gaze circumscribes us, and which in the first instance makes us beings 
who are looked at’ (Lacan, 1977, p.72). In the context of social anxiety, visibility 
(increased by embodied and visible anxious symptoms such as blushing, sweating, 
shaking), alongside making and maintaining eye contact, being seen and seeing the 
reactions of others, is overwhelming in that through this ‘unbearable gaze […] an inner 
space has opened up’ (Steiner, 2015, p. 1590). It also re-directs attention towards the 
failing and incompetent social self. Consequently, a person may withdraw or ‘avert their 
own gaze, turning it to the floor and inwardly, so that they no longer need to observe their 
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objects. They can avoid both seeing and being seen’ (Steiner, 2015, p.1590). These 
dynamics can be related to interpersonal dynamics of power and status, but they arguably 
begin to sit closer to what people with social anxiety palpably experience, feel and 
understand on a daily basis. 
Debilitating self-consciousness and self-criticism may, according to some psychoanalytic 
formulations, be embedded in a narcissistic and saturated sense of self. Narcissism, not to 
be confused with a grandiose, egotistical or selfish self, relates here to vulnerability in self-
esteem, self-representation and possibly a distorted sense of self as inadequate in dealing 
with a complex, demanding and engulfing social world. This conceptualisation of 
narcissism is more akin to the ‘vulnerable narcissism’ discussed by psychoanalysts 
Bernardi and Eidlin (2018). From a clinical perspective, they note that vulnerable clients, 
for whom ‘closeness to others’ is particularly problematic, find it difficult to face or re-
visit past events and traumatic experiences. Consequently, they ‘seek to withdraw from 
social situations when their own unfavourable evaluations of themselves with respect to 
others provoke intense feelings of shame, pain’ and self-directed aggression. Drawing on 
Britton (2004) these authors argue that this vulnerability lends itself to a ‘hyper subjective’ 
subject. Therefore, in the clinical setting, the intersubjective ‘third position’ of the 
analyst’s evaluation and interpretation is unbearable.51  
McEvoy et al. (2016) describe a common experience of ‘hiding behind a mask’ as 
individuals attempt to negotiate how to be in social situations (and, interestingly, in the 
research interview environment). Similar protective strategies are explored in relation to 
social anxiety in Boyle (2018) and agoraphobia in Davidson (2003) in terms of shielding 
the self from others and ‘putting on a face’, and feature later in this thesis (especially 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8). In order to advance a psychoanalytically-attuned social geography of 
social anxiety, the bald outlines of which may already be apparent from the last few 
paragraphs, in Chapter 3, I map out the contours of a predominantly Lacanian (but also 
Freudian) psychoanalysis that have most profoundly influenced this research. 
INTERPERSONAL PERSPECTIVES 
An interpersonal approach to social anxiety (Alden and Taylor, 2004; Stravynski, 2007, 
 
51 This analysis is very much situated within the Object Relations Theory school of thought, which prioritises 
childhood development and, in particular, ‘the triangular relationship between mother, father and child’ 
(McEvoy et al. 2016, p.562). 
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2014) implicates, in its conceptual framework, the inherently social nature of human 
beings embedded in social interactions and relationships, anchored in a variety of social 
and cultural systems (e.g. social roles, rules and hierarchies) and situated in the wider 
social-spatial environment. Crucially, these dynamics (i.e. interactions, systems, 
environments) do not operate as a backdrop to everyday life, but instead actively produce, 
and are produced by, the individual. Situated in an interpersonal framework, social anxiety 
can be identified as ‘an extended pattern of self-protection, enacted purposefully, against 
the threats embodied by other individuals in the social environment’ (Stravynski 2014, pp. 
xii-xiii). Crucially, in seeking to shift the narrative of social anxiety from one that is 
concerned with dysfunctions and abnormalities in organic and cognitive systems, 
Stravynski asserts that social anxiety is something that is ‘enacted, not something one has’. 
He argues that a state of ‘anxiousness’ cannot be discerned as a sealed in, a priori52 ‘inner’ 
state, but rather as ‘a dynamic process, reflecting the variations in the manoeuvring of the 
individual in the face of ceaselessly evolving threatening circumstances’ (Stravynski, 2014, 
p.25). This conceptualisation of social anxiety as a ‘social practice’ (Jackson and Everts, 
2010) aims to take account of the whole person as situated within a wider network of social 
and spatial relations. Attention must hence be paid to the context in which socially anxious 
‘patterns’ unfold, for attempting to account for such patterns void of social, spatial or even 
circumstantial events is to render them indiscernible and unintelligible: 
Fearsome circumstances and fearful activity are intertwined and form a 
dynamic system; socially phobic conduct arises in response to (or is evoked by 
the prospect of) definite activities set in social or interpersonal contexts. Both 
fearful activities and the fearsome settings in which they occur become 
meaningful only as embedded in a culture or way of life; otherwise they remain 
a denatured abstraction. (Stravynski, 2014, p.90) 
The interpersonal approach proposes that an individual’s social and interpersonal 
relationships provide important contexts for the ways in which social anxiety manifests in 
people’s everyday lives.  
Particular versions of the interpersonal model nonetheless still draw heavily from cognitive 
approaches, where problematic social functioning is viewed as an integral feature of 
psychopathology (Sullivan, 1953), positioned as a consequence of abnormal biological 
and/or cognitive vulnerabilities within the individual (1999). Much of the research in an 
interpersonal vein has followed this trajectory, exploring frequency, quantity and quality of 
interpersonal relationships and the detrimental interpersonal effects of social anxiety. For 
 
52 Existing before experience. 
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example, Beidel et al. (1999) highlight that children with social anxiety have fewer 
friendships and less extra-curricular involvement. Anderson et al. (2008) conduct a 
linguistic analysis of autobiographical narratives, meanwhile, to understand the role played 
by negative or painful social memories in causing and sustaining social anxiety. The study 
analyses grammatical, psychological (e.g. emotional, perceptual) and personal (e.g. 
occupational, education) content but does not make explicit reference to experiential 
accounts of participants. However, the accounts are linked to anticipatory processes that 
influence present and future-oriented thinking, emotional and management strategies. 
Other interpersonal difficulties reported are: fewer friendships and less peer-support in 
close friendships (La Greca and Lopez, 1998); fewer romantic relationships (Starr and 
Devila, 2015); poor quality of romantic relationships (Cuming and Rapee, 2010); and less 
intimacy in long-term relationships (Montesi et al., 2013). The interpersonal difficulties 
highlighted by the aforementioned studies are overwhelmingly regarded as the 
consequences of abnormal processes and, therefore, become indicative of a pathological 
anxious state (Stravynski, 2014), which reinforces the reductive logics of the cognitive 
model previously discussed. 
Stravynski’s (2014) model diverts from such a ‘consequential’ perspective, though, and 
views social anxiety as an on-going relational pattern that builds gradually and intensifies 
throughout the life course, as opposed to being predetermined by particular and abnormal 
mental or bodily processes. Interactional and interpersonal difficulties interact reciprocally 
to develop and to maintain social anxiety, usually associated with defensive strategies 
aimed at self-protection: for example, avoidance, withdrawal and passive participation. 
Stravynski (2014) addresses in detail various environmental and development factors that 
may contribute to (but not ‘cause’) the emergence of social anxiety: for example, parental 
and family influence, early social environment, peer environment, experiences of 
victimisation (e.g. bullying and ridicule) and adverse life events. Developmental aspects 
are often conceptualised within the broader relations of human attachment, specifically 
insecure attachment (Ainsworth and Bowlby, 1991), and linked with temperament and 
behavioural inhibitions (Rosenbaum et al., 1991). Similarly, Alden et al. (2014) address the 
relational processes in social anxiety and argue that childhood developmental experiences 
play a key role, although Stravynski and others (Shamir-Essakow et al., 2005) determine 
that specific effects of attachment, temperament and inhibitions could not be ascertained. 
Even so, that finding does not dilute the potential of a perspective alert to how iterative 
developmental and environmental factors contribute to the overarching relational patterns 
of social anxiety. 
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Social anxiety is thought to develop through processes of social learning where individuals 
are repeatedly mistreated in, diminished by and excluded from social and interpersonal 
relationships. Significant links have been found between childhood victimisation and 
social anxiety (McCabe et al., 2003) and childhood experiences of violence (Binelli et al., 
2012). Stravynski (2014) nonetheless maintains that no one specific traumatic event or 
experience leads to social anxiety. In fact, a fearful, repetitive and historic pattern of 
rejection, exclusion, social diminishment and unabashed ridicule ‘consolidates when an 
individual systematically and repeatedly fails to engage various aspects of social life of his 
or her community in a participatory and assertive manner and instead responds both 
fearfully and defensively (Stravynski, 2014 p. 286). 
In conclusion, Stravynski (2014, p.196) asserts that ‘[t]he fully formed socially phobic 
pattern is forged by adult demands made on the individual, by the way of life of his or her 
community. These crystallise in late adolescence or early adulthood; so does the onset of 
social phobia’. The relational tactics employed, whether avoidance, withdrawal, patterns of 
submissiveness, hyper-vigilance or through prescribed medication or self-medicating with 
drugs and alcohol, are done so defensively as a mode of self-protection against being 
ignored, maligned or negatively evaluated. Social anxiety is thus ‘highly idiosyncratic’ and 
‘historically contingent’ (Stravynski, 2014), always tied to specific life experiences and 
circumstances. Patterns of social anxiety are unavoidably embedded and implicated in a 
person’s social and spatial environments. 
REFLECTIONS ON PERSPECTIVES 
Before this chapter moves to map the contours of what I have termed a ‘social geography 
of social anxiety’, it is useful to tease the threads of the aforementioned perspectives, 
which, in conjunction with a critical approach to geographies of health and illness, lays the 
foundation for the conceptual and empirical materials that follow in the remainder of this 
thesis. I outline these briefly in three broad strokes and they are discussed in more depth 
later in this chapter and in Chapter 3. 
First and foremost, this research takes seriously the subjective and experiential dynamics 
of social anxiety in order to acknowledge real, living, maybe suffering and distressed, 
human beings and, as much as possible, give voice to that experience. This lends a certain 
priority to matters of meaning and understanding, and cultivating an awareness to space 
and place at a range of scales. In particular thinking of how the spaces occupied by people 
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are not just abstract surfaces but deeply textured ‘places’ of being, practice and encounter. 
There is of course an imbalance in the current literature as these aspects are missing from 
the dominant biological and psychological narratives and peppered throughout the others. 
Secondly, the interpersonal, habitual patterning of social anxiety outlined by Stravynski 
(2014) is a novel perspective, which not only values the socially and culturally constituted 
practices, roles, communities and environments that form the fabric of social life and play 
a significant role in social anxiety, but also, how these dynamics are governed by, and 
embedded in, wider institutions and structures53. While Stravynski’s model attempts to 
account for the ‘whole being’, by neglecting what he terms the ‘intrapersonal’ dynamics – 
the cognitions and bodily processes, signs and symptoms – he ignores the personal and 
social consequences of such emotional, embodied and affective events.. Arguably, 
Stravynski’s omission of these elements appeals to his rejection of biomedical and 
cognitive models of social anxiety that view ‘abnormal’ cognitions and bodily processes as 
the ‘whole problem’ and I sympathise greatly with this account. However, I argue that 
these signs, symptoms and sensations are significant elements when considering how 
bodies are socially and spatially implicated in anxious experiences. So, while Stravynski 
omits them as ‘intrapersonal’ dynamics grounded in, and reinforcing, the fundamental 
notion of a ‘mind-body’ split; they can, in fact, be viewed inter- and trans-
personally/subjectively as they embody symbolic meaning – defined socially and culturally 
– for the individual experiencing them. A useful comparison to draw upon here is the work 
of Bissell (2009, pp. 918 and 923, 2010a) who examines chronic and transient pain, 
typically localised in bodies (‘neurologically’) or between bodies and minds 
(‘psychosomatically’), as an affective and relation force which can augment and diminish 
quality of life and an intensity that is ‘folded through memory and past experience’. A 
similar perspective is fashioned here, one that views social anxiety as an affective 
intensity. Affective and emotional geographies are discussed in-depth in Chapter 3, and 
advanced further in Chapter 5 on ‘Intensities’.  
Thirdly, I am concerned with the self-other-world relations that emerge in the social, 
psychoanalytic and interpersonal accounts. Crucially, the theme of the ‘disorder’ is that 
individuals are anxious-in-relation-to-others, bringing to light the various ways ‘space’ and 
‘place’ may become much more complicated, diminished and isolating because of anxious 
experience. Similarly, they attend to issues of how the self is situated in such spaces and 
 
53 These dynamics also speak to the psychoanalytically-orientated concerns, for example, the Lacanian 
concept of ‘the big Other’, discussed in Chapter 3. 
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places as ‘other’, ‘abnormal’ and ‘out of place’ (Chapter 7 and 8). 
This chapter now moves to situate these loosely outlined concerns within a geographical 
framework by considering critical approaches in geographies of health and illness.  
ADVANCING A SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY OF SOCIAL 
ANXIETY 
Kearns (1993) argues that medical geography, with its primary focus on the spatial 
epidemiology of disease and inequalities of health and care provision54, is ‘incomplete’ 
without considering the wider links between health and place. His calls to engage with the 
situated and experiential, rather than biomedical55, accounts of health and illness are 
intended to ‘release’ medical geography ‘from the shadow of medicine’, so as to produce a 
distinct vein of research centred around the ‘geographies of health and healing’ (Kearns 
and Gesler, 1998, p. 3). Kearns (1995, 1996, 1997) avows that, conceptually, geographers 
should be more concerned with the roles played by social and cultural differences, and by 
experiences of ‘otherness’, and suggests the need, methodologically, to consider narrative 
methods for ‘storying’ experiences of health and illness. At the time, critical work 
addressing such themes – often through a lens alert to people ‘storying’ their own socio-
spatial worlds – has already emerged and become a fixture within social and cultural 
geography: for example, reconvening experiences of chronic illness, care and management 
at the intersections of gender, race and ethnicity (Dyck, 1995a, 1995b) or young men with 
HIV/AIDS internalising stigmatising perceptions of ‘otherness’ and ‘difference’ (Wilton, 
1998). Crucially, though, this work has not been ‘released’ from the medical as such, but 
instead has sought to re-engage critically with it by addressing socially and culturally 
constructed meanings of illness. 
In three ‘progress reports’ assessing the sub-disciplinary landscape, Parr highlights health 
geographers’ critical engagement with medical practice, science and discourse through 
 
54 Medical geography became a recognised subfield in geography in the 1950s (May, 1958) concerned with 
either the spatial patterning of disease or the provision of medical care and access to facilities (Mayer, 
1984). In a critical response to Kearns’s (1993) calls for a reformed medical geography, May and Meade 
(1994, p. 103) argue that medical geography is anything but void of concerns about the links between 
health and place. Using the tradition of disease ecology (omitted from Kearns’s discussion), they claim 
that ‘[d]isease ecology considers the numerous social, economic, behavioural, cultural, environmental, 
and biological factors which create disease in specific places at specific times’. They comment further 
that social geography should be an ‘element’ of medical geography but should not define the field. 
55 The biomedical model prioritises a curative model of a set of precipitating disease symptoms but is less 
concerned with, for example, health-related experiences and access to healthcare (Kearns, 1993). 
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work on the geographies of the body (Parr, 2002) the spaces of care provision (Parr, 2003) 
and the application of social theory in geographical research and practice (Parr, 2004). Parr 
promotes the connective tissue between health and medical geographies, encouraging and 
‘urging […] geographers to think outside, and beyond, usual boundaries of medical beliefs, 
treatments, bodies and authority’ (Parr, 2004, p. 253)56. Yet, while asserting that we must 
think about all manner of ways in which health and well-being must be conceived outwith 
the ‘biomedical’ tradition, Parr argues that we must acknowledge that medical institutions, 
practices and spaces continue to structure – so powerfully – the worlds of illness and 
healing. Philo (2007, p. 84) furthers Parr’s arguments, stating that those working with all 
matters and issues of disease, health, illness and wellbeing should fundamentally remain as 
‘medical geographers’ – precisely in this critical guise – encouraging an engagement with 
‘medical ideas, practices and spaces. Arguably, geographers working broadly in the 
context of health and illness are engaged in this kind of critical work, approaching illness 
experiences as ones grounded in material practices and – albeit accepted, negotiated and 
resisted in various ways – embedded in wider (neoliberal, biomedical and/or social) 
discourses (Moss and Dyck, 1999) (the nuances of these critiques are discussed in the 
remaining sections of this chapter). Elsewhere, Parr (2002, p. 86) notes how the dispersion 
of medical knowledge, previously restricted to medical professionals and communities 
(e.g. how to spot malignant melanomas or how to conduct breast examinations), across 
online spheres has, on the one hand, usefully disrupted the hierarchies of the doctor-patient 
relationship57 by empowering and educating individuals about their health and, on the 
other, has opened them up to ‘new and more specialised medical discourses and 
technologies which serve as resources for self-maintenance, discipline, and control.’ She 
also highlights the ‘emancipatory’ potential of sharing, discussing and contesting 
conventional (medical) and alternative knowledge in the context of online chatrooms for 
those with Multiple Sclerosis (MS), spaces enabling individuals to re-write a lived 
experience of illness.  
 
56 In an earlier review of the sub-disciplinary field of mental health geographies, Dear echoes these 
sentiments, stating that, not only would it be a ‘‘mistake for mental health geographers to lose sight of the 
traditions of ‘medical’ geography’, but also for ‘medical geographers to overlook mental health’ (Dear, 
2000, p.258). 
57 Stevenson et al. (2007) examine the benefits and limitations of Internet knowledge in the context of the 
doctor-patient relationship. Although some tensions were reported -- for example, reliability and 
interpretation of online health information – patients in this study viewed online information as an 
‘additional resource’ rather than an outright challenge to medical authority and practice.  
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Thus, health geography arguably is ‘post-medical’58 in the sense that it is still operating, as 
it were, in the shadows of the biomedical in an attempt to critically engage with, 
understand and re-frame discourses and narratives around health and illness. The 
significance of these critiques and arguments to this research is, as highlighted in Chapter 1 
and the prior sections here in Chapter 2, there are particular social, cultural and spatial 
conditions and discourses that shape the lens through which social anxiety is viewed and 
experienced. So, while this project is situated outwith the biomedical paradigm that has 
dominated the landscape of social anxiety research, it absolutely acknowledges that daily 
life with social anxiety is deeply embedded in, for example biomedical perspectives, 
language and discourses through the search for diagnosis and in the pursuit of normality 
through ‘cure’ that concerns to many individuals (Chapter 6). This also means, contra to 
Stravynski’s interpersonal framing of social anxiety, taking seriously the intrapersonal59 
dynamics (i.e. signs, symptoms, sensations and ruminations), not simply as pathological or 
symptomatic consequences but embodied and situated phenomena (Chapter 5).  
SUBJECTIVITY AND SPACE 
Situating the following discussion in the sub-disciplinary fields of mental health, chronic 
illness and disability geographies, I will now outline the three facets of health geography 
that have influenced my own research on the geographies of social anxiety under the broad 
heading of subjectivity and space. The spacing and placing of subjectivity aims to account 
for the various positions, practices, processes and politics through which subjects and 
subjectivities are made, mediated, ‘performed, resisted and disciplined […] in and through 
space’ (Brown and Knopp, 2003, p. 322 cited in Longhurst, 2003, p. 344). The ‘subject’ 
and their ‘subjectivities’ are often entangled with notions of the body, self, person and 
identity, as deeply embedded in and constituted by everyday social and spatial life. It is 
through these points that we are able to map ‘the subject’ into the social landscape and 
speak to experiences, expressions and composition of subjectivities (Pile and Thrift, 1995, 
p. 2; Simpson, 2017). Rather than an abstraction, the subject is thoroughly embodied and 
emplaced in relation to various subject positions60, discourses and social systems and 
contexts (Simpson, 2017). 
 
58 As noted by Kearns (1995, p. 253) – and Philo (2007) – ‘post’ in this sense alludes to a sensitivity towards 
post-modern and post-structuralist concerns with difference, nuance and contingency 
59 To reiterate, ‘intra’ is the term used by Stravynski to refer to the symptomatic dimensions of anxious 
experiences, ones that he aligns with biomedical and/or cognitively paradigms. I choose to view these 
aspects more inter-/trans-personally, by drawing on emotional and affective geographies in Chapter 3.  
60 For example, gender, class, race, sexuality and disability. 
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With this focus on ‘relatedness’, subjectivities are never singular or static; rather, they are 
contingent, unstable, incoherent, unfixed and incomplete (Pile, 2008). In order to advance 
these ideas, geographers have engaged with psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity to 
widen the lens through which the subject is viewed, one that: on the one hand, delves 
beyond and beneath any autonomous and transformative potential (popularised in 
structure-agency debates) to account as well for repetitive, fragmented and ‘unyielding 
features’ of subjectivity (Pile, 2008, p. 214)61; and, on the other hand, does not presume a 
transparent and accessible subject (Pile, 1996). Probyn (2003, p. 298) argues that:  
We need to think of subjectivity as an unwieldy, continually contestable and 
affirmable basis for living in the world. Subjectivities are then simply a changing 
ensemble of openings and closings, points of contact and points [that] repel contact. 
In space, we orient ourselves and are oriented. That is the spatial imperative of 
subjectivities. 
The necessary ‘openings and closings’ for mapping the subjectivities of social anxiety are 
discussed hereafter through notions of outside in/inside out/in-between; (in)visibility and 
(un)certainty; and normality/abnormality.  
OUTSIDE IN / INSIDE OUT / IN-BETWEEN 
The ‘fraught relationship between subjectivity and space’ (Segrott and Doel, 2004, p. 597) 
is intensely encountered in episodic and enduring experiences of illness and/or impairment. 
Davidson’s (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003) work on the geographies of agoraphobia is 
instructive for considering troubling ‘bodily events’ that fundamentally interfere with an 
individual’s capacities for leading a fulfilling social and spatial life. Davidson (2000a, p. 
641) details not only the ‘difficulties [faced] in traversing social space’, but also the 
‘complete breakdown of the boundaries between ‘inner’ self and ‘outer’ world. Similarly. 
Parr (1999, p. 675) examines the ‘disruptive senses of borders, boundaries, and 
borderlessness’ experienced with/in the self and one’s social and spatial surroundings 
through, for example, voice-hearing. Through this work Parr highlights that unconscious 
processes are actively bound up with issues of time and space and thus require our 
(geographical) attention (Chapter 3). Segrott and Doel (2004) examine ritualistic and 
repetitious behaviours enacted by those living with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
as often futile and exhausting attempts to regain, and if possible to maintain, a sense of 
control over ‘inner’ intrusive obsessions through compulsive spatial practice. This work 
highlights how subjectivities and corporealities are inextricably intertwined through 
 
61 This matter is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. 
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spatialised accounts of panic, delusion and compulsion, highlighting their relevance for 
mapping anxious subjectivities that repeatedly wreak havoc on normally taken-for-granted, 
mundane, habituated relations between self, space and others.  
There are similar repetitions and intensities experienced in social anxiety and there is 
indeed a sense that the relationship with the self is ‘thrown off’ by the perceived lack of 
control the individual has over the ‘self’. Visceral and intrusive thoughts and memories as 
well as uncontrollable bodily symptoms (e.g. palpitations, hyperventilating, sweating and 
blushing) are continually problematic. This, in addition to external intrusions and tensions 
that mark social space unpredictable, feeds cyclically and uncontrollably into a habitual 
and inescapable anxious patterning that radically changes and disrupts a person’s self-
other-world relations. 
 (UN)CERTAINTY / (UN)PREDICTABILITY 
Brashers et al. (2003, p. 497) note that uncertainty is fundamental in the experience of ill-
health. Echoing this assertion, work in the geographies of chronic illness and mental health 
has productively disrupted notions of illness as a static phenomenon with a linear 
progression towards recovery, rather illness experience is marked by uncertainty, 
ambiguity and unpredictability. The onset and progression of illness can often leave the 
individual in ‘unknown territory’ (MacKian, 2012) as bodily, social and spatial dimensions 
become ‘routinely unpredictable’ (Crooks, 2010). Uncertainty presents in various guises: 
there is, on the one hand, immediate unpredictability experienced with changing bodily 
states and fluctuating symptoms, for example during panic attacks, hypo/hyper-glycaemia 
and seizure (Davidson, 2000b; Lucherini, 2015; Smith, 2012) and ambiguities in everyday 
practices, routines and spaces, particularly home (Crooks, 2010) and workplaces (Moss 
and Dyck, 1996) and, on the other, longer-term concerns about diagnosis and recovery, 
including whether diagnosis is obtainable and recovery is achievable and sustainable 
(Moss and Dyck, 1999). There are also further concerns about changing social roles and 
identities as illness progresses or is disclosed (Dyck and Jongbloed, 2000; Crooks and 
Chouinard, 2006). Crooks (2010) also argues that social and spatial worlds are 
‘unpredictably routine’, as illness can, to a certain extent, structure daily life by 
diminishing mobility and restricting interactions. Thus curbs spontaneity as bodies and 
symptoms are continuously monitored, checked and controlled, which in turn affects 
mobility and social activities. Lucherini (2015) examines the regimented lives of people 
living with diabetes and the daily considerations required for management. He argues that, 
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‘spontaneous geographies involved the ability to do things and go places at a moment’s 
notice without significant pre-planning […] spontaneity [is] missing for [people with 
diabetes]’ as bodies need to conform, be controlled and contained.  
NORMALITY / ABNORMALITY  
At the crux of the shift from medical to health geography is the opportunity ‘to rescue […] 
the living, experiencing, thinking, feeling, often anxious, perhaps suffering, maybe dying 
human being’ (Philo, 2007, p. 83) from the objectifying and reductive gaze of scientific 
medicine. The classic medical model has been criticised extensively for pathologising 
mental illness and disability, thereby designating abnormal disease categories or 
limitations in functioning that are seemingly in need of treatment and correction62. 
Geographers working within the scope of mental health and disability have been 
particularly attentive to how conceptualisations of normal/abnormal are historically, 
socially and culturally entangled with/in space. These debates are of critical importance to 
this research, which seeks not only to understand the ‘disordered’ geographies of anxious 
experiences, but also to question the extent to which ‘disorder’-centred constructions of 
self and perceptions of social norms are influenced, even encouraged, by diagnostic and 
classification systems. 
There is a deep history of social and spatial segregation of people with mental illness and 
disabilities in society (Parr, 2008; Philo, 1997), of which I will give a brief overview63. A 
significant body of research attending to institutionalised settings of ‘asylum spaces’ – 
arising as a significant feature of the Western world from at least the 18th century onwards 
– explores the historical accounts of asylums as spaces of containment, isolation and 
separation (Parr et al., 2003), as therapeutic environments (Philo, 2014) and as sites of 
experimental practice (McGeachan, 2013). These sites, often removed and isolated, were 
successful in hiding ‘the unacceptable from contemporary societies’, a shutting away 
which, in turn, ‘fostered a lack of knowledge and negative perceptions about mental health 
among the protected public’ (Moon, 2000, p. 241). Institutional policies and practices of 
social exclusion, fuelled by stigmatising attitudes towards those with mental illness and 
 
62 Compare with the field of narrative medicine, which aims to: utilise narrative accounts of illness in clinical 
practice to understand journeys through illness; place emphasis on the relations between physician-
patient-practice; and encourage practitioner reflection in/of medical encounters. Narrative approaches 
encourage a model of medical practice that is empathy- and patient-centred (Charon, 2008). 
63 Early work in the geographies of mental health was primarily concerned with either the spatial 
epidemiology of mental illness, most notably Giggs’s (1973) landmark paper on the spatial patterning of 
schizophrenia in Nottingham, and the mapping of mental health care facilities (Davey and Giles, 1979). 
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disabilities, have duly ‘woven [fear] into the fabric of society’ (Livingstone, 2013, p. 9) 64. 
As a result, more recent (post-mid-20th century) processes of de-institutionalisation – that 
is, the decentralisation of psychiatric services and relocation of institutionalised 
populations back into the community – have often been met with strong community 
opposition (Dear and Taylor, 1982; DeVerteuil, 2013). The sub-disciplinary field of mental 
health geography has paid sustained attention to this changing landscape of mental health 
care and to the emerging social consequences for ‘post-asylum’ populations. This body of 
work has explored how societal attitudes towards people experiencing mental health 
problems oscillate between tolerance, stigma and exclusion (Parr and Philo, 2003) and how 
such oscillations seep into vital spaces of care and support (Parr, 2000; Parr et al., 2004).  
Negative community attitudes towards the siting of community-based mental health 
facilities, notions of difference, practices of ‘othering’ and societal attitudes more broadly, 
often underpin discourses that frame people with mental health problems as deviant, 
violent, unpredictable and/or strange social misfits65, and these attitudes can often lead 
wider communities to question the moral status and character of such shunned people66. 
Processes of ‘othering’ signal a perceived deviation from socially and culturally 
constructed norms and are deeply embedded in societal attitudes towards mental health. 
Diagnosis, labelling and stigmatising67 attitudes, in particular and often framed by the 
medical model, erect social and structural barriers that situate people experiencing mental 
health problems as ‘beyond or outside of society’ (Imrie, 1996, p. 398). 
Rose (1998, 1999) argues that collectively the psy-disciplines operate as an instrument of 
social governance, an ‘individualising technology’ that makes ‘visible and intelligible 
certain features of persons, their conducts, and their relations with one another’ (Rose, 
1999, p.11). A central concern of Rose’s work is how the psy-disciplines shape and govern 
 
64 Wahl and Aroesty‐Cohen (2010, p. 249) note that, while there has been an overall increase in positive 
attitudes towards mental health problems, negative attitudes still prevail regarding ‘social acceptance and 
expectations of people with mental health problems.’ 
65 Crucially, Moon (2000) notes that high profile cases of vulnerable and violent individuals with severe 
mental illness who have harmed themselves and/or others are marked, in the UK, by significant ‘inter-
agency’ failures between the National Health Services (NHS) and social care services. He draws on six 
cases of murder and five cases of suicide and self-harm, each demonstrating a ‘lack of comprehensive 
care planning’. 
66 Similar themes have also emerged in research concerning the ‘moral economy of poverty’. Hansen, 
Bourgois and Drucker (2014) explore how austerity and welfare sanctions in the US are redefining 
welfare eligibility, leading to a ‘pathologising of poverty’ whereby ‘permanent medical or psychiatric 
diagnosis is required to qualify’ for public support and people need repeatedly to prove their ‘disabled’ 
status. 
67 Stigmatising attitudes are found to be one of the key deterrents to people accessing mental health treatment 
and care (Clement et al., 2015). 
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the self in modern society. There is an increasing diffusion of psy-knowledges into the 
governance of social and spatial life (Foucault, 1997; Rose, 1999) that is evident in the 
medicalisation and pharmaceuticalisation of mental and emotional distress (Hickinbottom-
Brawn, 2013; Summerfield, 2001) and it operates through the psychologising of everyday 
life, workplaces, educational and criminal justice institutions (De Vos, 2016; Gagen, 2013; 
Jones et al., 2011).  
The practice and construction of ‘normalcy’ can therefore be considered as ‘less a 
condition of human nature than it is a feature of a certain kind of society’ (Davis, 1995, p. 
3). Social life is established, ordered and given meaning through routinised social and 
discursive practices (Simonsen, 2010), which perpetuate the social norms to which society 
conforms. Social anxieties are driven by, on the one hand, comparisons between ‘normal’ 
and ‘abnormal’ others or ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ behaviour and, on the other hand, 
criticism of a ‘socially awkward’ or ‘inept’, ‘weird’ and ‘incapable’ self. At the individual 
level, such anxieties may, in turn, encourage the pursuit of a supposedly ‘normal’ life – 
that is, stable, functioning and productive self – through, for example, pharmaceutical and 
psychological means. This thesis is attentive to the extent to which social norms and 
societal expectations feature, or are indeed internalised, in the lived geographies of social 
anxiety: for example, Chapter 6 explores the discursive and material realities of diagnosis, 
treatment and recovery, alongside the consequences of falling short of social ideals; and 
Chapters 7 and 8 explore how social geographies unfold against a backdrop of (perceived) 
‘normalcy’ and the failure to attain it through ‘normal’ signs of achievement such as 
success in relationships, education, career and life’s ‘milestones’ (as highlighted in the 
narrative at the beginning of Chapter 1).  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have outlined the existing disciplinary landscape of social anxiety 
research. By drawing on literatures and perspectives from biological and psychological 
sciences, cultural and social studies, and psychoanalytic and interpersonal theories, I have 
provided an extensive – although not exhaustive – understanding of how social anxiety is 
understood within these particular frameworks. I have attempted to map an understanding 
of social anxiety that is socially and spatially embedded in the practices, roles and relations 
that comprise everyday life – dynamics that will be examined in detail in Chapters 5 
through 8. Significant conceptual threads from social, counselling, psychoanalytic and 
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interpersonal perspectives were then taken forward and discussed in the context of critical 
approaches to the geographies of health and illness, namely work in the sub-disciplinary 
fields of mental health, chronic illness and disability geographies. The underlying themes 
will furnish the conceptual underpinnings of the research discussed in Chapter 3 and 
nourish the empirical heart of the thesis that follows.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL ANXIETY: 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
INTRODUCTION  
In order to deepen the social, cultural and ‘psychical’ accounts outlined in the previous 
chapters, this chapter maps the conceptual resources that inform a geographical sensibility 
of social anxiety. I begin by discussing the psychoanalytic concepts and geographies that 
have informed this research. The meeting points between social theory, human geography 
and psychoanalysis are instructive here for approaching an understanding of the 
unconscious as more than an internal, closed off kernel, but rather a ‘structure’68 that is 
socially and spatially constituted, not only by our earliest experiences, but shaped 
continuously by events and encounters throughout our lives. Drawing on particular strands 
of psychoanalytic thought/geographies, I demonstrate how the unconscious operates as the 
‘connective sinews’ (McGeachan 2014, p. 99) between our inner and outer worlds. I then 
move to discuss the anticipatory geographies that open up a temporal dynamic to lived 
experiences of social anxiety. Following this, I move on to the emotional and affective 
geographies, drawing some conceptual similarities between them and psychoanalytic 
geographies. Finally, I disrupt ‘normative’ accounts of habitual practice and embed these 
discussions, which echo the ‘uncertain’ and ‘unpredictable’ geographies outlined in 
Chapter 2, in a brief discussion of ‘home’ and ‘mobility. Each of the four ‘geographies’ 
mapped here, and their respective times and spaces, are not neatly configured to the four 
empirical chapters that follow. They should therefore be regarded as conceptual pinpoints 
and resources, which feed into and inform, in varying moves, degrees and intensities, the 
empirical heart of this thesis. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS AND GEOGRAPHIES 
If the unconscious – as something innate and inherently within us, hidden from view, 
unknown even to ourselves – is only decipherable in analysis by a trained analyst, what 
then, are the challenges and implications of psychoanalysis for constructing a social 
geography concerned with questions of subjectivity and space? A decade ago, Kingsbury 
 
68 This is in a sense a social ‘structure’ or ‘grid’, not one that is in any way organic. 
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(2009, p. 481) wrote that ‘psychoanalysis has been frequently viewed by a significant 
number of geographers with a cautiousness that borders on suspicion that even borders on 
paranoia’. Despite a concentrated body of research drawing on a range of psychoanalytic 
schools, frameworks and concepts – including: Freud’s ‘uncanny’ (Hook, 2005; Wilton, 
1998), Lacan’s ‘extimacy’, ‘jouissance’, ‘desire’ and ‘Other’ (Kingsbury, 2007, 2008, 
2015, 2017; Proudfoot, 2017), Kristeva’s ‘abject’ (Sibley, 1995), Winnicott’s ‘transitional 
space’ (Aitken and Herman, 1997); as well as a Special Issue in Social and Cultural 
Geography (edited by Philo and Parr, 2003) and an edited collection (Kingsbury and Pile, 
2014) dealing with issues of history and practice (McGeachan, 2014), space and scale 
(Naraghi, 2014), technology (Thien, 2014), and social life and its discontents (Nast, 2014) 
– there still exists a feeling of unease, even scepticism, about psychoanalysis in geography 
and the wider social sciences (Kingsbury, 2007; Philo and Parr, 2003). 
This caution pivots on the widely received view that psychoanalytic theory is ‘ahistorical’ 
and ‘acultural’69, imposing a universal, singular and unchanging model of humanity’s 
common psychic structuring, an orientation set in stark contrast to academic geography’s 
wider paradigmatic trajectories. Conversely, and despite its own insistence on taking 
‘difference’ seriously, another – almost diametrically opposite – criticism of 
psychoanalysis targets its determined focus on the personal histories and inner worlds of 
the individual, for some locking it away in the extreme particularity of individual 
experience. Psychoanalysis then faces criticism70 for being both ‘backward looking’, for 
example Sartre’s critique that ‘the dimension of the future does not exist for 
psychoanalysis’ (Sartre, 1956, p. 563), and ‘inward gazing’, for example Foucault’s (1978) 
argument that the gaze of interiority, in conjunction with the authority of the analyst, 
serves to silence experiences and expressions of ‘madness’ (see also Whitebook, 2005). 
Even within the psychoanalytic community, there are admissions that ‘psychoanalysis is 
reluctant to attend, both in theory and in practice, to the social forces that structure our very 
being and underwrite our lives’ (Rozmarin, 2017, p. 458). Pile (1993) nonetheless replies 
that psychoanalysis is uniquely situated to disrupt existing conceptual frameworks, 
 
69 This guiding principle strongly associated with ego psychology (a post-Freudian school of psychoanalytic 
thought), in which socio-cultural contexts are deemed relatively unimportant in the processes of human 
development. Ego psychology (the ‘American school’) was closely associated with behaviourism, an 
association that enabled ego-psychologist to situate themselves under the banner of objectivist science. 
This was particularly well received in the US as it aligned itself at the time (and today) with the wider 
socio-political landscape and the persistence of individualism in the US (McClure, 2010, pp. 144–147). 
70 Another resounding criticism of psychoanalysis is that Freud’s work, in particular, flourished on the idea of 
the ‘normal’ sexuality and function and contrasting them ideas of the abnormal and pathological (Davis 
1995). Crucially, I think Lacan’s work moves away from this binary distinction and offers a more 
nuanced approach that acknowledges the diversity in/of psychic life. 
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particularly the ‘structure-agency’ debate and the ‘new models’ of self emerging in 
geography in the late-1980s and early-1990s, models predicated on a knowing/knowable 
subject and favouring the autonomy and transformative potential of the individual in their 
social, cultural and political worlds. 
Callard (2003, pp. 299–300) offers a critique of human geographers’ apparent ‘taming’ of 
psychoanalytic concepts, arguing that they have been diluted and ‘too quickly co-opted 
[…] into the service of a particular model’ of human geography concerned with difference, 
power, resistance and progressive transformation. Outside of geography, Copjec (1989) 
levels similar critiques at film theorists, accusing them of a fundamental misrepresentation 
of the Lacanian gaze through its conflation with the Foucauldian ‘panopticon’. While 
Callard would not go as far as to say psychoanalysis has been misrepresented, she does 
make note of, on the one hand, the limited engagement with the vast body of Freud’s work 
and, on the other, the over-reliance on specific texts, namely The Uncanny (Freud, 1919) 
and Civilisation and its Discontents (Freud, 2010). Kingsbury, responding to Callard’s 
claims, argues that the ‘taming’ of psychoanalysis in academic geography is more to do 
with geography’s uncertainty about psychoanalysis, and that ‘un-taming […] is neither 
possible nor even desirable’ until there is an in-depth engagement with the substantial body 
of psychoanalytic theory. In agreement with Callard, he argues that this ‘taming’ is not 
simply ‘lame dismissals of wild concepts’ or an ‘overestimation’ of social-cultural-political 
transformation, but rather amounts to ‘a simplification – an over-rapid spatialisation – of 
the psychoanalytic subject and the social’ (Kingsbury, 2007, p. 240). A geographical 
engagement with psychoanalysis is, however, well positioned to engage in a ‘de-
clinicalised’ re-reading of psychoanalysis that fosters the plurality of meanings inherent to 
the texts that have the potential to enrich current conceptualisations of subjectivity and 
space. 
Elliot (2004) argues that psychoanalytic theory has provided a conceptual vocabulary to 
dismantle the binaries between individual/society, public/private, structure/agency and 
inner/outer. In its most fundamental form, psychoanalysis enables us to account for the 
idea that one cannot exist without the other and that both ‘sides’ of these dichotomies 
continually constitute one another. Furthermore, of particular interest to the subject of 
social anxiety, which has remained firmly in the grasp of biomedical and clinical accounts 
over the last 60 years (as covered in Chapter 2), Whitebrook (2005) suggests that 
psychoanalysis can offer a much needed ‘de-psychologising’ of the subject and their 
experience. There is no intention to replicate clinical-analytic practice, that is, to 
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psychoanalyse research participants, endeavouring to locate some deep-rooted trauma or 
‘kernel’ as the cause of their social anxiety. Rather, a reading of social anxiety influenced, 
in part, by psychoanalytic theories and geographies aims to shift the focus beyond clinical 
and/or medical accounts by descriptively enhancing our understanding of social anxiety as 
lived in the everyday world (and alert to how individuals with social anxiety may face 
particular and peculiar challenges in the conduct of everyday socio-spatial life). 
Rather than offer a re-reading of Freud’s and Lacan’s vast theoretical works71 in the 
following sections I address certain key psychoanalytic concepts, together with a 
discussion of the wider ‘psychoanalytic’ and ‘geographical’ frameworks that can support 
their use in relation to an analysis of experiencing social anxiety. Other psychoanalytic 
concepts are also discussed further in relation to ‘anticipatory’, ‘emotional’, ‘affective’ and 
‘habitual’ geographies, both later in this chapter and then woven through the empirical 
chapters that ensue. 
ANXIETY 
The concept of anxiety itself is located at the very core of psychoanalysis. The following 
outlines a rudimentary account, highlighting the significance of anxiety to the structure of 
psychoanalytic thought and the key facets and differences inherent in both Freud’s and 
Lacan’s theorisation of anxiety. I draw primarily on Freud’s Inhibitions, Symptoms and 
Anxiety (1926), as his most ‘developed’ understanding of anxiety, and Lacan’s Anxiety: 
Book X, a collection of seminars that he delivered on the subject between 1962 and 1963, 
as well as from secondary literature by Hook (2005, 2013) Kingsbury (2009, 2017) and 
Salecl (2004), in order to situate these concepts within a geographical frame for the 
analysis of social anxiety. 
FREUD’S ANXIETY 
Anxiety has been positioned as the foundation on which the entire architecture of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theories are built, with Freud himself asserting that ‘there is no question 
that the problem of anxiety is a nodal point at which the most various and important 
questions converge, a riddle whose solution would be bound to throw a flood of light on 
our whole mental existence’ (Freud, 2001, p. 393). The way in which anxiety is structured 
 
71 The vast and expansive psychoanalytic oeuvres of Freud and Lacan alone span from 1891-1939 and 1952-
1981, respectively, and were subject to continual revisions and iterations and the occasional monumental 
shifts. I have thus chosen quite specific concepts that speak to the subject of social anxiety. 
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is presented as lying at the root of all psychoanalytic explorations of the human condition. 
Freud developed his understandings of anxiety throughout his lifetime’s work. From 1895-
1925, he asserted that ‘neurotic anxiety’, which he distinguished from ‘realistic anxiety’72, 
was the transformation and manifestation of repressed sexual energies: ‘anxiety is the 
transformation of accumulated tension’ (Freud, 1894, p. n.p.). This theory, while 
preserved, then underwent several subsequent modifications, particularly as Freud 
developed his theory on repression73. In his final iterations, presented in Inhibitions, 
Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), he outlined a dual structure of anxiety. Here, on the one 
hand, he re-positions anxiety as a something that is ‘felt’, an ‘affective state’ operating 
primarily as the ‘precipitate of traumatic experiences’ (Freud, 1926, p. 12). On the other, 
he outlines anxiety as a mode of distressing anticipation, one of ‘anxious expectation’, as a 
future-oriented signal related to the dread of a future event. This temporal structure of 
anxiety, as a mode of repetition and anticipation, elevates the status of anxiety beyond a 
symptom and a consequence of trauma, reconfiguring it instead as the ‘precipitant of other 
mental processes’ and defences (Wong, 1999, p. 819).  
LACAN’S ANXIETY 
For Lacan, too, the question of anxiety was particularly urgent. Lacan’s psychoanalytic 
project is positioned as a ‘return to Freud’74. Book X: Anxiety is one of Lacan’s most 
 
72‘Realistic anxiety’ is considered to be rational and intelligible; an expedient reaction to danger, in which 
there is an expectation of harm and/or injury and combines ‘a mixture of the affect of anxiety and 
defensive action’ (Freud 1973 [1917], p.442) in the form of the fight or flight reaction. Freud (1917) 
dissected the ‘situation of anxiety’ further, determining preparedness for anxiety as an expedient 
behaviour and the generation of anxiety as an inexpedient behaviour. In the face of an external threat or 
danger, where anxiety is generated to an excessively high level, resulting in the paralysis of all action, 
including flight or defence, and interfering with instinctual self-preservation, it is considered to be an 
inexpedient behaviour. However, the generation of anxiety is also presented as a requirement for 
preparedness, a state of increased sensory attention and motor tension, considered to be an advantageous 
element in the face of external danger; as long as generation is confined to a mere signal, ‘preparedness 
for anxiety [will] transform itself without disturbance into action’ (Freud, 1973 [1917], p.443). 
73 The concept of repression is one of the most fundamental in psychoanalytic theory, denoting the ‘process 
through which thoughts and memories are expelled from consciousness and confined to the unconscious’ 
(Evans, 2002, p. 168). 
 
74 Lacan heavily criticised the American (‘ego-psychology’) and British (‘object relations’) schools for 
straying too far from the fundamentals of Freud’s theory, particularly in the field of language and the 
function of speech. Thus, Lacanian approaches are ‘diametrically opposed’ to these schools (Lacan, 1953, 
p.204). There are fundamental differences between Lacanian and ego psychology and object relations 
theories (ORT), particularly in relation to ego psychology’s biological structuring of the unconscious and 
the dual subject-object focus of object relations. In terms of the former, Lacan argues that the 
biological/anatomical foundation of the unconscious ignores the dimensions of nature and culture. In 
terms of the latter, Lacan argues that the focus on the reciprocal subject-object (child-mother) relation in 
ORT is misplaced, although there are those who have attempted to think through the ‘spaces in between’ 
theoretical and clinical fragments in Lacanian and, for example, Winnicottian object relations (Luepnitz, 
2009). 
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fundamental texts, in which he outlines several distinct turning points in the development 
of his psychoanalytic thought and aims to ‘shape a true orography75 of anxiety’ (Lacan, 
2016, p. 7). It is by re-mapping the affective terrain of anxiety, in its various forms and 
reliefs, that he makes this critical diversion. A thorough explanation of anxiety in the 
Lacanian vein requires a mapping, not only of anxiety, but also of the wider co-ordinates 
of his theory – of which anxiety is a fundamental component – namely, the ‘big Other’, 
‘desire’ and the ‘objet a’. I will address these three with reference to Lacan’s specific 
‘moves’ in his theorisation of anxiety, notably as he shifts the focus of anxiety from an 
‘intrasubjective’ to an ‘intersubjective’ force by reconfiguring it in terms of the subject’s 
relationships with the (transubjective) Other (Hook, 2015). 
BIG OTHER 
The ‘big Other’, as a symbolic dimension of the unconscious, is a concept invoked by 
Lacan that has a structuring and regulating function. While Freud engages a more familiar 
understanding of the term ‘other’ to refer to an ‘other’ person or ‘otherness’, for Lacan, 
there is a fundamental distinction between the little other (‘l’autre’) and the big Other 
(‘l’Autre’). This big, capital-O, Other76 stands for ‘a non-existent locus or point of 
reference that tacitly anchors, mediates, and gives consistency to symbolic rules, 
conventions, and mandates’ (Kingsbury, 2017, p. 2). The Other here operates as a symbolic 
network that is irreducible to one point, but for which – or in relation to which – the 
individual has to maintain an appearance with respect to the field of social rules. In short, 
interpersonal relations are mediated by social norms, gestures, hierarchies, expectations, 
representations, and so on. Evans77 (2002, p. 136) explains that: 
The big Other designates a radical alterity, an other-ness which transcends the 
illusory otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be assimilated through 
identification. Lacan equates this radical alterity with language and the law, 
and hence the big Other is inscribed in the order of the symbolic. Indeed, the 
big Other is the symbolic insofar as it is particularised for each subject. The 
Other is thus both another subject, in his [sic] radical alterity and unassimilable 
uniqueness, and the symbolic order [that] mediates the relationship with that 
 
75 Orography is the branch of physical geography studying and mapping the formation and feature of 
mountains. It is interesting that Lacan should deploy this fundamentally geographical notion of the 
physical landscape to advance his reasoning here. 
76 It is the mother who first occupies the position of the other for the child. Mother is often stylised by Lacan 
as ‘(m)other’ to signify the mother is often the first other that the infant encounters (Luepnitz, 2009) 
77 Lacan also contends that it is in the place of the Other that the psychoanalyst must situate themselves in the 
therapeutic encounter (Evans 2002). This is a stand in position, whereby the analysand can impact onto 
the analyst their unconscious desires, a process known as transference.  
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other subject. 
Crucially, Evans also notes that the Other as another subject ‘is strictly secondary’ to the 
Other as a symbolic order: 
It is thus only possible to speak of the Other as a subject in a secondary sense, 
in the sense that a subject [i.e. parent, teacher or analyst] may occupy this 
position and thereby ‘embody’ the Other for another subject. (Evans, 2002, 
p.136) 
The Other is therefore conceived of as a structural necessity that occupies a symbolic ‘third 
dimension’, not another human being per se but ‘a subject that stands above the interaction 
of real human interaction’ (Žižek, 2011a, p. 41).  
Hook (2015, p.10) neatly conceptualises the differences between ‘inter-subjectivity’ and 
‘trans-subjectivity’ in way that is useful for considering social anxiety in terms of mapping 
the ‘co-ordinates of how [an individual is] understood in the perspective of this other’. He 
writes that the degree of anxiety experienced in social situations is ‘often proportionate to 
the number of people’ present and ‘the difficulty one has in reading their prospective 
intentions’. Indeed, the subject’s position(s) (i.e. from where ‘I’ see myself in the eyes of 
the o/Other) is peppered with negative (self) evaluations, perceptions, guesswork, and the 
fear of negative evaluation, rejection, and isolation and so on. What becomes increasingly 
hard to manage and therefore more anxiety-provoking is ‘how an unfamiliar group as a 
whole sees one’ (Hooks, 2015, p.10 original emphasis). This is the level of the ‘trans-
subjective’. What emerges is not an ‘aggregate of intersubjective views’: although, 
arguably, ‘each single member of a group does have a view of you, and this combined 
force can be significant [, it is but] one vector in the overall trans-subjective consensus’ 
(Hooks, 2015, p.11). Therefore, as Kingsbury (2009, p. 488) highlights, ‘the unconscious is 
the accumulation of other people’s spoken words, that is, the subtle din and babble of 
people’s desires, demands, compliments, scolds, as well as cultural codes, more generally’, 
echoing Lacan’s (2006, p. 16) famous aphorism: ‘the unconscious is the discourse of the 
Other’. Our unconscious is, in this sense at least, the Other. 
The Other (as the social world of language, the law, and social conventions) is hence the 
fundamental principle that underlies and structures the symbolic order and, by extension, 
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our interactions with and within our socio-spatial worlds78. Anxiety emerges in this 
unassimilable ‘gap’ between the subject and the Other, that is ‘between the subject and 
what they take their symbolic and socio-historical location to signify and, importantly, to 
desire’ (Hook, 2015, p.115 original emphasis). 
DESIRE 
Desire emerges in the unconscious field of the Other and relates to the subject’s desire for 
social recognition, love and belonging (Evans, 2002), a concept that led to one of Lacan’s 
most repeated phrases: ‘Desire is the desire of the Other’. The desiring Other prompts the 
question from the subject, ‘what do you want from me?’ and, in turn, constitutes ‘our own 
recurring and idiosyncratic patterns of desire’ (Lapping, 2017, p. 911) our own quest to be 
made ‘whole’. We desire to be desired (i.e. recognised, loved and to belong). Crucially, 
desire is situated in the Lacanian oeuvre as a ‘social product’ not an inner process: ‘it is 
always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desire of other subjects’ 
(Evans, 2002, p.39). What provokes anxiety is that ‘the desire of the Other does not 
recognise me, and even if I have the impression that the Other does recognise me, it will 
not recognise me sufficiently. The Other always puts me into question, interrogates me at 
the very root of my being’ (Salecl, 2004, p.15). The insufficiency of the Other bothers the 
subject: it is because the Other is fragmented and incoherent that we cannot say ‘what the 
Other’s desire is or how one appears in the desire of the Other’ (Salecl 2004, p.14). This 
uncertainty and unknowability hence lies at the heart of anxiety. 
Echoing Pile (1991) in his assessment of what psychoanalytic geography can offer to an 
understanding of self and subjectivity, is the notion that the subject is, in a sense, 
ultimately unknowable both to themselves and to others beyond the experiences, 
knowledges, relationships and environments through which they construct meaning, 
identity and sense of self. Hook (2015, p. 116) argues that ‘the prospect of being stripped 
of the symbolic79 co-ordinates underlying one’s most basic identifications thus provides us 
with perspective on what engenders anxiety’. When viewed through the lens of social 
anxiety, we see an individual whose basic sense of self is destabilised, when (they 
 
78 Not any specific legislation per se, but rather the principles that make social relations possible and govern, 
for example, social exchanges and gift-giving. Kingsbury (2017) explores how these dynamics contribute 
to an ‘uneasiness in culture’. 
79 The symbolic is one of the three Lacanian ‘orders’ (the others being the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘real’). The 
symbolic attends to the ‘a-subjective social grid’ in which individuals ‘assume a position, a role [or] a 
place’.  
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perceive) their performance and place in the social world as the subject of (the) o/Other’s 
scrutiny – a scrutiny whose well-springs and expectations remain forever obscure, 
fractured and unpredictable – and are therefore convinced of their own (self-perceived) 
failure judged against the (perceived but not fully known) demands of the o/Other. 
Anxieties manifest across a spectrum of social and interpersonal spaces, for example, in 
the workplace and spaces of education (Chapter 7) and across an array of public settings 
(Chapter 8). Taking the example of the university, these environments constitute, in part, a 
desiring other in the form of lecturers, peers, academic expectations (from the self, family 
and/or degree courses) and/or the ‘institution’ in its entirety. These spaces, and 
consequently the interactions and relations that are produced through them, are exemplary 
of how the individual is confronted with the symbolic order, whereby all manner of 
institutional boundaries, pedagogical encounters, social conventions, rules and hierarchies 
– tantamount to the Other – are inscribed. Therefore, how the subjects encountering these 
spaces orient themselves in relation to this order is a considerable source of anxiety, 
potentially overwhelming for some. Lapping (2017) explores the shifting dimensions of 
desire and o/Other within academic research and practice, addressing the ‘overwhelming 
sense of institutional pressure’ that can indeed invoke a disturbing ‘otherness’. The Other 
here may become an ‘unknowable constituent of the self’ (Lapping 2017, p.376). In the 
context of academic practice, Lapping highlights how lack and otherness are constituted in 
the interview process between the (disciplinary) identities of herself (education) and her 
research subject (literary studies): 
[I]n so far as literary studies constitutes a specific other from which my 
subjectivity is constituted, and in so far as there are opaque aspects of literary 
studies that cannot be articulated within this subjectivity, it might be said that 
my interview with F evoked a disturbing otherness. This experience of 
otherness confronted me with my incompleteness, the gap in my ability to 
perform as researcher, and a certain, inevitable limit to my ability to 
concentrate on or attend to my participant – Because I don’t understand F, 
because I am in a sense overwhelmed by her otherness, I attribute my lack to 
her: she reduced me to a dull social science interviewer, she was being 
defensive (when in fact it is the unconscious relations between signifiers that 
constitute these interpretations). (Lapping, 2017, p.377) 
What is crucial to Lapping’s assessment (particularly relating to social anxiety) is the sense 
of opaqueness and uncertainty that the Other embodies, ultimately signifying to the subject 
that something is inherently lacking in them (i.e. I am not good enough, I am not capable). 
There is an inherent geography here, in that specific spaces engender different meanings, 
different articulations of desire and, as a result, variations in the intensity and focus of 
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anxiety. 
UNCANNY LITTLE OBJECT 
Freud (1926, p.100) famously claimed that anxiety is ‘about something. It has a quality of 
indefiniteness and lack of object’. This lack of object is also significant in 
phenomenological approaches to the problem of anxiety (Heidegger, 1953; Kierkegaard, 
2014; Sartre, 1956). In both accounts, fear is often used as a point of contrast when 
attempting to determine precisely what anxiety is and where it is located. Whereas fear 
encompasses a sense-perception of a present and a definite object or danger, anxiety is 
construed as ‘free-floating’ with an unknown or indeterminate object80. Lacan’s (1990, p. 
82 original emphasis) second objective was to extend Freudian and phenomenological 
conceptualisations by establishing that anxiety is ‘not without an object’. In this sense, 
anxiety may well lack the definitive and material object that induces fear inherent in, for 
example, biophobias81 (Davidson and Smith, 2003; Smith and Davidson, 2006) or a fear of 
needles (Andrews, 2011), but, as Lacan points out, this lack is not the same as ‘not having’ 
an object. 
The interactions, sites and settings of social anxiety are ‘not without’ significance in that 
they induce the most destabilising and distressing experiences of anxiety. The significance 
of the particular quality of the interactions and spaces, which may shift in location and 
intensity, can be exemplified by the person who can give a presentation to their team 
members but crumbles in anticipation of a one-to-one review of her performance with her 
manager82. There is hence a subliminal something83 at the root of anxiety, something that 
 
80 Despite this distinction, in the empirical heart of this thesis I still use fear and anxiety interchangeably, as 
do participants, as social environments are experienced as inherently fearful and anxiety-provoking. The 
difference between the two is often difficult to determine. 
81 Smith and Davidson (2006) explore, through Kristeva’s notions of the ‘abject’, the subjective feelings of 
disgust that emerge in phobias of nature. The ‘abject’ sustains the notion that the production and 
maintenance of identity is closely implicated in, and to an extent facilitated by, the expulsion of subjects 
and/or objects defined as ‘other’, in this case the threatening and uncontrollable presence of animals and 
nature, e.g. rats, cockroaches, snakes, etc. 
82 In this example, the former situation may enable more control as an individual can prepare, rehearse and 
have notes; whereas the anxieties present in the latter situation may revolve around issues of evaluation, 
performance, authority (of the manager), direct face-to-face or eye contact, or where the meeting will take 
place, e.g. in her manager’s office (another layer of authority/power). 
83 Lacan (2013, p. 140) notes that the processes of ‘sublimation’’ are responsible for transforming everyday 
objects, interactions and spaces into the ‘place of the Thing’. The ‘Thing’ is something familiar or 
‘ordinary’ that is simultaneously profoundly terrifying (Kingsbury, 2011) 
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escapes signification, which Lacan refers to as the objet petit a84. Kirshner (2005, p. 85) 
argues that we should not attempt to explain the meaning of human relationships through 
abstract concepts like the objet petit a, in the sense of offering a concrete answer to their 
complexity. Rather, the claim is that these concepts operate as ‘metaphysical constructs’ 
aiming to ‘bridge a gap’ between our biological existence and subjective experience. 
At the heart of the objet a lies a paradox. The objet a ‘fills the gap constituted by the 
inaugural division of the self’ (Lacan, 1964, p.270). This division accounts for Lacan’s 
theorisation of subjectivity, in that for him the subject can never be anything but split or 
alienated from a part of them85. The objet a stands for the object’s cause of desire insofar 
as the object of desire (discussed above) is unattainable. In this sense, desire has a relation 
to ‘lack’, in that we cannot assimilate the self with the desire of the Other. In other words, 
because the question ‘what do you want from me?’ cannot be answered, we experience an 
inherent ‘lack of being’ (Lacan, 2006, p.251) and perpetual uncertainty. Despite this, Lee 
(2017, p. 146) states that the subject ‘hauls itself onto a path for finding out what the Other 
might want or what might satisfy the Other’s desire.’ Hook (2015) notes that there are 
many indications in the social world (e.g. in culture, advertising and social media) that 
inform the subject on what is of value in them, how they can become more valuable (to 
others and their self) and what they should aspire to be. These ambitions for becoming 
more valuable are always unachievable, and thus arises the continual drive to do more and 
be more than what we currently are: in the end, of course, these ambitions are unfulfilling 
and unfulfillable. Kingsbury (2011, p.659) summarises this unattainable object of desire, 
stating that when a ‘person desires, they do not aim to satiate an appetite but rather aim at 
something more, something bigger, something better, something worthier, something 
somewhere else’. Desire can never be satisfied86, it only desires, manifesting in the 
continual ‘desire for something else’ (Lacan, 2006, p. 431)). This relation between lack 
and desire is doubly-framed through the inherent constitutive lack of the subject as well as 
the lack in the Other. It is at this deadlock that the subject encounters anxiety. Therefore, 
the object petit a is ‘what falls from the subject in anxiety’ (Lacan, 1990, p. 82): it is the 
object that is encountered ‘where the world fails’ (Žižek, 1994, p.178 cited in Kingsbury, 
2010, p. 544). 
 
84 Lacan requested that ‘objet a’ remain untranslated so as to determine its separateness from the little ‘other’ 
(l’autre) and also to maintain the position ‘a’ in his algebraic matheme as, if translated, it would translate 
in English to ‘o’ for ‘other’. 
85 In his algebraic matheme, the subject is depicted by $ (barred S), demonstrating the split subject. 
86 This differentiates desire from, for example, hunger or thirst. 
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Anxiety is particularly hard to locate or concretely define as there is something 
fundamentally paradoxical about anxiety, either as an absence occurring in the presence of 
a particular set of interactions or situations, or a lack that manifests through the intensities 
of experience (Chapter 5). The Freudian concept of unheimlich, the ‘uncanny’, plays a 
particularly important role in Lacanian theorisations of anxiety. Freud (1919, p.370 
emphases added) defines the uncanny as follows: 
The German word unheimlich is obviously the opposite of heimlich, heimsch, 
meaning ‘familiar’, ‘native’, ‘belonging to the home’; and we are tempted to 
conclude that what is ‘uncanny’ is frightening precisely because it is not known 
and familiar. Naturally, not everything that is new and unfamiliar is 
frightening; however, the relation cannot be inverted. We can only say that 
what is novel can easily become frightening and uncanny; some new things are 
frightening but not by any means at all. Something has to be added to what is 
novel and unfamiliar to make it uncanny. 
The uncanny, as simultaneously and paradoxically unfamiliar and disturbingly familiar, 
entails a repetition of sorts (Chapter 5). The ‘uncanny’ as concept has been employed in 
geography (and the wider social sciences) to capture the ‘strangely familiar’: in the 
emotional geographies of migration (Marinelli and Ricatti, 2013); in the breakdown of 
self-identities and bodily boundaries in experiences of chronic pain (Honkasalo, 2001); by 
problematising the boundaries of home/not-home in experiences of homelessness 
(McCarthy, 2018); and situating the proximity of difference as a perceived threat to social 
order in experiences of HIV/AIDS (Wilton, 1995). Hook (2005) demonstrates the 
‘polemics’ of the uncanny through monumental structures and architecture that embody a 
felt sense of presence in the viewer, arguing that: 
[T]here are two basic ‘poles’ of the uncanny: anxieties concerning variants of 
embodied absence on the one hand, and disembodied presence, on the other. At 
basis, these are ontological anxieties about the status of the object, and more 
particularly, anxieties about its status as human. Put differently, these are 
anxieties about the soul, which becomes problematic by virtue of either its 
absence (where it should be present) or its presence (where it should be 
absent). (Hooks, 2005, p. 697 original emphases) 
Robertson’s (2015, p.20) account of the uncanny is also particularly useful for considering 
the uncanny dimensions of social anxiety: 
It is always marked by the horrible feeling of being out of place and of 
everyone else seeing it written on your face, as if in bold, uppercase script. 
When I am asked to give a toast at a party or a wedding celebration, for 
instance, my mind suddenly goes blank and I find myself squirming and 
wringing my hands while everyone’s eyes fix me to the spot. All of a sudden, I 
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have the mildly psychotic experience in which the faces of my family and 
friends somehow seem to shed their sense of recognisability and familiarity. In 
the place of the familiar face or the recognizable friend, all that I see is the 
space of those horrible, gaping eyes opening up like uncanny black holes in the 
surfaces of everyone’s face. 
In relation to social anxiety, the manifestations of this paradox are indeed numerous, as the 
following empirical chapters will demonstrate, but, as an example, these dynamics could 
refer to the feelings of isolation and loneliness that emerge even when a person is 
surrounded by others, the seeming insufficiency of their not being ‘good enough’ in this 
situation becoming emotionally and affectively overwhelming and destabilising to their 
sense of self. It is precisely in these situations that even known and familiar people, for 
example friends and family, come to occupy a radical alterity or ‘Otherness’. Equally, the 
person experiencing social anxiety may also feel that their private, inner worlds have been 
radically exposed in the face of ‘agonising and paralysing embarrassment’ (Robertson, 
2015, p. 21). In reviewing Lacan’s theoretical move, Hook (2015, p. 119) concludes that: 
Anxiety then is less about an object per se, than about a crushing experience of 
‘out of placeness’. Given the conditions of anxiety, [...] an object of sorts will 
invariably be there, intruding upon the experience of the subject. Crucially 
however its disconcerting quality has less to do with any of its inherent 
properties, than with where it occurs, with how it disturbs the subject’s 
‘fantasmatic schematization of the world87‘. It is this phenomenon of the object 
out of place that so directly links Lacan’s notion of anxiety to Freud’s 
conceptualisation of the uncanny. 
Anxiety, and its affects (e.g. shame, guilt and embarrassment) represent ‘our sense of an 
inalienable and yet un-integratable surplus of self’ (Copjec, 2006, p. 23) that has the dual 
effect of distancing us from our self but also making us increasingly aware of our self, 
bodies and surroundings. Thus, psychoanalytic theory is useful to understand the 
fundamentally topological nature of social anxiety, in terms of how it is shaped personally, 
socially and culturally through traumatic circumstances, social norms and cultural codes 
and conventions. It also accommodates concerns about how everyday social interactions, 
situations and spaces occupy an inherent sense of uneasiness and uncertainty, at best, and 
an excruciating sense of loneliness and isolation, at worst. 
ANTICIPATORY CONCEPTS AND GEOGRAPHIES 
The anticipatory dynamics of the subject-matter for this project are centred on three 
 
87 Literally, how the world is understood, constructed, experienced and made sense of. 
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intertwining trajectories: the embodied temporalities and spatialities of anticipation; the 
role of anticipation in the constitution of (anxious) subjectivities; and the role of 
anticipation in the (un)habitual patterning of social anxiety. There is a burgeoning interest 
in human geography with the ‘topology of the future’ (Brown and Michael, 2003, p. 4). 
Research in this area is broadly concerned with the assemblages of anticipatory 
knowledges, for example ‘pre-emptive’, ‘precautionary’ and ‘preparatory’ logics, as well 
as anticipatory practice. This concern encompasses the various ways in which the future is 
‘mobilised’ and made present (Anderson, 2010) and its impact on the materialities and 
vitalities of everyday social and spatial life. Logics are defined as a ‘coherent way in which 
intervention in the here and now, on the basis of the future, is legitimised, guided and 
enacted’88 (Anderson, 2010, p. 778) adds that, if pre-emptive and precautionary actions 
aim to ‘prevent the occurrence of a future’, then preparedness ‘prepares for the aftermath’ 
of what does end up occurring. 
Anticipatory processes are orchestrated within particular technologies and regimes of (self) 
governance and (self) securitisation (Adey and Anderson, 2011; Anderson, 2010; Evans, 
2010). Forms of anticipatory governance are considered geographically through scientific 
and technological ‘modulation’ of molecular processes (Anderson, 2007), natural hazards 
and disasters (Adey and Anderson, 2011) and threats to biosecurity (Hinchliffe et al., 
2012). They have also been influential in health-related studies concerning the 
management of ‘risky’ bodies through policy interventions geared towards obesity 
prevention (Evans, 2010), and also with respect to the biomedical management of pregnant 
bodies (Parker and Pausé, 2018) and epilepsy (Smith, 2013)89. Outside of geography, 
others examine ‘anticipatory discussions’ in health and social care settings, demonstrating 
their formative role in the end-of-life care, by enabling patients, in collaboration with 
General Practitioners and their families, to account for potential events and interventions in 
the course of their treatment (Oude Engberink et al., 2017).  
Much of this scholarship is operationalised on a macro-scale, but there are small pockets of 
work where the focus has shifted to assess the logics of practice and performance in 
everyday life. Tucker (2013) considers the spatial anticipation of the future through mental 
health service users’ practices of ‘home-making’. Drawing on the experience of two men 
 
88 The anticipatory experiences in social anxiety are not often ‘coherent’ and do not always appear to make 
sense: these ‘logics’ are contextualised and examined in Chapter 5. 
89 These aspects are embedded in the ‘responsibilisation’ of health care, processes that are evident in the 
‘governing’ of social anxiety (Chapter 6). 
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(‘Chris’ and ‘Roy’), whose social and spatial geographies are mostly limited to home and a 
mental health day-centre in the community, Tucker argues that home becomes the 
quintessential anticipatory space for people living with mental and emotional distress 
(Chapter 7). Present states of wellbeing are enacted through anticipatory ‘home-making’ 
aimed at reducing (future) uncertainty and instability – and this argument is particularly 
interesting given that both men have relatively precarious living situations in terms of 
geography and tenancy agreements. First, Tucker (2013) illustrates how Chris’s practices 
of stock-piling dried and canned foods can be viewed as a form of anticipatory action in 
the present. For Chris, regular ‘stockpiling’ produces consistency in his routine habits and 
future stability by increasing resiliency should he fall upon future hardship. Second, he 
discusses Roy, who had recently taken over tenancy of his late mother’s house, illustrating 
here how Roy’s sense of ownership is anchored in the materiality of the home by sorting, 
de-cluttering and re-organising his (and his mother’s) belongings. Anticipatory practices of 
home-making not only stabilise the present but aid in generating hopeful and positive 
futures. A central theme that progresses through these iterations of anticipation is the 
conceptualisation of anticipatory knowledge, practice and governance as a stabilising, 
regulating and enabling force in the face of unknown and uncertain futures. Tucker is less 
concerned, however, with the lived experience of anticipation as a temporally and spatially 
disruptive force (cf. Boyle, 2018; Smith, 2013).  
Anticipatory processes are not just about management of bodies, they are embodied, dis-
embodied and re-embodied in the everyday experiences of health and illness. Locock et al. 
(2016) identify temporal and spatial cues that cause women to anticipate a formal 
diagnosis of breast cancer and how various medical sites, sounds, settings and procedures 
invoke an accompanying affective uneasiness. Smith’s anticipatory analysis of experiences 
of epilepsy is particularly instructive for this research. While addressing the wider 
biopolitical governance of epileptic bodies, he also considers in-depth how the anticipatory 
dynamics of the epileptic body manifest and shape everyday social and spatial worlds. He 
highlights this point through the event of seizure, outlining how the ‘event’ in and of itself 
is not and cannot be known by the individual having a seizure due to loss of consciousness 
and subsequent memory blanking. It is only before the event, through anticipation and 
‘aura’90, and after the event when a person regains awareness – which, even then, is 
marked by a ‘lower state of consciousness’ – that events become known. Botterill et al. 
(2017, p. 9) examine practices of self-securitisation by ethnic and religious minority youth 
 
90 Smith (2013, p. 4) describes an aura as an ‘embodied sensation’ akin to a warning sign that an epileptic 
seizure is immanent for example, a feeling or a smell.  
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in Scotland, arguing that they are fundamental to preserving a person’s sense of 
‘ontological security’. They state that: 
In anticipating certain futures, individuals calculate risk, taking into account a 
series of imagined futures. Their subsequent actions are justified through the 
preservation of ontological security. We conceptualise ‘pre-emptive strategies’ 
of young people as acts that are based on an emergent and indeterminate threat. 
Anderson’s anticipatory ‘logics’, by definition, assume ‘coherence’. Yet, in social anxiety, 
the vision of the future and the experience of the present is often incoherent, destabilising 
and wrought with uncertainty. Useful parallels can be drawn between lived anticipation 
and ‘anticipatory grief’, which in part is characterised by feelings of suspense, being 
overwhelmed, a disconnection from social and spatial life, not being able to think through 
or construct ‘futures’ beyond the anticipated event, and contradictory and conflicting 
feelings and desires (Duke, 1998). In this sense, anticipation as a ‘forewarning’ can be 
viewed as ‘rehearsal’ for the actual event of death (Fulton et al., 1996). Anticipatory 
anxiety can lead the individual to construct similar bodily, social and spatial mechanisms 
in preparation of an impending and/or imagined future event (Boyle, 2018). The reality of 
anticipation is felt as a pervasive threat, where time and space and their relational 
dynamics are written, unwritten and rewritten as people orientate their everyday social and 
spatial worlds. Social and spatial environments, comprised of relational patterns and 
interactions, are, by their very nature anticipatory. As an affective condition, anticipation is 
a dynamic movement that therefore takes place between a person and their social spatial 
surroundings, and these felt dynamics or ‘intensities’ (Chapter 5) find ‘corporeal 
expression in bodily feelings’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 736).  
Important aspects of anticipatory processes have thus far been neglected in geographical 
research, namely those concerned with a relational unfolding of anticipatory experiences. 
Future-orientations are not stable, they are continuously written, unwritten and rewritten in 
the face of increasing social and spatial demands, and therefore attention must be paid to 
how anticipations are temporally and spatially (mis)placed. The anticipatory sensibility put 
forward in this thesis aims to make sense of the anticipation that emanates from the 
(un)knowns, (un)certainties and (in)securities of everyday social and spatial life as it 
relates to experiences of social anxiety. Anticipation is integral to the constitution of the 
(anxious) subject, to the shaping and re-shaping of anxious experiences and to the ‘full-
blown’ pattern of social anxiety that gradually comes into being. Anticipated social threats 
are made present through the visceral ‘reoccurrence’ of past events. These events are re-
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experienced in the emotional and affective dimensions of anticipation and embodied in the 
symptoms and sensations indicative of social anxiety (Chapter 6). Anticipation, in this 
sense, serves to destabilise, disorganise and disable the individual. An anticipatory 
geography of social anxiety is concerned with what happens before and after an anticipated 
event and the various ways that anticipations are socially and spatially constituted and 
embodied in the present. Moreover, the cyclical iterations of past events, social rebukes 
and criticisms, projected forward and coloured by various intensities, further bolster the 
habitual pattern of social anxiety. 
EMOTIONAL AND AFFECTIVE GEOGRAPHIES 
Bondi et al. (2007) note that the crux of emotional work is most apparent at the 
intersections of two streams of geographic thought: critical geographies of health and 
embodiment, on the one hand, and geographies of identities and social relations, on the 
other. The ‘emotional turn’ continues to enrich and enhance geography’s previously 
‘emotionally barren’ (Bondi et al. 2007, p.1) disciplinary landscape. Davidson and 
Milligan (2004, p. 542) conceptualise emotions ‘as a form of connective tissue that links 
experiential geographies of the human psyche and physique with(in) broader social 
geographies of place’, highlighting the interconnections between mind-body-world. By 
unearthing and placing emphasis, in the context of health, illness and care, on: the 
emotional dynamics of situated doctor-patient and workplace relations (MacKian et al., 
2004; Rowland, 2014); narratives of help and treatment-seeking (Kingsbury et al., 2012); 
physical and emotional labour in the context of care-giving (Giesbrecht et al., 2016; Parish 
and Montsion, 2018); biographical disruption in experiences of health and illness (Bell et 
al. 2016; Lucherini, 2015); and the embodied experiences of health and illness (Davidson, 
2001; Longhurst, 1994; Smith, 2012): in all of these ways emotional geographies research 
has captured how emotions are thoroughly embodied and embedded in everyday aspects of 
health, illness and wellbeing91. 
Emotional geographies have been influenced by three wider disciplinary trajectories: 
humanistic, feminist and non-representational (Bondi, 2005). Early humanistic approaches 
privileged a knowing and knowable subject, replete with consciousness and agency in 
 
91 The integration of emotions into geography as a ‘field of study’ required geographers to turn the emotional 
lens on themselves, and consequently various authors have highlighted the emotional dimensions of 
academic life, for example, research(er) anxieties (Laurier and Parr, 2000; Proudfoot, 2015) (and the 
emotional labour of fieldwork (McGarrol, 2017) (Chapter 4). 
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interaction with their surrounding environments92. Bondi (2005, p.435) argues that, while 
humanistic approaches paved the way for the discipline’s engagement with emotion, this 
body of work, concerned with the ‘wholeness’ of the subject, did not challenge or attempt 
to rework the distinctions between self, other and environment or see emotion as located 
anywhere else but in the ‘interior lives’ of the individual93. Feminist approaches aim to 
disrupt the gendered politics of emotion that situate ‘feminine’ notions of emotion and the 
subjective in opposition to masculine rationality and the objective (Anderson & Smith, 
2002). For example, Valentine (1989) and others (Brownlow, 2005; Wilson and Little, 
2008), through their work on the geographies of fear, demonstrate how feelings of fear, 
doubt and vulnerability manifest relationally through culture, the media and attitudes of 
family and friends, impacting how both men and women perceive, use and navigate both 
built (Koskela and Pain, 2000) and natural (Burgess, 1998; Madge, 1997) environments. 
These approaches also aim to disrupt the coherent narratives of the self as advanced by 
humanistic approaches by taking account of the fluidity of emotions and permeability of 
bodily boundaries – aspects that are particularly evident in phobic (Davidson, 2000; 2001; 
2003) and delusional (Parr, 1999) geographies. 
Despite these disruptive attempts, inquiries alert to emotional geographies are often 
accused of still being too concerned with the cognitive and ‘interior’ lives of the individual 
(McCormack, 2006; Pile, 2009a). Psychotherapeutic ideas and methods have taken account 
of how emotions are relationally and inter-subjectively (mis)understood (Bondi, 2009), 
embodied, practised and produced in and through space (Bennett, 2009; Bondi, 2009; 
Simonsen, 2007). More importantly, they have furnished an understanding of emotions as 
not explicitly cognitive, and therefore unavailable for individuals to ‘know’, to ‘represent’ 
and to wilfully act upon – and hence the turn to affect, in order to engage with the more 
collectively felt, dimly apprehended, hard-to-recognise or articulate dimensions of life. 
Geographers have worked in various creative ways to gain an understanding of people’s 
emotional and creative lives, by employing methods that extend beyond simply asking, 
‘how do you feel about that?94‘, examples being Bingley’s (2003) tactile ‘sand play’ and 
 
92 Early humanistic approaches were also largely  subjectivist i n  th a t  p l ace  was  understood as a 
cognitive representation inside the human being and ontologically separate from the objective 
environment outside (Seamon & Lundberg, 2017, p.9).  
93 Similarly, Rose (1993) notes that humanistic approaches are too individualistic and do not pay significant 
attention to broader social and power relations. 
94 McCormack (2006, p.331), discussing his affective (rather than emotional) approach to Dance Movement 
Therapy experience, says that he was ‘never once asked how [he] felt, nor was anyone else’, reflecting a 
conceptualisation that emotions are cognitive and discursive, that is, the opposite of affects. This issue is 
discussed in more detail below. 
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McGeachan’s (2017) encounters with ‘Art Extraordinary’95, which capture the liminal 
tensions between people’s ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds. Davidson and Milligan (2004, p. 
524) state, that: 
[E]motions can clearly alter the way the world is for us, affecting our sense of 
time as well as space. Our sense of who and what we are is continually 
(re)shaped by how we feel. Similarly, the imagined or projected substance of 
our future experience will alter in relation to our current emotional state. As 
studies of phobic and delusional geographies show, for some, the feeling that 
space is populated with the complex and often contradictory emotional 
projections of others results in experiences of unbearable intensity and distress 
that challenge the very boundaries of the self. 
Emotions are woven into the fabric of a person’s experience of health and illness and are 
therefore fluid and complex, reflecting the ebb and flow of experiences over time and 
across space. During illness, everyday life tends to be marked by uncertainty, as seen in 
chronic illness (Moss and Dyck, 2003). This intensity of emotional experience can also be 
positively and/or negatively impacted by external events, for example by the presence or 
absence of support systems and employment issues (Dyck and Jongbloed, 2000) or by the 
ability to find enjoyment and fulfilment in leisure activities (McQuoid, 2017). While 
certain experiences of health/illness may cause a person to be overwhelmed with emotion, 
other experiences can leave an individual feeling numb, empty, detached and emotionless 
(yet still feeling) (Chapter 7). 
Parr et al. (2005) demonstrate the thoroughly emplaced dynamics of emotions through a 
study of mental ill-health in the Scottish Highlands. By working (if loosely) with the 
Freudian notion of repression, they disrupt the problematic splitting of emotion and affect 
(as a split between the cognitive and the non-cognitive). They discuss how social and 
cultural norms inherent in community life render emotions ‘unspeakable’ and consider the 
social and emotional consequences of this individual and collective repressive practice: 
‘[t]he consequences of transgressing cultural norms surrounding emotional expression can 
include community rejection, devastating in its social impact on small rural places’ (Parr et 
al., 2005, pp.93-94). Consequently, for people with mental health problems there: 
is a huge sense of social pressure not to disclose or discuss their problematic 
emotional and psychological states [and] to battle constantly with the 
experience of emotional and psychological disruption, not only in terms of 
searching for recovery from illness, but in respect of the need to conceal what 
 
95 ‘Art Extraordinary’ refers to a unique collection of Scottish ‘outsider art’ from asylum spaces in early-20th 
century Scotland. 
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they have learned [as] inappropriate behaviour. 
Parr et al. (2005, p.90) also draw attention to the fact that emotion and processes of 
repression ‘are not anchored solely in the individual, but rather in a more collective, 
shared, socially, culturally and even environmentally96 situated play of exchanges’. The 
conceptualisations of emotion by Parr et al. (2005) and Davidson and Milligan (2004) 
share similar conceptual ground to affect, and Pile (2009) notes that the shared relational 
ontologies in play here could be a productive middle-ground. 
Conceptualisations of affect in academic geography (and the wider social sciences) have 
been effectively grounded in the work of neuroscientist Damasio and developmental 
psychologist Stern (Papoulias and Callard, 2010). Geographies of affect are often situated 
contra the emotional, the discursive and the cognitive (Wetherell, 2013), and certain 
conceptualisations of affect, certainly those dominant in non-representational modes of 
geographic thought, are often impelled to seek meaning and ‘reality’ beyond words, 
speech, symbols, thoughts and ideas (Thrift, 2004). This polarising of emotion versus 
affect, representational versus non-representational, bodies versus talk and practice versus 
discourse, arising it seems in work on affective geographies, has been the subject of 
criticism from both within and outwith the discipline (Thien, 2005; Wetherell, 2015, 2013).  
Thien’s (2005) criticism centres on the dichotomy of affect and emotion. As the former 
becomes positioned on a more mechanistic and ‘theoretically sophisticated register’, the 
latter, she complains, is reduced to a more ‘touchy-feely’ feminised sphere. She is critical 
of how affect is operationalised in geographic thought, specifically objecting to the fashion 
in which the language employed to describe how affect is ‘engineered’ becomes 
‘something more akin to the networks of pipes and cables’ that ‘provid[es] the basic 
mechanics […] to urban life’ (Thrift, 2004, p.58; cited in Thien, 2005, p.452). Thien (2005, 
p. 450) contends that: 
This model of affect discourages an engagement with everyday emotional 
subjectivities, falling into a familiar pattern of distancing emotion from 
‘reasonable’ scholarship and simultaneously implying that the emotion of the 
individual, that is, the realm of ‘personal’ feelings, is distinct from wider 
(public) agendas and desirably so. 
For Thien (2005), there is an implicit feminisation of emotion occurring here when 
 
96 Recent work in an ‘environmental’ vein has sought to engage emotional geographies with climate change 
action studies in order to orchestrate transformative change (Ryan, 2016).  
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positioned opposite more masculinised conceptualisations of affect. 
There is hence an impasse of sorts between affective geographies and any interest in 
representation97. Affect is strongly associated with a non-representational ontology (Thrift, 
2008) that is centred around practice and performativity98. Non-representational 
orientations prioritise the pre-discursive and visceral forces that are ‘irreducibly bodily and 
automatic’ (Massumi, 2002, p. 28) and therefore apparently resist or escape representation 
and signification. The body is taken to have ‘a grammar of its own that cannot be fully 
captured in language’ (Shouse, 2005, p. np). Affective geographies are centred around 
notions of the excessive, sensorial, intensive, atmospheric, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic 
dimensions of everyday social, cultural and political life (Anderson, 2009; Bissell, 2009; 
Thrift, 2004). Bissell (2010a, p. 81) highlights the affective registers of the chronically 
pained body: 
First, there is the affective force of the physical painfulness of the pain itself 
impressing through the body: the sheer bite of pain through the body itself. 
Then there is the affective power of the materiality of the hospital that is 
significantly enhanced by the presence of the pain, demanding a bodily 
response through choosing to sit on a particular side of the bus […] But then 
there is the affect of the hospital that intensifies the embodied sensation of 
physical pain, the clenched fists, the thumping of the heart, through its 
proximity. Furthermore, there is also the affective power of the condition of 
uncertainty itself. 
Bissell, relaying how these various registers come together to disrupt and to overwhelm, 
articulately represents the complexities of affect. However, of these affective relations 
between body and world, he rather pessimistically says that ‘affect always exceeds 
understanding and conceptualisation […] it precedes signification and the formation of 
meaning’ (Bissell, 2010, p. 82). Yet, the intensity of his experience provokes an attempt to 
make sense of it, to harness the ‘bite’ of pain and the body’s responses to it, by 
representing it, in detail, through written word. 
Wetherell is critical of geography’s orientation towards affect, not least because it 
positions affect within a non-discursive framework that she argues is ‘unhelpful’ and 
unsustainable. Wetherell (2014, p. np) states that: 
 
97 An impasse that many have argued creates a ‘strait jacket’’ for empirical work (Wetherell, 2013, p. 357; see 
also: Laurier and Philo, 2006).  
98 Practice broadly defined here as the ‘the ongoing mix of human activities that make up the richness of 
everyday social life’(Painter, 2002, p. 2002). 
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It is so obvious that semiosis and affect are inextricably intertwined, not just in 
the production of ‘atmospheres’, spaces and relations but in their effects and in 
subsequent patterns of engagement. It has been seriously unhelpful to posit a 
generic category of autonomous affect (applied to relations between all bodies 
human and non-human). Human affect and emotion are distinctive because of 
their immediate entanglement with very particular human capacities for 
making meaning. These entanglements organize the moment of embodied 
change and are crucial to the ways in which affect articulates and travels. They 
need to be centre stage in any social theory of affect and emotion.  
Similarly, Pile (2009a, p. 16) argues that the construction of affect as a non-
representational object split from thought and language renders affect ungraspable and 
unintelligible. As a result, ‘the means through which affect might make itself known, via 
feelings or emotions or representations, are thereby rendered opaque’ (Pile, 2009, p.17 
emphasis added), although Pile fails to note that others had already broached this middle 
ground, most notably Lea’s (2006) exploration of massage and wellness. Lea’s 
‘alternative’ non-representational framing is instructive for this research, as she examines 
how affective experiences/practices and discourse come together to shape our 
understandings of self and world (Chapter 7)99. 
This assessment of emotional and affective geographies does not intend to dismiss their 
relevance, but rather to address what is lacking in current conceptualisations, chiefly with 
respect to my own particular project. After all, anxiety is understood to have a particular 
affective architecture (Chapter 6) and manifests as a social, emotional and affective 
practice (Jackson and Everts, 2010; Wetherell, 2015). Therefore, an engagement with 
emotional and affective registers is crucial, and, following Pile (2010), I suggest that 
psychoanalytic theory can be a useful tool to re-orient our engagement with emotion-
affect, one that acknowledges the simultaneity and entanglement of representational and 
discursive practice. 
Indeed, language often fails to capture the richness and complexity of experience and we 
are left, in the Lacanian sense, with the presence of absence, that is, an embodied lack – a 
lack that is affectively and emotionally embodied in experiences of social anxiety. 
Crucially for Lacan, and something that could potentially expand non-representational 
accounts100 of emotion-affect, while there is ‘no such thing as a pre-discursive reality, [as] 
every reality is founded and defined by a discourse’ (Lacan, 2016, p. 32) language is 
 
99 Such affects, as products of a wider biomedical and/or political discourse, are discussed in Chapter 7. 
100 Anderson (2018) recently addressed the ‘force of representations’, stating that cultural geography was 
‘once again’ concerned with representational analyses and practices. 
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exercised neither as whole or complete. Lacan argues that affects are inextricably tied up 
with Freudian ‘ideational representations’ or Lacanian ‘signifiers’, as thoughts, ideas, 
memories, words, etcetera101. He (1991, p. 57) writes: 
The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual102 
accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical beyond of the production of the 
symbol, which would precede the discursive formulation. Only this can allow 
us from the start, I won’t say to locate, but to apprehend what the full 
realisation of speech consists of. 
Representation relates to how people understand themselves, their social and spatial 
worlds, how they (attempt to) make sense of their experiences and the resulting impact on 
their overall health and wellbeing. Such representations are both conscious and 
unconscious, depending on ‘traces of previous experiences and on the presenting elements 
of the situation which at that moment is being experienced’ (Timary et al., 2011). The 
individual and the social cannot be easily separated and so ‘affect is not something 
external, added to the symbolic, but an internal component of it’ (Laclau; cited in Glynos 
and Stavrakakis, 2010, p.225). However, representations are not conceived as solely 
interpretative of a person’s individual inner world, but rather reflect what Timary et al. 
(2011) call a ‘community of content’. Context, past and current practice, and complex acts 
of meaning-making and representation are involved in the spreading of affect, no matter 
how ‘contagious’ affectivity may appear to circulate103. Reflecting back on Parr et al.’s 
(2005) work on mental ill-health in the Scottish Highlands, we see the various ways in 
which representations of emotional-affective life are indelibly bound to context and to 
individual and collective social/cultural norms and practices. 
(UN)HABITUAL GEOGRAPHIES 
The habitual practice of daily life is understood to encompass ‘a series of repetitive and 
mechanistic routines, practices and interactions [...] that establish a sense of familiarity and 
stability’ (Boyle, 2018, p.2). Habit is an important conceptual hook for geographers 
concerned with the rhythmic and syncopated embodiments of daily life (Edensor, 2010a). 
 
101 Similarly, Neill (2011, p. 23) notes that: ‘The subject, in a sense is nothing but language, while at the 
same time, the subject is nothing because of language. It is only through being represented that the 
subject can be said to exist at all and yet, at the same time, in being so represented, the subject is 
strictly not there. The signifier is there.’  
102 By ‘intellectual’, Lacan is referring to conscious thought or cognition. 
103 The viral model of affect is posited by Thrift (2008, p. 235) to highlight how affect ‘spreads’ between 
bodies and is contagious, seemingly operating like a virus, organically, without the need for human 
signification or representation. 
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These approaches have been theoretically guided by Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu, 1990) notion of 
‘habitus’ and Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) ‘lived body’, striving to understand the everyday 
practices through which people ‘unthinkingly’ shape and navigate their social and spatial 
worlds. While there is no ‘single, authoritative [or] consistent definition’ (2013, p.137) of 
‘habitus’ in the work of Bourdieu, he does make the following distinction: ‘[o]ne of the 
reasons for the use of the term habitus is the wish to set aside the common conception of 
habit as a mechanical assembly or pre-formed programme’ (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 218 [note 
47] cited in Crossley, 2001, p. 139). 
The implication of this distinction is that ‘habitus’ is not conceived of as a ‘mechanical’ 
practice, but rather it entails a learned, skilled and acquired adeptness. Merleau-Ponty’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘habitual body’, as a pre-personal and pre-reflexive body, is rooted 
in his wider analysis of embodiment and perception104. Both concepts have been 
particularly instructive for the non-representational analysis of the sequences, repetitions 
and practices that structure daily life and become ingrained in habitual and unreflexive 
routines: for example, everyday mobilities of walking (Edensor, 2010b; Middleton, 2011) 
and commuting (Binnie et al., 2007) or leisurely mobilities such as cycling (Cook and 
Edensor, 2017) and dancing (McCormack, 2008). 
The mobilities and embodiments that constitute this substantive area of research, whether 
they are engaging with mundane and repetitive, instinctive and unreflexive routines or with 
co-ordinated and choreographed practices, often call forth an understanding of habit that 
elevates its ‘unifying’ and ‘integrative’ capacity (Alexander, 1987, p. 147) Edensor’s 
(2010a, p. 8) discussion of everyday routines and ‘synchronicities’ is particularly 
indicative: 
Familiar places are the unquestioned settings for daily tasks, pleasures and 
rhythmically apprehended routines, with regular patterns of walking, driving, 
shopping and other routinised practices as part of a familiar spatio-temporal 
experience. These patterns are marked by regular paths and points of spatial 
and temporal intersection that routinise action in space […] Shops, bars, cafes, 
garages and so forth are meeting points at which individual paths congregate, 
providing geographies of communality and continuity within which social 
activities are co-coordinated and synchronised. This ongoing mapping of space 
 
104 While Bourdieu was certainly influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1962), there 
is a distinct difference between the concepts of ‘‘habitus’’ and the ‘‘lived body’’. Merleau-Ponty was 
concerned with how the body comprehends movement, acquires habits and, reflecting post-
phenomenological concerns, the various ways in which technologies operate as an extension of the body: 
for example, in driving a car. He refers to this extension of/incorporation into the body image as ‘a bodily 
auxiliary’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). 
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through repetitive, collective choreographies of congregation, interaction, rest 
and relaxation produces what Seamon (1980) calls ‘place ballets’. 
Much of the work in the subfield of habitual geographies fails to address those who do not 
or cannot encounter social and spatial worlds unproblematically, for whom daily life is 
habitually (un)predictable, where the routine spaces that constitute everyday life are 
continuously disrupted and habitual practices are routinely ‘written, unwritten and 
rewritten’ in the face of a patchwork of emotional, affective, relational, social and spatial 
(un)certainties (Boyle, 2018, p.4). Geographies of health and illness demonstrate that the 
habitual nature and practice of daily life is arguably not as seamless and ‘unthinking’ as 
normative frameworks of habit suggest. Engman and Cranford (2016, p. 36), for instance, 
provide an instructive reconfiguration of habit through the lens of physical disabilities, 
arguing that: 
If we consider habits only in the context of normative embodiments, it is easy 
to mistake the homology between body and world that is developed during 
habit formation as resulting unilaterally from the body’s ability to mould itself 
to the environments it encounters. 
The role of environment in both the conceptualisation of habit and the development of 
habits is key. Engman and Cranford note that environmental consistency is crucial to the 
development and maintenance of habits such that, if one’s surrounding environment is 
disrupted, ingrained habits can become ‘non-functional’. This perspective, however, fails 
to account for the ways in which ‘the environment is preconfigured prior to the 
development of any particular habit by any particular individual for action by particular 
kinds of bodies’ (Engman and Cranford, 2016, p.31 original emphasis). Equally, habit that 
extends a cohesive view of self fails to account for the habitual sense of precarity 
experienced by people with enduring mental health problems, for whom securing some 
sense of a stable self from which habits can proceed – which can become habituated – may 
be supremely difficult. 
Few geographers have engaged explicitly with habit/habitual practice in the context of 
health. Notable exceptions are Lea et al. (2015) and Rowles (2000), who examine the 
habituation of new habits as a mode of intervention from two different perspectives. 
Rowles (2000) argues that there is a need to understand ‘the complexity of habitual aspects 
of being in place’ for older people in the community. He highlights how their time-space 
routines are part of a larger social and spatial ‘homeostatic’ system that has evolved over 
decades in, and ingrained through, community life. Consequently, even minor disruptions 
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(e.g. running late for an appointment) destabilise the rest of the day’s routines. Rowles 
engages habituation as an occupational therapy intervention, highlighting how gradual but 
repeated environmental adjustments that enrich older people’s sense of place, particularly 
in the event of illness or reduced mobility, can enable them to respond and adapt to change. 
Lea et al. (2015) explore the capacity to cultivate new habits, routines and positive 
behavioural changes through Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) techniques. 
MBSR requires people to engage in a self-reflexive dialogue with the self by directing 
one’s awareness towards habitual patterns of mind-body activity that often escape 
conscious awareness. In this context, MBSR techniques are implemented to intervene in 
the daily routines and habits that potentially trap the individual in a negative or 
unproductive cycle, thereby aiding in alleviating stress and anxieties. 
Crucially, what both of these pieces of work highlight is that habituating new habits is 
often a gradual and time-consuming process, demanding of attention, thought, and 
reflection – what might be termed the thoroughly unhabitual making of the habitual. 
Habit/habitual practices are hence not always a seamless intertwining of self-body-world, 
passing through bodies without necessarily much mindful involvement, but neither are they 
‘easily accessible and readily mutable’ (Lea et al. 2015, p.61). Lea et al’s notion of 
habitual self-reflexive practice also speaks specifically to people experiencing social 
anxiety, as daily life is often interrupted by self-conscious and self-critical reflexive 
practices regarding performance and perceived failures in social interactions and spaces. 
The pervasive presence of anxiety here acquires a destabilising quality that ‘habitually 
unmakes the assumed structure of daily life’ (Boyle, 2018, p.4). Not only does this anxiety 
operate to prevent change, holding the person captive within repetitive and fluctuating 
anxious cycles (Chapter 6), but it also serves to destabilise the capacity to orchestrate and 
ingrain new, potentially supportive habits, thus, stalling any productive transformative 
potential of habit105. 
With the exception of the aforementioned research, explicit engagement with the notions 
of habit, the habitual and habituation is largely missing in health geography. This absence 
is surprising given that work on the geographies of mental health, chronic illness and 
disability is particularly instructive for viewing habit differently, by considering the ways 
in which the ‘habitual nature’ of everyday life is not as seamless and ‘unthinking’ as 
 
105 MBSR and Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) techniques are the primary therapeutic interventions 
prescribed for social anxiety, but these self-practiced and self-managed techniques carry with them the 
responsibilisation of treatment, problematic when they fail (Chapter 6; also parts of the literature review 
work in Chapter 2). 
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habitual geographies appear to convey. In what follows, I pay attention to the routine 
disruptions and habitual precarity experienced by those with mental health problems, 
chronic illness and disability by considering the disruption of time-space routines through 
two dimensions that underpin daily life: home and (im)mobilities. 
HOME 
Geographical engagements with home-spaces typically attend to the symbolic and material 
dimensions of the home (Blunt and Dowling, 2006). Traditionally, home is often 
constructed as a place of intimate and bounded safety, a place saturated with emotions and 
nostalgia, and deeply invested in our personal and shared identities where traditions and 
values instil a sense of belonging and connection. Since the 1990s, geographers have 
engaged in a more critical assessment of home as a contested space marked by, on 
occasion, its problematic gendering, uncertainty, precarity, discomfort, loss and/or 
confinement. Sibley (1995, p.93), for example, notes that the notion of ‘home as haven’ is 
not unproblematic, family units/home spaces are replete with often-problematic power 
relationships and boundary disputes. Thus, home is better conceived of as a space that 
‘disappoints, aggravates, neglects, confines and contradicts as much as it inspires and 
comforts us’ (Moore, 2000, p. 213). The taken-for-granted meanings of home may also be 
acutely contested, disrupted and changed with the onset of illness or disability where 
senses of bodily-social-spatial stability and security become frayed (Dyck, 1995b; Moss, 
1997). 
When people withdraw from wider social networks and spatial life, the home, despite 
being the place to which people may alternatively come to anchor, can itself often come to 
symbolise the loss of independence and social identity. For those who retreat to the home 
with the onset of physical impairment, home can become a form of entrapment and 
confinement that is socially and psychologically harmful (Imrie, 2004). In experiences of 
agoraphobia, the boundaries of the home represent a ‘reinforcement and extension of the 
psycho-corporeal boundaries of the self’ (Davidson, 2010, p. 380) but this shift can often 
render people more or less housebound. Establishing personal territories and territorial 
practices within the home-space often aids in regaining a sense of control over the 
uncontrollable (e.g. other people, germs or injury), but communal areas shared by family 
members, visitors or housemates can be inherently distressing, and therefore the space of 
safety can often be reduced to a single bedroom (Chapter 7). The materiality of home, for 
example telephones, doorbells and windows, embodies an intimate exteriority, whereby the 
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‘outside’ is felt as present and ever-encroaching. Drawing on experiential accounts of 
epilepsy, Smith (2013) highlights that, although the home ‘conceals’ the ‘epileptic body’ in 
the event of a seizure, the ‘surfaces, textures and spacings’ of the home may become 
threatening to someone during seizure are hence needing to be strategically altered to avoid 
injury. The quality and stability of domestic life is further entangled with a wider set of 
social processes including employment, home ownership, housing tenure, social division 
(Blunt & Dowling, 2006), aspects that are likely to be more precarious for those with 
mental health problems, chronic illnesses and disabilities. 
Home also speaks to the various other spaces people live in or have lived. Presenting a 
more nuanced account of what, or where, can be considered home, Parr et al. (2003) 
highlight how an old ‘lunatic asylum’ (or mental hospital) became a contested, yet home-
like space for people with mental illness who had been socially and spatially removed from 
their own Highland and Island communities across Scotland. Asylum spaces 
simultaneously represented isolation and community, exclusion and friendship, and 
containment and care for institutionalised communities, even when ‘discharged’ home or 
to other living arrangements. McCarthy (2018) also disrupts conventional understandings 
of home, arguing that, for those living through homelessness, the traditional domesticated 
sphere of home can be an uncertain and uncanny space and homes are re-made throughout 
the city in multi-story car parks and hostels. 
(IM)MOBILITIES 
Binnie et al. (2007, p. 165) argue that we are always ‘caught up in banal or mundane 
mobilities […] enmeshed with[in] the familiar worlds that we inhabit, constituting part of 
the unreflexive, habitual practice of everyday life’. Arguably, for many, this claim is true, 
with daily journeys sinking into the background of daily life, playing out relatively 
unnoticed. The ‘new mobilities paradigm’ advocates, in part, to consider ‘local’ concerns 
about everyday transportation, material cultures, and spatial relations of mobility and 
immobility (Sheller and Urry, 2016). Yet, studies here often neglect to recognise or 
incorporate those whose mobility, including social mobility, as a result of their (in)visible 
disabilities, chronic illnesses and/or mental health problems, are, at best, severely restricted 
and, at worst, marginalised and excluded, as they negotiate everyday life with physical, 
social and/or functional impairments. For people with social anxiety, these everyday 
mobilities do not always embed seamlessly into the automatic, unthinkingly routine, but 
rather continually feature in conscious, repeatedly made and re-made decisions about how 
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to navigate social and spatial life (Chapter 8). 
Imrie (2000) identifies the ways in which urban design and planning incapacitates 
individuals whose bodies and abilities deviate from the ‘norm’, leaving people with 
physical and mental impairments socially isolated and spatially marginalised by the 
‘design and maintenance of public transport’ (Kitchin, 1998a, p. 348). The individual’s 
movements across public space are rarely experienced in isolation from other people, but 
there has been less consideration given to the kinds of personal and socio-spatial barriers 
that can be presented – to certain groups in society – by social interactions106 around public 
transportation and mobility in public space107. Murray (2018, p. 19), examining the ‘why, 
where and when’ of mobility for people with learning disabilities, argues that:  
Getting from point ‘A’ to point ‘B’ is not necessarily a leisurely or enjoyable 
mobility from one place to the other, but rather it becomes a ‘put-up-with’ 
necessity in order to enjoy and experience site ‘A’ or ‘B’. This occurrence 
leaves behind distinct ‘pods’ of safety and comfort, rather than a network of 
flows between and within spaces and places. 
CONCLUSION 
Throughout Chapters 2 and 3, I have outlined the social and spatial configurations for 
approaching an understanding of the lived experiences of social anxiety. In the following 
empirical chapters, these conceptual markers are not straightforwardly mapped, rather the 
various dimensions unearthed in the preceding chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) will be 
discussed both implicitly and explicitly, in such a way that I hope enables the words of my 
participants’ to breath unencumbered. Chapter 5 will speak to the entanglements between 
inner-outer worlds and time-spaces by unearthing the habitual and anticipatory nature of 
anxious experiences and revealing the emotional and affective intensities which persist for 
the individual. In Chapter 6, the scale shifts towards the ‘governance’ of social anxiety in 
order to consider how social anxiety is understood and managed. Here, the appeals and 
pursuit of perceived ‘normality’ are highlighted and discussed. In the final chapters these 
‘intensities’ and ‘governances’ are re-situated back within the context of participants 
everyday lives. Chapters 7 and 8 are written as a couplet and explore in-depth the everyday 
 
106 Bissell (2010, p. 273) is a notable exception here, considering the impact of affective atmospheres on (the 
absence of) sociality in rail passenger journeys, arguing that they ‘‘modify passengers’’ possible field of 
actions, changing their capacity to feel and act.’’ 
107 From a policy perspective, in May 2016 Stagecoach, a UK coach company, in partnership with the Mental 
Health Action Group (MHAG) and Anxiety UK, launched a new initiative as part of the UK 
Government’s Accessibility Action Plan to increase support for, and improve the experiences of, people 
with hidden disabilities and mental health problems on their transport network. 
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sites, settings, spaces and social interactions that affect and are affected by social anxiety.  
Now, this thesis breaks from the conceptual groundwork outlined in Chapters 1 through 3, 
to attend to the methodological specifics of conducting research with people experiencing 
social anxiety.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCHING SOCIAL ANXIETY: 
METHODOLOGY, REFLEXIVITY, METHODS 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, qualitative approaches have changed the focus of both subject 
and method in research in the geographies of health and wellbeing. Kearns’s (1993) call to 
anchor research in ‘post-medical’/health geographies to the central concept of ‘place’ 
marked a fragmentation in the sub-disciplinary field of medical geography, shifting focus 
from a concern with the spatial ecology and epidemiology of disease towards social 
models of health, illness and care. This shift mirrored trajectories in the wider discipline 
and social sciences influenced by cultural and humanistic approaches (Ley, 1985) which, 
in turn, fuelled qualitative and interpretative methodologies in order to explore the social 
construction of health, illness and wellbeing in place. Implementing qualitative 
methodologies in research involves the systematic collection, organisation and analysis of 
textual, visual and audio materials gathered from, for example, interviewing or 
ethnography. Qualitative approaches to health research are grounded in interpretive 
perspectives that prioritise developing a nuanced understanding of the personal meanings 
of health and wellbeing, and responses to illness that are ground in people’s everyday 
experiences. Furthermore, through a growing use of qualitative methods there are myriad 
possibilities to re-conceptualise the field of inquiry by challenging the dominant 
biomedical discourses and social processes through which experience is constructed (Dorn 
and Laws, 1994). 
The voices and experiences of people with mental health problems have historically been 
excluded from research about them especially in dominant biomedical and clinical 
accounts (Davies, 2001). Individuals with experiences of mental health are often 
positioned by their ‘psychopathology’108 as a passive victim (Laing, 1967) within these 
 
108‘Psychopathology’ refers to the origin, development and treatment of mental disorders. 
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systems. Over and above rendering experience and experiential knowledge invisible109, the 
dominant paradigm governing quantitative clinical and biomedical research (and informing 
related discourses) also erases the reality that this knowledge attempts to represent. Parr 
(2008) calls for work on the geographies of mental health to ‘correct a methodological 
imbalance’ by designing inclusive research processes that not only acknowledge the voices 
of people with sustained experiences of mental (ill) health, but also build ethical research 
agendas and relationships with participants. Qualitative approaches in mental health 
geographies unearth corporeal and spatial experiences of madness/illness that are typically 
understood only by their psychiatric classifications (Parr, 1999a, 1999b). Furthermore, we 
must consider closely what methods we employ to access these knowledges and how they 
shape and influence the kinds of data produced. Parr (1998, p. 343) asks researchers, 
particularly those working in the geographies of mental health, to consider ‘contextual 
methodologies’ in order to ‘recognise the research subject as embodied, as thinking, as 
feeling, as acting and as more than just a container for information about geographical 
patterns and relationships’. Thus, the ethical and methodological implications of 
conducting research with marginalised and potentially vulnerable groups require careful 
consideration. In this sense, the research process is (small ‘p’) political in terms of the 
methodological approaches and tools implemented to access and represent the ‘politics’ of 
individual experiences: that is, the subjective experience of ill-health and how this 
experience is assigned meaning and mapped onto symbolic, social and physical space. 
Diverse species of qualitative methodologies are used to uncover the diversity and 
dimensions of mental health experience in place, and exploring illness through lived and 
experiential accounts is a common way to humanise mental health/illness. This kind of 
research includes: interviews woven with archival materials to uncover patient narratives 
of institutional spaces in rural Scotland (Parr et al., 2003); field observations and in-depth 
interviews to explore staff and ‘service user’ perspectives on mental health facilities and 
care (Pinfold, 2000); ethnographic interpretations of ‘semi-institutional spaces’ (Parr, 
2000); collaborative film-making to understand the impact of the arts on mental health 
(Parr, 2007); and photo-voice to provide context-rich accounts of mental health stigma and 
recovery (Han and Oliffe, 2016). Other research prioritises unearthing particular 
 
109 Despite this, there are prolonged discussions in medical fields concerned with the value of qualitative 
research to clinical practice and health policy (Poses and Isen, 1998). In this vein, the sub-field of 
narrative medicine has sought to uncover ‘how physicians can reach and join their patients in illness, 
recognise their own personal journeys through medicine, acknowledge kinship with and duties toward 
other health care professionals, and inaugurate consequential discourse with the public about health care’ 
(Charon, 2001, p. 1897). 
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‘pathographies’ (Hawkins, 1999) or narratives of illness experience (Frank, 2013), 
employing interviews and focus groups to explore women’s experiences of agoraphobia 
(Davidson, 2000b, 2000a) and specific phobias (Smith and Davidson, 2006); personal 
testimonies of schizophrenia (Woods, 2012) autobiographical accounts of bipolar disorder 
(Chouinard, 2012); and in-depth interviews (supplemented with ethnographic material) to 
explore ‘personal-psychic’ dimensions of delusional experiences (as opposed to broader 
‘medico-legal’ understandings) (Parr, 1999b, p. 678). Finally, there are pockets of research 
in both health and mental health geographies engaging with the Internet as a topic of 
research, field of research and/or a tool for research (Crooks, 2006; Parr, 2002; Parr and 
Davidson, 2008). As this project engages with all three aspects of Internet inquiry, if to 
varying degrees, I provide an in-depth discussion of online research and working with 
‘vulnerable’ populations on these platforms further below. Briefly to anticipate, though,, as 
a research tool, geographers have approached the Internet in two ways: conducting a 
‘passive’110 analysis of already-posted ‘live’ and ‘archived’ online content related to 
particular health experiences (Campbell and Longhurst, 2013; Parr, 2002); or directly 
recruiting and engaging with participants online via online surveys and synchronous online 
interviews (Boyle, 2018; O’Connor and Madge, 2001). 
In what follows I outline and provide justification for the methodological approach taken 
and the methods of data collection and analysis employed in the research project. Firstly, 
this analysis is embedded in the wider politics and goals of research in the geographies of 
mental health and, by engaging with feminist and psychoanalytic approaches to reflexive 
practice, I provide an assessment of the research process, practice and my own 
positionality. Secondly, the over-arching aim of this research design and methodological 
approach has been to be inclusive and accessible to individuals who often find face-to-face 
interactions distressing, and thereby I have sought to reduce the potential for harm as much 
as possible. While not without its challenges, I explore how carefully considered online 
approaches can be implemented to enrich geographical inquiry. Throughout, I consider the 
inherent benefits of, and challenges presented by, online research and offer an assessment 
of the practical and ethical considerations of conducting research with ‘hidden’ groups 
who, due to their mental ill-health experiences, may be stigmatised, vulnerable and/or 
isolated. Finally, I detail my use of, and justification for, the specific methods employed to 
collect the data, as well as addressing the analytical approach adopted for interpreting the 
 
110 By ‘passive’, I mean that the researcher is not actively engaging with individuals on particular platforms 
(e.g. conducting interviews via e-mail or in chat rooms) but rather analysing the content of their posts and 
conversations. 
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data. 
RELATIONAL AND REFLEXIVE APPROACHES 
The reflexive turn in qualitative research has endeavoured to address a relational 
problematic by acknowledging and analysing the positions held, and power relations 
inherent in, the research process. Feminist and, more recently, psychoanalytic critiques 
have been central for developing a reflexive and inclusive approach to methodologies and 
epistemologies in geographic research as a means to achieve ethical practice (Brown, 
2006; England, 1994; Pile, 1991; Proudfoot, 2015). This call to reflexivity in scholarly 
practice aims to unsettle and to question the interpretative authority of the researcher 
(Borland, 2006) and is characterised by a heightened awareness of the positions that ‘we’ 
(as researchers) occupy in relation to those who participate in research. This ethico-
political shift is geared towards a recognition that the construction of knowledge is 
situated, partial and diverse (Haraway, 1988; Rose, 1997). Yow (2006, p. 55) calls for an 
increasing awareness ‘to the ways that [researchers] are affected by their [fieldwork] and 
how the [researcher], in turn, affected the [fieldwork] relationship, the data it generated and 
the interpretive processes and product’. This call imposes, on the part of the researcher, an 
awareness of the relational dynamic between researchers and researched, including the 
content of fieldwork exchanges and what anxieties, difficulties and/or pleasures arise, as 
well as a responsibility to acknowledge and to analyse ‘our’ shifting positions in the 
research process.  
Many have offered critical reflections on reflexive analysis as a ‘methodological act’ 
(Lynch, 2000, p. 149; see also: Cushion, 2018). Indeed, expressing concern for the future 
of politically engaged and policy relevant research in the geographies of mental health, 
Wolch and Philo (2000, p. 149) state that, with the shift towards representation and 
position, there is ‘a risk that some researchers become paralytically self-reflexive’. Lynch 
(2000, p. 47) argues that ‘confessional modes of self-reflection’ only serve as attempts to 
re-route us back to the very objectivism we intend to critique and/or avoid; whereas 
Cushion (2018), drawing on Foucault (1996), critiques reflexivity as a technology of 
power, arguing that instead of fostering critical thinking, reflection risks becoming a 
disciplinary practice that objectifies, enforces self-surveillance and, by extension, risks 
creating systems of docility. Similarly, Lynch (2000, p. 36) comments that reflexive 
practice does not ‘come naturally; it requires a tutorial under the guidance of a particular 
programme.’ Arguably, one of the challenges of reflexive practice is to what extent, in the 
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quest for greater transparency in research process and practices, do we ‘enhance 
objectivity’ or ‘undermine objectivism’ (Lynch, 2000; see also Kerr, 2003)111. However, 
reflexive practice can also be a tool to challenge the dualism of subjective/objective, so as 
‘to allow and create a more conceptual and lived space in which we can be more open to 
the more blurred genre of our experiences’ (Etherington, 2004, p. 36). As an on-going 
process and not something that only happens after ‘we’ have left the field (as Lynch’s 
critique alludes), a continual reflexive awareness of our positions and our ‘self’ serves to 
enhance the credibility of research design, approach, interpretations and findings. 
As I reflect on my own ‘position’, I acknowledge that personally and emotionally engaged 
research is inherently messy. My own anxieties and vulnerabilities as a researcher of 
experiences of social anxiety and also as a person with experience of social anxiety are 
integral parts of my attempts to (un)situate myself throughout the research process. I 
thereby take the perspective of ‘insider-outsider’ in relation to the participants of this 
study. This acknowledgment seeks to address how personal and professional worlds 
intertwine in simultaneously beneficial and uncomfortable ways, compelling sustained 
attention to reflexive practice (Bondi and Fewell, 2017; Lucherini, 2017; Moss, 1995; 
Valentine, 1998). Furthermore, reflexivity is contextual and necessitates a continual 
reflection upon a project’s methodological and ethical practice (Naidu and Sliep, 2011). As 
highlighted above, people with experiences of mental ill-health have been historically 
subject to everyday abuses of power and, in the process, systematically marginalised, 
devalued, stigmatised and discriminated against. Thus, exploring the lived experiences of 
social anxiety carries with it some responsibilities to design research that fosters 
participation, but that also enables people to define the nature and limits of their 
participation. A contextually reflexive practice ensures accountability and transparency in 
the research process, as well as an extended duty of care towards research participants, to 
ensure that past wrongs are not repeated or sustained112. What follows highlights the 
personal, relational and contextual dimensions of reflexive practice. I explore the 
unavoidable entanglements between researcher, researched and research context that are 
especially present when personal and professional worlds intertwine. I also pay attention to 
how, in my own research, the intimacies of closeness/distance, sameness/difference and 
insider/outsider status were negotiated and reflected upon throughout. 
 
111 Kerr (2003, p.30), in developing a collaborative analysis of homelessness, argues, somewhat 
controversially, that a more inclusive and reflexive practice ‘produces more objective and effective 
research’. 
112 Similar issues have been discussed in relation to ‘decolonising’ research methodologies (Smith, 2012). 
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The objects of reflexive practice in feminist and psychoanalytic approaches are 
fundamentally different (Proudfoot, 2015). Feminist scholarship offers a sustained focus on 
the knowable power relations present in the research relationship and on the interpretation 
and production of knowledge. England (1994, p. 82 original emphasis) defines reflexive 
practice as the ‘self-critical sympathetic introspection’ and the ‘self-conscious analytical 
scrutiny of the self as researcher’. Feminist reflexive practices calls for a greater awareness 
of how multiple and intersecting identities arise and entangle in the research relationship 
(for example, age, gender, race, nationality, social and/or economic status), influence the 
researcher’s position and shape the collection, interpretation and production of knowledge 
(Madge, 1993). Rose (1997) argues that the ultimately ‘unknowable’ (because to an extent 
they are unconsciously held) positions of the researcher/researched and the uncertainty of 
fieldwork obstruct any attempts at providing a fully transparent reflexive practice. These 
dimensions hence only tell a partial story and exclude important intimate, affective and 
emotional experiences intrinsic to the research process and wider experiences of social 
anxiety. Psychoanalytic perspectives113 are ‘profoundly intersubjective’ (Pile, 1991) and 
seek to expand on, or to problematise, feminist approaches by acknowledging the 
inherently ‘unknowable’ through the dynamics of the unconscious. Reflexive practice is 
conceptualised and fostered in psychoanalytic approaches as an interpretative openness to 
the ‘methodological significance’ of affectivity and language in the research process, so as 
to take account of the researcher’s interactions and interpretations (Lapping, 2016). 
Crucially, this step is not about ‘rendering the unconscious conscious’ (Bondi, 2015, p. 
73), but rather is about enabling the researcher to disentangle their own issues from those 
presented by participants114. 
Valentine (1998, p. 308) notes that ‘personal geographies are taken for granted until they 
are transgressed’. In my own experience, geography115 and mental health (my own 
experiences included) have formed a reciprocal relationship of sorts, with each pushing the 
boundaries of my understanding of the other in different ways. Geographies of mental and 
emotional health – as in inclusive studies and their geographies – have been a creative and 
conceptual outlet that has helped me to make sense of my own experience. I noticed a 
 
113 Psychoanalytic perspectives, akin to psychoanalytic traditions, are numerous and draw on various strands 
of psychoanalytic theory and practice, including Lacanian (Proudfoot, 2015) and Object Relations 
(Bondi, 2015) conceptual moments. 
114 Others question whether we can engage in a truly psychoanalytic reflexive practice without the guidance 
of the analyst (Brown, 2006; see also Proudfoot, 2015). 
115 I am referring here to both ‘‘worldly’’ geography (in relation to my own experience) and ‘academic’ 
geography, as the two appear to be in perpetual dialogue with one another. 
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particular ‘geography’ to my experiences in my undergraduate years whereby particular 
social interactions, sites and settings became increasingly unmanageable (for example, 
social gatherings, one-on-one conversations, large groups, and university lectures and 
tutorial classes). Developing a social and spatial understanding of social anxiety has helped 
me to view my and others’ mental health experiences through a different lens, one that 
diverts attention away from the dominant conceptualisations present in biomedical and 
clinical literature. I was excited about the possibility of channelling my experiences of 
social anxiety into something more positive, and hence I formulated projects (at both 
Masters and PhD level) with social anxiety quite deliberately chosen as the core focus. 
Despite this positivity, it has continued to be difficult for me to live and work with social 
anxiety. My initial plan was to situate my own personal reflections of living with social 
anxiety alongside others’ stories. Chatham-Carpenter (2010) discusses similar implications 
of auto-ethnographic research on anorexia recovery, highlighting how the desire to get 
‘good’ material can exacerbate the researcher’s own on-going physical, mental and 
emotional health problems. The process of reading, talking, writing and re-visiting my and 
others’ experiences of social anxiety day in, day out, while trying (and sometimes failing) 
to manage my own anxieties, was all encompassing and overwhelming. Realising that an 
auto-ethnographic approach may have been doing me more harm than good, I decided to 
work solely with the stories of others116. At times, the research affected or depleted my 
own sense of wellbeing, and the more that I immersed myself in others’ stories (detailing 
personal histories and trauma, the sites, settings and situations of anxiety and ‘(un)healthy’ 
coping practices), the more I felt the heavy presence of anxiety. On many occasions, I tried 
to remove myself, not in an attempt to occupy a detached and objective position, but to 
distance myself in an act of self-protection from the sites and spaces that social anxiety 
occupied. I also attempted to mitigate the effects of this immersion: for example, the 
decision to implement online methods was as much about allaying my own anxieties about 
the immediacy of face-to-face interactions, as it was about providing a safe environment 
for participants. Despite the considerations given to participants, I have often considered 
my chosen methods as an act of avoidance, which also led me to question whether or not I 
was conducting ‘real’ fieldwork when ‘hiding’ behind my computer screen and whether 
my data would be missing crucial emotional and relational dimensions. 
 
116 The mode of self-reflection required in auto-ethnographic writing can often be quite painful and 
distressing when scrutinised through the self-critical lens of social anxiety. 
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The (un)conscious117 attempts made to ‘un-situate’ myself in the research process can 
indeed be interpreted as an avoidance, since they served as a means to distance me from 
the messy realities of social anxiety: ‘I’m trying desperately to keep [participants’ 
experiences] at a distance because it feels too familiar’ (Research notes, August 2015). 
Identifying with various social, spatial and emotional dimensions of participants’ 
experiences made them difficult to work with and to keep separate from my own 
experiences: ‘I can’t work with other people’s anxieties right now. I feel like pouring over 
these experiences is making me more anxious and making me think of new things to be 
anxious about that have never occurred to me before.’ (Research notes, January 2016). 
Despite reproducing here two statements presented as research diary entries, I should admit 
that I did not keep a regular research diary. I often scribbled down thoughts, reflections and 
anxieties in an application on my phone, but for the most part they simply documented my 
attempts to maintain a safe distance from any encroaching research and/or social anxieties, 
as in the two entries quoted here. These materials are incoherent and messy, and I 
questioned whether they were valuable reflections until I read Tamas’s (2009, p. 18) article 
on ‘troubling the ethnographic voice’ where she argues that ‘clean and reasonable 
scholarship about messy, unreasonable experiences is an exercise in alienation’. 
Drawing on psychoanalytic perspectives provides a useful conceptual framing for 
understanding such relational ‘owning’ and ‘disowning’ during fieldwork. Bondi (2015, p. 
68) states that identification occurs when the subject ‘absorbs and incorporates aspects or 
attributes of others, metabolising this material to generate his or her own identity’. This 
process also involves an unconscious ‘projection of unwanted psychic material’ (Bondi, 
2015, p.69) onto other people and objects. 
In order to access participants’ personal and emotional experiences, it was necessary to 
establish a sense of rapport and to build trust in the research relationship. This fostering of 
trust often demands long-term and on-going interactions that may have been difficult to 
negotiate with people experiencing social anxiety, but my chosen methodological approach 
– with its principally online character – greatly aided the overcoming of these temporal and 
spatial barriers. Equally, disclosing my own experiences with social anxiety and 
acknowledging the inherent challenges of social interactions positioned me as able to 
acknowledge, understand and interpret their experiences with empathy and understanding, 
 
117 ‘Unconscious’ in the sense I could not precisely pinpoint – nor name – my own feelings of uneasiness and 
anxiety, while also recognising the psychical processes of which I am not consciously aware, but may 
ultimately feel the affects. 
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thus highlighting the value of the ‘insider’ perspective. 
Yet, working with the words of participants meaningfully and ethically has still been a 
continuous source of tension (Tamas, 2009). I feel a great sense of responsibility about re-
telling others’ stories and doing them justice, one that is compounded by feelings of guilt 
that I will ultimately be the only one to benefit from their re-telling. Bondi and Fewell 
(2017, p. 115) note that ‘research is a way of bearing witness and contributing to 
conversations about the world within which we are embedded’. While I am deeply 
embedded in a world where social anxiety is a live presence, my role as researcher, 
situated alongside my personal experience, positions me as neither completely ‘inside’ or 
‘outside’ of conversations about social anxiety. Furthermore, in the absence of more auto-
ethnographic details, I worry that my ‘outsider’ status re-positions me as an academic 
voyeur, with it becoming in effect the responsibility of participants to tell their stories and 
for me to select the ‘good’ material. Tamas (2009, pp.16-18) expresses similar concerns 
about ‘intellectualising’ experiences of trauma and loss for academic audiences, 
questioning how can we (as researchers) present personal and ‘emotional experiences as 
knowable and meaningful events’. 
I had a pre-existing relationship with the two web-forums on which I placed the research 
call. I had used both to varying degrees as vital sources of informational and emotional 
support as I attempted to understand and manage my own experiences of social anxiety 
(although my engagement with one of these sites was under a personal alias). As 
mentioned previously, I was conscious of becoming the invasive researcher and disrupting 
group dynamics, but I was also concerned about changing the nature of my own 
relationship with these communities. In a sense, my own personal relationship with the 
online communities has happened and it would feel ‘strange’ now shifting my identity 
back to being a member of the community now that I am beyond the ‘active’ researcher 
phase. 
Engaging with the reflexive psychoanalytic practice advocated by Bondi (2015) helped to 
unravel and reflect on some of the difficulties that I have faced in negotiating the 
boundaries between personal and professional worlds. Reflexive practice unearths the 
difficulties in maintaining a balance between identification (‘closeness’) and detachment 
(‘distance’). My position throughout this research process has hence been one 
simultaneously ‘within’ and ‘outwith’, one of oscillation between closeness/distance, 
sameness/difference and insider/outsider wherein moments of 
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closeness/sameness/insideness have been repeatedly mediated by moments of 
distance/difference/outsidedness. 
ONLINE RESEARCH 
The Internet is a vast repository of written, audio and visual material representing peoples’ 
thoughts, opinions and experiences, and a particularly rich – if complex and tricky – 
resource for uncovering how people understand, negotiate and express their socio-spatial 
worlds. The proliferation of Web 2.0118 technologies has revolutionised not only how we 
generate, consume and share information, but also how we communicate, organise and 
socialise with each other. The Internet provides infinite opportunities for digital 
communities to coalesce around particular interests. In particular, virtual communities are 
instructive platforms demonstrating how individuals separated by time and/or space form 
around common interests or experiences. This element has been particularly instructive in 
the shaping of online health-seeking behaviours and communities (Bowker and Tuffin, 
2004; Crooks, 2006; Madge and O’Connor, 2004; Parr, 2002) (Chapter 6). As a research 
tool, the Internet is a less expensive and time-consuming method compared to traditional 
methods of data collection, eroding boundaries of time and distance and providing 
improved access to hidden or hard-to-reach populations (Im and Chee, 2006; Madge and 
O’Connor, 2004; Wright, 2005). The Internet is often conceived as an ‘untapped’ resource 
for social researchers (Laurier, 2016). Despite these benefits, we (as researchers) must pay 
attention to the numerous new considerations that arise from conducting research through 
computer-mediated communications and with individuals in virtual communities, 
including those concerning informed consent, privacy, anonymity, confidentiality and 
autonomy (Wright, 2005). With this in mind, researchers engaging with/in this platform, as 
both research tool and research field, should do so with a heightened awareness and 
sensitivity, recognising that it provides crucial spaces of refuge and support that are often 
limited in the outside world – ones where great care should duly be shown to avoid 
colonising or damaging them for the people who really need what they offer. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
This project employed a multiple-method approach comprised of online questionnaires, 
online semi-structured interviews and telephone interviews with people diagnosed, or self- 
 
118 Web 2.0 denotes the ‘second stage’ of the Internet, characterised by the shift from static web pages to a 
model that ‘facilitate[s] interactive information sharing, user-centred design and collaboration’ (Bernhardt 
et al., 2011). 
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diagnosing, with social anxiety. The online design and implementation of the research 
encouraged participation by enabling people to define the limits of their personal 
involvement while still encouraging respondents to write extensively about their 
experiences of social anxiety – I discuss these issues throughout the remainder of this 
chapter. The research was also informed by a variety of social anxiety resources and 
personal experiences documented in blog posts, vlogs119 and forum threads. With 
permission from website moderators, I administered the research through the two online 
user-led communities Social Anxiety Scotland (SAS) and Social Anxiety UK (SAUK) and 
advertised it further via a website and social media listing on Anxiety UK (AUK)120, a 
mental health charity that provides support and services to individuals with anxiety-related 
health problems. The fee for the website listing was £50 and the listing remained in place 
for six months, while the fee for the social media listing was £30, which also included a 
listing in AUK’s magazine issued to their membership every quarter. AUK provided a 
‘Letter of Support’ for the research to be distributed via their channels for the purposes of 
my ethics application (Appendix 1). Despite the ‘wide-reach’ of AUK communication 
channels121, recruitment via SAUK was the most productive. A potential reason for this 
disparity is that AUK supports people from across the anxiety spectrum, whereas SAUK is 
made up of a specifically social anxiety-focused community. Furthermore, the vast 
difference in membership numbers between SAUK and SAS, as well as Scotland-based 
participants’ use of both forums, is also reflected in the difference in recruitment numbers 
here. It is possible that the community aspect drove participation up as members 
demonstrated their interest in the project on the forum. Participants’ biographical 
information (where provided), alongside their assigned pseudonyms, is reproduced in 
Appendix 2 and provided in graph form in Appendix 12. There was a total of 132 
participants, 126 people participated in the online questionnaire, 21 participated in a 
follow-up interview (20 online, 1 telephone) and 2 participated via telephone interviews 
only (to be discussed later)122. Table 4 highlights participant recruitment numbers and their 
respective contribution to the questionnaire responses and interviews from SAS, SAUK 
and AUK. 
 
119 Video blog. 
120 URLs for each site are as follows: SAS - www.sascotland.co.uk; SAUK – www.social-anxiety-
community.org; AUK – www.anxietyuk.org.uk. 
121 150,000 monthly website visits (although not necessarily to their specific ‘research page’), >100,000 
social media followers and 1,500 subscribers to their quarterly magazine (Anxiety UK, n.d.). 
122 Two participant’s did not complete the online questionnaire and contacted me directly after seeing the call 
for participants on AnxietyUK’s website to schedule an interview. I discuss the implications of this later.  
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 Social Anxiety 
Scotland 
Social Anxiety UK Anxiety UK 
Questionnaire: 
Interview: 
11 
2 
117 
17 
0 
2 
Table 4: Participant Recruitment Numbers for Websites 
SAS and SAUK are volunteer-led organisations. As well as providing informational 
resources on their websites, SAS and SAUK provide moderated web-forums123 to a 
membership of 400 and 25,000 people, respectively124. The structure of the web-forums is 
‘hierarchical’, devised as a main forum made up of sub-forums (or ‘categories’). Each sub-
forum is made up of numerous topics of conversation known as ‘threads’ composed and 
contributed to by members of the community. Figure 5125 depicts the main forum interface 
on SAUK, showing examples of sub-forums: e.g. ‘Welcome and Introductions’ and ‘The 
Social Anxiety Room’. As of July 2016, SAS is no longer active, and I discuss the 
implications of this curtailed activity in Chapter 6. 
SAS and SAUK provided me with a platform to access a socially ‘remote’ population who 
would otherwise have been difficult to reach due to a lack of offline services available for 
people with social anxiety126. Accessing the groups for research purposes required gaining 
consent from the web-forum moderators (an example e-mail to SAUK is included in 
Appendix 3). I advised potential participants that their participation was voluntary 
regardless of their membership of any of the above platforms, as well as stressing that 
participation could be withdrawn at any time. Recruiting participants and conducting 
research online responded to the fact that individuals with social anxiety often find face-to-
face interactions challenging and/or distressing and may feel stigmatised offline (Wright, 
2005). 
 
123 Electronic discussion boards. 
124 Despite extensive membership numbers, particularly on SAUK, it is not known how many of these 
members have active memberships or regularly use the sites. The site provides numbers for members 
‘active in the last 24 hours’ and there are about 150-200 active members per day. 
125 I have removed any identifiable characteristics, including user names. 
126 In the early stages of the project, there was only offline support group that I could identify, Social Anxiety 
Self-Help (SASH), located in London, UK. I was aware that this group had already been the focus of 
McCarthy’s (2014) PhD thesis and made a conscious decision not to approach them for research 
purposes. This group has since stopped their regular support meetings. 
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Figure 5: Screenshot of Main Forum of Social Anxiety UK 
One of the main research objectives, moreover, was precisely to explore how and why 
people engage in online communities and Internet technologies, and to enquire about the 
implications of these platforms for overall mental health and wellbeing. A secondary focus 
here was to understand the relations between online and offline life. It therefore made 
sense to record participants’ experiences in-situ, in a ‘space’ – virtual, rather than physical 
– that is contextually relevant to the research project and has the added benefit of 
facilitating a safe and (if properly managed) anonymous research environment. 
Research and events127, particularly in/around the geographies of health and wellbeing, 
have drawn attention to the importance of such in-situ research methods as a dynamic form 
of qualitative inquiry that can be used in order to explore in-depth various time and space-
specific responses to wellbeing (Bell et al., 2015; Bell, 2017). Research has typically 
focused on methods that assume no limitations to social and/or physical mobility, notably 
in walking, swimming and run-along interviews (Evans and Jones, 2011). The use of 
online and Internet technologies is instructive here, opening up a more nuanced approach 
to exploring the relationships between self and place while conducting in-situ research that 
overcomes conventional understandings of spatially and temporally-fixed environments 
(Dubé et al., 2014). However, it is important to note that participants were still located 
‘somewhere’. While many were ‘online’ in the relative safety of home, others were at work 
or in different public spaces: for example, in the local library or at a coffee shop. In several 
interviews, there were momentary interruptions as family, colleagues and strangers came 
 
127 For example, Geographies of Health and Wellbeing Research Group (GHWRG) ‘Hack Day: In-situ and 
mobile methodologies in health and wellbeing’, RGS-IBG, London. 
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into the participant’s personal space. Equally, conducting the interviews from my office at 
the University, I often experienced interruptions, as it was not immediately obvious to 
others I was in ‘research mode’. Furthermore, I was aware that the decision to recruit 
participants and conduct research in an online environment might exclude those who do 
not have access to the Internet, are not technologically ‘mobile’, are not aware of these 
supportive platforms, and/or choose to manage their social anxiety in off-line 
environments. While age is often a concern when it comes to Internet use, there is a 
thriving sub-community on SAUK specifically for ‘those a little older’ (aged 30-81) and 
arguably ‘ageing’ populations are more technologically connected than ever before.  
There are further concerns about implementing the Internet as research field and research 
tool, mainly relating to how it has shaped social contexts, lives, and practices. The Internet 
has blurred the boundaries between public and private that, in turn, have changed the 
nature of communication, including what and how we share information through online 
platforms; this has certain implications in a research context. Kitchin (1998b, p. 386) 
comments that the Internet and online technologies ‘are creating new social spaces that 
lack the formal qualities of geographic spaces’. Online, the traditional social plane of face-
to-face communications is collapsed, fostering a ‘pseudo-sociality’ as interactions and 
participation, removed in space and time, are ‘abstract’, ‘feigned’ or ‘synthetic’ (Thurlow, 
2013, p. 244). Despite creating a seemingly more interconnected world, many authors have 
critically assessed the impact of computer-mediated communication128 (CMC) on the 
development and maintenance of interpersonal relationships (Walther and Burgoon, 1992). 
Studies conclude that there are significant drawbacks to CMC when compared with face-
to-face modes of communication, and assert that, due to a lack of visible social cues, CMC 
is necessarily inferior (Kock, 2004)129, particularly where the communication of emotion is 
concerned (Byron, 2008). Dynel (2017) argues, notwithstanding the complex participatory 
frameworks that transcend traditional models of communication, CMC should not be 
regarded as ‘pseudo’ as, at the most basic level, they quite directly replicate ordinary ‘real-
world’ conversations even if at a spatial and temporal distance (e.g. asynchronous 
communication). In the context of online exchanges on social media or web-forums, there 
 
128 CMC are ‘tentatively’ defined by Spitzberg (2006, pp. 630–631) as ‘any human symbolic text‐based 
interaction conducted or facilitated through digitally based technologies […] that requires actual people 
engaged in a process of message interchange in which the medium of exchange at some point is 
computerized’. 
129 Kock’s (2004) critique of CMC is based on a psychobiological model drawing from Darwinian 
evolutionary theory arguing that interpersonal skills have evolved to be used in face-to-face 
communication. Consequently, CMC falls outside of this degree of ‘naturalness’, and is therefore 
insufficient for interpersonal needs and inferior as a mode of communication. 
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is still a ‘producer’ and ‘receiver’ in the same sense that offline there will likely be a 
‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’, although online exchanges may be complicated by Internet 
discourses with the inclusion of acronyms, images, videos and memes130. In the absence of 
non-verbal cues, individuals imbue their messages with meaning through the use of online 
language (‘LOL’, meaning ‘laugh out loud’), emoticons/emojis (☺) and punctuation (‘!!’; 
‘…’), all of which, Brody and Caldwell (2017, p. 2) argue, ‘increases the emotional 
intensity’ of, and ‘reduces the ambiguity’ in, text-based exchanges. Equally important here 
is how the Internet has shifted and blurred the idealised distinction between public and 
private, and personal and social worlds. Baym and Boyd (2012, p. 320) state that the 
Internet: 
[B]lur[s] boundaries between presence and absence, time and space, control 
and freedom, personal and mass communication, private and public, and virtual 
and real, affecting how old patterns should be understood and raising new 
challenges and opportunities for people engaging others through new 
technologies. 
The implications of these shifting boundaries concerning social life as a whole are equally 
relevant to those researching social phenomena in and/or through Internet platforms. 
THE ETHICS OF DOING ONLINE RESEARCH WITH 
‘VULNERABLE’ POPULATIONS 
Geographers have contributed to debates regarding online research, acknowledging that 
many of the traditional considerations and challenges, both ethical and practical, negotiated 
in conventional approaches remain present and require sensitive assessment in the virtual 
sphere (Madge and O’Connor, 2002). The following section addresses these concerns 
alongside offering discussion about the concept of ‘vulnerability’ and its application in 
social science research. 
DEFINING ‘VULNERABILITY’ – LABELS OR LAYERS? 
The concept of ‘vulnerability’ is contentious in research ethics131. Recently, a special issue 
of Social and Cultural Geography (2017)132 examined the methodological and ethical 
 
130 ‘An image, video, piece of text, etc., typically humorous in nature, that is copied and spread rapidly 
by Internet users, often with slight variations’ (Oxford Dictionary, n.d.). 
131 Research ethics refers to ‘the moral principles guiding research from its inception through to completion 
and publication of results and beyond’ (ESRC, 2015, p.43). 
132 Volume 18, Issue 7. 
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processes and research responsibilities involved in geographical research with ‘vulnerable’ 
groups. Elsewhere, a growing body of literature has sought to address how vulnerability is 
conceptualised and employed in research ethics and practice (Bracken-Roche et al., 2017; 
Luna and Vanderpoel, 2009). While there is criticism that the concept of vulnerability in 
research guidelines is ‘too vague’ or ‘too broad’ (Schroeder and Gefenas, 2009), others 
argue that the vulnerability can only be meaningfully defined in the context of the specific 
research project and should be considered as ‘a spectrum’ (Bracken-Roche et al., 2017). 
Indeed, von Benzon and van Blerk (2017, p. 897), exploring vulnerability in research in 
social and cultural geography, argue that vulnerability is ‘socially constructed and 
dependent on the way in which power relations are created’ and negotiated between 
researcher and researcher. Following Luna and Vanderpoel (2009), it is hence appropriate 
to look at ‘layers’, rather than ‘labels’, of vulnerability. 
This research is interested in a population that may be deemed ‘vulnerable’ due to their 
experiences with social anxiety. Participants are deemed potentially ‘vulnerable’ in a legal 
rather than, say, ‘sociological’ sense when a vulnerable group is considered incapable of 
giving, for example, informed consent, which almost certainly not the case for people with 
social anxiety (particularly if able to access and utilise online media) People with social 
anxiety may nonetheless be vulnerable due to numerous, overlapping emotional, social and 
structural barriers, including but not limited to: significant obstacles in accessing education 
and employment (Chapter 7); being subjected to discrimination and stigma in workplace 
and social relations (Chapter 8); and being emotionally and/or psychologically ‘at risk’ due 
to negative impacts on ‘self-esteem, personal confidence and ontological security’ 
(Thomas, 2007, p. 72). Participants in my study reflect on their own personal feelings of 
vulnerability, acknowledging that their social anxieties often leave them feeling socially 
vulnerable (‘feeling vulnerable especially when surrounded by other people’ [Jo QR41]) or 
emotionally vulnerable (‘[I] feel very down and vulnerable’ [Ben, QR32])133. Perceived 
vulnerability not only influenced the initial stages of research design, therefore, but also 
required an on-going and open-ended process of consent to be established (von Benzon 
and van Blerk, 2017)134 to cover the legal base just mentioned 
 
133 Structural vulnerability manifests in various social contexts and wider institutional settings within society. 
This vulnerability relates to (a lack of) income and/or job security and discrimination in employment 
(Chapter 7) and healthcare settings (Chapter 6). Another participant highlights that she is trying to allow 
herself to be ‘more vulnerable’ (Jess, QR88) by exposing herself to new or often distressing social 
situations. 
134 This on-going and informed process of consent is discussed further in relation to specific methods. 
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The interpersonal perspective covered in Chapter 2 suggests that relations of power, 
specifically ones of dominance and submission, mediate interactions and exchanges 
between people with social anxiety and others. Stravynski (2007, p.351) describes how 
such power relations are ‘choreographed’ whereby ‘a fixed stare is met with lowered eyes 
and averted gaze’. Issues of social power and rank have been found to influence socially 
anxious behaviour and to shape an individual’s interpretation of verbal and non-verbal 
social cues, including eye contact, body language, posture, facial expressions and tone of 
voice (Gilboa-Schechtman and Shachar-Lavie, 2013). Face-to-face interactions can thereby 
present serious challenges to people with social anxiety in everyday life, and so the 
research encounter, if conducted face-to-face, holds the potential to exacerbate existing and 
unequal power relations. Therefore, adapting my research design and methods to facilitate 
participation as free as possible from such stressful dynamics was fundamental to 
developing an accessible and inclusive research process suitable for the population under 
study. Equally, this approach maybe helped to address inherent power relations in the 
research relationship by removing normative assumptions made about ‘non-normative’ 
bodies, given that a person’s ‘body’ (inclusive of the social cues mentioned above) is not 
necessarily visible online (Fox et al., 2007). Online environments served to remove 
elements of social evaluation and the inherent risk of scrutiny and judgement that are 
normally present in face-to-face interactions (Bowker and Tuffin, 2004). While there are 
limitations of online methods (discussed later), the perception of online anonymity meant 
that respondents, already particularly accustomed to expressing themselves in written and 
online forms, were more open to writing about difficult and sensitive aspects of their 
mental health experiences. 
However, even with these ‘protective’ measures in place, online encounters still presented 
many challenges and anxieties – with one participant in particular. Recently, geographers 
have discussed at length anxiety-inducing encounters in the field (Proudfoot, 2015) while 
Lucherini (2017) discusses a problematic online and asynchronous encounter in his 
research with people with diabetes. One participant e-mailed me after completing the 
online questionnaire to request participation in an interview. They were particularly 
enthusiastic about the project, suggesting local mental health groups with which they were 
involved that may be beneficial to participant recruitment. They specified their preference 
for a telephone interview that we scheduled for the following week. The weekend 
following our e-mail exchange, I received five consecutive late night e-mails asking 
various questions about the project and one request to withdraw from the study. Following 
the protocols from the ethics application, which outlined that anyone who withdrew 
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consent could do so with no questions asked, I promptly replied, thanking them for their 
participation to this point and stated that the information that they had provided in the 
questionnaire would be deleted. I received a final e-mail that said: ‘You don’t give a fuck 
about me!’ and a further e-mail was subsequently sent to one of my supervisors. At this 
point, I ceased all communication and forwarded the e-mails to my supervisors for advice 
on how to approach this situation. This confrontation was extremely anxiety-provoking 
and, given the reasons for conducting the research and the steps taken to design a sensitive 
and inclusive approach, I questioned my integrity as a researcher – what had I done to 
provoke this reaction?  
The next morning, I received another e-mail, stating that, after all, they wanted to 
participate in the study again. This led me to revisit the ethical considerations and, 
crucially, the process of informed consent. Informed consent is defined as: 
[T]he process through which a researcher obtains, as well as maintains, the 
permission of a person or a person’s authorized representative to participate in 
a research study. Informed consent is achieved when a subject of your study 
receives full disclosure of the research plan and its intent, understands all of the 
information that is disclosed to him or her, voluntarily consents to participate in 
the study and is competent to do so, and understand they may withdraw from 
the study at any time. (Labaree, 2009, p. np emphasis added)  
After consideration and discussion with my supervisors, I decided to decline the request to 
participate; this was mainly due to the intensity and content of the e-mails in the preceding 
24 hours. In refusing consent, I was not questioning their capacity to give informed and 
meaningful consent, but rather acknowledging that they may have felt vulnerable about 
their participation in the research at that time. I felt that the appropriate steps to take were 
to acknowledge this uncertainty – while not excusing the communications, which I felt 
were unnecessary, aggressive and excessive – and to refuse participation due to a concern 
for the participant’s (and my own) wellbeing. I also felt personally and professionally 
vulnerable and did not want to put myself in the uncertain position of conducting a 
telephone interview. Equally, I was also concerned about the capacity to maintain consent 
questioning what would happen if, for example, this situation were to happen again?135 
As highlighted earlier, the initial role of online forums in the research was twofold: as an 
object of study (i.e. context analysis of threads) and as a resource (i.e. recruitment and 
distribution of questionnaires). Many of the ethical debates surrounding research with/in 
 
135 There was no further communication. 
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online communities rest on whether online communities and their content are ‘public’ or 
‘private’ (Eysenbach and Till, 2001; King, 1996) and I was indeed conflicted about the use 
of thread materials. Taking direction from the Association of Internet Research (AoIR, 
2012) I negotiated the tensions between the types of data and the specific contexts in which 
data is produced. The guidelines appropriate to this research are shown in Figure 6. 
The online platforms with which I engaged in this research fall under the category of 
‘special interest forums’ and, as highlighted in Figure 6, consideration must be given to the 
level of privacy expected on these platforms and whether researchers can maintain this 
privacy. Members usually take steps to conceal their offline identities by employing 
usernames and avatars136 to maintain their privacy and anonymity. 
 
Figure 6: Ethical Decision Making and Internet Research Ethics – Considerations for 
Direct Communication and ‘Special Interest Forums’ (AoIR, 2012) 
 
Arguably, there are expectations and perceptions of privacy in online communities, 
particularly when access is only permitted once an individual has completed registration 
with the website. This was the case with SAS, but is not currently the case with SAUK: 
SAS’s access was restricted to membership only, whereas all sections of the SAUK forum 
are open and accessible to anyone without prior registration (with the exception of SAUK 
– Support Groups’ that are ‘private’: see, Figure 6). The ‘open’ nature of SAUK, while 
seemingly answering the ‘private/public’ dispute, presents further problems in that search 
engines index137 SAUK forum posts, which means that direct quotations are traceable back 
to the original source via an Internet search and the individual author identified (even if 
only by their ‘online persona’). As the boundaries between personal and public 
 
136An image used to represent a user in the virtual world that is usually not a portrait of the user. 
137‘Indexing’ here is the process of adding webpages to Internet search engine results. 
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communication on these platforms are blurry and, while the Internet is changing the nature 
of communication, I could not assume users’ perceptions of privacy. Ultimately, due to the 
ease for which this sensitive information can be searched in online search engines, 
potentially compromising participant anonymity and user privacy, I made a conscious 
decision not to replicate this material in the thesis. Furthermore, Bowker and Tuffin (2004, 
p.231) attest that ‘public access does not guarantee public disclosure’. Individuals engage 
with online communities as a means of support and rarely do so with the expectation of 
becoming research subjects. Research into the interpersonal dynamics of online 
communities is still an emerging field, but we (as researchers) should strive to ensure that 
we do not disrupt group dynamics or invade the privacy of groups of interest. The 
following quotation from an online community member (reproduced in King, 1996, 
p.122)138 highlights the potential for harm involved in conducting research in online 
communities and reflects my hesitation to ‘invade’ further into these crucial spaces of 
support: 
I am not going to say any more about myself other than that my name is 
[deleted], as you can already see from my address. The reason I will not say 
any more about myself is that since I have become a member of this list, I have 
been seeing more and more postings from students doing research papers or 
working on their advanced degrees or journalists looking for interviews for 
articles. When I joined this, I thought it would be a *support* group, not a 
fishbowl for a bunch of guinea pigs. I certainly don’t feel at this point that it is 
a safe environment, as a support group is supposed to be, and I will not open 
myself up to be dissected by students or scientists. 
As I was conscious that people with social anxiety are often crucially aware of being the 
focus of attention from ‘others’, I was especially cautious about reproducing the ‘fishbowl’ 
effect highlighted by this participant in King (1996), and thereby disrupting individual 
interactions or supportive community dynamics on the forum. 
Online communities are situated somewhere ‘in-between’, disrupting the taken-for-granted 
assumptions about public and private spheres. Researchers negotiating ‘private’ worlds in 
the ‘public’ realm must consider the overall social benefits of encroaching on these spaces 
versus the potential harm to a given community and its members, while also being aware 
of the latter’s expectations of privacy and safety. Furthermore, gaining informed consent 
from every member who contributes to a thread conversation of interest would have been 
difficult and time-consuming, particularly when membership is constantly fluctuating. 
Considering these issues, I sought to find a balance between using the Internet to engage 
 
138 King (1996) reproduced this forum post with permission. 
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with participants while respecting the supportive functioning of online spaces and 
communities. 
Finally, in terms of ethics applications, I submitted two applications to the University of 
Glasgow Ethics Committee. My previous Masters of Research dissertation project (Boyle, 
2012) proved to be a useful pilot here, insofar as I had gained experience of negotiating the 
nuances of online research, as well as having previously established research links with the 
online communities in question. The Economic and Social Research Council’s Framework 
for Research Ethics (ESRC, 2015) guidelines for conducting online research are limited. 
Instead, I consulted in-depth the Association of Internet Researchers guidelines on Ethical 
Decision-Making and Internet Research (AoIR 2012) to help with negotiating often blurry 
and overlapping research boundaries. In order to support the application further and to 
reduce ethical concerns over participant distress, I completed the Scottish Mental Health 
First Aid (SMHFA) course in July 2015. This two-day course provided training to help to 
respond to distress and to prevent a mental health crisis developing into a more serious 
state. It provided practical steps on how to recognise distress and to provide first aid to 
people experiencing anxiety, depression and psychosis. The first ethics application was 
approved in November 2015 (application number: 300140175). The second application 
requested an amendment to include the participation of 16+ year olds, following a specific 
request from a younger forum user to be a participant in the project, to which end I applied 
for PVG139 membership that includes an enhanced disclosure to work with young adults. 
The second application was approved in February 2016 (application number: 300150067). 
METHODS 
ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRES 
The first stage of the research process involved designing and implementing a mixed-
method online questionnaire to obtain descriptive-statistical and in-depth experiential data 
about people’s experiences with social anxiety. The online nature helped to facilitate 
recruitment by allowing participation at a distance, in the sense that there was no direct 
interaction with myself at any point unless individuals contacted me for more information 
or opted to participate in a follow-up interview (see below). The use of questionnaires is a 
path well-trodden in social science research and a staple component of the human 
 
139 Protection of Vulnerable Groups (PVG) scheme membership requires a criminal record and background 
check carried out by Disclosure Scotland. 
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geographer’s toolkit for gathering information about past and present behaviours, attitudes, 
social characteristics and awareness of specific issues (Cloke et al., 2004; Flowerdew and 
Martin, 2005; McGuirk and O’Neill, 2005; Parfitt, 1997). Web-based surveys have been 
employed in recent years as an alternative to traditional telephone and mail-based methods 
(Fleming and Bowden, 2009; Madge and O’Connor, 2004). There are numerous benefits of 
web-based surveys to the research process, including the relatively minimal time and cost 
of conducting them and enabling access to geographically remote and/or socially isolated 
populations. One of the primary concerns of web-based surveys (particularly from a 
quantitative perspective) is the inability to ensure a representative sample, as there is 
usually no central database from which to establish the extent to which a sample represents 
the ‘population’ (Madge and O’Connor, 2004)140. It is important to note that mine has been 
an ‘availability’ survey dependent on who is online, views the relevant threads and is 
willing to opt-in or complete the questionnaire, all aspects over which, of course, I could 
have no control. Therefore, I am not in a position to ensure representativeness in the classic 
social science mode (Kitchin and Tate, 2013), meaning that extracts which follow must be 
taken simply as illustrative of diverse experiences of social anxiety, not as anything akin to 
data from a ‘clinical trial’. That said, in analysing the questionnaire returns alongside the 
interview transcripts, I have sought to ‘triangulate’ findings wherever possible, in the sense 
of looking for claims, points, stories and the like that are shared between participants or 
which clearly disclose certain patterns or regularities of experience, understanding and 
hopes or fears. 
The online questionnaire was created using the software programme Lime Service, an 
online open source141 survey tool. I chose Lime Service as it met with ethical 
considerations related to anonymity, privacy and confidentiality, and it is also a service 
that requires no registration on behalf of participations. The record of their responses did 
not contain any identifiable information about them, with the exception of questions 
explicitly asked by the researcher: for example, contact details for interview participation. 
Participants were able to access the research information page, questionnaire, support 
information and provide electronic consent via a stand-alone website (Appendices 4-7). 
The first page of the questionnaire served as the research information page and participants 
could download this directly from the webpage and retain a copy for their records. I 
 
140 Fleming and Bowden (2009) distributed surveys via two modes: online and mail, and found that the socio-
demographic make-ups from both modes were not statistically different. Other comparison studies also 
found no significant difference in sampling between web-based and other distribution modes (including 
telephone, mail, and face-to-face) (Cobanoglu et al., 2001; Lindhjem and Navrud, 2011). 
141 Open source denotes programmes and computer software that is freely available to anyone online. 
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advised participants that their contribution was voluntary and that their anonymity would 
be maintained at all times. Participants were also made aware that, by submitting the 
questionnaire, they were consenting to their responses being used in the thesis and related 
outputs. 
The use of the questionnaire method is often criticised for the limited ‘depth’ and ‘extent’ 
of qualitative data that can be produced (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2005), and de Vaus (2013) 
argues that questionnaires do not allow for the complexities and contradictions of 
experience to be adequately portrayed. In this context, however, the questionnaire 
approach appears to have been an inherent positive of the research design, strengthening 
rather than hindering the quality of the resulting data. On the one hand, the online and 
anonymous mode helped to facilitate participation and, on the other, the open-ended and 
asynchronous nature provided an environment where participants had the time, space and 
privacy to consider and process their response. This was an extremely important aspect 
given that many individuals with social anxiety find the proximity and immediacy of in-
person communications distressing. This research environment hence enabled the 
subtleties and nuances of their experience to be expressed in written form, a more 
comfortable medium of communication precisely for these respondents removed from the 
potential embarrassment or distress of the encounter. 
Crucially, moreover, the design of my online questionnaire did not confine experience to a 
series of ‘tick box’ responses. The common principles of questionnaire design advocate 
shortness and simplicity to encourage completion and to avoid ‘fatigue-bias’ (Parfitt, 
1997), but for my study, and in order to elicit detailed narrative outcomes, participants 
were encouraged to give detailed responses inclusive of their thoughts, feelings and socio-
spatial surroundings. I purposefully designed a questionnaire comprised of 5 sections and 
34 ‘open’ and ‘close-ended’ questions. Closed questions included multiple choice and 
Likert142 scale questions intended to elicit descriptive statistics that represented particular 
attributes of anxious experience (Appendix 6). McGuirk and O’Neill (2005, p.149) argue 
that ‘closed questions rest on the assumptions that words, categories and concepts carry the 
same meaning for all respondents and this may not be the case’. Open-ended questions 
then made it possible to pose more complex questions to generate more detailed and 
nuanced narrative accounts, but they were equally susceptible to respondents’ 
 
142 A Likert scale provides a range of responses from one extreme to the other, e.g. very unlikely to very 
likely, usually given a quantitative range (i.e. 5 = very unlikely; 1 = very likely) so as to allow the 
generation of simple descriptive statistics. 
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interpretations of the question and the relevance of the question to their own experiences 
(Appendix 7). The questionnaire design followed a logical and coherent sequence, with 
questions addressing various aspects of socially anxious experience grouped together under 
specific headings (Table 5). Given the length of the questionnaire, the design was 
fundamental to sustaining a participant’s engagement: each section featured an 
introductory statement followed by several closed-ended questions – intended to encourage 
participants to start thinking about the sites and settings of their anxiety – building up to 
open-ended questions enabling participants to reflect in-depth and with detail about their 
experiences. 
Questionnaire Outline 
Introductory questions: Personal, social and biographic information including age and gender. 
Everyday life: Everyday interactions, situations, and spaces that affect/are affected by social anxiety. 
Closed questions relating to ‘feelings of safety’ (from very unsafe to very safe) and ‘likelihood of anxiety’ 
(from very unlikely to very likely). 
Symptoms: How social anxiety manifests, what symptoms are experienced, impact of these symptoms? 
Community, management and support networks: Management of social anxiety, sources of support and 
information. 
Final Questions: Opportunity to note anything important that was not covered, additional information, 
feedback and note interest for further participation.  
Table 5: Outline of Questionnaire Sections 
The anonymity and unlimited nature of open-ended, text-box answers encouraged 
participants to write extensively about their experiences, and I found that many participants 
were indeed prepared to do exactly this – perhaps in part because the very nature of the 
recruitment process, via web-forums, meant that participants were accustomed to writing at 
some length online about their social anxiety concerns when blogging/posting. 
Alternatively, the lengths at which some participants wrote also signalled that the topic was 
one they may not have had the opportunity previously to discuss at length, a possibility 
highlighted by many of the positive comments added at the end of the questionnaire and by 
the sheer amount of data collected via this method (approximately 70,000 words of 
qualitative text). Two iterations of the questionnaire were produced before the final version 
was uploaded and made available to participants, and these versions were piloted with four 
people (two from SAS and two from SAUK) and one moderator of SAUK. 
While the questionnaire was the most appropriate method to engage participants in the 
research process due to how it was implemented, i.e. anonymously and online, I was 
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unable to seek clarification or expansion on individual responses unless participants self-
selected to participate in a follow-up interview. Conversely, the questionnaire itself was a 
productive method for researching sensitive topics relating to mental health experiences 
that are still taboo and stigmatising. The online nature assured anonymity and a medium of 
interaction with which people were comfortable (i.e. non face-to-face and allowing written 
responses). These conditions ensured the seemingly open and honest accounts of 
experience evident in the extremely detailed accounts shared through the questionnaire. 
Participants may not have been so forthcoming in their responses through other, more 
corporeally invasive methods. Through the questionnaire data, I devised an iterative 
framework for semi-structured interviews, in order to engage in an on-going process of 
developing meaning and sparking new lines of inquiry leading to a refined focus and 
understanding (Srivastava and Hopwood, 2009). 
ONLINE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
The trend towards creative and visual praxis is fuelled by a sustained hostility towards the 
importance placed on verbal, written and discursive representations of life that still 
characterises a lot of research in contemporary human geography (Dowling et al., 2017). 
Despite this hostility, the interview method is probably the most common mode of data 
collection in the history of qualitative research in health geography as a way of 
understanding participants’ experiences through their own words and perspectives. A focus 
section of The Professional Geographer (1999) outlined the early methodological issues, 
challenges and implications of ‘qualitative approaches in health geography’. The collection 
alone highlights the prominence of in-depth interviewing in the sub-discipline for 
exploring various aspects of health, including: relationships with physicians (Marshall and 
Phillips, 1999); meanings of health-related risk (Baxter and Eyles, 1999); lived experience 
of HIV/AIDS (Wilton, 1999); and approaches to heart health promotion (Robinson and 
Elliott, 1999). In the same issue, Garvin and Wilson (1999) combine interviews with 
images to develop picture-elicited narratives about women’s tanning behaviours. While 
there is a vast array of literature concerned with the interview process and techniques, there 
is a small and relatively stagnant body of research discussing Internet-mediated methods, 
including asynchronous (Ward, 1999), synchronous (Boyle, 2018; O’Connor and Madge, 
2001) and Skype-based (Iacono et al., 2016) online interviews and online focus groups 
(Fox et al., 2007). Arguably, a significant problem with the lack of utilisation of online 
research methods is that the technology evolves faster than the discussion: for example, the 
technology implemented by Madge and O’Connor’s studies (2001; 2004) is no longer 
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operational. 
The second stage of my research process hence involved conducting semi-structured 
interviews. I used synchronous online interviews to elucidate further the material gathered 
from the questionnaires with self-selecting respondents, rather than using an asynchronous 
method that entails a ‘temporal displacement’ (hours, day or weeks) between the sending 
of questions and the receipt of responses (Bampton and Cowton, 2002). Respondents who 
had completed the questionnaire were given the option, at the close of the questionnaire, to 
self-select to participate in an online interview. Interview schedules were comprised of an 
iterative framework of general themes emerging from the questionnaire responses and pre-
established questions that helped to establish a ‘loose sense of format or structure for the 
interview’ (Cloke et al., 2004, p.152). In addition to this ‘overarching framework’, 
interview schedules were also tailored to individual participants to prompt personal lines of 
questioning, enabling me to expand on details from the questionnaire response – an 
snapshot section of the generic interview schedule is attached (Appendix 8). Each 
interview schedule was tailored to the participant’s questionnaire responses in order to 
focus on and prioritise aspects of experience that were significant to the respondent. I 
contacted self-selecting participants within two weeks of questionnaire completion with 
more information about the interview process, including a copy of the research information 
sheet (Appendix 11). I aimed to schedule interviews within one to two weeks of my initial 
contact. 
The ‘placing’ of interviews was of particular concern given that face-to-face interviews 
would have been impractical for many participants, not least for the various reasons 
explained above with reference to my target cohort (people with social anxiety). I aimed to 
make the research design as flexible, inclusive and accessible as possible, offering online 
text-based interviews in the first instance and negotiating terms on an individual basis143. 
This approach proved to be beneficial as many participants demonstrated concerns about 
face-to-face interactions in their remarks at the end of their questionnaire. Several 
participants stated explicitly that they would only participate further via online methods: 
I’d much prefer online, as I struggle to answer phone calls but I would be 
happy to take part in a follow up interview online. (Olivia, QR187) 
I’m willing to do it online, not in person or via Skype. (Molly, QR42) 
 
143 People may have been less responsive to participate had the telephone interview been offered in the first 
instance and online interviews negotiated on an individual basis. 
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For one participant, despite the anonymity offered by the online environment, the 
immediacy of synchronous exchange was potentially as distressing as face-to-face 
interactions: ‘Even the thought of an interview online terrifies me. I may not be of any 
further use to you but I will give you my e-mail address, I can always decline can’t I?’ 
(Tina, QR123). I sent a follow up e-mail to Tina one week after she completed the 
questionnaire, acknowledging her concerns and providing more information about the 
interview process. Unfortunately, I did not receive a response, but the detail with which 
she initially recorded her experience in her questionnaire is extremely valuable. 
I conducted the interviews using a web-based chat room called ‘Chat Step’ (accessed via 
www.chatstep.com). As our conversations were not stored or archived on Chat Step’s 
database, the disposable nature of the platform provided a solution for any concerns over 
anonymity, privacy and data security. Using Chat Step, I was able to create a password-
protected chat room and share the information with participants to log in at a pre-arranged 
date and time. Initially, I sought to obtain consent via this platform, but this proved too 
time-consuming, and so instead I negotiated consent electronically in the e-mail 
communication prior to the interview (Appendix 9). I also provided participants with a set 
of guidelines to help facilitate the interview process (Table 6). Participants did not have to 
register to use the services or download the programme on to their computers. At the end 
of the interview, a transcript of our conversation was available to download immediately 
and participants could retain a copy of the transcript for their own reference144. There were 
no requests to amend transcripts. A screenshot of an interview conducted via Chatstep is 
attached in Appendix 10. 
In my e-mail exchanges with participants, and again in the interview guidelines, I 
highlighted the importance of their personal experiences; particularly after one respondent 
worried that she was ‘no expert’ and that her lack of ‘medical knowledge or technical 
terms’ (Kirsty, QR87) would make her an unsuitable participant. Making participants 
aware that there were no ‘wrong answers’, and that their own lived experience was the 
‘expert knowledge’ and focus of this research project, helped to reduce inhibitions and 
appeared to encourage an in-depth and detailed range of responses. 
 
 
144 One participant noted she had found the discussion so illuminating that she was going to take a copy of the 
transcript to her next counselling session to unpack the text further. 
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ChatStep Guidelines for Participants 
Thank you for taking the time to chat with me today. 
• I would like to chat to you about your questionnaire responses in more detail and have an informal 
chat about your experiences with social anxiety. 
• The interview should last no longer than 1.5 hours. 
• Responses on the ChatStep platform are restricted to 200 characters. Please send responses 2-3 
lines at a time to avoid any technical problems. 
• Please give as much detail as you are comfortable with. 
• Finally, if you feel uncomfortable with any of the questions or would like to step the interview, you 
can do so at any time ☺ 
Do you have any questions before we get started? 
Table 6: Guidelines for participants provided at the beginning of the interview 
process 
 
One of the limitations of Chat Step is that messages have a 200-character limit. At times, I 
was unsure whether periods of silences meant that a participant was thinking, did not 
understand the question or, as happened on several occasions, they had experienced 
technical difficulties that did not register on my end of the chat-room and been ejected 
from the room. When participants were responding, a pulsing icon appeared next to their 
name, providing reassurance that they were still active in the chat room. Madge and 
O’Connor (O’Connor and Madge, 2001) report similar difficulties with online interviews, 
noting that, in the absence of visual cues, an attentive but direct line of questioning often 
replaced the more subtle gestures and probing present in face-to-face interactions. From 
the perspective of the researcher, online interviews can therefore present some difficulty 
because the embodied details and social cues inherent in face-to-face interactions are 
concealed, making it difficult to sense the appropriateness of particular lines of questioning 
through participants’ non-textual responses. Further concerns about the absence of visual 
and verbal cues relate to those cues that would indicate participant’s distress, uncertainty 
and ambiguity in the research process. From an ethical standpoint, I was concerned that I 
would not be able to respond sympathetically or appropriately in these instances. 
Participants often gave indications of their emotions, feelings and frustrations, using 
symbols and acronyms popularised by CMC, but, even so, their overall words were usually 
far more insightful in this regard. Significant in this research is that prioritising textual 
representations removed the element of social evaluation and, by extension, participants’ 
perceived scrutiny and therefore any triggering of their own self-critical perspectives 
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(Bowker and Tuffin, 2004). Gies (2008) argues that online interviews and CMC in general 
are ‘impoverished’ by a lack of body language and social cues, viewing textual 
representations of conversations as merely a process of ‘making do’. From psychoanalytic 
perspectives145, the digitalisation146 of language can only partially capture or represent 
experience: 
[W]riting can only depict some of the melodic patterning of face-to-face 
speech through the digital means of meter, rhyme, punctuation, etc. When 
writing is then used to recreate screen-to-screen interface through the Internet 
(e.g., Facebook), the missing analogical elements, such as emotions, must be 
added through the digital means of emoticons [(: )], acronyms (LOL, OMG), 
typeface, and so forth. Most important for analytic work, the nuances of 
emotions, which are analogical, become increasingly displaced at each digital 
step in ways that challenge one to re-examine concepts such as disavowal and 
dissociation. (Litowitz, 2012, p.508). 
Litowitz (2012) duly questions how analysts can do the kinds of analytic work required of 
them in/through online platforms given that the emotional responses, body language, 
‘ums’, omissions, silences and so on cannot be adequately represented or interpreted. 
Certainly, many aspects that may have given a ‘fuller’ representation of social anxiety in-
situ were missing with this approach. However, it would have been unnecessary, not to 
mention ethically unsound, to place participants in a social interaction that could have 
triggered or exacerbated their anxieties in order to capture these dimensions. While not a 
perfect tool, the Internet allowed access to a marginalised population and enabled their 
participation in the research on their own terms. It required, in certain instances, more 
probing to unearth many of the nuances of experience that may have been detectable 
through body language, facial expressions and emotional responses, but I am confident in 
the quality and indeed robustness of the data that my online interviewing method afforded 
How my participants wrote about their experiences in the ‘virtual’ world was often very 
emotional, incredibly detailed and no less salient or powerful in the absence of the ‘real’, 
fleshy person. Textual representations here did not hinder or ‘impoverish’ the research 
 
145 The primary modality of psychoanalytic practice and theory is rooted in face-to-face encounter and 
treatment. Litowitz (2012) notes that, despite clients bringing aspects of the Internet into treatment (e.g. 
social networks), psychoanalysis has been slow to conceptualise or respond to these activities (e.g. are 
clients avoiding reality or playing with reality?) and what the implications might be (Chapter 6). The 
principles of psychoanalysis do not map easily on to a culture saturated by the evolving nature of the 
Internet. 
146 In this sense, all language written or in print ‘digitalises’ experience, although the Internet adds another 
dimension to this process of ‘digitalisation’ as experience here is expressed through written and online 
languages (Litowitz, 2012). Interestingly, online language (e.g. LOL [laugh out loud], TMI [too much 
information]) is now used in everyday face-to-face communication, a reverse move from online to offline. 
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process, but rather enriched it by providing an anonymous platform through which 
participants reflected in detail on their experiences. To put this into context, the 
questionnaire and interview responses together generated over 120,000 words of 
qualitative data (approximately 70,000 and 50,000 respectively), clearly demonstrating 
participants’ willingness to share in detail and at length their experiences of social anxiety. 
TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS 
Telephone interviews are regarded as a principal method of data collection in quantitative 
research (Novick, 2008), particularly in health-related fields (Aday, 1996). Methodological 
literature concerning the design and implementation of telephone interviews tends to align 
the method with the questionnaire survey mode of inquiry, describing the approach as a 
compromise between face-to-face and postal questionnaire surveys (Parfitt, 1997). 
McLafferty147 (2010, p. 83) states that telephone interviews are ‘generally limited to short 
questionnaires with fixed-response questions’, and it is added that the time limit for 
telephone surveys should not exceed 30 minutes (de Vaus, 2013). Consequently, in human 
geography few qualitative studies employ in-depth telephone interviews and little 
methodological discussion or critical debate about the telephone as a mode of qualitative 
inquiry beyond survey-based methods. The field of nursing research has engaged with 
telephone interviews as a qualitative mode of inquiry (Novick, 2008) and conducted 
comparative studies with face-to-face interviews (Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). Similar 
concerns arise with telephone interviewing as with online interviewing regarding the 
mode’s compatibility with an interpretive research approach (Sweet, 2002) and the loss of 
non-verbal and contextual data (Opdenakker, 2006). 
In this project, semi-structured in-depth telephone interviews were implemented to expand 
on participants’ completed questionnaire responses and not used to carry out a telephone-
based questionnaire survey. As with the online questionnaire design and online interview 
method, general research principles relating to type of question or length of interview did 
not apply in this context. Telephone interviews were equally as in-depth as online 
interviews and lasted approximately 1.5-2 hours, with no signs of participant fatigue. The 
three participants (Karen, Moira and Nina) who participated via telephone interviews did 
so for a variety of reasons, including preference and Internet access issues. They also 
expressed no overwhelming anxieties about voice communication and/or interactions and 
 
147 In the same text, Longhurst (2010) discusses semi-structured interviews, but does not mention or discuss 
telephone interviewing. 
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felt comfortable participating in this capacity. Similar to the online methods, telephone 
interviews enabled participation by individuals who were socially and geographically 
remote148. Furthermore, Karen had no home Internet connection or access to a laptop, 
finding the project while browsing the Anxiety UK website on her mobile phone, further 
cementing the value of maintaining an open and flexible approach that responded to the 
needs of participants. 
Prior to the telephone interviews, I communicated with participants via e-mail and sent an 
information sheet and consent form (Appendix 9 and 11) that covered the interview 
process and issues of consent, confidentiality, and anonymity and data collection. This was 
primarily a repetition of the information sheet that was sent to participants previously, but, 
as approximately two weeks had passed between arranging and conducting the interview, I 
wanted to ensure that participants fully understood the research and interview process. This 
also ensured that all participants were receiving consistent information (Burke and Miller, 
2001). I obtained verbal permission from all three participants to record the interviews: 
telephone interviews were played through the loudspeaker on my mobile phone and 
recorded using a Dictaphone. As the conversations had to be played on loudspeaker, I had 
to consider carefully when and where to conduct the interviews so interviewees could not 
be overheard. Two were conducted in rooms that I had booked in the University of 
Glasgow and one was conducted at home. Telephone interviews were then uploaded to my 
PC at the University and transcribed using qualitative analysis software NVivo® (v.11) 
(see also below), and the Dictaphone was subsequently wiped of all data and recordings. 
Opdenakker (2006, p.4) raises concerns over the lack contextual and non-verbal 
information available to the researcher when conducting telephone interviews when there 
is ‘a synchronous communication of time but asynchronous communication of place’. 
Similar issues have been discussed above relating to online interviews. Of those 
interviewed via telephone, Karen and Nina were at home and Moira was at work; while not 
visible to me, where these participants were located became extremely important to what 
they would and could discuss during their interviews. Karen is relatively housebound and 
discussed her experiences of anxiety in the context of home and relationships with family; 
Moira focused on the workplace and workplace tasks and relations, raising concerns about 
an upcoming conference; and Nina, who had returned home from her volunteering role, 
focused initially on the impact of a supportive workplace for her social anxieties. Much of 
 
148 The telephone interviewees were located in North East Scotland, South West England and Northern 
Ireland. 
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the contextual data was communicated through participants’ own words rather than being 
interpreted through the eyes of the researcher. 
While both Karen and Moira were extremely forthcoming in their responses, I found 
interviewing Nina to be a little more challenging as she seemed hesitant to discuss the 
emotional dimensions of her experience in-depth. Nina was the only interview participant 
(online and telephone) who did not complete the online questionnaire149. She contacted me 
directly from the post on AUK requesting to participate in an interview. I tried to be as 
flexible as possible in order to accommodate Nina’s request and schedule, but her non-
completion of the questionnaire made it more difficult to strike up rapport with her as I was 
entering the interview with no information about Nina’s experiences150, and she had no 
previous engagement with the research as other participants did. Therefore, it was difficult 
to judge the appropriateness of questions and I could sense her becoming quiet or 
withdrawn when I pressed for more emotional dimensions of her experience. She 
responded on several occasions with ‘I’ve never actually thought about it’ or, if I attempted 
to re-word a question, ‘I don’t know’. There was a sense that Nina was hesitant or 
uncertain and these responses could be interpreted as a way of shutting down discussions 
that touched upon more uncomfortable or personal dynamics151. 
DATA ORGANISATION AND ANALYSIS 
Of the 178 people who engaged152 with the questionnaire, 128 people submitted their 
responses153 (a 72% completion rate154); while 38 participants self-selected to participate in 
a follow-up interview, although I was only able to establish contact with 19 interview 
 
149 I did provide her with the link and requested that she complete the questionnaire prior to the interview so 
that I could conduct a preliminary analysis of her responses and tailor the interview schedule to her 
experiences, but she did not have the time. Also, due to her work commitments we had to reschedule the 
interview on one occasion. 
150 I worked iteratively between questionnaire responses and interviews by reading through the online 
questionnaire responses made by individuals who I went onto interview (online or over the telephone), so 
that I already possessed quite a detailed picture of how they lived with their own social anxiety – and of 
other aspects of their everyday life-worlds.  
151 Equally, there was the sense that Nina experienced quite a lot of shame and (self)-stigma regarding her 
mental health. She highlighted that she was previously a counsellor and was ‘angry’ that she had found 
herself ‘in this position and not recognised it sooner’. 
152 By engagement, I mean participants who proceeded beyond the research information sheet and either 
partially completed or fully completed the questionnaire, but did not necessarily submit their responses. 
Participants were required to submit their responses at the end of the questionnaire in order to provide full 
consent. 
153 This does not include Sam’s withdrawn response (discussed earlier). 
154 As I advertised the research online via multiple platforms, the potential population size is unknown; 
therefore, it is not possible to gain information on the response rate. 
 
 
 122 
participants155. Two participants participated in interviews only. The total number of 
participants was 130. Using NVivo® I created a ‘case file’156 and assigned ‘case attributes’ 
(i.e. characteristics of a person, including age, gender, living situation, sexuality) for each 
participant, whether or not they proceeded to the interview stage. I filed individual 
questionnaire and interview transcripts, as well as data collection and analysis memos, for 
each participant in their assigned ‘case’ files. I assigned participants a case file number, a 
reference number corresponding to their questionnaire response ID (e.g. QR01). I assigned 
pseudonyms to participants whose responses were used in the thesis write-up and related 
outputs. 
An advantage of conducting online research was that all of the data generated through this 
route was written and therefore in effect already ‘transcribed’, and I was able to download 
the questionnaire and interview transcripts from the Lime Survey and Chat Step platforms. 
During the process of transcribing the three telephone interviews, I omitted transcribing 
‘filler’ words such as ‘um…’, ‘ah…’ and ‘like’, although I noted when participants 
laughed or sounded frustrated and/or exasperated157. The textual records are in plain 
English although some Glaswegian and Scottish vernacular, particularly between me and 
other Scottish participants, emerged. Similarly, the women who participated in the 
telephone interviews were from Scotland, Northern Ireland and England, each with very 
distinct local vernacular and turns of phrase. I have omitted this information as, for the 
most part, it is also ‘missing’ in the textual representations unless it serves to contextualise 
specific socio-spatial dimensions of experiences. All identifiable characteristics have been 
removed and quotations are reproduced in the following chapters with omitted text 
(signified by ‘[…]’), minimal grammatical and formatting ‘corrections’ for ease of reading. 
I implemented an inductive158 and iterative approach to analysing and interpreting both the 
questionnaire and interview data by drawing loosely on a constructivist (as opposed to 
objectivist) ‘grounded theory’. This approach is well established in social science and 
 
155 Participants may have decided to ignore invitations to participate in the interviews, but this disparity 
between those opting to participate and those who responded highlights another issue presented by online 
research. It is possible that my university e-mail address was not ‘recognised’ by the receiver’s e-mail 
account and was therefore not delivered. 
156 ‘Case’ here is not intended to mimic clinical language, but is simply the language used by NVivo to 
designate a ‘‘unit of observation’’ in a research study (e.g. participant, organisation). 
157 Two out of the three telephone interview participants became frustrated or exasperated when discussing 
the lack of understanding that family, friends, workplaces and/or health professionals display about social 
anxiety. 
158 Obtained from the data. 
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health disciplines and is defined by Charmaz (2006, p. 2) as a set of ‘systematic, yet 
flexible guidelines for collecting and analysing qualitative data’. Unlike the objectivist 
stance, this approach enables a process of theory-building that is rooted in the data 
collected and, crucially, requires the researcher to acknowledge the wider social context 
from which data and knowledge are produced159. This approach, in turn, ‘fosters 
researchers’ reflexivity’ (Charmaz, 2006, p.131) as we scrutinise our conduct and 
challenge pre-existing experiences and assumptions that may impact relations with, and 
representations of, research participants as well as interpretations of the data. Employing 
an approach that was ‘content-driven’ proved critical to shaping a project that aimed to 
acknowledge the words and experiences of others. This meant that ‘the patterns, themes 
and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than 
being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis’ (Patton, 2002, p. 306). 
Chapman et al. (2015, p. 202) note that such an approach requires ‘pre-existing knowledge 
about the topic [to be] deliberately withheld […] in order to prevent it from influencing the 
research findings’. Following Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 7), I found this ‘requirement’ 
difficult as it ‘denies the active role of the researcher’. The subjective and theoretical 
perspectives that informed my own position, including my own ‘insider’ status as 
discussed previously, inevitably influenced the collection, analysis and interpretation of the 
data. I could not wholly remove my own experience with, and understanding of, social 
anxiety from my interpretation of the experiences of others. Rather, I see this ‘insider’ 
knowledge as a positive feature, enhancing what I have been able to deduce from ‘complex 
layers of meaning that can attach to what are often apparently simple [or in the case of 
social anxiety, often invisible] social behaviours’ (Cloke et al., 2004, pp. 308–309). 
Following a tactile period of data immersion, which involved an initial reading and 
examining of hard copies of the questionnaire and interview transcripts in detail, followed 
by a second analysis where I started to make notes of emerging themes, I established an 
initial coding framework. Rather than a linear process of empirical materials ➔ 
identify/code categories ➔ identify relationships ➔ theme-building, my data analysis here 
was an iterative process involving numerous rounds of revisiting the data and refining the 
approach as new themes were unearthed (Cope, 2010; Crang and Cook, 2007). I had 
intended to maintain a tactile approach to analysis throughout by working with hard copies 
of the data, but the immense paper trail of detailed questionnaires and interview transcripts 
made it difficult to catalogue and manage. As a result, I conducted computer-assisted 
 
159 An objectivist stance assumes that data is ‘discovered’ by the researcher rather than ‘co-produced’ by 
researcher and researched (Charmaz, 2006, p.131). 
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qualitative data analysis using NVivo®, which is compatible with ‘grounded theory’ 
approaches and enabled in-depth descriptive and thematic coding of the data (van Hoven, 
2010). The questionnaire and interview transcripts were coded using ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ 
categories160, and codes were then organised and collated towards the production of 
overarching themes (Figure 7 shows preliminary ‘Nodes’ (i.e. codes) on NVivo Platform). 
I also conducted a descriptive statistical analysis of responses to closed questions from the 
questionnaire, which provides a summary of, for example, how safe/unsafe participations 
feel in a given list of researcher-selected spaces and the likelihood of a participant 
experiencing anxiety in a researcher-selected list of situations; this evidence is situated 
alongside the illustrative qualitative material in the empirical chapters that follow. 
 
Figure 7: Preliminary Coding Exercise in NVivo. 
 
Once I had completed the final analysis, I spent a substantial amount of time exploring the 
codes and attempting to re-organise them in a meaningful way through ‘axial’ coding 
(Cloke et al., 2004). During this period of refinement, it was difficult to ‘box’ experiences 
 
160 ‘Emic’ categories refer to the words and phrases that appear in the data (i.e. how people describe their 
experiences) and are used in the identification and naming of codes, while ‘etic’ categories require further 
interpretation on the part of the researcher and are related to the wider conceptual framework of the 
project (Cloke et al., 2004). 
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(in the form of codes and sub-codes) under broader themes, as experiences are dynamic, 
overlapping and messy. I did not want to reduce the complexity of experiential data 
through an overly systematic analysis simply in order to make things ‘fit’ into neat boxes. 
That said, the iterative approach did progressively if slowly lead to a refined focus of the 
themes, representing the complexity of individual and collective experiences. Four over-
arching themes were finally identified that form the foundations of the empirical chapters 
to follow: Chapter 5: Intensities; Chapter 6: Governmentalities; Chapter 7: Spatialities I; 
and Chapter 8: Spatialities II. Crucially, each chapter serves to build on the last as the 
emotional, affective, embodied, social and spatial dimensions of anxious experience weave 
through narrative accounts, demonstrating the complex social and anticipatory geographies 
of social anxiety161. 
 
161 This can also account for the minor repetition that may exist between chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5  
INTENSITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I explore the emotional and affective ‘intensities’ of social anxiety in order 
to examine the various ways that it is embodied and enacted as people orientate their social 
and spatial worlds. Through the intensities of participants’ experience, I consider the force 
and form of social anxiety and how, materially and discursively, these manifestations 
texture participants’ everyday lives. In order to understand the social and spatial 
implications of social anxiety explored in the substantive heart of this thesis, particularly in 
Chapters 7 and 8, it is necessary to lay the emotional and affective groundwork, and 
thereby to contextualise how social anxiety is variously embodied and experienced. The 
spatial structure of social anxiety is one that is intimately and inextricably interwoven 
between body and environment. Intensities understanding how social and interpersonal 
worlds shape, and is shaped by, emotional and affective resonances. Drawing on 
psychoanalytic geographies, as a conceptual meeting point between emotional and 
affective worlds162 (Chapter 3 [Pile, 2009]), I outline the temporalities and spatialities that 
shape the continuous interplay of ‘embodied affectivity’ (Fuchs and Koch, 2014), an 
interplay firmly rooted in an emotional and sensorial continuum. 
Such felt dynamics emerge through states of anticipation, guilt, shame, humiliation, 
embarrassment and self-consciousness; and arise in/through the bodily signs and symptoms 
of anxiety, such as blushing, shaking, palpitations, sweating and stuttering. These states 
continuously punctuate experiential accounts; in situating a discussion with ‘intensities’ at 
the beginning of this empirical narrative, their persistence should become apparent and not 
require explicit highlighting in the in the discussions that follow. 
In her psychoanalytic writings, Horney argues that such feelings and symptoms operate 
 
162 While I draw on affective/non-representational geographies, many geographers in this domain would 
argue that the methodological approach implemented in this project has already rendered affect lost. This 
is where I feel a purely non-representational approach falls short, as to attempt to understand the nuances 
of social anxiety removed from the ‘speaking subject’ (Wetherell, 2013), would restrict our understanding 
of how people feel and embody social anxiety, whether this be through the aforementioned intensities that 
cause feelings of precarity and insecurity to ensue or through internalising ‘pathologies’ or societal norms 
and stigma (ideas advanced in Chapter 6). 
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either as the ‘expression of anxiety or of a defense against it’ (Horney, 1937, p. 235). 
These intensities have the effect of signalling, exacerbating and sustaining anxiety and are 
key components to understanding how social anxiety moulds and stifles social and spatial 
worlds. Furthermore, I aim to address Callard’s (2003, p. 295) concerns about how to 
mediate the ‘palatable’ version of psychoanalysis tends to be employed by human 
geographers, and present a psychoanalytically-informed geography of social anxiety that 
necessitates paying attention to the individual prone ‘as much to inertia and repetition as to 
progressive transformation’. The reality of social anxiety is all-consuming and one that is 
not entirely ‘progressive’ or ‘transformative’, often rendering the individual liable to 
‘repeat that [which] makes them suffer’ (Van de Vijver et al., 2017, p. 1). By attending to 
the emotional and affective dimensions, I unearth the qualitative character of that 
experience, one that invariably, to use participants’ words, ‘gets right under [their] skin’, 
‘weighs heavily’, ‘paralyses’, ‘builds’, ‘creeps’, ‘seizes’, ‘suffocates’ and ‘invades’163 their 
psychical and corporeal worlds. Crucially, this is not about locating a ‘root cause’ of social 
anxiety in participants’ personal histories, but rather about developing an understanding of 
the ways in which anxiety manifests, endlessly and relentlessly, in the everyday social and 
spatial lives of the individual. 
ANTICIPATORY GEOGRAPHIES OF SOCIAL ANXIETY 
Traditionally, little has been written about the concept of the future in psychoanalysis, and 
its determined focus on the personal histories in composing the interior worlds of the 
individual continues to be a central criticism of both its practice and its theory164 
(highlighted in Chapter 3). Yet, psychoanalysis is fundamentally concerned with the 
coming into being of the subject, a process that is fraught with anxiety. For Lacan, in 
particular, anticipation plays an important role in ‘identification’165 in terms of how our 
psyches are organised, how we orient ourselves in the world and how we distinguish 
between our inner and outer worlds. These processes do not start and end with 
identification166. As human beings, we are seemingly driven to find our place in the world 
 
163 From the following Questionnaire and Interview Responses: QR9, QR111, QR150, QR220, QR41 (Jo), 
QR182 (Moira) and IR187 (Olivia). 
164 Zizek (1991, p. 202) states that ‘psychoanalysis is not concerned with the past “as such”, in its factual 
purity, but in the way past events are included in the present, synchronous field of meaning’. 
165 Identification refers to the constitution of the subject in relation to the symbolic order (See Chapter 3). 
166 While many psychoanalysts look to childhood experiences to locate and unearth unconscious traumatic 
events, Horney (1937) argues that as we continue to change and develop throughout our lives, it is 
imperative to look beyond exclusive childhood experiences and for ‘patients’ to identify the sources of 
their anxieties. 
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by carrying out certain routines, practices and movements in order to find and then to 
maintain stability (Van de Vijver, 2000, p. 166; see also: Boyle, 2018; Lucherini, 2016; 
Davidson, 2003). Lacan stresses that the anticipatory processes of the subject are 
‘constructed in two suspended motions’ (Van de Vijver 2000) – one of time and one of 
space167. A psychoanalytic approach to anticipatory processes prioritises the ever-evolving 
relationship between the self-body-world, as one that inexorably unfolds in relation to the 
subject’s previous experiences and (anticipated) futures. I attend to these dynamics through 
notions of ‘retroaction’ and ‘anticipation’. Therefore, this approach opposes the linear 
notion of subjective time and space, aiming to trace a conceptual path that tolerates and 
values the uncertainties and ambiguities that emerge in the ordinary complexities of social 
and spatial life. 
RETROACTION: STUCK IN THE AFTERMATH 
In order to understand the complexities of anticipatory processes, I start retroactively, in 
the aftermath of the event. The reason for starting afterwards168 is perhaps not immediately 
obvious, particularly when anticipation lends itself towards an event; however, it serves an 
important and logical purpose here. Verhaeghe (2012, p. 110) argues that, ‘what is 
“previous” comes into existence retroactively starting from the “next”‘. This retroactive 
practice encompasses not only how past experiences are projected towards the future, thus 
influencing experience in the ‘present’, but also how ‘present’ experiences influence the 
perception and interpretation of past events169. Psychoanalytic interpretations enable this 
experience of being ‘drawn back’ to be conceptualised as a return to, or repetition of, an 
earlier event. As such, experiences, whether or not they actually happened in the manner in 
which they are consciously/unconsciously catalogued, are often problematically and 
devastatingly re-experienced in the present. 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory structures the unconscious like a language, a notion upon 
 
167 There is an interesting body of research, primarily in sociology, critical philosophy and communications 
studies, that draws on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis to explore ‘social systems’ as constituted 
through the recursive relationship between the ‘subject’ and ‘anticipatory’ processes. Based on the 
subject’s innate capacity to construct futures through a re-construction of the past, ‘being human means 
being anticipatory’ (Blomme and Hoens, 2000, p. 122). 
168 The Freudian concept of ‘Nachträglichkeit’ (Lacan’s ‘apres coup’) is central to his theories on hysteria and 
trauma. The term translates to afterwardness and concerns how an event ‘retroactively alters the 
subjective interpretation of the past’ (Bistoen et al., 2014, p. 672). It is crucial for understanding not the 
reality of the events that unfolded but how ‘the subject responded or reacted to this experience that 
determined the effects of the so-called traumatic encounter.’ 
169 By ‘event’ I mean a happening, memory and/or trauma significant to the individual. 
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which I draw on briefly to make sense of these anticipatory entanglements (Lacan, 1988, p. 
48) (Chapter 3). Lacan argues that a word is only given sense and meaning by the word(s) 
that precede it; a similar process can be attributed here to the event: event 1 influences 
(‘anticipates’) the experience of event 2; while event 2 retroactively reshapes the meaning 
and experience of event 1; event 3 is influenced by the reshaping of event 1 and the 
experience of event 2 and then retroactively works to reshape e1 and e2; and so on and so 
forth. Therefore, an event is re-interpreted and re-defined by/through the previous 
sequence of events. There are multiple external intrusions significant to experiences of 
social anxiety, ones that impose on the individual and have a lasting impact on the psyche. 
First, there are those that are a result of continuous and repeated exposure to interpersonal 
hostility and aggression (e.g. bullying or physical and/or emotional abuse); then, there are 
‘micro-events’, a series of separate events of a similar quality (e.g. isolated experiences of 
embarrassment or social exclusion); and finally, there are those that may be considered 
‘less severe stressors’, ones that are not immediately recognisable as traumatic, but can 
cause long-term mental and emotional distress (e.g. sudden changes in environment or 
ongoing experiences of stress) (Bistoen et al., 2014). Such events, whether of instantaneous 
trauma or a regular feature in one’s everyday life, serve as a form of ‘socio-symbolic 
violence’ that operate as ‘brutal interruptions that destroy the symbolic texture of [a] 
subject’s identity’ (Žižek, 2011b, p. 292)170. 
Psychoanalysis contends that event-encounters are internalised and inscribed and 
catalogued at a psychical level through processes of repression171; the ‘memories’ of which 
are very much anchored in/to the body172 (Pile, 2009b) and re-emerge in situations – in 
specific times and spaces – that are similar, in one form or another, to the ‘original’ event. 
Bodily memory can manifest and be activated in different forms: situational, metaphorical, 
habitual and traumatic (Casey, 2000; Fuchs, 2012). Crucially, memory does not function as 
a repository where experiences are stored, accessible and retrieved, but rather, like an 
archive, it is fragmented, pieced together and re-interpreted at a temporal and spatial 
 
170 A question posed to psychoanalysis is why the psychical consequences of, for example, two people with 
similar ‘traumatic’ experiences, play out in completely different ways. Arguably, this rests on a host of 
internal and external factors and ultimately, it is how these events are processed in relation to these factors 
that account for how traumatic experiences re-emerge in the individual (or not). 
171 Repression is one of the most fundamental principles of psychoanalysis and ‘denotes the process by which 
certain thoughts or memories are expelled from consciousness and confined to the unconscious’ (Evans, 
2002, p. 168).  
172 Freud uses the term ‘aufheben’, which translates loosely ‘to suppress’. Zizek uses the term ‘sublate’ 
meaning ‘to assimilate (a smaller entity) into a larger one’ (Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.). The latter 
attends to a ‘layering’ of traumatic events that build, shift and manifest in other ways and the events each 
have a qualitatively similar affect. 
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disconnect. A complex process is at work in the recollection of memories, where recalled 
memories are comprised of precipitates and traces that are not necessarily representative of 
the original experience or event173. Memories are distorted and distorting, but no less 
significant and signifying. Memory fragments are re-lived and re-embodied through 
practices of rumination and their forcible return into conscious thought, one where 
symptoms speak of a repression, absence and abundance (Hodder, 2017). Therefore, I 
attend to individual and private memories as social and spatial ‘remains’ (Jones, 2011) and 
‘reversions’174 (Philo, 2006). Crucially, psychoanalysis is less concerned with the real 
sequence of an individual’s past; rather, it is only concerned with ‘the past insofar as it is 
historicised in the present – historicised in the present because it was lived in the past’ 
(Lacan, 1991, p. 12). Thus, the retroactive processes involved are symbolically related to 
being ‘stuck in the aftermath’ of an event, one where past events (and their associated 
memories and bodily resonances) always return with an uncanny and uncertain 
familiarity175. 
In the questionnaire responses, participants often referred to feelings such as being ‘stuck’ 
(Jane, QR90) or ‘trapped’ (Kim, QR40) by their anxiety176. One of the most common 
expressions participants use to describe what it was like to live with social anxiety is ‘a 
vicious cycle [or] circle’. Such descriptions account for repetitions, not as 
unproblematically formative practices that ensure continuity and instil belonging (Edensor, 
2006), but as embodied events that do in fact burden, disturb, distress and isolate. Freud 
(1914) asserts that the most basic model of mental life entails, against all therapeutic 
efforts and interventions, the unconscious compulsion to repeat. It is through repetition that 
we come to understand past events and experiences of trauma (Blum and Secor, 2011) . 
Such circuitous loops are not only compulsive, but also counterproductive, representing 
‘the perpetual recurrence of the same thing’177 (Freud, 1920, p. 22) and marking a(n 
un)conscious return to a qualitatively similar set of experiences. For example, Jane, who 
 
173 Laplanche (1999, p. 91) considers ‘the unconscious element or trace not as a stored memory or 
representation, but as a sort of waste-product of certain processes of memorisation’. 
174 A local or temporary return to a previous state or practice (cf. ‘Regression’, a long-term return to an 
earlier, usually childhood, state) (Bever, 2017).  
175 Freud (1919, p. 245) states that, ‘the uncanny is something which is secretly familiar, which has 
underdone repression and then returned from it’. 
176 Interestingly, while many feel ‘stuck’ and ‘trapped’ by their social anxieties one of the biggest sources of 
anxiety about navigating everyday environments is a fear of not being able to escape. This is evident 
when participants discuss being in various social and public spaces and, in particular, on public transport 
(Chapter 6 and 7) and this lack of progressive movement is arguably also in play here. 
177 This material is the ultimate focus of psychoanalytic therapy. 
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grew up in an ‘authoritarian’ household, describes how numerous events actively 
‘condition’ (in the present) her intense and vivid response to external ‘triggers’, 
continuously serving to ‘send [her] back to [her] childhood’: 
Imagine living with a military commander [her stepfather] who watches your 
every move, criticises everything and over reacts to everything. Plus, the 
constant threats of violence and [a] disgusting sexual taint to everything. 
Although no physical violence or otherwise happened to me, the shouting, 
attacking furniture and having my bedroom ripped to shreds; the threat of 
everything melted my brain. […] I find myself reacting overly fearfully to 
people [who] raise their voices because of the way my stepfather used to shout, 
especially with people who are authority figures – which is pretty much 
everyone because I feel lesser than everyone – I sort of sink into myself and 
withdraw. 
Significant in Jane’s discussion of her early memories are notions of being visible, of being 
watched, scrutinised and receiving a negative response from her stepfather, aspects that 
continue to have a pervasive impact on her daily life and form the very foundation of her 
experience with social anxiety. Through an internalising of authoritative, aggressive and 
threatening conditions that were a habitual feature in her early/formative years, Jane 
repeatedly re-experiences the feelings of uncertainty, anxiety and hostility in her current 
interpersonal and social relations. She also discusses how these traumatic memories are 
deeply tied to and embedded in places that command repetition178: 
Previous places where I’ve had bad times are a trigger too, for example if I 
walk by my secondary school that can taint my social interactions for the rest 
of the day because I keep remembering negative stuff. 
The intrusive and uncontrollable repetition of ‘traumatic’ experiences is often inescapable 
and prevents the individual from moving past them.  
The surfacing of anxieties in particular interactions and situations that are symbolically 
reminiscent of the original event(s) demonstrates the (un)boundedness of the psyche (Parr, 
1999b) and its materialisation in the present. Kim describes three situations throughout her 
life that resurface when she encounters similar situations in the present: 
I find myself remembering and kind of reliving all the times I messed up in 
important or significant situations and looked/felt like an idiot. Things that 
happened recently to things that happened 10 or 20 years ago [Louise: What 
 
178 ‘The very mode of this determining is overdetermined by the present synchronous symbolic network. If 
the trace of an old encounter all of a sudden begins to exert an impact, it is because the present symbolic 
universe of the subject is structured in a way that is susceptible to it’ (Žižek, 1991, p. 202). 
 
 
 132 
interactions/situations do you remember?] I was bullied by co-workers and feel 
to some extent I let it happen/deserved it. It was easy for me to become the butt 
of their jokes/taunts. In school, messing up presentations, awkward exchanges 
with classmates [and] being singled out and absolutely humiliated by a teacher 
for getting something wrong. [Then,] the time my mum tried to take me to 
dancing lessons and I freaked out. I was 5 or 6 at that time but I remember all 
these details so vividly, I remember feeling so overwhelmed that it was painful 
and that’s the same feeling I get time and time again like I’m stuck in my 5 or 
15 or 20 year old brain and body and I can’t escape. (Kim, IR) 
These memories resurface as fragments but their most salient points remain. Kim, now 
aged 25, tracks back from the most recent event, through her teenage years to the 
overwhelmingly ‘painful’ childhood memory where she was faced with the threat of 
performance. Kim’s testimony, although brief, illuminates how various elements of her 
past (and present) experience are representative of what went before, organised around 
themes of performance, humiliation, authority and confrontation, and situated in formative 
social environments. I query Kim’s reasoning for feeling that she deserved to be bullied or 
taunted. She replies saying, ‘Tbh179, my self-worth is so low that it was easier to take it 
than complain plus, how was I going to bring that to my boss and then HR180 and still have 
to face them every day? I couldn’t go through that scrutiny.’ Eventually, she quit her job in 
an effort to escape the hostile work environment, but it is a situation to which she is 
effectively forced to return to time and time again. Similar to Jane, Kim alludes to fears of 
authority figures. Throughout Kim and Jane’s testimonies, and the testimonies of other 
participants, a relationship between social anxiety and the ‘situated’ self emerges. The 
(past) sites and settings of traumatic and anxious events are highly subjective but shed light 
on the manner in which they have been reiterated throughout Kim’s (and others’) life-
course, affecting her sense of self and self-other-world relations. 
RUMINATIONS 
The most banal daily interactions can inflict cumulative psychical and emotional harm on 
the individual. The minutiae of these interactions are often the focus of self-conscious and 
self-critical practices of rumination that the individual conducts. in the aftermath of an 
event181. Rumination manifests through habitually and ‘highly negative views of self and a 
painful and repetitive self-scrutiny [that are] characterised by harsh internal dialogues 
about social performance or perceived failures’ (Boyle, 2018, p. 2). This critical 
 
179 Short-hand for ‘to be honest’. 
180 Human Resources. 
181 In cognitive-behavioural approaches, this is referred to as ‘post-mortem thinking’. 
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examination of the self in relation to others compromises a person’s self-other-world 
relations and, leading them to question their own social value and place in the world. In the 
aftermath, participants report feeling ‘worthless’, ‘useless’ ‘drained’ or ‘dead inside’182, 
wherein each repeated attempt to ‘be normal, live normally, have normal relationships with 
others and myself – just live’ (Daniel, QR115 emphasis added) reinforces a sense of failure 
that produces a ‘less-than-human’ (Philo, 2017) subject. 
Daniel writes that he ‘spend[s] too much time analysing every interaction or situation’ for 
social mistakes, faults or failings that, from his perspective, cause ‘other people to think 
negatively of [him]’ (Daniel QR115). In a follow-up interview, he describes the aftermath 
of a social event: 
Social things are stressful, I feel tense and nervous most of the time and I feel 
very self-conscious, so they are pretty awful to deal with. When I am alone, I 
have all this time to sit with myself and run through everything I did or said 
[and I] worry about what other people think about me. I play it over and over 
and over again in my head. I really start to hate myself and how awkward and 
incapable I am of being normal in social situations. It spirals out of control and 
I can’t stop thinking about it. 
L: What sort of things do you think about? 
D: I go over and over everything I said and did: Why I did it? How I did it? 
Why I did it that way? How I said something? (e.g. tone of voice, volume, 
projection, wording); How my body language or general demeanour makes me 
look anxious and weird and completely unapproachable – I feel people avoid 
me anyway because of this. I really beat myself up over being so 
unapproachable. 
L: When you have those conversations with yourself, how do you feel? 
D: Worthless. Beyond worthless. I’ve done nothing with my life and I feel so 
pitiful and empty. I’ve heard those thought patterns called ‘analysis paralysis’ 
and ‘post-mortem’ thinking, or something like that, but I feel like I’m already 
socially paralysed by them, I just exist; a lifeless existence. (Daniel, IR115) 
Similar to the aforementioned ‘retroactive’ events, practices of rumination have the 
capacity to ‘paralyse’ the individual, regimenting them in past interactions, sites and 
spaces. Daniel’s ‘lifeless existence’ can be compared to the notion of ‘social death’. 
Králová (2015) situates ‘social death’ in direct opposition to ‘wellbeing’ and notes that it is 
concerned with three interrelated socio-spatial conditions: loss of social identity, the loss of 
 
182 QR214, QR143 (Lisa), QR118, QR187 (Olivia), QR149 and QR137.  
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connection and social relations, and the disintegration of the body183, which culminate in 
the individual’s disconnection from social and spatial life184. Amber (QR27) describes her 
social anxiety as ‘crippling’: 
It leaves me with a constant feeling of dread and unable to relax for any 
sustained period. My mind constantly recalls bad memories at the most random 
[times] which invokes hours/days more of self-criticism and feelings of wasted 
worthlessness. The majority of the time I feel like I just want to escape from 
everything and everyone and just exist alone. 
Callum recalls that feeling like a ‘misfit’ throughout his school years was shaped by 
others’ perceptions of his character, which hindered his ability to maintain social 
connections and relationships: 
I’ve never really fit in anywhere. I’ve always been a bit of a loner and a loser. I 
didn’t fit in at school [and] any “friends”185 I did have drifted or moved away. I 
often think about how painful those experiences were, all the times people gave 
me funny looks [when I was] trying to strike up a conversation with [them] – I 
was never really teased or anything, they just ignored me – [and] how 
dismissive teachers were of me. I feel society is equally dismissive now. They 
see me as this lonely weirdo. (Callum, IR189) 
Rumination, therefore, involves a conscious yet uncontrollable undoing of the (past) self in 
the present. Natalie’s ruminative practices have chipped away and hollowed out her sense 
of self: 
I feel like the ‘social’ world drains the life out of me to be honest. It’s so 
physically and mentally exhausting to try and stay tuned in to situations that 
are unbearable. I dwell on them endlessly, replaying the embarrassing 
interactions or awkward exchanges in my head. They are so intrusive and chip 
away at me. I feel like I’ve just become this shell of a person, you know? 
This undoing of self often entails drawing comparisons to the self before it was gripped by 
social anxiety. Other participants reflected on their ‘past’ selves with a feeling of sadness 
and loss for who ‘I used to be’ (Karen, IR). Becoming socially anxious is often a slow and 
gradual process (Chapter 8), and Sarah comments that it ‘slowly infected’ different areas of 
her social life and career, and ‘before [she] had really got a hold on what was happening, it 
had completely wiped them out’ (Sarah, QR18S). The practices of rumination raise 
 
183 Kravola (2015) notes the terms initiation into the social science literature through Sudnow’s (1967) 
understanding of the ‘social value’ of patients in healthcare settings and how this impacted care and 
treatment. 
184 I explore themes of loneliness and social isolation in Chapter 8. 
185 Callum says he writes “friends”, as any friends he did have were a product of the environment i.e. ‘kids 
forced together at school or my mum’s friend’s kids.’ 
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questions about what constitutes continuity and coherence in/with the self, and signals the 
difficulties in trying to reconcile a (new) sense of self while living with social anxiety. 
Loss of self and difficulties with identity were strongly related to perceptions of normality 
and the living with ‘ill/well’ selves. 
Jess’s testimony is difficult to situate under a specific heading of ‘retroactive’, 
‘rumination’ and ‘anticipation’ as she tracks back and forth through various times and 
spaces in an effort to ‘locate’ her anxieties. I make no attempts here to restructure Jess’ 
testimony into a more coherent narrative that follows a logical progression of ‘past-
present-future’. Rather, I prioritise the ‘bits and pieces, snapshots, grabs and glimpses of 
respondent lived experiences’ (Vickers 2012), but situate it here as a reflexive act through 
which various memories, times and spaces unfold: 
I can never quite put my finger on what it is that causes me to experience such 
crippling anxiety. I wasn’t always like this. Is it that I might be laughed at? Is it 
that I might come across the wrong way? Is it that I’ll show signs of anxiety or 
nervousness? All I know is that a whole host of innocuous situations, from 
going to the shops to making a telephone call to ordering a coffee, cause me to 
zero in on myself and analyse every aspect of the situation and myself in that 
situation, replaying how I think I appear to [others] in that moment. Weird, no 
doubt! [...] I actually just had to phone the doctor (tell me if this is useless info 
btw186) and it took me all morning and afternoon but I knew I had to do it 
before this [interview]. I could kick myself for the STATE I get myself into 
over making a fucking phone call … [I’m thinking the receptionist at the 
doctors] will think: ‘Oh, her again’, ‘what now?’ and I got all flustered trying 
to make an appointment. Anyway. Sorry, I don’t know how I got here, to this 
point in my life. (Jess, IR) 
In the first instance, Jess is unable to place what came before her anxiety but proceeds to 
project herself forward, anticipating the consequences of an imagined future; although one 
that is not out-with the realms of her experience. She connects her distressing anticipations 
with several everyday situations (i.e. shops, telephone and coffee) assuming that there will 
be an immediate and glaring ‘fault’ or ‘failing’ she ‘zero[s] in’, selecting herself as target. 
Followed by a short account of making a telephone call several hours before our interview 
took place, she checks whether her experiential accounts are ‘useless’, before she reflects 
on the morning’s anticipations before reflexively ‘kicking herself’ for being so 
overwhelmed by the seemingly simple task of making a doctor’s appointment. She 
proceeds to ruminate over the receptionist’s perceptions of her before cycling back round 
 
186 Shorthand for ‘by the way’. Side notes like this one appeared regularly in the questionnaire responses and 
in conversations with participants, who were unconvinced of the ‘value’ or ‘usefulness’ of their stories. 
This, in itself, portrays a certain situational anxiety and highlights a self-conscious awareness in the 
interview 
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to her initial query: How did I get here? Or, from where did I get here and why does what 
happened then continue to disrupt what happens in the here and now? 
ANTICIPATION: ENCOUNTERING TIME AND SPACE 
Leading on from the complex temporal projections back and forth in Jess’ case, I turn now 
to the ‘future-oriented’ dimensions of anticipation, as an encounter with the times and 
spaces before the event. Anticipation is fundamental to the shaping and sustaining of social 
anxieties, but this role is ambiguous and paradoxical. On the one hand, anticipation plays 
an important role as a structuring function in the coming-into-being of the subject (Van de 
Vijver, 1998). First, in terms of the ‘situatedness’ of self in relation to others and the social 
world; and second, as a necessary function for taking ‘abstract’ ideas and previous 
experiences and projecting them on to future beings and doings. On the other hand, the 
emotional and affective dimensions of anticipatory anxieties mark the ‘emergence of 
unpredictability’ (Grosz, 2013, p. 225). Reliving the intensities of past and traumatic 
experiences not only seizes the individual, but initiates the anxiety-drenched anticipations 
of a future that is continually encroaching on the present. The subject’s forward projections 
and the impending nature of future threats inevitably meet, situating the subject in a space 
of annihilation. Overwhelming and intolerable levels of anxiety cause significant mental 
and emotional distress for the individual who is engulfed by memories of negatively 
perceived past experiences, and hence the threat of those experiences repeating: 
It’s not just before, the anticipation. And it’s not just during, the anxiety during 
the event. It’s the after too. Social interactions from months ago I still haven’t 
let go of. How I was perceived. Whether I wanted to be perceived that way 
(most the time no). It pulls me down because all social interactions make me 
feel bad about myself. Not Good Enough. Stupid. Selfish. Pathetic. Wrong. All 
of those negative judgements that I think of myself, and I perceive others are 
thinking of me, stick with me for a long time, if not forever. (Sarah, QR18S) 
Sarah captures the overwhelming and distressing dynamics of anticipatory processes that 
are experienced before, during and after the social ‘event’. Before (‘future-oriented’), 
individuals experience an accumulation of worry and uncertainty about a potential but 
unknown future. Crucially, while avoidant behaviours are common, many people endure 
social situations despite the intense levels of distress experienced. During such situations, 
she experiences a visceral feeling of vulnerability, causing intense awareness of the self 
and socio-spatial surroundings. After (‘past-oriented’), the individual engages in a 
repetitive focus on issues of relating to social performance and self-worth. The vision of 
the future and the experience of the present is often incoherent, destabilising and wrought 
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with uncertainty. The complexity of the anticipatory processes involved are as such in that 
they are always contingent upon on the overlapping and intertwining of corporeal, 
relational, temporal and spatial dynamics. 
In this vein of anticipatory action, I have explored elsewhere (Boyle, 2018) the complex 
relationship between anticipation and the coping strategies that people implement in their 
everyday ‘routines’. Through various time-space ‘routines’, ‘routes’ and ‘screens’, I 
discuss those participants who incorporate socio-spatial cues and bodily ‘warning signs’ 
into a ‘habitually unhabituated’ management of self and space. Much of the work in 
geography concerned with routine/habit/repetition is concerned with the stabilising 
capacity of reliable (bodily) rhythms and routines that instil a sense of predictability and 
certainty to the practice of everyday life (Binnie et al., 2007, 2007; Middleton, 2011). This 
work, in a predominantly non-representational vein, concerns embodiment through the 
‘taken-for-granted’ practices that ‘unburden us from the necessity to constantly find our 
bearings again’ (Fuchs, 2012, p. 13). While others (Lea et al., 2015) have sought to disrupt 
this reproductive nature to account for an awareness of how habits are unlearned and re-
learned through mindful practice, I argue that current conceptualisation of habit ‘assume[s] 
the capacity of people to mould into normative temporalities and spatialities’ (Boyle, 2018, 
p. 2), for there are those whose habits indeed do become habituated and sunk into the 
taken-for-granted practice of everyday life. For people with social anxiety, however, there 
can be no such easy habituation as everything is marked by gripping uncertainty with the 
potential to become the subject of rumination and anticipation. Habit, in this sense, so 
often becomes a pattern of habitually and disruptively picking apart the minutiae of how to 
manage the routines, movements and encounters of everyday life as evidenced by Sarah 
and Jess’s testimonies. There are other temporal and spatial dynamics at play here, 
including the strategic management of time and space, that are explored later in this thesis.  
Amelia’s account of how her anxiety manifests exemplifies a sense of anticipations as 
continuous and cumulative: 
It builds and builds over a matter of days or weeks […] I just can’t control my 
thoughts, or see clearly, everything is foggy and gets increasingly intense and 
my body doesn’t contain anything. I sweat, and blush, shake, stutter and it’s 
like my anxiety is just oozing out for everyone to see. It’s awful. I’m so 
ashamed of not being able to control this. I’m waking up every day and 
worrying about what will happen, who I will have to talk to and where I will 
have to go. Will the door go? Will the phone ring? At the end of the day I go 
over in my head every last detail of what I did, what I said, how I said it, what 
my face looked like, did I make enough eye contact and how were people 
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reacting to me? I’m constantly questioning myself, doubting myself, criticising 
myself then it starts all over again.187 (Amelia, IR)  
The intimate entwinement of the time-space interactions and everyday materialities188 that 
constitute anticipatory processes are cruelly apparent in Amelia’s testimony. Her account 
describes a ‘cumulative effect’ that ‘builds and builds’ over extended periods of time; the 
repetitive questioning of ‘what if...’ and the list of bodily symptoms reinforce a sense of 
uncertainty and accumulation. The affective and emotional manifestations of anticipation 
signify the impending loss of control and are ‘sensorially overwhelming, emotionally 
uncomfortable, socially stigmatising and so, disabling’ (Davidson and Parr, 2010, p. 63). 
Similarly, terms like ‘constantly’ and ‘starts all over again’ and point to a symbolically 
structured and continuous cycle of anticipatory anxiety, one that cannot but initiate a ‘new’ 
cycle of repetition. 
Catastrophic thinking entails the imagining of worst case scenarios, magnifying immediate 
and eventual consequences of internal processes and external conditions that are perceived 
as threatening to consume the bounded self (Gellatly and Beck, 2016). Anderson (2010, p. 
779) states that it is through the act of imagining that ‘futures are made present in affects, 
epistemic objects and materialities.’ On the one hand, individuals draw on external cues 
magnifying the perceived threat from others; and, on the other, they shift attention to 
internal cues and warning signs (e.g. sensations, thoughts and emotions) that are 
interpreted as imminent signs of personal and social catastrophe. The perceived lack of 
control over the self and socio-spatial surroundings reinforces the belief that they cannot 
‘do any of the normal social things required to be a functioning human being’ (John, 
QR54): 
Visually seeing a worst-case scenario in your head. So when my anxiety is at 
its worst I will actually imagine myself being around other people and having a 
full-blown panic attack and ending up in the hospital with [doctors] saying ‘yes 
you’re going crazy.’ These things make my anxiety even worse and those 
thoughts just spiral out of control. (John, QR54) 
Participants frequently reference living with persistent feelings of ‘dread’ (QR226, QR180) 
and in a state of ‘tension’ (Lisa QR143, Callum QR189). Tension is most frequently 
associated with bodily sensations, including: ‘stomach churning, needing [the] toilet, 
sweating [and] headaches’, (QR117); others report, ‘palpitations, leg tremor, facial 
 
187 This material is also included in Boyle (2018). 
188 In the remainder of this thesis (Chapter 6, 7 and 8) I highlight how the materialities of various mundane 
objects and spaces (e.g. telephones, doorbells, waiting rooms and corridors) are anticipatory. 
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twitching, sweating, blushing, sweaty palms, headaches, bodily/muscle tension, jaw 
clenching, disturbed sleep (waking up early in the night and unable to get back to sleep) 
[and] mental/physical fatigue.’ Jane writes that because she ‘exists’ in a constant state of 
anticipation, ‘it is rare I feel truly relaxed or happy. I can’t really enjoy things, they just 
don’t attract me and I feel so little from them because I’m always so worried […] [and] 
socialising is so draining and difficult. Not being able to relax properly makes my tension 
worse as I can’t unwind and the fear has me constantly winding tighter and tighter.’  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter lays the emotional and affective groundwork of anxious experiences that will 
be discussed at length in the following chapters. I explored the emotional and affective 
‘intensities’ of social anxiety in order to examine the various ways that it is embodied and 
enacted as people orientate their social and spatial worlds. I have sought to engage an 
understanding of how social anxiety is continuously structured and situated through the 
entwining temporalities, spatialities and potentialities of anticipatory processes. Through 
these intensities, experienced as repetitions, ruminations, and projections, I consider the 
force and form of social anxiety and how materially and discursively these manifestations 
texture participants’ everyday (and longer-term) geographies. Despite the cyclical and 
pervasive repetition of anxious experiences, they are never seamlessly habituated rather 
they continue to habitually rupture the fabric of everyday life and spaces. It is evident that 
the affective and emotional dimensions of social anxiety cannot be so readily separated 
from the sites and settings in which they are encountered or from the past memories, 
experiences and ‘traumas’ in which they are entangled. The present, presents the individual 
with repeating scenarios of a humiliated and shamed self, one that is always faltering and 
failing at the point of human connection or, simply, being human. The remnants of 
previous encounters and events relived, draws our attention to the inescapable situatedness 
of social life in a way that highlights what it means to be ‘unbearably human’ (Philo, 
2017). The minutiae of daily life provide infinite fodder for critical, self-reflexive 
ruminations. The intensities of experience depicted here, point to processes and 
experiences that exhaust and confine, rather than enliven and liberate the individual and 
demonstrate the capacity of social anxiety to disturb distress and disrupt the self-body and 
self-other-world relations. 
Chapter 6 moves these arguments forward by employing a wider lens to the experiential 
accounts of social anxiety, exploring the spaces and authorities of health-seeking practices. 
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This, in itself, is embedded with its own anticipations and expectations: of recovery, clarity 
and legitimisation but equally, uncertainty, rejection and failure. 
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CHAPTER 6  
GOVERNMENTALITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
The conceptualisation of health and wellbeing, and the associated management of illness, 
are often characterised in geography with reference to Foucault’s notions of 
governmentality, biopolitics and technologies of self (Keane, 2000; Lucherini, 2016). The 
concept of ‘governmentality’ is broadly understood as the ‘techniques and procedures for 
directing human behaviour’ (Foucault, 1997, p. 82). Governance at a societal level shapes 
practices of ‘self-governance’ in that such processes ‘seek to act on the actions of others to 
bring about particular comportments, behaviours and subjectivities’ which, in turn, 
encourages ‘subjects [to] act on themselves to produce particular bodily habits and 
attitudes to the self’ (Huxley, 2008, p. 1635). This chapter seeks to explore the concept of 
governance by examining two spaces of help and/treatment-seeking: primary health care 
(including, GP and psychological therapies) and the Internet189. 
The relationship between neoliberal principles of individualisation and the self-
management of mental health and illness has not gone unnoticed (Brijnath and Antoniades, 
2016; Madsen and Brinkmann, 2010; Teghtsoonian, 2009). Healthcare strategies and 
policies influenced by these principles promise to deliver ‘an empowered patient 
participating in shared decision-making and self-managing her disease’ (Brijnath and 
Antoniades, 2016, p. 1). Principles that prioritise individual responsibility, self-sufficiency 
and self-regulation over collective responsibility have contributed to a shifting geography 
of care that promotes the role of the individual, while state, local authorities and healthcare 
professionals proceed to ‘govern at a distance’ (Rose and Miller, 1992; see also: Milligan, 
2000)190. This shift between taking care of people who are ill towards teaching people how 
to manage their own illness is described by Rose (1999, p. 74) as a technology of 
‘responsibilisation’. 
 
189 Of course, recovery and self-management is an inherently personal practice that is often strategically 
negotiated by participants in different ways, across different times and spaces, in response to fluctuating 
states of mental health. Participant’s report practicing yoga, mindfulness, meditation, regular exercise, 
getting outside, etc. as means to promote positive mental health and wellbeing. There is not the time or 
space to do justice to these dynamics in this thesis. This could be a fruitful area of future study.  
190 This is mirrored by wider cuts in health and social care spending. 
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Emerging mental health policy advocates that those who are capable must become active 
agents of their own wellbeing, following closely the discourses of resilience, responsibility 
and self-care evident in state programmes designed for the self-management of chronic 
illness (Kendall and Rogers, 2007). Criticism of various self-management programmes 
emerging out of the mental health ‘recovery movement’, including Wellness Recovery 
Action Plan (WRAP) and Mindful Based Interventions (MBI)191, argue that such 
programmes ‘construct a prudent, responsible subject who plans ahead, maintains control, 
is constantly engaged in self-surveillance and works incessantly to sustain a healthy 
lifestyle’ (Scott and Wilson, 2011). Rose provides a productive framework for thinking 
through the relations between health-illness, governmentalities and the ‘self’ towards an 
understanding of how processes of subjectification – that is, how individuals ‘think about 
themselves, act for themselves and transform themselves’ within certain regimes of 
knowledge (Harvey and Rail, 1995, p. 167) – take shape. However, such programmes may 
very well play a key role in exacerbating the conditions that enable ‘ontological precarity’ 
to ensue(Fisher, 2009)192 as people who self-manage cannot always assure continuity in 
levels of self-care. This responsibility to be ‘well’ acts to verify ‘the moral aptitude of 
individuals’ (Greco, 1993, p. 357).  
MacKian et al. (2004) note that health-seeking practices and behaviours are a ‘somewhat 
over-utilised’ and yet ‘under-theorised tool‘; and with this caution in mind, this chapter 
addresses not only the medical and/or therapeutic spaces people engage with but also how 
these spaces shape their understanding of mental health and wellbeing (see also: Popay et 
al., 2007). Drawing on relevant geographical and psychoanalytic literatures, I explore the 
agencies, bodies and sources with which people engage in order to acquire information and 
potential guidance about their social anxiety. What becomes clear is how health, illness 
 
191 There are various strands of mindful practice under the MBI umbrella including, Mindful Based Cognitive 
Therapy (MBCT), Mindful Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) and 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). A recent UK Government report from Mindfulness All-
Party Parliamentary Group (2015) advocates mindfulness as a low-cost intervention in many aspects of 
everyday life including, health, education, workplace and criminal justice settings, with advice mindful 
parenting, mindfulness and unemployment and its role in character and resilience-building in education. 
192 Notably, the critique of mindful practice centres around its implementation in Western culture and the 
subsequent ‘neoliberal corporatisation’ of Eastern mindful practice and Buddhist philosophy. Eisen (2014, 
p. ii)argues that mindful practice, ‘crystallized around an apparently heart-felt need to get back in touch 
with the present moment’, amounts to a ‘technology of self’ that initiates a ‘reconditioning’ of the subject 
in line with neoliberal principles of self-management and self-responsibility. Conversely, Walsh (2018), in 
recognising the critiques directed at mindful practice and dealing with the mechanics of biopower, argues 
that a ‘queering’ of mindful practice could ‘resist neoliberal governmentality’ while ‘affirm[ing] the lives 
that it subjugates.’ 
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and ‘recovery’193 are predominantly moulded by medical, psychological and therapeutic 
technologies, but that these models are adopted and resisted in various ways. First, I 
examine the role played by various medical and ‘therapeutic’ spaces and their influence on 
how social anxiety is understood. I explore how individuals obtain and make use of their 
diagnosis within, alongside or out-with medical and/or clinical treatment pathways. I pay 
attention to how medical practice and spaces not only shape the experience of diagnosis, 
but also lay the groundwork for the course of treatment, care and ‘recovery’ and shape 
particular ‘ill’ identities. Second, I pay attention to the role played by online communities 
and technologies in everyday management and sense making. I address practices of self-
diagnosis to unpack their significance for the individual and the implications on the 
traditional boundaries of the ‘doctor-patient’ relationship. I unpack how interactions and 
practices in online spaces translate back into lives lived offline and how this connection 
supports or negates wider ‘recovery’. Overall, I aim to consider how dominant discourses 
and medical authority over mental health and illness contribute to societal and personal 
understandings of social anxiety, feeding into the spatialities, temporalities and embodied 
habits through which everyday life is lived and social anxiety is managed (Chapters 7 and 
8). 
MEDICAL SPACES 
The first point of contact for people experiencing physical and mental health problems in 
the UK is usually their GP194. From an initial consultation, a person reporting mental health 
problems may follow several pathways for treatment, including devising a treatment plan 
that may include medical and social prescriptions195; alternatively, they may be referred for 
further assessment to a mental health care team in their local community (e.g. community 
psychiatrist) and/or referred to a counsellor or therapist. A person seeking mental health 
 
193 For many, the severity and intensity of social anxiety ‘developed’ over time, as opposed to something 
that is innate to the individual. Recent mental health studies describe a practice of recovery that is ‘always 
unfinished’ rather than a return to a pre-illness state (Duff 2015). While this resonates with many of the 
people participating in this project there are those whose focus of recovery is to return to their ‘old’ and 
‘non anxious’ self (QR12). The conception of ‘normality’ is significant in this context. Therefore, the 
application of recovery does not straightforwardly refer to a state after illness, but rather acknowledges 
that ‘recovery’ goals and journeys are unique to the individual and refers to managing to live with social 
anxiety as much as achieving ‘health’ beyond and/or after social anxiety. 
194 General Practitioner. A GP tends to be located in the person’s local community and may also be a family 
doctor and ideally familiar with personal and/or family health history. 
195 Social prescribing is a holistic approach to physical and mental health and wellbeing that aims to connect 
people to sources of non-clinical support within their local community including, community garden 
projects, art classes, volunteering and befriending (Kings Fund 2017). 
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care may also be given information about self-management programmes196 (e.g. Wellness 
Recovery Action Plan [WRAP]) and self-referral therapeutic services (e.g. Living Life197). 
 
Figure 8: Comparison: Feelings of Safety in Doctor’s Office and Therapist’s Office 
The majority of people experiencing mental health problems will be seen solely by their 
GP or other primary healthcare professionals198 (Dehghan et al., 2017) with only a small 
percentage being referred to secondary (‘specialist’) care services, such as Community 
Mental Health Teams (CMHT). Therefore, GP surgeries and therapeutic services are 
crucial spaces of care and treatment for people experiencing social anxiety. 
Ruga (2008) argues that the GP Surgery or primary care environment is comprised of three 
distinct environments: physical, social and generative. Physical space comprises aspects of 
the natural and built environment and the sites and spaces therein, including waiting rooms 
and doctor’s offices. Social space is actively produced through interactions with others in 
these spaces and with the space itself. The primary care environment is also conceived of 
as a ‘generative space’, space that ‘encourages, supports, and reinforces improvements to 
health and wellbeing’ and is, by extension, ‘life-enhancing’ (Ruga, 2008, p. 465). This 
concept advances earlier concepts of ‘healing environment’ and ‘evidence based design’ 
concerned towards a more holistic understanding of how the physical environment and 
 
196 Participants made reference to these programmes throughout the research process but an in-depth 
engagement with them is outwith the current scope of this research.  
197 A telephone-based Cognitive Behavioural Therapy service run by NHS Scotland. 
198 Counsellor or therapist 
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social space interact and condition one another. The physical and social dimensions of the 
surgery can also influence the doctor-patient consultation, the decision-making process 
within it, diagnostic effectiveness and response to treatment (Rapport et al., 2007). The 
effects of the physical environment on healing and wellbeing have proven to be significant 
to the experience and management of physical, chronic and mental illness. Previous 
research in the geographies of health and illness have shown that people with epilepsy 
(Smith 2013) and diabetes (Lucherini 2016) overwhelmingly feel safe in their GP surgery 
due, in part, to the proximity of trained and knowledgeable healthcare staff in the event of 
an epileptic or diabetic episode, but the same cannot be said for people experiencing social 
anxiety, since many of my participants report feeling ‘unsafe’ and ‘very unsafe’ in their GP 
surgery (Figure 8).  
Figure 8 shows, for some participants these spaces had little impact on their feelings of 
safety. However, a larger proportion of participants felt less safe in their GP surgeries and 
consulting rooms than the sites of therapeutic practice199. This is problematic, as GPs are 
often the first point of contact for mental health care and treatment but only after years of 
enduring and suffering with social anxiety. As I explore later, people often avoid making 
an appointment for fear they will not be taken seriously or because previous encounters 
have had a negative impact on their mental health. Furthermore, the ‘general practice’ for 
therapeutic treatment is self-referral, which left some participants like Mia feeling 
dismissed or that their anxieties were not taken seriously – compounding their initial 
anxieties for avoiding their GP in the first place: 
Mia: I was 4 years [living with social anxiety] before I made an appointment at 
the doctors. It was only when my mum said [the surgery] had an online 
appointment system that I made the appointment.  
L: What happened next? 
M: I agonised over it for weeks. When I finally went I was in and out in less 
than 5 minutes.  
L: What did the doctor tell you? 
M: I had to self-refer for CBT and medication was an option if I wanted it.  
L: How did that make you feel? 
 
199 It should be noted that ‘therapy rooms’ is a broad descriptor as these rooms may be located across 
numerous sites and settings through, for example, CMHT or University Counselling Services. 
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M: It didn’t help. It just felt like I was dismissed and then passed from pillar to 
post, ‘come back if you feel even shittier’-type of thing. (Mia, IR). 
Self-referral, that is, the action of a making an appointment with a medical specialist 
oneself, rather than being referred by their doctor, can be problematic for people with 
social anxiety. In Mia’s case, like many others, it takes a long time to build up the strength 
to make200, never mind attend, a doctor’s appointment. Self-referral systems often take the 
form of ‘responsibilisation’ rather than that of a self-directed and empowered individual. It 
also assumes a individual ‘sufficiently activated’ (NHS England, 2016, p. 12).  
Routine appointments are often characterised by feelings of vulnerability, uncertainty, 
anxiety and fear, with the material and social environment often exacerbating these 
feelings. For instance, Nicole (QR63) explains: 
I’m so scared to make and keep an appointment to see my doctor. I don’t even 
know where to start I am so terrified to pick up the phone and even the thought 
of walking into the surgery makes my skin crawl. […] [The surgery] is an 
overwhelming space, all the small interactions that are involved are just a 
nightmare […] [such as] going to the reception, going to waiting room, finding 
a seat, waiting and waiting and waiting, then if the doctor’s running late which 
is usually all the time I start thinking I’ve done something wrong, I’m too late, 
I didn’t hear her call me in, I missed my appointment, I’m too early, am I in the 
right waiting room? If I go check, what if she comes? Then I visibly start to 
panic and people start to notice. That’s the case in pretty much every situation 
in life! Haha, it’s an absolute nightmare but there is something about [going to] 
the doctors that is so overwhelming. 
The emotional geographies of these spaces have a significant impact on an individual’s 
therapeutic experience, an experience shaped and disrupted by numerous spatial, social and 
time-related aspects. 
Physical locations can embody therapeutic qualities that harbour restorative, renewing and 
healing properties (Williams, 2017), but spaces intended to direct and assist in the 
treatment and care of people with mental health problems are not always experienced in 
this way and can become sources of stress and anxiety (Curtis, 2016). Georgia discusses 
how the physical design and organisation of her newly refurbished surgery affects her 
experience in the space: 
The surgery got renovated recently and the building itself makes me really 
 
200 Verbal conversations via the telephone can be as problematic as face-to-face encounters (see also, Chapter 
7). 
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anxious; it’s fucking awful. I went recently and had to go outside to calm 
down. By the time I came back in I’d missed my appointment and the doctor 
couldn’t see me. […] [The building] is a big square block. Inside the ceilings 
are low and corridors are long. The waiting rooms are these narrow off-shoots 
off the main corridors with two rows of chairs that face each other, so you’re 
face-to-face with a stranger while you wait [and] there’s absolutely no airflow, 
it’s always sweltering! […] Even the colours make it sterile and clinic-y. 
[Before] it was kind of welcoming, a nice wee sandstone building that had 
some character about it. They did install this wee computer to check-in for your 
appointment, so you don’t need to speak to anyone. You just put your name 
and date of birth in and it tells you what doctor you’re seeing and what floor 
and waiting room to go to. That’s quite good but the rest is pretty dire. 
(Georgia, IR) 
Despite new technology that helps Georgia to navigate the surgery space and avoid 
anxiety-provoking interactions with reception staff, the overall design and organisation of 
the building causes an unbearable sense of unease and discomfort. Recognising the 
difficulties that individuals experience in simply making and attending GP appointments, 
Georgia’s existing anxieties are further heightened by entering into a known yet unfamiliar 
space. The organisation of the space, with its sterile conditions and narrow spaces prompts 
a negative reaction, resulting in an uncanny sense of uncertainty that leaves Georgia 
feeling simultaneously exposed and confined. While relations to space can shift over time 
as illness progresses or mobility decreases (Crooks, 2010; Dyck, 1995b) the jarring 
transformation of a once reassuring space impacts negatively on Georgia’s overall 
experience. Albrecht et al. (2007) coined the term ‘solastalgia’ to explore the implications 
of negatively perceived or experienced changes in the environment on health and 
wellbeing. Although originally applied in the context of psychological impacts of 
environmental change, the term has been adopted by geographers to explore the emotional 
reactions to changes in psychiatric hospital spaces (Wood et al., 2015), demonstrating that 
what may be an efficient use of space for one can cause distress for another. Georgia 
reflects with some nostalgia on the warmth and ‘character’ of the original surgery, set in 
stark contrast to the sterile reality and modern design of the new facility. Familiarity with 
and attachment to place helps to establish a strong feeling of security that operates as a 
foundation from which a person can manage emotional experiences. The shift in meaning 
attached to the space not only destabilises Georgia’s sense of attachment, but has 
consequences for her overall health and wellbeing to the extent that she even missed a 
crucial appointment with her doctor.  
Lisa (IR143) describes a similar experience between her first and most recent encounter 
with her University’s Counselling and Psychological Services: 
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They renovated the building and designed this awful ‘functional and efficient’ 
space. It had a very white, minimal and clinical design. The offices you go to 
for your assessment are horrible white cubes all lined up next to each other. 
The walls aren’t solid walls but a grey-white frosted panel. I could sort of see 
faint shadows from the rooms on either side and hear lots of noise and 
footsteps. It felt like there was no privacy. 
Comparing the design and layout of the room where she had previously received her 
therapy sessions, she says: 
[Before] it was nothing fancy. There was an old fireplace in the room, two mis-
matched armchairs and a small coffee table with some tissues on it and this 
little frog ornament LOL! But it felt cosy, sort of like my gran’s house! (Lisa, 
IR, 143) 
Similar to Georgia’s experience, the original furnishing and organisation of the therapy 
space are nostalgic for Lisa as she recalls a homely environment. Lisa also faces similar 
difficulties with the spaces of university and campus life (discussed in Chapter 7), which 
highlights the value in being able to locate crucial sources of practical support and spaces 
of refuge on campus. The consequences for Lisa are that she ‘never went back [for the 
CBT sessions and] continued to struggle through the rest of the year before I built myself 
up to go see my doctor.’ Rapport et al. (2007) examine GP’ workspaces as both a place of 
work and medical treatment. GPs are aware of the aesthetics of the care environment and 
attempted to strike a balance between a space that appears lived-in and homely, and a 
space that is functional for diagnosis (i.e. access to technologies and instruments). The 
design of the physical, social and symbolic dimensions of therapeutic spaces can promote 
‘clinical efficiency’ and ‘wellbeing’ (Gesler et al., 2004). While the changes to Lisa’s 
University’s Counselling spaces may have been an efficient use of space in order to 
accommodate growing numbers of students seeking mental health care and support, 
succeeding in portraying ‘clinical efficiency’ through a ‘hygienic’ and minimal design, it 
failed to convey an overall sense of safety, security or means to promote Lisa’s wellbeing. 
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DIAGNOSTIC AND THERAPUETIC ENCOUNTERS 
 
Figure 9: Participants’ Status of Diagnosis  
Of the 130 participants who completed this section of the online questionnaire, 49% (n = 
62) report self-diagnosing with social anxiety and 51% (n=64) report having obtained a 
diagnosis from a healthcare professional (e.g. GP, psychiatrist or psychologist) (Figure 9). 
I asked participants about the process of their diagnosis, i.e., what was their experience of 
obtaining a diagnosis and what were the implications for their overall mental health and 
wellbeing. The majority of participant’s report that obtaining a diagnosis was arduous. 
Even those who were happy to receive a diagnosis note that diagnosis was not 
straightforward and often caused further upset and distress. There was frequent mention of 
‘being passed from pillar to post’ (John, QR54) and ‘going round in circles’ (Marta, QR33) 
regarding obtaining a diagnosis. Many participants who were diagnosed by a healthcare 
professional also report researching their experiences online and/or self-diagnosing online 
before going to a healthcare professional for a ‘formal’ diagnosis.  
I was interested in the process of diagnosing someone with social anxiety and had the 
opportunity to discuss this with one Glasgow-based GP. Here, he advises on the conditions 
that influence his own practice in diagnosing SAD: 
Generally speaking if someone came to see a health care professional with a 
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free flowing anxiety, maybe social phobia but didn’t have classical depressive 
symptoms (tearfulness, early morning wakening, loss of appetite, loss of 
interest in things (anhedonia), [and] loss of libido. I’d consider a [diagnosis of] 
social anxiety disorder. Psychological therapies seem to be in vogue at present 
(particularly CBT and Mindfulness) and generally I’d refer onto other agencies 
or self-help groups. I don’t think there is much evidence for drugs 
(antidepressants or benzodiazepams) [but] occasionally beta-blockers can 
help201. (Robert202, Personal communication). 
This extract is from a very brief discussion about the nature of my research and the focus 
on help seeking in particular however, it does appear representative of General Practice in 
that it follows the NICE (2013) guidelines outlined for social anxiety treatment and echoes 
with what participants have communicated about their diagnostic encounter. Robert’s 
approach is centred around diagnostic symptoms, but given the centrality of anti-anxiety 
medications as treatment for said criteria (or rather the absence of ‘depressive criteria’), it 
was interesting that his treatment approach was very much situated within psychotherapies 
and ‘outside agencies’, i.e. in the community. He does note that CBT and Mindfulness 
approaches are very much ‘in vogue’, but that there are concerns over their ‘real world 
effectiveness’, which speaks to Stravynski’s (2014) criticism of biomedical and cognitive-
behavioural models discussed in Chapter 2 (see also: Parker, 2014). 
Those who received a formal diagnosis of social anxiety from a healthcare professional 
often report mixed and complex feelings about the diagnostic encounter, and the impact of 
diagnosis on their wider understandings of self and ‘ill-being’. The overwhelming 
consensus appears that receiving a diagnosis of social anxiety is a ‘double-edged sword’ 
(QR45S), one that has the potential to restrict an individual as much as they hope it will 
enable them. On the one hand, having subjective experiences recognised and validated 
within a diagnostic framework helps to facilitate (self) understanding by naming and 
defining (“labelling”) experiences of distress, providing relief and justification, as well as 
hope for treatment and recovery. On the other hand, locating experiences within a 
biomedical framework often means that participants view their anxieties as a personal fault 
and failing, rooted in their own “defective” mind-body, reinforcing negative views of self 
 
201 This is consistent with findings of a systematic review where psychological therapies were found to be the 
most efficacious treatment when compared with pharmacological treatments (Mayo-Wilson et al. 2014). 
While acknowledging pharmacological interventions are important particularly for those who cannot 
access or do not want psychological therapies, Mayo-Wilson et al. (ibid.) state that the side-effects of 
medications can reinforce distress and worry, exacerbating existing anxieties. This research has helped to 
shape NICE guidelines for the treatment of social anxiety in the UK that suggests CBT should be the 
frontline treatment, although this somewhat controversial in some areas, e.g., psychoanalytic and 
interpersonal fields. 
202 Pseudonym.  
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and consequently hindering recovery (Pasman, 2011).  
As social anxiety is not readily visible to others, receiving a diagnosis can help to validate 
experiences as well as provide the necessary paperwork for workplace and education 
accommodations (Chapter 8). Many are relieved to have their social difficulties 
acknowledged and the authority of a medical diagnosis legitimates anxious states as 
‘illness’. For example, Jo (QR41) writes that her diagnosis provides her with, ‘affirmation 
that I’m not just “shy” or “pathetic” or “weak”. It’s affirmation that it’s an actual illness 
that I’m not alone in suffering. When the psychiatrist diagnosed me (without me even 
telling him what I’d self-diagnosed myself with), it was a relief to have my struggles heard 
and recognised.’ Similarly, for Rachel (QR07) a diagnosis ‘helps me to understand why I 
feel anxious all the time. It’s not just me being pathetic, I have an illness.’ 
Diagnosis not only helps people to understand their thoughts, feelings and behaviours, but 
it provides context for, and also a language to communicate, what they are experiencing: 
I am relieved that the problem has been recognised officially. It is important to 
me that I was diagnosed by the NHS which makes it seem more real and that I 
am not ‘imagining’ or ‘exaggerating’ it. I received some treatment (CBT via 
IAPT) before being officially diagnosed but found this strange and did not 
know how to phrase it to people. Some people do not understand social anxiety 
and think it is the same as being a bit shy and that you just need to get over it. I 
find it difficult to tell people about SA so the official diagnosis helps me 
recognise it is a genuine problem and gives me confidence to refer to it if 
necessary. (Cara, QR78) 
For Cara, it is important to have her social anxiety officially recognised from a societal 
perspective as well as an employment perspective. It legitimates her experiences as a 
‘genuine illness’ and demonstrates to others that, by seeking a diagnosis, she is indeed 
playing an active role in her own treatment and ‘recovery’.  
It shows that you are at least taking some small step in both trying to identify 
the issues and then can address what actions can be taken to alleviate them. 
From an employment and societal perspective it helps because you need to 
prove that you are suffering from a genuine illness, and if you do need any kind 
of support or become unemployed and need to undergo disability assessment 
that you have evidence backing your claims.  
It is also vital for triggering the administrative process necessary for proving disability, 
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obtaining work place accommodations or applying for benefits203: 
Routine204 consultations with a GP can have a significant impact on a person’s mental 
health and wellbeing: in the short-term, by providing a safe environment where they feel 
their subjective experiences have been validated and understood; and, in the long-term, as 
an instrumental part of their mental health support network and recovery (Buszewicz et al., 
2006). The doctor-patient relationship is fundamental and is built on effective 
communication, establishing rapport and empathy (Kornhaber et al., 2016). Research in 
the treatment of social anxiety has shown the significance of the therapeutic relationship 
and ‘alliance building’ (Valle, 2014) to successful treatment. Yet, the interpersonal 
dimensions of any therapeutic relationship serves to hinder help-seeking for social anxiety, 
given a common set of fears about authoritative figures, discussing symptoms and 
experiences, being perceived negatively and being negatively evaluated by a healthcare 
professional (Valle, 2014). Amelia received a diagnosis from her family doctor who she 
felt ‘comfortable discussing [her] deepest inner thoughts’, but when she moved to a new 
area she had to register with another practice and was not assigned a new family doctor: 
It’s so important to find the right doctor. My family doctor has known me since 
I was a baby and seen me through all my mental health struggles. I haven’t 
found a new doctor yet. When I registered at the new place they basically 
assigned me on a locum205 list. [L: What does that mean?] Whenever I make an 
appointment, if there’s a locum that’s who I see or they put me with any doctor 
that’s got a space. [L: How do you feel about that?] It’s not ideal, having to 
repeat my story to a new person every time I need a sick-line or to discuss 
meds. It’s like justifying my self over and over again. 
Continuity of care is therefore seen as a crucial aspect of community mental health care 
that enables a patient to build a therapeutic relationship with their doctor. It is fundamental 
to building trust, negotiating treatment and directing individuals to and through 
increasingly complex health and social care systems, as well as navigating social and 
structural barriers (Freeman and Hughes, 2010): 
Oh my psychiatrist! I just adore him! And my CPN206! I see them two days a 
week, every week. My GP surgery are so fucking useless – sorry, but they 
 
203 As highlighted in Chapter 6, workplace accommodations for social anxiety are inadequate at best and, at 
worst, non-existent. 
204 ‘Routine’ in the sense that a GP may become a regular point of contact for a person experiencing mental 
health problems and also in the sense of non-emergency care/treatment. 
205 A ‘locum’ is a doctor who temporarily fills a doctor’s position in their absence.  
206 Community Psychiatric Nurse. 
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make me so angry – in the past I go to them and I get there and it’s too much 
for me to cope with and they send me up to bloody A&E for a panic attack – 
they just don’t want to deal with me. But my psychiatrist, he worked at [in-
patient unit] and left them to come into the community […] So I don’t go to my 
GP anymore because they make everything worse, they don’t take me 
seriously. (Karen, IR) 
Karen found her GP surgery difficult to deal with and as a result her psychiatrist and CPN 
became her primary care team. However, this transition had consequences for Karen’s 
benefits application. She continues: 
[The GP] had sent off a report and [Department of Work and Pensions (DWP)] 
sent my application back saying I was getting £21.80 a week [based on the 
GP’s report]. I sent my mum up to them ‘cause I couldn’t deal with them and 
[they said] ‘Karen doesn’t really come to see us anymore’. So [DWP] used it 
against me that I wasn’t going to the bloody GP even though I’m seeing my 
psychiatrist and CPN twice a week [exasperated]. Well, my psychiatrist wrote 
off a report to them, an A4 page double-sided [letter] writing of my illness and 
how it affects me and how, at this stage, he sees me every week. He wrote 
down he was seeing me every week and all the rest. (Karen, IR) 
ILLNESS IDENTITY AND VALIDATION OF EXPERIENCE  
While many value the authority of a professional in acknowledging and validating their 
experiences, the presence of authoritative figures can also aggravate anxieties (Stravynski 
2014) and can be one of the most significant barriers in accessing support and treatment. 
Eilidh (QR91) explains: 
[Social anxiety] is stopping me from getting going to my doctor. I want to get 
help but I’m also scared of being defined by my anxiety. 
There are many ways that people with social anxiety attempt to navigate this complex 
relationship of power and the anxieties that ensue. Health information and communities 
online are valuable sources of information and support for people with social anxiety 
(discussed later) and while the volume and quality of information available on the Internet 
is often conceived of as the ‘site of a new struggle over expertise in health’ (Hardey, 1999, 
p. 820), it also plays an instructive role in encouraging individuals to seek help offline as 
well as preparing them for the interactions that take place in medical settings. John (QR54) 
and Jane (QR90) explain how their online practices helped them to communicate their 
experiences with their GPs: 
I was really struggling and people [on SAUK forum] kept saying ‘maybe you 
should speak to someone’, ‘go to your doctor’, you know, like, you don’t suffer 
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this in silence kind of thing. It was months before I made the appointment […] 
I was so scared. I asked loads of questions [about] how to even approach this 
with a doctor and got great advice. […] A few people told me to write a letter 
to my doctor and give it to them in the appointment in case I froze up and 
couldn’t talk, but really it was good to read what people had done themselves 
and [to] know what to expect. (John, QR54) 
[I went to the doctors] when I hit rock bottom. I was done. I’d spent so much 
time being terrified of the doctor but I couldn’t take it anymore. I printed off 
some things from the NHS website [about social anxiety] and took it with me 
[to the appointment] to be like, ‘this is what I’m going through!’ It had taken 
me so long to get to that point I didn’t want them to ignore me or think I was 
being stupid. I didn’t want to come away without some hope. I went prepared. 
(Jane QR90) 
Kathryn (QR96) values a formal, medical diagnosis but writes at length about her struggle 
to obtain one: 
It took a long time for me to be diagnosed by a professional. This was mainly 
because they didn’t want to give the wrong diagnosis and therefore refrained 
from giving one at all. This was very unhelpful because it made me feel like 
there was something wrong with me but it wasn’t serious enough to be 
classified. However, my anxiety was significantly impacting my life and I 
didn’t feel like that was being taken seriously. It was important to get a 
diagnosis because I didn’t know which thoughts belonged to me and which 
were my anxious thoughts. Because I hadn’t been through any trauma I was 
ashamed of my anxiety because I felt like it wasn’t justified but the diagnosis 
made me feel better because it was my brain chemistry that wasn’t quite right, 
rather than me as a person.  
Kathryn’s social anxiety had become all-consuming, exacerbated by the uncertainty of 
being ‘diagnosable’ and the length of time she waited for a diagnosis. She communicates 
experiencing a sense of relief in being able to locate her ‘problems’ firmly in her ‘brain 
chemistry’, since she felt that her anxieties were unjustified because she had not 
experienced any ‘real’ trauma in her life. By ‘localising’ the problem in this way Kathryn 
is able to justify, and separate her from, her anxieties. Diagnosis seemingly makes her 
mental health problems more acceptable and manageable, and provides hope and direction 
towards recovery: 
I was so desperate by the time that I got the diagnosis that it meant that I could 
be put on medication that specifically addressed how I was feeling. It changed 
my life because I was able to view myself as a separate entity from my anxiety. 
This meant that I could accept how I was feeling because my mind became a 
bit clearer. There was an explanation and I was no longer alone. It was 
recognised by a professional that I had an issue and so I felt like all of the 
stigma from people regarding the embellishment and fabrication of mental 
illness meant nothing to me anymore. I understood my symptoms and kept 
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them to myself largely before. I was ashamed to show them. Since the 
diagnosis I have been able to share my story because, to me, it is no different 
than raising awareness of a physical illness. (Kathryn, QR96) 
Kathryn’s diagnosis provides her with ‘boundaries’ and anchors her experiences in a 
particular set of classifications that separates the distressing and abnormal anxious 
experiences from her sense of self. The ‘authority’ of a formal diagnosis can therefore 
validate experiences of illness, so much so that: 
I think that my disorder has got better. 1) because my medication has helped to 
ease some of my symptoms so I could think clearer and 2) because I was able 
to accept that I had a disorder that wasn’t my fault, it was just a glitch with my 
brain chemistry. I no longer blamed myself for my issue, rather saw it for the 
illness it was. Sometimes it feels like it gets worse due to stigma. This is 
because people tend to scoff at mental health labels and think that we are 
fabricating our illnesses and so sometimes it is easier to hide our issues and 
keep them within. I think that people don’t understand how bad things get 
before one can officially be diagnosed with a disorder or how low you need to 
feel before reaching out (Kathryn, QR96) 
Receiving a diagnosis can, as shown, be experienced as a form of release, a process that 
absolves the self of blame for perceived and embodied interpersonal failings.  
In What You Must Think of Me, an autobiographical account of living with social anxiety 
written by Emily Ford (with psychiatrist Michael R. Liebowitz207), Ford documents how 
her life was adversely impacted by social anxiety and her ‘eventual triumph’ over the 
disorder. In a section titled ‘At Last, a Diagnosis’, Ford recounts the feeling of relief that 
she experienced in having her personal difficulties with social interactions defined and 
validated by her psychiatrist. She writes: 
When I walked into the psychiatrist’s office, I was a blank slate. Dr. A. didn’t 
know me through my parents or my classmates. He didn’t know where I had 
grown up, how well I did in school, or what kinds of incidents from my past 
had caused me deep embarrassment. He simply listened, and while I didn’t 
speak with flowing ease, I had a feeling that my halting speech was fine with 
him. 
I told Dr. A. that I thought I might be depressed, although I didn’t explain why 
in detail or bring up the anxiety at all. He asked me a series of questions, and I 
recognized them as similar to those in the book on anxiety that I had read 
during my first year in college. ‘‘Emily,’’ he said, ‘‘the score that indicates you 
might have social anxiety disorder is a 19. You scored a 47. (Ford et al., 2007, 
 
207 Liebowitz is a leading figure in social anxiety research in the psy-disciplines 
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p. 50)208 
Ford’s autobiographical account of social anxiety is the only source used outside of my 
own data. I utilise it here as her account of the diagnostic encounter is interesting in that 
the social and interpersonal aspects of her daily experience are stripped away and her 
social anxiety is measured and quantified in order for ‘Dr. A.’ to arrive at a sound 
classification and diagnosis of her distress. This form of psychiatric assessment that 
employs rating scales and symptoms checklists rather than paying attention to a person’s 
individual and unique experience, is impersonal at best and dehumanising at worst. 
Speaking to a medical-clinical gaze, in which bodily phenomena, constitutive of interactive 
parts and systems, become measurable and controllable (Zwart, 1998). The body, 
increasingly objectified and monitored by medical science, is deemed to be unaffected by 
sociocultural and historical influence (Martin, 2007).  
NEGATIVE ENCOUNTERS 
While some participants found validation and a sense of empowerment in their formal 
diagnosis, others do not feel they have or want to be labelled with a mental health problem 
in order to seek help and support. Others, rejecting the medicalisation of their experiences, 
feel that they are equipped to handle their anxiety without medical intervention or do not 
want to take medication (Olfson et al., 2000). Sean and Anya also write of having negative 
diagnostic experiences: 
I went to the doctor’s and tried to describe what I was feeling but I was so 
nervous I could only focus on how ridiculous I sounded. I felt like I wasn’t 
being taken seriously. The doctor was really dismissive. After a few minutes he 
interrupted me and said, ‘sounds like mild social anxiety, take these’and 
handed me a prescription for anti-depressants and that was it. (Sean, QR15) 
[When I went to the doctor] I was struggling to function as a person and very 
unhappy to the point of feeling suicidal most of the time and desperately 
wanted help. I have seen four doctors since I was diagnosed [6 years ago]. 
Each [doctor] has upped/changed my medication but not given me any real 
solutions or help. […] I feel like a biological fact, that my brain is laid out this 
way and I can’t be helped. I know it’s not ‘normal’ to be this afraid of people. 
(Anya, IR) 
Hall (1996) argues that the diagnostic process for people with mental health problems 
under the medical model serves to undermine the individual. For some, the process of their 
diagnosis consisted of them ‘filling out a few forms’ (QR24). It is unknown what the 
 
208 There is no indication of what the scale is here. 
 
 
 157 
specific forms were as those participants did not participate in follow-up interviews, but it 
is likely that they were patient health questionnaires implemented as screening tools for 
anxiety and depression. Participants are often required to self-report the frequency of 
anxiety and/or depression and the likelihood of avoidant behaviour over a two-week 
period. While this is arguably time and cost-efficient, since on average it takes 8.4 minutes 
to diagnose the most common ‘mental disorders’ in primary care (Jackson et al., 2001), it 
focuses narrowly on problems defined by clinical and biomedical frameworks, resulting in 
‘a contrived and sanctioned dehumanisation of the individual’ (Hall 1996, p. 17). The 
reductive and mechanistic approach in the diagnostic encounter can often have a negative 
impact on the individual leaving them feeling dismissed or reduced to the ‘category’ of 
their ‘disease’ – as highlighted in Mia’s testimony earlier in this chapter. These factors 
influenced Sara’s experience of formal diagnosis following many years of self-diagnosing: 
S: I was in and out in 5 minutes. I’d filled out a form in the waiting room, the 
doctor took one look at it, put it to one side and wrote me a prescription for 
citalopram209 and beta-blockers. 
L: How did that make you feel? 
S: I was kind of in shock because, even though it confirmed what I already 
knew, I was looking for help [and] information. Maybe even support?! I 
wanted someone to help me and she didn’t really engage me once, didn’t ask 
me any personal questions or nothing. I’ve had more in-depth appointments 
over a throat infection to be honest. (Sara, IR) 
The focus on, and treatment of, physiological symptoms follow the principal diagnostic 
framework of the ‘disease model’ (Hall 1996; Stravynski 2007). The lack of time and care 
spent on the individual’s personal, familial and interpersonal history or the daily 
implications of their experiences during the diagnosis of social anxiety (and mental health 
problems more generally) is emblematic of this approach. Furthermore, Sara’s expectations 
of her GP as a source of knowledge about her mental health and a ‘facilitator’ to mental 
health services are not met as trusted routes for treatment-seeking pathways appear 
‘inaccessible’ (Popay et al., 2007).  
Many participants note that the process of obtaining a formal diagnosis is ‘fraught [and] 
tedious’ (QR09) and ‘an absolute nightmare’ (Lucie, QR28). Crucially, the very 
experiences that they wish to resolve are the ones acting as a significant barrier to help-
seeking and treatment: for example, feelings of shame and embarrassment about 
 
209 A brand of anti-depressants. 
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symptoms, significant difficulty attending face-to-face appointments with a GP, as well as 
uncertainty over what to say and how others will react (Olfson et al. 2000). Inconsistency 
in the therapeutic relationship or in the diagnostic process can cause considerable harm to 
an individual’s health and wellbeing, the repercussions of which may short-circuit attempts 
towards recovery210. Josh’s experience also highlights these issues: 
I saw a GP before [starting therapy] but did not discuss problems in any detail. 
After that [there] was a phone assessment. But that was the first time I was 
encouraged to talk one to one in detail about problems. [The] frustrating thing 
for me is I had seen a GP over 5 years ago and mentioned some of the 
symptoms but was not referred any further or probed in detail. It would have 
been better for me to address the problem then. But the onus was on me to 
share but obviously, with social anxiety that is not something people find easy. 
(Josh, IR). 
Several participants have hence avoided seeking a formal diagnosis in anticipation that 
their GP would not ‘believe me’ or ‘take me seriously’, or because they would think ‘I’m 
just attention seeking’ or ‘I’m overreacting’ (QR14, QR19, QR48, QR88). Another 
participant highlighted that a therapist became ‘frustrated because I couldn’t say exactly 
what it was I was anxious about’ and ‘didn’t seem to understand anything about social 
anxiety at all’ (QR65). People with mental health problems often report feeling dismissed 
and dehumanised by healthcare professionals and diagnostic processes. Stigmatising 
behaviours are the key deterrent preventing people from seeking help and delaying 
treatment, the impact of which is often perceived to exacerbate their mental health (Barney 
et al., 2009). Sophie (QR37) recalls struggling to ‘find answers’ and her experience of 
feeling dismissed by numerous healthcare professionals211. She writes: 
I knew I had something since I was very young, I knew something was wrong. 
I would cry my eyes out at night wondering why I couldn’t do certain things 
and why I was so weird around people [and] anxious doing normal things. It 
led to me having a LOT of problems. I tried to go to the doctors and told them I 
constantly felt panicky around other people but they didn’t really take me 
seriously […] The response I got [from the doctor] was, word for word, 
“everyone feels like this but you have to deal with it yourself”. I felt severely 
angry that I wasn’t getting the respect and recognition I knew I needed, like 
 
210 Pinfold et al. (2005) report that service users feel most discriminated against by mental health care staff. 
211 Social anxiety is associated with significant barriers to treatment, one of which is a lack of awareness from 
healthcare professionals about the severity of impairment or ‘clinical significance’ of the disorder (Olfson 
et al. 2000). The NICE (2015) guidelines for social anxiety also report that it is misunderstood and mis-
diagnosed in clinical settings. Yet there is no research exploring how it is experienced in healthcare 
settings or the longer-term implications on a person’s mental health (although similar work exists for 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and depression (Barney 
et al., 2009) and in wider mental health care settings (Hamilton et al., 2016). 
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they didn’t respect me AT ALL.[I was] just another attention seeking kid. When 
I went to the GP the second time at I felt like I had no respect and she basically 
laughed and made me do a quiz. But then she assigned me on Citalopram [an 
antidepressant] that did next to nothing, so after about 2 weeks of taking them I 
stopped and began to recognise my anxiety in different situations and used that 
knowledge to help instead of the meds (Sophie, IR37) 
Sophie is highly critical of how numerous healthcare professionals and services failed to 
acknowledge her social anxiety in a way that legitimated her experiences. Failure to 
respond effectively to experiences of emotional distress creates serious barriers to 
accessibility and quality of care: 
They judge, they categorise and then they ignore [you]. Oh look another 
attention-seeker stick her on meds and send her off. I got a number for talking 
therapies, which were shrinks212 that would call you and then you’d talk and 
that’s it. I did one appointment, and then they said they’d refer me further, [but] 
did they call me back? Did they bollocks! (Sophie, IR37) 
This lack of follow-up can have life-threatening consequences for individuals who have no 
other means of social, emotional or therapeutic support, as Sophie (IR37) continues: 
 It got so bad and I was so desperate, I tried to kill myself twice. This is why 
recognition is needed, along with respect and dignity too, without being 
belittled and made to believe you’re being foolish. 
The accessibility of information online is vital in practices of self-diagnosis. As shown in 
Figure 9, more than half of those who participated in this research self-diagnosed with 
social anxiety after consulting health-information and anxiety communities online. For 
instance, Dawn (QR01) and Emma (QR18) dispute the diagnosis (or lack of diagnosis) 
given by their psychiatrists: 
[My] psychiatrist only diagnosed generalised anxiety and said it falls under the 
same umbrella, but lots of Internet research has led me to discover that it by 
itself warrants its own separate diagnosis, [of social anxiety] and the symptoms 
listed all match my own. (Dawn, QR01) 
My psychiatrist actually doesn’t believe I have social anxiety because I’m not 
crippled by things like giving presentations; he says it’s not social anxiety but a 
lack of social skills. I perform well in work, have a decent job and aced 
university, but anything outwith those ‘comfort zones’, I’m a mess. I hate 
social interactions and will go to ANY length to avoid them. (Emma, QR18) 
The negative experiences reported by participants here, and discussed widely in other 
research studies relating to mental health and illness, are indicative of a more systemic 
 
212 Clinical psychologist, psychiatrist or psychotherapist. 
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issue where social anxiety is under-recognised, misunderstood and mis-diagnosed (Knaak 
et al., 2017). The proliferation of medical information available online, given rapid 
developments in mobile technologies and applications, has led to a digitisation of 
diagnosis. Indeed, there are over 100,000 mobile phone applications designed for the 
purpose of disseminating health and medical information (Jutel and Lupton, 2015). 
Through such technologies, we are arguably bearing witness to ‘digitally-engaged patients’ 
(Lupton, 2013) and subsequently changing the nature of lay-professional relations (Lupton 
and Jutel, 2015). 
ONLINE SPACES 
There are two aspects of online space: the Internet as an information resource and as a 
social space. The growth of the Internet has made vast amounts of health and medical 
information readily accessible to the public. Health information-seeking and sharing online 
have significantly increased mental health literacy213 (Christensen and Griffiths, 2003) and 
enables people to participate meaningfully in their own care and to accommodate different 
perspectives on health and healthcare (Ryan and Wilson, 2008). Equally, the rise of online 
technologies and virtual communities have become vital sources of information, 
connection and support for people experiencing mental health problems (Campbell and 
Longhurst, 2013; Davidson and Parr, 2010; Parr, 2002) The proliferation of health 
information on the Internet has led to the ‘democratisation’ (Parr, 2002) of medical 
knowledge, yet there are concerns among healthcare professionals over accuracy, quality, 
clarity and volume of information that is available to people online (Christensen and 
Griffiths 2003). The overwhelming amount of information available can cause confusion 
and uncertainty for users. 
Parr (2002) demonstrates an evident shift in Western medical discourse and practice from a 
practice of ‘collective care’ to a person-centred care fostered by online technologies and 
health consumerism. Since this analysis, I would argue a further shift is materialising, one 
that is re-positioning the ‘patient’ as the sole director of their care and treatment. This shift 
has been branded as a way to create ‘more person-centred service systems’ (Croft et al., 
2016) that views people as active agents in the therapeutic/treatment relationship, acutely 
aware of what supports or impedes their own recovery. In reality, it has fostered (as 
mentioned earlier) the ‘responsibilisation’ of the subject (Rose, 2000) and the 
 
213 Mental health literacy is defined as the ‘knowledge and beliefs about mental disorders, which aid their 
recognition, management or prevention’ (Jorm et al., 1997). 
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‘operationalisation’ of self-management (Brijnath and Antoniades, 2016). In addition to 
this, as mental health policy strives to deliver an empowered and responsible citizen, a 
series of social and systemic issues compromise the quality and accessibility of effective 
treatment options for those with mental health problems and for social anxiety in 
particular. 
While the Internet has undoubtedly played a role in facilitating the task of 
‘responsiblisation’ by enabling a more informed citizen in control of their own health and 
care, the ‘responsibilisation’ of the subject to govern their mental health is a paradox of 
recovery policy and practice. Not only are ‘citizens urged to turn the medical gaze upon 
themselves, and engage in such technologies of the self as monitoring their own bodies and 
health states and taking preventative action in accordance with medical and public health 
directives’ (Lupton, 2003, p. 57) they are further stigmatised by family members, medical 
practitioners and society if they then struggle and fail to ‘get well’. In addition, there is a 
fundamental lack of therapeutic services and community support groups for people with 
social anxiety. Healthcare systems delivering ‘one size fits all’ care fail to significantly 
address the specific issues faced by people with social anxiety and treatment approaches 
that place the onus of management and recovery on the individual inevitably do more to 
exacerbate social anxiety than heal it. Thus, the Internet has also been instrumental as a 
response to, what Parr (2008, p. 203) terms a ‘crisis of real-space community and its caring 
capacities.’ The Internet has therefore emerged as a vital space in which individuals can re-
position themselves collectively through engagement with online mental health 
communities. 
Overwhelmingly, the Internet is conceived of as an enabling space with online 
communities providing vital sources of informational and emotional support. Online 
spaces enable people to socialise, engage with others, relax, enjoy, learn and even resist, 
without the associated costs and risks involved in ‘real-world’ situations. People have 
access to ‘the thing’ – connection, community and an engagement with the world – 
‘without actually having it’ (Contu, 2008, p. 374). Online spaces are operative spaces of 
desire for the satisfaction of social need. Social Anxiety Scotland (SAS) and Social 
Anxiety UK (SAUK) are the two forums that feature in this study and the primary avenues 
for recruiting participants (see Chapter 4). In mid-2016, SAS was taken offline by the site 
administrator and is no longer accessible to its members, the implications of which will be 
discussed later. Both web-forums are user-led and receive no external funding, being 
supported solely through donations and advertising, although SAS was primarily funded by 
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the site administrator and was run from their home in Scotland. SAS and SAUK are 
comprised of three parts: a ‘main site’ (the website, featuring information about social 
anxiety and links to further information and resources), a chat room (a synchronous 
platform for communication) and a web-forum (an asynchronous discussion board)214. The 
desire is to create a safe online environment for people to find information about and 
connect with others experiencing social anxiety. This desire to orchestrate safety is 
facilitated by a certain organisational structure and community ethos. The websites and 
forums have similar organisational structures and are run by a group of volunteer staff 
made up of administrators and moderators. Administrators, known as ‘admins’, are usually 
the owners of the web-forum or website responsible for day-to-day operations and site 
management. Moderators, known as ‘mods’, are users granted ‘administrative privileges’ 
for managing discussions and content and ensuring all users are following community 
rules. A ‘mod’ would be responsible for moderating user threads (e.g. ensuring they are in 
the appropriate section on the forum) and suspending and/or banning users who engage in 
behaviour that breaks community rules (e.g. bullying or harassment). In this sense, they are 
highly moderated and managed social spaces. SAUK outline the purpose and goals of their 
online community: 
[T]o provide a starting point for people just finding out about SA and related 
issues, to enable them to access further information through this site and 
through external links; to act as a central hub for the community of those with 
social anxiety problems in the UK; and to attempt to raise the profile of SA 
problems and campaign for change, so that in future, people afflicted by them 
don’t have to suffer in silence as so many of us have done in the past. (SAUK 
website: emphasis in original) 
As feelings of social isolation and loneliness – whether through experiences of 
marginalisation or the practice of avoidance – maintain a pervasive presence in the daily 
lifeworlds of people with social anxiety (Chapter 8), SAUK and SAS play a fundamental 
role in opening up people’s social worlds once again. For instance, Kathryn (QR96) writes 
about the positive impact that the Internet (and SAUK in particular) has had on her life: 
My life in general has been opened up to more possibilities through the 
Internet. I have forms of support I never had before so if I’m feeling 
particularly down or harmful or if I’ve had a weird interaction and I’m going 
into meltdown, I can come home and sort of ‘go back out again’ through the 
Internet. It’s definitely a way of expelling all the bad shit and connecting with 
 
214 Other than the synchronous and asynchronous aspects of chat rooms and web-forums, they differ in that 
message ‘threads’ (conversation exchange under a particular topic) are usually archived and can be 
accessed indefinitely from the main forum website. Synchronous chat conversations are not usually 
available or accessible once someone exits a chat. 
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people who understand and can give you a reasonable advice or even just the 
acknowledgement of what you’re going through is real. 
Social contact and connection through online communities are not only ‘invaluable’ (Cara, 
Q78), but operate as a ‘life-line’ (John, QR54; QR23) for many who find comfort in the 
notion that ‘we are not alone in our suffering’ (John, QR54). Being online provides people 
with a sense of belonging as ‘finding others who experience the same things helps you to 
feel part of something, part of a community’ (Marcie, QR57). Similarly Hannah (QR77) 
writes: 
It’s my only way to socialise and communicate. The forums have chat rooms so 
they can be quite busy at weekends. It’s a nice environment and it’s safe as 
there are mods215 so it feels managed. Everyone understands each other and 
even though our anxieties aren’t all the same, our levels of anxiety vary, 
everyone understands that we face individual difficulties and really try and 
reach out to support you if you put yourself out there and ask a question. 
Sharing the personal minutiae of daily life as well as the intimacies of mental health 
experiences is usually reserved for the interpersonal spheres of life. Through online 
technologies social connections are formed and sustained across geographical distances. 
The co-presence of people with social anxiety in a dedicated and delineated (online) space 
helps to foster relational intimacies with other users. 
Operating as the primary connective medium as well as a vital source of information, 
support and everyday functioning, people overwhelmingly experience the Internet as an 
empowering and enabling space. Yet, despite the benefits of web-forums such as SAS and 
SAUK and their capacity for social connectivity there are also a number of shortcomings 
of computer-mediated communications. There are those who feel that engaging in online 
communities is only beneficial in the short-term and has very little impact in the long-term 
with respect to providing the necessary structure for building trusting and supportive 
interpersonal relationships. Cameron writes, ‘relating to each other is surface level stuff’. 
Others feel that the Internet ‘hasn’t had any long-term positive impact on my life’ (Emily, 
QR25) and is, ultimately, more of a ‘crutch’ (Ben, QR32), making some ‘even more 
anxious’ (Molly, QR42) as many are unable to ‘separate my physical self from what I do 
online’ (Marta, QR33). 
 
215 Shorthand for ‘moderator’. 
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LURKING 
‘Lurking’ or ‘lurkers’ is a pejorative term used to describe those who inhabit the margins 
and peripheries of online communities. Crawford (2009) argues that much of the research 
on online communities has focused on participation, interaction and ‘having a voice’, but 
that very little attention has been paid to those who rarely, if ever, contribute to online 
communities and discussion threads. Lurkers constitute the overwhelming majority of 
online community users, with up to 90% engaging in only light online activity216. There is 
a surprising amount of antagonism directed at those who do not demonstrate fully engaged 
and active participation in these communities. Kollock and Smith (1996) deem lurking 
behaviours ‘selfish’ as users consume information shared by others but do not contribute to 
the reciprocal nature of online communications. Drawing on Ostram (1992), they use the 
term ‘free-rider’ and state that such users are ‘problematic’. Others argue that lurking 
behaviours are ‘detrimental’ to the purpose and use of collective online technologies 
(Butler et al. 2002). These claims parallel the neoliberal demand of active citizenship 
whilst trivialising the value of inactive participation.  
Nonnecke and Preece (2003, p. 110) call for researchers and online communities alike to 
acknowledge and ‘rethink’ the practice of lurking, recognising that online communities are 
unique spaces for enabling access to group conversations, community and information 
‘without being visible or forced into public participation.’ For those who ‘lurk’, the 
practice is not necessarily about ‘scavenging information’ (Harquil, 2010), but rather a 
hesitation about entering into an unfamiliar social space and exposing themselves to 
unknown others. For some, online communities encompass various aspects of ‘real’ social 
space, provoking an intense anxiety and fear that they will be negatively judged, 
scrutinised and rejected by others, even those who are in a prime position to support and 
understand their struggles: 
I want to contribute to conversations on SAUK and Reddit217 etc. but just the 
fact that there are a group of people talking to each other makes me feel like 
I’m in group social situation and my anxiety flares up. I can’t bring myself to 
post a topic or contribute. Anytime I start [to contribute] I agonise over every 
word, [thinking] Is this relevant? Does this make sense? I sound ridiculous! No 
one cares! And I’ll delete it. (Lucie, QR28) 
 
216 The ‘rule of thumb’ is that Internet culture is made up of 90% lurkers, 9% contributors and 1% creators 
(Neilsen, 2006).  
217 Reddit is a news and discussion website. Similar to a web-forum, posts are organised by topic into user-
created ‘subreddits’ (i.e. threads) and cover a wide variety of topics, including news, science, politics and 
health. There is a dedicated social anxiety sub-reddit that, as of July 2018, has 108,000 subscribers. 
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I’m just overcome with a fear of getting negative feedback or sounding stupid 
or I post something and it gets completely ignored so I don’t [post anything] 
but I still find SAUK really valuable (Kim, QR40) 
Levordashka and Utz (2016) state that, while there is no physical presence in online 
worlds, there is social presence, one that amounts to an affective quality of ‘being there’, 
and so, for many who opt for ‘silent’ over ‘active’ participation, this is a particular strength 
of online forums. Negatively characterising those who opt to ‘read only’ is inappropriate 
and could further deter a person’s active participation in online spaces. It also fails to 
acknowledge those for whom regular ‘checking in’ (QR21) and ‘browsing’ (QR43) is 
enough or those who may be learning through the experiences reported by others on the 
forums. For example Emma (QR18), who is a ‘self-confessed lurker’, writes, ‘I learn from 
others how to survive social interactions and it gives me a certain strength knowing there 
are others like me. I don’t feel confident enough to share [my own experiences] yet.’ 
Negative perceptions of lurkers also exist in online communities where many become 
frustrated about the lack of engagement from other members, how ‘quiet’ community 
forums are at certain times or the lack of detailed discussion. However, there are some 
benefits to ‘lurking’, allowing members to ‘build up’ to entering discussions in a similar 
way to entering ‘real world’ social situations. Emily (QR25) writes that ‘reading some 
experiences can make the quieter people know they’re not alone and maybe they’re taking 
steps to build up to posting,’ Similarly Marcie (QR57) writes: 
I’ve just joined SAUK and haven’t been particularly active. I have been using 
it on a daily basis and it seems like a good place but I’m just getting used to it 
and sort of sussing it out. But I do feel like the advice and support you can get 
on such a site could potentially be very important. 
SAUK clearly has had a significant impact on 30’s experience without her having to be 
active or to show engaged participation on the forums. Crawford (2009) argues that lurking 
amounts to ‘witnessing the comments of others’, a virtual ‘tuning in’ akin to listening to 
the radio, reflecting a process of engagement with the community that, in turn, forms ‘part 
of the texture of the everyday.’ Whereas QR16 ‘joined only to observe at first, but 
gradually started to post as well once I gained some confidence.’ Nonnecke and Preece 
(2003, p. 118) argue that those who lurk use the practice to evaluate the group, ‘reducing 
the risk of making a faux pas or being rejected’. These issues are significant in the offline 
lives of people with social anxiety, while online communities afford those who lurk a sense 
of belonging and community through shared experiences, mutual understanding and 
collectively without the pressure of active participation and interactions. Another forum 
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user responds that 47% of users on Social Anxiety Support had never posted, concluding 
‘Lurkers, you are not alone :)’. 
Contributing regularly to a web-forum is time-consuming and tiring work, particularly if 
users feel a personal responsibility to maintain activity on the site. Lurking appears to be 
less of an issue on the larger SAUK forum where lurking members float under the radar. 
However, it was mentioned as a particular problem on the much smaller SAS forum. 
Several participants comment on the lack of activity on the forum, with Claire (QR16) 
saying: 
I wish more members made use of the forum and there was less dependence on 
a few regulars to keep the discussions going.  
The size of the SAS community arguably affects how some members perceive the group 
and their place within it, which may contribute to people engaging in lurking practices: 
I’ve just been reading a lot of the threads since I joined [2 months ago]. I feel a 
bit feart218 to join in the discussions because it seems to be the same group of 
people [that contribute]. I know it’s not cliquey so I don’t mean that in a 
negative way but it’s like a new person joining a group of friends that have 
known each other forever, does that make sense? I don’t want to be the obvious 
newbie trying to fit in and people being like ‘oh who’s this?’(QR49) 
Arguably, everyone ‘lurks’ in online communities at some point by reading 
forum posts and choosing whether they wish to engage or not. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has considered the formal agencies and ‘biomedical authorities’, which can 
legitimise and provide support for social anxiety through diagnosis, and more informal 
online environments. Focusing on what people with social anxiety do in the context of 
negotiating ‘ill-being’ and ‘wellbeing’, it details the minutiae of how people negotiate 
these agencies and spaces, demonstrating the distinctive dimensions, and personal barriers 
faced by individuals in accessing effective care and treatment, as well as the social and 
structural conditions that shape and/or restrict access to efficient and supportive care. The 
Internet has played a key role in the democratisation of health for people with social 
anxiety enabling them to negotiate their own diagnostic categories and ‘recovery’ journeys. 
However, as McCarthy (2014) found in her research with a London-based social anxiety 
 
218 Scottish word meaning ‘frightened’ or ‘afraid’. 
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self-help group, certain groups, programmes and platforms adhere to and reinforce 
biomedical models of recovery and the neoliberal principles of ‘responsibilisation’ and 
resiliency that without fundamental support, ultimately sustains the conditions that enable 
anxiety to flourish. 
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CHAPTER 7  
SPATIALITIES OF ANXIOUS EXPERIENCE I  
INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 7 and 8 are written as a couplet in order to explore the social and spatial 
contingencies of living with social anxiety. The chapters are designed to complement one 
another, moving away from the broader configurations of governance and management 
discussed in Chapter 6 and turning instead to focus on the more intimate lived geographies 
of anxious experience. Where this chapter (outlined further below) addresses the formative 
spaces of home, education and work, Chapter 8 builds a more expansive geography of 
everyday sites and settings that constitute anxious experiences while simultaneously 
digging deeper into the relational and embodied encounters in and with such sites and 
settings, addressing how various social relationships are implicated in anxious encounters 
with space.  
This chapter addresses the spatial contingencies of living with social anxiety in order to 
map the disrupted and the disruptive geographies of anxious experience. Here I pay 
attention to the formative spaces of home, education and work, taking into consideration 
the complexity of physical, material and socio-spatial factors that comprise these everyday 
spaces and the practices that emerge through them. In doing so, I seek to unpack their 
significance for a geography of social anxiety. 
Following calls (outlined in Chapter 3) to tackle the more ‘unhomely’ aspects of home, I 
wanted to examine how home is experienced by people with social anxiety. In the online 
questionnaires, participants acknowledged home as one of the safest spaces (alongside 
spaces within the home, for example a bedroom). This was perhaps an automatic 
assumption of what the home should be, as further discussions often unsettle initial 
‘rankings’ of home as a space of near-complete safety. A core focus of this chapter is to 
highlight the ways in which home can be seen as a fragmented space, one where meanings 
can be contested, disrupted, changed and lost as a sense of stability and security becomes 
frayed during social anxiety.  
This chapter also focuses on the socio-spatial challenges associated with educational 
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spaces and the workplaces. I explore how employment and educational spheres of life have 
been disrupted over the life-course of individuals who manage (and struggle) to gain and 
maintain education and employment opportunities. There is a focus on the everyday 
management and negotiation of these spaces that pays attention to interactions and 
performances that fuel social anxieties – for example, giving presentations or speaking to 
people in authority – that make them increasingly fearful and disabling aspects of everyday 
life. Attention is also paid to the tensions and stigma that arise in relation to working with a 
(known) mental health problem219 at this juncture between (reli)ability and recovery. 
Participants share detailed accounts of the ways in which their education and careers have 
been disrupted by pervasive anxieties and fears; often reflecting on personal and structural 
barriers and the psychological and physiological consequences of trying to (re)gain and 
maintain meaningful participation in educational, vocational and work-related activities. 
This also fuelled further discussions in interviews about the temporal, spatial and 
emotional work involved in managing and negotiating everyday life with their mental 
health problems (Laws, 2013). 
HOME 
SHIFTING, FRACTURING AND FRAGMENTING HOME-SPACES  
Home is generally regarded as a safe space with set routines and where ‘known’ social 
relationships with family can be maintained (Blunt and Dowling, 2006), but social anxiety 
often disrupts this space of safety and the spaces available to (re)gain control are often 
severely reduced. In this sense, safety within the home is ‘always conditional and 
contingent’ (Brickell, 2012, p. 232). What emerges in the following section is not only an 
understanding of the spatial practice in/of home and the therapeutic benefits in the making 
of home spaces, but a consideration of how homes become psychologically inhabited, 
disrupted and re-written. As anxieties and experiences are tied to and deeply embedded in 
their socio-spatial surroundings, it is important to consider the consequences of how 
invasive and pervasive mental health experiences enfold with the intimate micro-spaces of 
home.  
 
219 ‘Known’ in the sense that it has been disclosed to management and/or colleagues. 
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Figure 10: Comparison - Feelings of Safety Bedroom and Home 
It is perhaps unsurprising that participants overwhelmingly consider their home to be a 
‘safe’ or ‘very safe’ space (Figure 10). For instance, Mia responds saying: 
I feel safer here [at home] because it’s my space, you know? My own little part 
of the world that is solely my own. I live alone and have complete control over 
this space – who comes to visit, who I answer the door to or who I speak to. I 
know when I close the front door I feel safe and there’s a feeling of relief that 
comes with that expectation disappearing. I get home and these four walls are 
like armour. (Mia, IR119) 
For Mia, home marks a clear boundary between the feelings of uncertainty associated with 
external social space and the feelings of safety and security engendered by being at home. 
Similarly Lauren (QR179) writes that she felt ‘safe in my home and far too exposed and 
panicky when outside’. The home is a place where both Mia and Lauren are able to seal 
themselves against potential exposure to other people. Mallet (2004, p. 71) argues that 
‘[d]ifferent performative expectations exist for people’ outside of the home, where 
‘different rules of engagement with people, places and things’ apply. The private realm of 
home is one ‘where tensions built up from the constant surveillance built up in others 
settings of daily life can be relieved’ (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998, p. 27). Furthermore, the 
home is a space where Mia feels she has complete control and around which she can place 
limitations on social interactions and unexpected encounters.  
The (imagined) boundaries of home offer idealised separation between inside/outside and 
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public/private, which may encourage individuals to become housebound for extended 
periods of time. For example, Dawn (QR01) writes, ‘I wish I didn’t have to ever leave the 
house. It’s not that I get any actual enjoyment out of staying home a lot […] I find it harder 
to go outside when I don’t go out for extended periods of time’. Karen, a single mother of 
three young children, discusses similar periods where she has been relatively housebound: 
I’m comfortable and safe here; it’s just my own surroundings. I did go out with 
my sister. That was only the other week and I hadn’t been out the house in like 
six weeks just out in the garden and stuff … that’s my safe place and I don’t 
want to leave … (Karen, IR) 
Ultimately, then, Karen discloses here acts of safekeeping (Davidson, 2010) in the face of 
experiences of social anxiety, which she states have a ‘horrendous’ impact on her day-to-
day life. She experiences intense anxiety about being outside the confines of her home and 
being approached by people within her very close-knit community who may notice her 
absence from community life, ask questions and spread gossip. She has frequent and 
recurring panic attacks and can experience up to four panic attacks ‘on a good day’, even 
within the relative security of her home space. Her home is a known and predictable 
environment offering privacy to manage routinely (un)predictable bodily experiences, 
where she has access to medication to control intense periods of anxiety and where she 
practices established domestic and daily routines: 
I just keep myself busy in the house […] I try to keep busy doing housework 
and just doing things, you know, like hanging out the washing and maybe 
sitting out the back [garden]. I’ll sit out there and take my medication. I’m 
okay in the house […] I can help cook their [her children’s] dinner, help them 
do their homework; help them get dressed or ready for bed. My son, I bath him 
in the morning. Homework and stuff is not a problem. I just cannot take them 
over that front door. (Karen, IR) 
Throughout the interview Karen spoke about wanting ‘to be a good mother’ and how she 
felt ‘guilty’, and worried about the impact her health has on her children and her 
relationship with them. It is important to her to provide a caring and facilitative role within 
the home as she is unable to go beyond it without feelings of intense anxiety and panic. 
Home life is punctuated by being able to do ‘little things’ that aid in the everyday 
management of social anxiety or as a component part of longer-term mental health 
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recovery220. Karen places particular importance on roles and rituals practised within the 
home. It is through these habitual practices that she establishes and maintains a positive 
sense of home and, by remaining active through her cyclical bouts of panic, her role as a 
‘good mother’. Within the home she has a stronger and more stable identity compared to 
outside, where she loses all sense of herself and the control she has re-built over her socio-
spatial and bodily boundaries. Feminist geographers argue that such domestic practices 
‘reinforce the stereotypical gendered nature of the home or domestic sphere’ by ‘repeating 
patterns of oppression within the history of gendered spaces’ (Bankey, 1999, p. 169). 
Confined within the home, individuals ‘re-inscribe those places and their family 
relationships through domesticated ideals that immobilise them’ (Bankey, 1999, p. 169) 
further.  
However, for others, experiences of home are not so concrete. Kirsty (QR87) recognises 
that while at home she is ‘isolated and alone, which is good for the anxiety’, being home it 
is not necessarily conducive to her overall health and wellbeing. The intensity of social 
space may prompt long periods of isolation to recover from its multiple and often 
competing demands221 (Moss, 1997). Far from being an idealised space, the home can 
often become a space of confinement whereby one’s social geography is restricted to one 
of homebound isolation. Harriet (QR204) writes: 
I’ve been at home for a long time and the suffering becomes just as bad as if I 
were outside everyday around other people. It’s totally driven me away from 
the world. It gets to a point where you begin to feel like a prisoner in your own 
home. 
The shrinking of Harriet’s social and spatial worlds has a marked impact on her health and 
wellbeing. Not only has she lost the freedoms to travel beyond the confines of home, her 
experience is further complicated by feelings of socio-spatial isolation that have been 
inscribed into the everyday experiences of home. Individuals living with social anxiety can 
 
220 Karen has also spent periods of time as an inpatient in a Mental Health Unit where daily routines were set 
and enforced by staff. Returning home was important for her in being able to (re)establish her own rules 
and routines. She is mostly housebound except for bi-weekly visits with her psychiatrist. She has no 
home-based interventions in an act of separating of mental health care from home favouring community 
based treatments, despite the intense levels of anxiety experienced when accessing them. 
221 It should be noted that the experiences documented here and throughout this thesis are not uncommon 
aspects of everyday life. While presenting at conferences I receive comments and questions where 
individuals recognise their own social behaviours, thoughts and practices in those I am discussing. 
However, while I acknowledge that everyone can relate to feelings of anxiety, I do not wish to draw 
associations between distressing social anxiety and a lethargy of social and spatial life experiences, 
particularly given the pervasive nature of these anxieties and the disruption caused to social life, health 
and wellbeing. 
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often become ‘social captives’ (Charmaz, 1995, p. 668) as social worlds diminish and 
everyday mobilities become reduced. While the home is typically considered conducive to 
wellbeing, Anya’s (QR212) experiences of being housebound are extremely tense and 
palpable, causing her to feel ‘like I’m being crushed’. Similar to Harriet, Anya’s ‘world 
was getting smaller’ (Davidson, 2000b) to the extent that ‘I was so terrified by the thought 
of contact with others […] I wouldn’t hang out the washing in case I met the neighbours; at 
one point, all the curtains in my house were drawn for four years. I was restricted in every 
possible way’. The socio-spatial restrictions placed on the self and the boundaries of home, 
where objects, like curtains, as well as other avoidance strategies, are implemented to limit 
the dilution of internal personal space by external social forces. 
In the wake of deteriorating mental health, tensions manifest in the relationships between 
the self and socio-spatial surroundings causing experiences of place and the meanings 
attached to them to shift and fragment. In the following interview excerpt with Jess 
(QR88), the capacity for mental health experiences to cause disruption becomes apparent: 
Jess: As my mental health got worse I became very disconnected from 
everything and everyone around me. My anxiety was affecting work, 
friendships, relationships, family; I spent a lot of time at home because I didn’t 
want to go outside or face anyone not because I wanted to be there I just 
couldn’t really be anywhere else. Before, I really loved my place. It was mine, 
with all my things, I would have people round and it was open but then I 
couldn’t, I shut down … it began to not feel like home, it was nothing. 
Louise: Can you explain why that happened? 
J: I guess what was happening was all those horrible feelings – the anxiety, the 
panic, feeling ashamed and judged by others – those feelings were all coming 
home with me. They didn’t get left at the door. There was no weight off my 
shoulders when I stepped over the threshold. My down time is at home and 
that’s when I’ve really got time to play everything over in my head and think 
everything through […] 
L: Has that changed now, does it feel like home again? 
J: At the moment I’d say it’s the safest place I’ve got but there’s still so much 
that I can’t control. [L: Like?] Like, people turning up unannounced. That’s 
probably the worst one. I can’t prepare for anything. I think because my place 
was so busy before, always people coming and going, there’s the expectation of 
people coming by so I can’t ever really relax. Plus, I spend most of my time 
behind these four walls – well, I’m back at work now so it’s better – but my 
worst days were spent here so I have some pretty bad memories. (Jess, IR) 
As Jess’ mental health deteriorated, and the impact of her social anxiety took hold of the 
important and formative parts of everyday life, there was gradual shift in the meanings she 
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attached to home. Once a place she ‘loved’, framed by a sense of belonging that reflected 
her sense of self and wellbeing, her home began to mirror her shifting frame of mind as she 
slowly retreated and disconnected from those around her. Rather than being a place where 
she could find relief from the emotional intensity of her anxious experiences, her home 
played a crucial part in strengthening her anxieties. Home became a place of negative 
reflection on the day’s events, ones that to those not experiencing crippling social anxieties 
are likely to appear inconsequential but, for Jess completely disrupt the habitual nature of 
her everyday life. There is no respite for Jess in this state as the collection of (perceived) 
negative evaluations that she repeatedly revisits manifest in growing feelings of shame. 
Furthermore, her home fosters the anticipatory anxieties that rupture any sense of stability, 
safety or belonging. Despite an improvement in her overall mental health, signalled by her 
ability to return to work222, Jess’ understandings of, and relations to, home become re-
written, imbued with a new set of meanings, emotions and histories. These new 
associations reveal a disconnection between Jess and this once ‘homely’ space. Douglas 
(1991, p. 289) states that ‘home starts by bringing some space under control’, but Jess ends 
up struggling to reconnect with a home that, on the one hand, is now riddled with tension 
and uncertainty of what might happen next and, on the other, is tainted by ‘bad memories’ 
of when she was at her ‘worst’. Exploring attempts made by people experiencing mental 
distress to stabilise the home, Tucker (2010, p. 533) proposes that it is through ‘habit and 
memory that we come to perceive patterns of stability and sameness in our lives’. In 
contrast, I would argue that in experiences such as those discussed by Jess, the repetitive 
re-playing (habit) of negatively perceived past encounters (memories) is a key disruptive 
and destabilising force. With reference to agoraphobia-related panic attacks, Davidson 
(2000b, pp. 652–652 emphasis in original) explores how ‘home often seems to be the only 
imaginable space in which to rebuild your defences, away from the prying eyes and 
presence of others’, but, because the home is never fully sealed or secure, Jess can never 
truly feel at home. Jess remains highly attune to the potential for external interferences and, 
exacerbated by her homebound isolation, overwhelmingly expectant of them. For Jess, the 
role of habit is anything but therapeutic. Home has become the meeting point between a 
habitual confrontation with negative past experiences and equally habitual anticipation of 
other people encroaching on the boundaries she has attempted to create and maintain. This 
overlay of anticipatory processes and events are ‘acts or experiences of severance’ 
(Brickell, 2012, p. 233) whereby tensions are created between the sense of belonging and 
 
222 Evans and Wilton (2016) have noted the importance of gaining meaningful employment as a key 
milestone towards recovery. 
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connection to place and the negative associations that, in this case, are born out of 
experiences of ill-health. 
The geographies of home are overlapping and conflicting, constituted by ‘multiple material 
and imagined spaces in which different social relations are enacted and expressed’ 
(McLean, 2008a, p. 564). The idea of home is negotiated and made sense of through a 
number of physical spaces (living room, bedroom), social relations (family, friends, 
visitors, neighbours) and objects within the home (telephones, windows, doors, doorbells), 
all imbued with different meanings and anticipations. These ‘affective’ or ‘anticipatory’ 
objects, spaces and encounters of/in the home are unbearable, representative of the 
individual’s perceived inability to encounter social life ‘normally’ and also the inescapable 
presence of ‘the social’. Anticipatory objects in geographical research are generally 
considered in the context of Anderson’s (2010) ‘pre-emptive’ action, to manage or adapt to 
(un)known futures223. In this context, every day, unremarkable objects embody an 
‘uncertain immanence’ (Leyshon and Geoghegan, 2012) that encroaches and persists as the 
(un)certainty of the social world is forced upon the individual. 
The encroachment of the outer world into the ‘bounded’ spaces of home was repeated time 
and time again in the questionnaire and interview responses. There is often a significant 
effort involved, over and above that, which would ‘normally’ be expended in the process 
of ‘securing’ the home against unwanted and unwelcome social interactions. As a result, it 
became evident that the ideal of home does indeed not always correspond with its 
‘experienced’ and ‘material realities’ (Brun, 2008, p. 566) as home is still encountered as 
an intensely social space in which people become even more minutely imprisoned: 
People say, ‘home is my safe space’ or whatever, not for me. My house is 
constantly open to other people, I live in a constant state of tension that the 
phone will ring, the bell will go, family will visit, brothers – their friends are 
always around – or someone will come to the door. So, I stay in my room and 
that’s my space. It doesn’t take my anxiety away but that is the place where I’m 
safest and I can escape to there when the rest of the house gets busy or 
unbearable. (Rachel, QR07) 
The idea and practice of home is not static. Intense social anxieties, such as those 
experienced by Rachel, are deeply entangled with the construction of home as a place of 
‘movement, communication [and] social relations’ (Massey, 1994, p. 171). The experience 
of there being too much of the ‘outside’ inside the home is one all too familiar for people 
 
223 For example, nanotechnologies or cattle grids (Anderson, 2007; Leyshon and Geoghegan, 2012).  
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experiencing chronic social anxiety, in which there is often a persistent encroachment of 
everything ‘out there’ in the public realm into the private spaces of the home. Unable to 
maintain separations and boundaries within the home environment, particularly with 
family members, participants often retreat into a smaller space within the home, typically a 
bedroom. However, perceptions of safety are shifting and relational, inherently responsive 
to the particularities and levels of social anxiety experienced. The hidden social (micro) 
geographies of social anxiety are played out across fluctuating, spatial scales (Dyck, 
1995b; Parr, 2000). Anna, although relatively housebound, discusses how her safe zone 
shifts in response to her mental health (simultaneously highlighting the fluctuating nature 
of anxious experiences): 
Everything outside of my safe bubble [is unsafe]. Sometimes, on good 
days/months that’s anything from my doorstep outwards. Any of it. [On] bad 
days/months, that’s anything from my bedroom outwards. (Anna, QR157) 
In the questionnaire responses (Figure 11), 62% of participants marked bedrooms as ‘very 
safe’, compared to 40% who marked home as ‘very safe’, highlighting the distinction 
between the home and a space of safety within the home. Maggie speaks about a ‘hierarchy 
of safe places’ within her home: 
Even in the house, at home, there’s a spare bedroom upstairs, which is now my 
craft room, that’s very much my space. There are certain rooms in the house 
that are more mine. So they’d be higher up in the hierarchy of safe places. 
Anna demonstrates the difficulty in trying to cope with the uncertainty of home while 
establishing a personal territory in the search for security: 
I have to work very hard to find a safe place anywhere. My bedroom is ‘very 
safe’ because where I live I have strict rules about who can go in there. I have a 
partner but we have separate bedrooms. He isn’t allowed in my bedroom/on 
my bed unless I say so. My bedroom is a safe place I guess because there are 
no expectations there from anyone else. Obviously outside of my bedroom my 
partner roams around, people can knock on the front door and I expect to have 
contact with someone… outside of my bedroom isn’t really completely mine, 
and so isn’t completely safe. 
 
 
 
 177 
 
Figure 11: Feeling of Safety in Bedroom 
Anna’s strict management of her bedroom-space is a coping strategy that affords her near-
complete control over a defined space in her home, but also serves to isolate her further. It 
also demonstrates the struggle to maintain the boundaries outside of the confines of her 
room where space becomes more unstable and unpredictable. This air of anticipation and 
perceived lack of control of social interactions and encounters, no matter how familiar or 
seemingly insignificant, marks anything beyond these boundaries as less safe. 
This ‘territorialising’ of home – drawing on Wise (2000, p. 298) who contends that the 
notion of ‘territory’ is both a ‘space’ and an ‘act’ – is a twofold process: on the one hand, it 
involves the creation of a space that marks a distance between the self and an ‘other’; and 
on the other, it addresses how this space is shaped through a variety of socio-spatial 
‘markers and milieus’. In relation to experiences of social anxiety, this ‘other’ may be 
signalled by the intrusion of another person, the unwelcome bodily signs and symptoms 
that operate as markers of anxieties or the recurring feelings of shame born out of 
perceived judgement and scrutiny from other people. Socio-spatial ‘markers and milieus’ 
relates to those objects and practices that may help to create a cohesive sense of place or 
may signal a fragmentation of those boundaries. These aspects, emerging across various 
platforms of social-spatial life, are particularly disruptive in a place pregnant with a sense 
of security, belonging and identity, such as the home. Unfolding throughout the 
discussions with participants about their homes, and how it becomes compromised, were 
the many ways in which various ‘markers’ – objects, habits and social encounters – 
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obtrude into the forefront of everyday life to the extent that they may become ‘unbearable’: 
When the doorbell rings, I’m scared to death. I almost go into a panic attack; I 
have shortness of breath and my heartbeat races and have tons of fear about 
who is on the other side of the door. Most of the time I can’t even bring myself 
to move to answer [the door]. I get so terrified that they’ll hear me and will 
know I’m home hiding from them. I sit there rigid, panicking, until they go 
away. It really knocks me off [pauses then laughs]. Sunday is the only day I 
know I’ll get complete peace! (Eva, IR) 
Valentine (1998, p. 321) discusses how ‘simple objects’ and ‘everyday sounds’ can 
radically disrupt the everyday ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of home environments. For Eva, the 
doorbell is a signal that threatens her physical and psychological boundaries, generating 
intense anxieties associated with face-to-face interactions. Eva’s experience, like Rachel’s, 
demonstrates how seemingly inconsequential components of the home such as doorbells or 
windows (see Olivia, below) invoke a series of bodily affects that further destabilise 
feelings of safety and security.  
For similar reasons, telephones become a source of anxiety enabling the potential for 
instantaneous and unexpected interruptions in the home. Clara states that ‘when the phone 
rings my anxiety spikes’. Rosie, in response to similar anxious experiences, ‘unplug[s] the 
phone unless I know I’m expecting a call … like my mum phones on a Saturday so I’ll 
plug it back in on a Saturday morning’. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the temporality 
of home, highlighting how it may be disrupted in a single moment, throughout the course 
of a day or through shifting expectations between the week and the weekend (McLean, 
2008a)224. Despite the fleeting nature of these disruptions, these objects and the anxieties 
they produce resonate through and saturate the surrounding space: 
My house is a safe place, yes, but I do have the blinds closed and I never 
answer the door. […][W]hen the blinds are open, I feel like people can see in, 
see me and make judgements. I don’t know, it just makes me feel very 
uncomfortable knowing that people can possibly see in and see me. (Olivia 
QR187) 
Although her home is experienced as ‘safe’, windows are markers of a ‘gap’ in the 
protective boundaries of home. They are a particular source of intense discomfort that 
speak to wider social anxieties about being visible to other people, leaving Olivia open to 
 
224 McLean (2008b, p. 397) suggests greater attention must be paid to ‘temporal dimension[s] more closely 
connected to the everyday lived enactments, experiences, and expressions of home’ to uncover the 
meanings of home, not only, ‘across a life-course’ but, also, the shifts that occur day-to-day and between 
weekdays and weekends that could further challenge ‘the normative and static notions of home.’ 
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potential judgement and scrutiny. As such, the seemingly private spaces of home can be 
understood more as a ‘turbulent sea of constant negotiation rather than simply some haven 
for the self’ (Miller, 2001, p. 4). 
EDUCATION SPACES 
There is now growing evidence that a significant proportion of the student body are 
experiencing mental and emotional health problems (Eisenberg et al., 2007). The following 
section considers the everyday reality of secondary, college and university educational 
spaces as experienced by people with social anxiety, uncovering how in such spaces people 
are presented with considerable barriers affecting access, attendance, grades, participation 
and attainment.  
 
Figure 12: Feelings of Safety on Campus 
I focus on general feelings of safety on campus225 before considering education spaces as 
platforms where particular anxieties manifest through, for example, interacting with those 
in a position of authority, answering out in class or the impact of particular pedagogical 
practices and learning environments, for example, group work, seminars and lecture 
theatres, through which educational experiences are explored. Appendix 12 shows the 
 
225 Campus refers broadly to the various spaces where learning or education takes place including, high 
school, college and/or university and the spaces that ‘make up’ these environments including, classrooms, 
lecture theatres, libraries, corridors and wider campus grounds.  
14
35
25
45
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Very unsafe Unsafe Neither
safe/unsafe
Safe Very safe
Feelings of Safety - Campus
Quiet Street
 
 
 180 
‘likelihood of anxiety’ experienced in particular situations associated with education 
spaces, for example, sitting exams, speaking out loud and giving a presentation. The 
barriers in access to, and learning in, post-secondary education have been addressed 
elsewhere in relation to those with mobility impairments (Fuller et al., 2004; Norman, 
2002), and learning disabilities (Mortimore and Crozier, 2006). The social consequences 
for students with diabetes has also been addressed concerning alcohol consumption and 
self-care practices (Balfe, 2009). Attention has also been paid to help-seeking behaviours 
in relation to mental health problems among the student body across college and university 
settings. In geography, Hansen (2005, p. 33) explores ‘individual incapacity’ and 
community/societal perceptions and attitudes in the educational spaces for women with 
disabilities. Valentine and Skelton (2003) identify social isolation as a key factor in 
dropout rates among D/deaf students. While Conradson (2016) assesses how to foster 
student wellbeing from pedagogical practice within the discipline and takes note of the 
neoliberal shifts and changes in academic culture that may contribute to increasing reports 
of mental and emotional distress among the student body. He argues that the ‘competitive 
ethos and performance orientation in some courses of study can induce or exacerbate 
anxiety, for example, which in turn may negatively impact upon academic performance’. 
Here he is advocating that pedagogical practices inherent to the discipline, notably group 
work, residential fieldwork and reflective assignments, can help to foster student wellbeing 
(2016, p. 240). His argument speaks to that of Hickinbottom-Brawn (2013, p. 732) who 
criticises the biomedical model of social anxiety and its emergence specifically ‘against the 
backdrop of neoliberal enterprise culture’. Nevertheless, there is a significant gap 
addressing the accounts of people with enduring mental health problems in access to, and 
experiences of, educational settings. 
Perceptions of safety on campus (Figure 12) among participants are linked to the micro-
social interactions as well as the wider academic and social expectations that play out 
across various educational environments. Individuals with social anxiety may face 
difficulties integrating into social and academic life across, and when transitioning 
between, secondary and post-secondary educational spaces226. These transitional time-
spaces have been explored in relation to the transitions between childhood and adulthood 
(Valentine, 2010); youths with intellectual disabilities into paid employment (Butcher and 
Wilton, 2008), and training and learning opportunities for people with mental health 
problems (Philo et al., 2005). 
 
226 Equally these difficulties must be considered and negotiated concerning the transition between education 
and paid employment and between employment opportunities for people with mental health problems. 
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Figure 13: Participant’s Level of Education 
Although a substantial number (Figure 13) of participants are currently in, or have 
completed, post-secondary education, further restrictions are placed on the individual who 
feels that they lack the necessary skills for academic and social success. The learning 
environment itself can be a considerable source of tension where lecture theatres or 
classrooms ‘full of people’ (Isla QR12) are experienced as deeply unsettling and 
unpredictable social environments, often disruptive to learning and leading to socio-spatial 
isolation and exclusion: 
I went to university but I didn’t interact with anyone, join any clubs, socialise 
or make any long lasting friendships. I went in for lectures, did what I had to 
do and went home again. (Eve, QR12)  
As well as learning environments, spaces of education are innately social environments 
that should encourage social participation and opportunities to expand social networks. 
Madge et al. (2009, p. 141), exploring the significance of social media for social 
integration into university life, advocate that ‘more general social networking practices and 
face‐to‐face interrelationships and interactions remain important’227. This social aspect of 
education highlights a challenge for people with social anxiety who, like Isla, experience 
significant levels of anxiety in face-to-face interactions with severe consequences for 
 
227 Social networking sites like Facebook emerged as a key tool in planning social events and making social 
links with others while at university. However, face-to-face interactions are still vital for initiating contact 
with peers (Madge et al. 2009). 
17%
28%
35%
14%
6%
Participants' Educational Attainment
Secondary
Additional Training
Undergraduate
Postgraduate
No Formal Qualifications
 
 
 182 
interpersonal communications and relations. 
A further dynamic of university life that may cause disruption is living arrangements. 
Attending university often involves living away from home during term-time, 
predominantly in student residences or shared accommodation. Thomas (2002), assessing 
student retention, highlights the benefits of shared accommodation for encouraging social 
interaction and expanding social networks, while still preserving quiet spaces to work and 
rest. Communal living may add additional stress and disruption to the daily lives of 
students with social anxiety and, as Claire (QR16) explains, may contribute to withdrawal 
from Higher Education: 
I’m living in shared accommodation […] my parents thought it would help me 
socialise but it’s nothing but torture. I spend almost all of my time in my room 
that really feel draws the life out of me sometimes but I don’t want to step on 
people’s toes or get in the way. It’s having an impact on uni and I’m seriously 
considering withdrawing and going home.  
This approach taken by Claire’s parents is arguably indicative of a lack of public 
awareness and understanding of the impact their social anxiety has on the lives of those 
experiencing it. Attributing her experiences to shyness or lack of sociability, they believe 
that altering the settings for sociability will improve her situation, when in fact it is 
precisely this opening of her accommodation spaces to such sociability that is exacerbating 
her already heightened anxieties, with detrimental effects on her studies, attendance and 
overall wellbeing. As shown, both Isla and Claire actively limit the opportunities for social 
interactions in educational spaces as a protective measure. 
Olivia writes at great length about the social anxiety that affected her formative years 
through school, and it became evident that her experiences and mechanisms for coping 
were cyclically reproduced, significantly impacting her journey through secondary and 
post-secondary education. The pervasive and habitual nature is present in her detailed 
narrative highlighting transitions through different education spaces entailing a sustained 
and on-going negotiation with the self and in her relationships with others that is 
responsive to, and contingent upon, the various situations, settings and spatialities 
encountered. Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 87) states, ‘the habitus acquired in the family 
underlies the structuring of school experiences […] and the habitus transformed by 
schooling, itself diversified […] in turn underlies the structuring of all subsequent 
experiences, and so on, from restructuring to restructuring’. Reay et al (Reay et al., 2001, 
para. 1:2) argue that ‘[h]abitus produces action, but because it confines possibilities to 
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those feasible for the social groups the individual belongs to, much of the time those 
actions tend to be reproductive rather than transformative’. Olivia’s early experiences of 
educational spaces are marked by a lack of social integration and support that exacerbates 
her anxieties about failure and not understanding the curriculum, fears of being 
reprimanded for this failure and the risk of embarrassment that it entails. It is evident in the 
following narrative how the perceived and experienced intensities of her early learning 
environments are consistently re-produced, with serious consequences for the (social) 
geographies intrinsic to education and learning: 
School was always hard; I hated it with a passion. I used to fake illnesses a lot 
to get time off school- especially on days when I had a lesson I really hated due 
to the people there or the teacher, or the fact I just didn’t get it and not being 
able to approach anyone about it. At school break times I would always hang 
around in the hallways or go to the library if I could just to be in a less crowded 
place. (Olivia, QR187) 
This is particularly instructive of Olivia’s experience of educational spaces in that practices 
such as ‘faking illness’ and avoiding spaces and people are consistently re-produced 
through her secondary and post-secondary years. Illustrated throughout this narrative are 
themes of continuity and change – component parts of Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ – 
whereby pervasive anxieties produced by, and deeply embedded in, these educational 
spaces are managed through her capacity to navigate the surrounding socio-spatial 
environment, routinely seeking refuge in hallways or the library in an attempt to limit 
internal and external disruptions. She continues: 
[At] university, the first day I had a bad panic attack and had to call my 
boyfriend to come and get me. He persuaded me to stay but he had to stay with 
me (this was during welcome week and the tutor was very understanding). My 
boyfriend accompanied me all week for my first week, and then he had to go 
back to work so I had to cope on my own. I would drag out the break times in 
the toilets, or wandering around corridors I knew would be quiet, go places I 
knew no one really stayed. I made every attempt to avoid people as much as 
possible, avoided the restaurant area, as it was always busy. 
Completely overwhelmed by the uncertain and unfamiliar environment on her first day at 
university, Olivia felt vulnerable to unwelcome interactions with others. Her boyfriend 
operated as a safety net between her and any external interference: space can be rendered 
less threatening, temporarily at least, by the presence of known others. Ultimately, his 
continued presence was not a practical option but it afforded Olivia the time and space to 
settle into her new environment: 
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[A]s the year went on I felt worse and worse, regressed in confidence and my 
coping strategies no longer worked for me, so I ended up missing a lot of days 
[and] making up excuses for not going in. [M]y motivation really lacked 
towards the end of the year, and I have now decided to withdraw from the 
course and do an online/distance learning course with the Open University 
instead. 
The decision to withdraw from university is usually a complex process influenced by a 
number of interacting factors that occur over time (Thomas 2002). Olivia’s deteriorating 
mental health, potentially exacerbated by her experiences of university and increasing 
social isolation – factoring in the disintegration of her long-term coping strategies – have 
clearly played a significant role in her decision to withdraw from university. 
Similarly to Olivia, several participants expressed an interest in online and distance 
learning, in particular the Open University (OU)228, as an alternative pathway to education 
when conventional pathways are perceived to be unsuitable for their levels of social 
impairment and learning needs. Although beneficial in enabling people with social anxiety 
to complete a degree programme, the key requirements of the courses may still require 
group work tutorial and/or seminar attendance that could be beneficial to the student: 
I’m currently doing an Open University degree, they have been very helpful, 
but I can’t attend tutorials or do any of the video conferencing tutorials [that] 
would benefit me. (Kim, QR40) 
The length of time taken to complete university education can also have a significant 
impact on people’s lives. Tina (QR123) writes: 
I was far too terrified to think of going to university after my A-levels Around 
[age] 36 I did an Open University Science degree. I was getting very good 
marks but dropped out in my final year because I was too scared to go away for 
a mandatory 1 or 2 week course full of people I had never met. A few years 
later I started a different BSc but when a similar scenario presented itself I had 
a sort of ‘nervous breakdown’. [Two] years later I returned to the course and 3 
years later graduated with a 1st class honours. A lot of those [three] years felt 
like having to walk through fire. 
Data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) reported that withdrawal rates 
from UK universities due to mental health problems trebled from 2014 to 2015 (Marsh, 
 
228 The Open University course is a distance and open learning institution that offers flexible and part-
time study for undergraduate and postgraduate courses and qualifications. (Open University, n.d.). 
The OU is an option for further education explored by some participants that may provide a 
supportive, distance learning environment by removing the difficulties that individuals experience 
intensive face-to-face environments. The capacity for this option to lead to further socio-spatial, 
however, isolation should also be acknowledged and considered. 
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2017). Conradson (2016) notes the importance of various pedagogical practices, including 
residential field trips, for ‘fostering wellbeing’ in the student body, but intense periods 
away from home with unknown others, particularly if previous barriers to social 
integration and support have been identified can be fraught and problematic. Mandatory 
course requirements such as residential trips229 can instead present significant barriers to an 
individual in pursuit of a degree, impacting attendance and grades while causing 
considerable distress and, in extreme cases, may result in the student’s withdrawal from 
university altogether. 
WORKSPACES 
There are commonplace assumptions made about people who experience ‘enduring mental 
health problems, that they are unable to work unless, or until, they have recovered’, where 
questions of willingness, reliability, ability and productivity arise (Grove et al., 2005). 
Employment is also viewed as significant step in the process of recovery (Evans and 
Repper, 2000; Evans and Wilton, 2016)230. Beynon and Tucker (2006, p. 78) argue that 
‘while people with ill health and disability have positive attitudes to work, their capacity to 
work is limited by multiple and often mutually reinforcing barriers’231.  
Previous research in the area consistently demonstrates that ‘social anxiety has negative 
impacts on occupational functioning’ (Himle et al., 2014, p. 924). Individuals are likely to 
experience downward social mobility associated with unemployment or underemployment 
and a devaluation of workplace knowledges, skills and experiences over time that can have 
a significant impact on future employment prospects and overall health and wellbeing. 
Figure 14 shows the breakdown of participant’s employment status. While the highest 
number of participant’s note that they are in full-time employment, nearly 70% of 
participant’s are otherwise employed, in further education, on long-terms sickness and 
 
229 These may be particularly problematic for people with mental health problems on OU courses where there 
have been limited opportunities for social integration and they are therefore entering a completely new 
and unfamiliar social/learning environment. 
230 A tension exists between the recognition of gaining and maintaining meaningful employment as a vital 
step in the recovery process and the realities of disclosing a mental health status to your employer (as 
either justification for long-term unemployment or order to gain workplace adjustments). Wilton and 
Evans (2016, 236) explore the potential role of social enterprises in providing opportunities for 
(re)integration and inclusion in that they can simultaneously ‘accommodate and support’ people with 
enduring mental health problems while ‘unsettl[ing] prevailing assumptions about mental health’ in the 
workplace. 
231 There are a host of online threads entitled: ‘How do I get a job with severe social anxiety?’ (or similar) so 
there appears to be a lack of support services, programmes or advice for people with social anxiety in 
terms of seeking/gaining employment. 
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disability, or unemployed showing a staggering level of precarity in (un)employment. 
While this was not a significant focus of this research, it could be a vital area of future 
research. 
 
Figure 14: Employment Status of Participants 
Questionnaire respondents highlight numerous personal and structural barriers in their 
attempts to gain and maintain employment – ‘I have never been, or would ever be, able to 
go for an interview’ (Kim, QR40) – as to advance within/beyond their current role by 
‘flatly reject[ing] any possibility of promotion232‘ (Tina, QR123). Callum (QR189) 
captures the impact that social anxiety has had on these inter-related spheres of his life, 
initially on his academic attainment and then the subsequent effect on his employment 
opportunities: 
I managed to graduate from university but feel that I could have achieved a 
better degree (I got a 2:2) if I had been able to attend lectures, seminars, 
tutorials233 etc. I have had no career, just a succession of menial jobs, because I 
fall apart in an interview situation. When I did work, I was unable to remain in 
any job for more than two years, as I would be ostracised by colleagues or 
become depressed because of the isolation. As time progressed, finding work 
became harder and harder, because my work record was so poor and because I 
 
232 Kirsty notes that her manager often encourages her to apply for jobs in order to progress within her 
role/company but she faces many personal barriers. 
233 In the UK, graduate schemes and postgraduate programmes minimum entry requirements are generally a 
‘2:1’ degree or higher. This rendered Callum’s opportunities coming out of university extremely limited. 
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have never had a promotion, with the result that I have not had a permanent job 
since 2004 and not worked at all since 2010. (Callum, QR189) 
Callum’s experience relays the implications of these anxieties on aspects of attendance and 
engagement in higher education and how spaces of education are impacted/negotiated are 
explored throughout this chapter. Many of the wider societal impacts of social anxiety are 
crystallised in Callum’s experience. Singley (2003, p. 25) notes that people with mental 
health problems are often plagued by various forms of psychological distress, including 
low self-esteem, and restricted by a lack of ‘job skills (basic and specific)[…], work 
experience […] and low education levels’. This is particularly pertinent for people 
experiencing social anxiety where distress is centred around, and exacerbated by, a 
perceived inability to ‘perform’ adequately across many social situations, including 
interview situations. Despite being in full-time employment, Sol’s social anxiety has had a 
marked impact on his ability to progress in or beyond his current position: ‘[social anxiety] 
has definitely affected my career progression as I am too nervous to attend interviews/give 
presentations’ (Sol, QR14) While hampering those already in employment, the anxiety and 
fear can be disabling for those who are actively looking for work. As Jo writes: 
I have been looking for work for four years but I freak out whenever I get a job 
reply so [I] often chicken out as I can’t manage the anxiety that goes with an 
interview. I’ve cancelled and rescheduled so many interviews because the 
anxiety is unbearable. (Jo, QR41) 
Jo’s anxieties, in a similar way to Callum’s, greatly hamper her ability to gain employment 
and further experience within the workplace, reinforcing her pervasive feelings of failure 
and self-doubt. Moreover, long periods of unemployment are also a significant barrier to 
securing future employment (Grove et al. 2005). Callum’s education and work history are 
symptomatic of the conditions that create a vicious cycle of social exclusion and 
un(der)employment in people’s lives. 
Geographers exploring ‘non-accommodating’ and difficult to negotiate workplaces for 
people with disabilities (Wilton and Schuer, 2006; Wilton, 2004), chronic illness (Dyck, 
1999; Dyck and Jongbloed, 2000) and mental health problems (Wilton and Evans 2016) all 
highlight the barriers and tensions in accessing, maintaining and (re)negotiating 
workplaces and employment opportunities with, or after the onset of, ill-health and/or 
disability. Similar to those experiencing chronic illness, social anxiety can be inherently 
disabling despite its relative invisibility in comparison with, say, physical impairment. 
Despite being able to ‘pass as normal’ (Davidson and Henderson, 2010), even if they feel 
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painfully out of place, people experiencing social anxiety face difficulties accessing and 
negotiating the workplace through a subtle set of mechanisms present in the immediate 
social and material environment. The following section will map these barriers, tensions 
and negotiations. 
As highlighted above by Jo, the hiring process is a significant barrier to gaining 
employment for people with social anxiety. The interview is an intensely anticipated event 
during which the individual’s performance is assessed and scrutinised. This encounter can 
be extremely distressing: 
I’ve had so many bad experiences and failed attempts that I can’t even think 
about trying to look for a job at this point. The last job I applied for was over a 
year ago and from the moment [the interview] was scheduled it consumed my 
every waking thought; I couldn’t sleep for worrying about it. Every day for 
weeks I had this feeling in the pit of my stomach that something was going to 
happen. Constantly playing over all the things in my head that could/would go 
wrong [L: Like?] Oh, like, not being able to answer questions, failing 
miserably, being visibly anxious, like, shaking and blushing, having a panic 
attack, being judged, them thinking I’m stupid or incompetent and having them 
staring at me, face-to-face situations are crippling and the fear of failing. All of 
it. It’s just terrifying. (Sophie, IR) 
Lara’s anxieties concerning the interview situation have, based on previous experiences 
and perceived negative interactions, intensified over time. The enormity of anticipated 
interaction highlights how every action is perceived to be highly symbolic of her 
‘incompetence’ and inability to perform ‘correctly’ in social space leaving her vulnerable 
to – certainly in her own estimation - negative judgement and scrutiny by others. She 
continues: 
By the time the interview came round I was in such a state. I was in the waiting 
room with all the other candidates and I wanted to burst into tears. I knew I’d 
failed already. It was so horrible I took a panic attack. My symptoms are visible 
too, physically trembling, sweating and I had a heavy tightness in my chest, 
blurry vision and so I felt like everyone could see me freaking out. [L: What 
happened next?] I left. I felt like I didn’t belong there. I couldn’t sit in the 
interview in that state; I was a total wreck234. 
For Lara, the interview process is an emotionally charged, complex situation. The visceral 
experience of sweaty, trembling and tight bodies give rise to a heightened sense of bodily 
 
234 I asked Lara how she felt about conducting an online interview. She responded saying, ‘It’s okay. I have a 
little time to think through my answers. I was still apprehensive but nothing like before. You can’t see me 
and I can’t see you so, there’s less pressure I think, and you can obviously relate which helps.’ The 
perception of understanding and empathy was missing from Lara’s job interview experiences. 
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self-awareness, as well as the space the body is occupying, further amplifying experiences 
of distress. This loss of bodily control and ‘inability’ to self-regulate spiralling emotional 
experiences, particularly in the professional and formal setting of the interview/workplace, 
are deemed contextually ‘inappropriate’. Sibley (1995, p. 3) argues, ‘who is felt to belong 
and not to belong contributes in an important way to the shaping of social space’; and, as 
such, Lara’s experience renders her intensely ‘out of place’ (Cresswell, 1996). 
Gwen works full-time in a job that provides her routine and financial stability. Although 
her social anxieties do not completely restrict her ability to work, she recognises that they 
have had a detrimental impact on her occupational functioning and long-term career 
aspirations. Currently, she feels she is unable to progress further within her current role: 
I’m not living life to the full and have got to the point where I’ve lost the 
confidence to try new things. I also feel that because of my SA I wouldn’t cope 
with a job that required regular contact with other people e.g. working in a 
team or dealing with the public. Jobs that say ‘must have an outgoing 
personality and be a team player!’ … They’re not for me. This job allows me to 
avoid talking to people when I’m feeling particularly anxious. 
The workplace, like educational spaces, can be an intensely social environment and 
workplace culture may be further disabling. Wilson-Cortijo (2016, p. np) argues, ‘in the 
past I imagine it would have been quite easy for a socially anxious individual to make a 
life for themselves doing some form of manual labour that wouldn’t require the cultivation 
of ‘people skills’. But in today’s neoliberal world, where selling one’s personal 
(communicative and performative) attributes are of the utmost importance, such skills are 
an absolute necessity. Whether it is in a corporate environment (meetings, group 
presentations, conferences, the importance of “leadership”) or an ordinary retail job, there 
is a clear correlation between success and one’s ability to produce confident spiel.’ Gwen 
notes that the culture of her workplace, including expectations from colleagues to be 
sociable, is a significant factor in triggering her social anxieties: 
I find it difficult to socialise with colleagues. I work on an open plan floor and 
I find this very stressful at times especially when it’s busy and I feel more 
anxious. Comments have been made about how quiet I am and it has become 
an issue for me at times. There is an expectation for people to be outgoing and 
although management are aware of my SA they don’t always seem to 
understand situations that can affect my anxiety. 
Over time Gwen has negotiated the workplace, employing certain strategies to overcome 
or to replace anxious thoughts and feelings. Communal workspaces encourage 
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uncontrolled social interactions and create an environment where individuals are under 
constant observation. Gwen deliberately blocks out her surrounding environment by 
wearing headphones, restricting external interferences and placing a barrier between her 
and any potential interactions enabling focus on external objects and tasks: 
I’ve found coping mechanisms to deal with my anxiety but some days are 
better than others. I wear headphones all day to limit social contact with people 
and am able to focus on my work. I have my lunch on my own at a quiet time 
at the same time every day because[,] even though it’s monotonous, it’s 
familiar and makes me feel calmer […] I sometimes go outside work for a walk 
at lunchtime during the summer months. I also go to the toilet and take a few 
minutes to do visualisation. If anything disrupts my routine e.g. a meeting 
[that] runs over my normal lunchtime[,] my anxiety increases greatly and I start 
to shake, my throat feels tight and I feel a need to escape. 
Within her working environment Gwen is able to manage her anxieties and limit her social 
interactions, but doing so is contingent upon numerous internal and external factors, 
including the fluctuating nature of her social anxiety and disruptions to her daily routine, 
that are not always within her control. Maggie expressed similar feelings about her job role 
and workplace culture that help to create and maintain a stable working environment: 
It’s a quiet working floor … people need quiet to think a bit more, whereas 
other floors are more chatty and busier. If you go up a level it’s much noisier, 
much chattier, that’s managers, data co-ordinators, they’re not doing an 
analysis on that floor. There’s a lot more analysis on this floor. It’s half-empty 
at the moment. It helps, you get a bit of familiarity [and] folk don’t sneak up 
behind you. It helps. 
Kirsty is in full-time employment, and, in attempting to negotiate her social anxiety in the 
workplace particular accommodations have been made that enable her to maintain 
employment but cause tensions to arise between colleagues: 
Kirsty: On a particularly bad day [at work] I might need to take a few ‘time-
outs’ over and above my breaks to sort of compose myself and gather my 
thoughts, usually when I’m on the brink of freaking out and I’m getting 
flustered. I’ll take a break. I try to put it off for as long as possible so people 
don’t think I’m skiving235 […] They probably think I’m taking the piss but 
sometimes I just need five minutes to reset, that’s all. 
Louise: Does that make it worse, that they might think that of you? 
K: Without a doubt. 
However, despite disclosing her social anxiety to her manager, who is ‘pretty 
 
235 Taking an undeserved break or avoidance of work duties. 
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understanding’, enabling workplace accommodations to be made, Kirsty still feels that she 
is under surveillance by her colleagues, increasing the social intensity of her job. Her 
experience highlights that employers making adjustments within the workplace does not 
necessarily create a culture of accommodation among colleagues236. In this light, 
workplace accommodations may be perceived as special treatment and delegitimised due 
to the relative invisibility of social anxiety (Richardson, 2005). Kirsty’s work colleagues 
are aware that specific accommodations have been made, but are unsure of the exact 
circumstances under which they have been granted. Dunstan and Maceachen (2014) 
explore the issue of ‘external validity’, through which certain accommodations may be 
resented, when there is a disjuncture between the visibility of the accommodation (i.e. 
‘time outs’) and the relative invisibility of the condition, such as, Kirsty’s social anxiety. 
Disclosure is a necessary step before requesting workplace accommodations but the 
decision to disclose/conceal their ‘hidden’ health condition may have a marked impact on 
their social relations or levels of functioning. Dyck and Jongbloed (2000) examining the 
workplace experiences of women with Multiple Sclerosis (MS), note that concealment of 
health conditions is easier if individuals are relatively free of supervision. For some, there 
is diminishing access to and status in the workplace in relation to disability (Imrie, 2001), 
chronic illness and returning to work after an injury (Crooks and Chouinard 2006). Carol 
(QR216) shifted from full-time employment to unemployment for a period of time and 
subsequently began re-gaining part-time employment: 
I was fired from a job […] because of social anxiety and stress237. Some co-
workers tended not to respect my work abilities. Soon after that, I applied for 
and started to receive disability [benefits]. Now, I work just a few hours a week 
because interacting for several hours with the intensity of doing my job and 
being with others is just too difficult. I am more successful when I work fewer 
hours and have some ability to make decisions about how much to work.  
Facey and Eakin (2010) discuss the contingent nature of work for people experiencing ill 
health. Contingent work here refers to part-time, casual, contract, temporary and self-
 
236 Colella (2001, p. 104) in an extensive assessment of co-worker attitudes towards workplace 
accommodations argues that ‘whether or not co-workers judge the distributive fairness of an 
accommodation depends on the salience and relevance of the accommodation’ to them. Accommodations 
made for disabilities that are ‘self-caused’, socially undesirable and/or psychological, like mental health 
problems, and therefore ‘unstable’, are more likely to be received negatively (see also: Richardson (2005, 
p. 38)for an account of sufferers of chronic pain who continuously need to legitimate their ‘invisible’ 
illness and defend themselves against allegations of ‘malingering’). 
237 Carol entered therapy after cancer treatment where she was diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (as a result of her cancer diagnosis and childhood experiences of illness) and social anxiety. 
Through therapy, she stated, the extent to which PTSD was impacting her life had ‘lessened’ but she still 
faces anxiety in many social situations causing extensive disruption to her everyday life. 
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employment forms of work that are often unstable and inconsistent. Wilton (2004) notes 
similar issues for people with disabilities where there may be ‘flexibility’ within the 
workplace but often no ‘accommodation’.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted the spatial contingencies of social anxiety. By engaging with 
spaces of home, work and education, I have shown how uncertainty and ambivalence 
emerge and the multiple ways these spaces may be renegotiated. The home is often 
considered a space to anchor, offering seemingly impenetrable protection from the outside 
world. The questionnaire responses met with these basic, potentially ‘un-thought’ 
assumptions of home as a safe space. What emerged in my subsequent conversations with 
participants is a more nuanced, ambivalent and often disruptive tale (Crooks, 2010). In the 
first instance, home operates as a space through which personal and material boundaries 
can be established, controlled and defended, yet seemingly unremarkable and everyday 
objects are symbolic of the ‘outside’ social world encroaching into one’s personal and 
physical space, as well as a failure of the home to maintain these boundaries between 
inside and outside. ‘Home-making’ often entails a continual practice of re-establishing 
bodily and home boundaries through routine and habitual practice – doing the ‘little things’ 
as Karen (IR) puts it. Crucially, it is often a space-within-the-home, usually a bedroom, 
that offers the individual the strongest sense of safety and security alluding to an ever-
shrinking set of geographies (Chapter 8). 
I then discuss the everyday reality of secondary, college and university education spaces, 
uncovering how people with social anxiety are affected with considerable barriers affecting 
access, attendance, grades, participation, attainment and overall student experience. 
General feelings of safety on campus are explore before considering education spaces as a 
crucial setting in which particular anxieties manifest, for example, interacting with those in 
a position of authority, answering out in class or the impact of particular pedagogical 
practices and learning environments, for example, group work, seminars and lecture 
theatres. Topham and Russell (2012, p. np) highlight that the ‘largely utilitarian model’ of 
university education has ‘contributed to an education culture where the ability to present 
oneself and one’s work for critical evaluation is regarded as necessary for academic and 
occupational success.’ This, arguably, warrants further investigation and would be a 
fruitful venture of critical study. Finally, building on the difficulties faced in 
academic/educational settings I examine how the workplace often becomes a key site of 
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contention: on the one hand; recognised for its role in process of recovery in providing 
routine and structure238 and promoting health and wellbeing; on the other, a place fraught 
with social interactions, performances and the potential for failure and embarrassment. 
Thus, considerations are often given to the hiring process, mobility, workplace culture, the 
timing, spacing and pacing of the work environment (Hansen and Philo, 2007), and 
colleague attitudes (particularly in relation to issues of disclosure) 
This chapter has laid the foundations for considering the next ‘layer’ of this geography of 
social anxiety. Therefore, Chapter 8 seeks to delve deeper into these contingencies, 
embedding them within a wider network of interpersonal, social and spatial relations. 
 
238 While acknowledging the role of significant events like gaining meaningful employment in the process of 
‘becoming well’, Duff (2016, p. 72) argues that it is the collection of everyday routines and interactions 
behind the scenes that ‘enable’ these larger milestones towards recovery to ‘transpire’. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 SPATIALITIES OF ANXIOUS EXPERIENCE II 
Social anxiety has made my world so much smaller (Anna, QR157) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim in this chapter is to deepen the accounts from ‘Spatialities I’ focusing on the 
relational and embodied encounters and reactions, and the micro-textures of these 
encounters that comprise anxious experiences. Participant’s’ social worlds uncover the 
complexity in, and limitations placed on, everyday social life. They also highlight the 
broader impact over a life-course as opportunities for encounter, both passing and 
sustained, become increasingly diminished. Significantly, participants expressed difficulty 
with numerous aspects of social life and relationships, inclusive of the proximal social 
interactions, bonds and support with family and friends as well as more distal interactions 
and encounters that comprise everyday life and spaces. Despite the importance of social 
encounters to psychosocial wellbeing and quality of life, few studies have examined how 
social anxieties shape social worlds239. I close this chapter by examining how individuals 
navigate (between) spaces (including those discussed in Chapter 7). I address 
(im)mobilities associated with public transport and walking. Of key consideration is how 
individual’s social geographies are disabled or become diminished to ‘predictable, 
purposeful trips, origins and destinations’ in the face of mobilities experienced as ‘a messy, 
unpredictable, diverse and changeable reality’ (Huxley, 1997, p. 2 cited in Imrie, 2000, p. 
1644). 
FRIENDSHIPS AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 
Friendships and family relations are significant social relationships that form the structure 
of our daily lives (Pahl, 2000). The strong interpersonal bonds integral to these relations 
 
239 Notable exceptions to this are studies in clinical fields. The research demonstrates the significant difficulty 
faced by individuals in various interpersonal spheres of life. For example, people are: more likely to have 
impaired interactions with significant others and strangers (Alden and Taylor 2004); less likely to engage 
in social interactions (Beidel et al. 1999); more likely to experience negative consequences in their closest 
relationships (Davila and Beck 2002); less likely to have intimate relationships (Dodge et al. 1987); less 
likely to have romantic relationships or marry (Hart et al. 1999); and have fewer close friendships or 
acquaintances (Whisman et al., 2000). 
 
 
 195 
are crucial for managing and maintaining physical and mental health by providing 
fundamental sources of emotional, instrumental and informational support (Andrews et al., 
2014; Kearns and Andrews, 2009; Tough et al., 2017). The vast majority of respondents 
note a substantial decline in the quality of interpersonal relations with both family and 
friends. Participants note that the disintegration of social relations occurs ‘over time’, 
‘gradually’ and ‘to the point where I faded away [from social life]’ (QR06, Claire [QR16], 
QR87). Four interrelated themes were identified that capture the processes involved in 
participants diminishing or changing social relationships: difficulty and uncertainty, 
opportunities available for social contact and the emotional work involved in sustaining 
relationships. 
DIFFICULTY AND UNCERTAINTY 
The progression of social anxiety is associated with increased socio-spatial isolation as 
patterns of social interaction change and use of public space is encountered with great 
difficulty or avoided completely (Dyck 1995). Smart et al. (2012, p. 99) explore some of 
the difficult dimensions of negotiating friendships, arguing that while they may provide a 
sense of ontological security through mutually supportive and beneficial interactions and a 
strengthening of self and collective identity, they can also be ‘ontologically unsettling’: 
Relationships with family and friends have taken a big hit over the last few 
years. I’ve slowly withdrawn as social things became increasingly difficult. I 
have no friends, I slowly pushed them away [by] rearranging [plans] and not 
turning up – I didn’t want to burden them with my problems. I was constantly 
making excuses. The longer I didn’t see them the more anxious I was. I was 
afraid of losing them. I felt incredibly guilty and undeserving, I wasn’t being a 
good or a true friend, that I was avoiding them, but I was even more afraid of 
being judged by them and of going outside and being surrounded by people I 
didn’t know. (Leanne, QR144) 
Social relations are deeply entangled with the ‘self’ thus, the physical and emotional need 
to distance oneself from the objects of anxiety that completely undermine any sense of self 
is complex. Leanne’s (QR144) gradual disengagement from social life is implemented as a 
self-protective strategy. Crucially, this is also entangled with her ‘moral worth and ethical 
standing’ (Smart et al., 2012, p. 107), one in which she believes she is ‘undeserving’ of her 
friendships. Smart et al. (2012) view friendship as the mirror through which we face 
ourselves but, for those highly sensitive to such interpersonal dynamics, the difficulties 
inherent in social relations are that they provide a painfully close channel for unearthing 
the precariousness of the self.  
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FEWER OPPORTUNITIES 
Due to the difficulties and uncertainties faced by participants in their relationships with 
family and friends, there are fewer opportunities for social contact. This contributes greatly 
to participant’s experiences of loneliness and isolation: 
As my social anxiety got worse, I started to get more insular. The more intense 
it got over a longer period of time I started to feel very lonely and isolated. 
Before, I would avoid going to the shops or getting the bus during rush hour 
because there was too many people but the longer it went on the more it started 
to affect work and close relationships and friendships […] so my social life 
has, well, I don’t really have one (Anna, QR157). 
This gradual retreat is enacted as a self-protective strategy to mitigate anxiety and distress. 
Horney notes (1937, p. 138) ‘[a]ny protective device may have, in addition to its reassuring 
quality, the quality of creating new anxiety […] The formation of vicious circles, with all 
their implications, is the main reason why severe neuroses240 are bound to become worse, 
even though there is no change in external conditions’. 
Gillian is frustrated that she is missing opportunities for bonding and social activities with 
close friends and, as a result, feels isolated. However, she also recognises the locations and 
frequency of social contact are unmanageable for her: 
I’m fortunate enough to have a few close friends who I now see occasionally 
but I often feel left out. They are a much closer group and have been on 
holiday and go out regularly together, go for lunch and things like that, all 
things I feel I’ve really missed out on. Even though I’d love to go out with 
them I can’t bring myself to meet up with them 2-3 times a week like they do. 
It’s far too much for me. It’s really overwhelming to be in a bar or a cafe, 
there’s so many things involved and too much to consider going to places like 
that ... or just going out, really.’ (Gillian, QR215) 
Gillian’s experience is emblematic of the gradual restrictions placed on socio-spatial life as 
certain interactions and spaces become out of bounds. Her experience of missing out leave 
her feeling excluded and detached from the main group, creating, in turn, fewer 
opportunities for social interaction. 
EMOTIONAL WORK 
Participants describe the emotional cost of social interaction, as ‘exhausting and a constant 
 
240 Note on language used needed. 
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battle’ (QR59), ‘debilitating’ (QR191, QR194) and ‘overwhelming’ (QR194). Several 
respondents commented that not only was there a societal stigma surrounding mental 
health but people close to them were frequently questioning why they could not ‘snap out 
of it’ for the sake of children or their job. A person’s struggle to ‘get well’ (Karen, IR) led 
to further questions about how much someone wants to get well, particularly when they 
engage in destructive behaviours, miss or avoid doctor’s appointments or relapse. While 
crucial sources of emotional aid, developing new and maintaining existing social 
relationships requires considerable amounts of emotional work (Bilecen, 2014). However, 
simply interacting with other people can have a negative impact on an individual’s 
wellbeing. Marta (QR33) explains: 
I’m constantly on edge whenever I leave my home. […] Every time I interact 
with someone. I’m constantly conscious of how I look, where my hands are, 
whether I’m making enough/too much eye contact, what they’re thinking of 
me, if my voice is shaking, if they can tell I’m nervous, if I’m going to make a 
fool of myself and how I’m supposed to pluck up the courage to ask or say 
what I need to [say]. It is completely and utterly draining. 
These transient and seemingly insignificant micro-interactions result in a state akin to an 
interpersonal ‘burnout’. Burnout, most commonly associated with occupational stress, is 
characterised by emotional, mental or physical exhaustion that ‘originates from 
emotionally demanding interpersonal relationships’ with others (Maslach, 1993): 
Since [school], I’ve had no friends at all. I’ve never attempted to make any, 
because I simply don’t know how to, and even if I did, I don’t know what it’s 
like to have a friend, like how to behave. I feel the pressures of having a friend 
[would be that] I would have to go out regularly and interact with [them]. It is 
not worth the effort. (Marta QR33) 
Marta highlights her deep-set belief that she is incapable of making friends and lacks the 
necessary social skills to interact with other people. Equally, she attributes the absence of 
interpersonal relationships with negative aspects of the self. She expresses a deep sense of 
shame241 and perceives the lack of close social bonds to be a personal failure: 
I thought my inability to function properly in social situations was just because 
I was broken somehow or plain pathetic and I had no friends or social life 
because I was a horrible person. (Marta QR33) 
 
 241 When asked to consider how her social anxiety affects her day-to-day life, QR138 states she spends most 
of her time ‘avoiding people, even friends, [and] alienating myself [from them] as I feel such toxic shame’ 
(QR138). The paralysing capacity of shame is entrenched in an inherent sense of self-worthlessness. The 
emotional and affective states provoked by ‘toxic shame’ have a significant impact on health, illness and 
health-related behaviours (Dolezal and Lyons 2017) (Chapter 7). 
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Rokach (2004) highlights how feelings of social inadequacy and self-criticism in 
pregnancy and motherhood are not only distressing but profoundly isolating. Similar 
reflections are discussed in relation to first-time mothers who, because of inadequate social 
support, coupled with reduced social interactions and exacerbated by feelings of 
vulnerability, experience motherhood as deeply isolating and lonely (Lee et al. 2017). 
LONELINESS AND SOCIAL ISOLATION 
It is unsurprising given the nature of social anxiety that the themes of loneliness and 
isolation emerged with such prominence. What is striking is the pervasive and enduring 
nature that ‘feel[ing] lonely’ or ‘being alone’ (QR38) has on the social and emotional lives 
of people with social anxiety. The majority of conceptual and theoretical work around 
loneliness has been conducted in nursing studies (Donaldson and Watson, 1996; Kileen, 
1998; Rosedale, 2007; Victor et al., 2000) focusing primarily on the elderly. Physical and 
mental health can cause loneliness but can also be exacerbated by it. Chronic and long-
term loneliness is associated with increased mortality rates (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2015), and 
has similar consequences on health as smoking, obesity and sedentary lifestyles (House et 
al., 1988). 
Yet, loneliness has become something of an academic ‘blind spot’ in human geography 
where the impact of loneliness on mental health and wellbeing is an often over-looked 
component. Franklin (2009, p. 343) suggests society is experiencing ‘a disturbing epidemic 
of loneliness’ making the relative absence of research on loneliness over a life course even 
more striking. Weiss (1973) developed two distinct forms of loneliness: emotional 
loneliness and social loneliness. The former describes the lack or loss of intimate social 
relations with family, friends or a partner. The latter is associated with the absence of a 
wider social network or system of support. The following addresses a relational 
perspective, taking into consideration the interplay of emotional and social forces that 
create and sustain experiences of loneliness. 
The pervasive nature of loneliness and social isolation is evident through the questionnaire 
and interview responses. In the questionnaires, there are 21 references to being alone, 
feeling lonely and loneliness and 46 references to feeling isolated, isolating and isolation. 
In some cases, these are single-word responses to questions; for example, Can you 
describe what it is like to live with Social Anxiety Disorder? ‘Isolating’ (QR49) and 
‘Lonely.’ (QR90). Responses, such as these, while not detailed often capture the emotional 
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consequences endured by a feeling of disconnection and detachment from social life242. 
QR197 expands on her feelings of loneliness: 
I am extremely lonely all of the time. Being too afraid to leave the house 
resulted in me losing all of my friends at one point in time as [I] often face 
problems when going out and trying to get in contact [with them] I become 
extremely agitated and nervous. This can lead to me avoiding contact 
altogether for long periods of time and becoming even more isolated. 
The social dimensions of loneliness and isolation are associated with a lack of meaningful 
social connections and wider networks of support. However, a number of structural 
barriers can exacerbate these conditions (Olfson et al., 2000) including, stigmatising 
attitudes to mental health and low professional and public recognition (NICE 2013). Social 
anxiety is dramatically mis-recognised, under-recognised and under treated in healthcare 
settings leading many individuals to turn to self-diagnosis (Katzelnick and Greist, 2001) 
(Chapter 6). Simon (QR211) recounts his experience with the healthcare system: 
From my earliest days at school, I was seen as ‘different’ and isolated, despite 
the school’s insistence that I see a number of child psychologists, none were 
able to offer anything by way of help […] I was denied access to the NHS 
completely [and] I remained isolated for most of my life. After the death of 
[my parents], I moved to the Midlands, where I became even more isolated 
than in the past. I joined a [support] group. It took many years to change my 
experience with social anxiety […] but at times it seems that I hadn’t made 
enough changes to be accepted and despite everyone knowing why I was 
‘weird’, I was told that I wasn’t welcome at the meet-ups243. I thought about 
taking my life several times, I felt alone, isolated, hopeless—I saw no point in 
my existence. 
Loneliness is one of the most frequently reported challenges of major life events such as 
bereavement (Utz et al., 2014) or moving to a new city (Sawir et al., 2008). Frie (2017, p. 
n.p) suggests experiences of ‘loneliness may reflect the emotional dynamic of a person’s 
inner life or be a response to the loss of relatedness and a hostile social environment’. 
Simon’s painful emotional and social loneliness is compounded by structural barriers that 
exclude him further from social and civic life including: significant failures by healthcare 
 
242 Single word responses are powerful, however, they highlight a significant weakness in the questionnaire 
method (Chapter 4). Due to the way the questionnaire was implemented, i.e. anonymously and online, I 
was unable to seek clarification or expansion on answers unless participants self-selected to participate in 
follow up interviews. Conversely, the questionnaire was a lucrative method for researching sensitive 
topics relating to individual’s mental health that are still taboo and stigmatising. The online nature assured 
anonymity and a medium of interaction that people were more comfortable with (i.e. non face-to-face and 
written responses). These conditions ensured more, seemingly open and honest, accounts of experience 
evident in the extremely detailed accounts shared through the questionnaire. 
243An informal meeting or gathering around a collective cause. 
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professionals to provide information or a diagnosis, a stringent lack of mental health 
support services and stigmatising attitudes within the community. Despite finding local 
user-led support groups, Eric was too ‘weird’ and too ‘different’ to participate in straddling 
the contested boundary between ‘normal’ behaviour and social ‘deviance’ (Busfield, 
1996). This experience echoes Parr’s (2000) assessment of mental health drop-in centres, 
in which more or less acceptable ways of being are ‘constructed and maintained’ through 
the licensing of ‘certain behaviours and emotions’. 
I never had any gay friends growing up, I was far too anxious to socialise and 
meet people in those circles (or anyone). I don’t really have anyone to reach 
out to that could help me. I don’t want to be lonely, I don’t want to be single 
but I feel so uncomfortable and like I don’t belong in LGBT communities or 
spaces. And now that I’m at a point in my life where I would like to try and 
improve, I can’t (David, QR08) 
David was only one of two participants who spoke explicitly about their sexuality244.  
THIRD PLACES 
Throughout the questionnaires and interviews, participants reflect on their feelings of 
safety in specified sites and settings across public space particularly those that support 
daily routines and wider social and civic life (Figure 15). Participants also expand on their 
experiences with specific reference to other sites of socialising and enjoyment including, 
but not limited to, cinemas, theatres, cafes, lunch halls, libraries, gyms, social groups and 
museums. Informal gatherings and shared spaces, which Jeffres et al. (2009, p. 334) refer 
to as ‘third places’ operate as ‘unique public spaces of social interaction providing context 
for sociability, spontaneity, community building and emotional expressiveness’ beyond the 
home (the first place) and work (the second place) (Oldenburg, 1998).  
 
244 Despite 22% of participants (n = 27) identifying as LGBTQ+ on the online questionnaire, only David and 
Olivia made specific reference to LGBTQ+ identities and only Olivia, who identifies as bisexual, opted to 
participate in a follow up interview. Olivia only mentioned her sexuality in the context of her romantic 
relationships but made no explicit reference between her sexuality and mental health. The LGBTQ+ 
community experience higher levels of anxiety and depression overall but it was not a focus of this 
research to explore LGBTQ+ mental health and wellbeing issues, which arguably requires sensitive and 
focused attention. One participant who identified as transgender started, but did not complete, the online 
questionnaire.  
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Figure 15: Comparison: Feelings of Safety in Public Spaces 
There has been a sustained focus on the significance of third places in promoting and 
maintaining health and wellbeing in geographical (Butterfield and Martin, 2016) and 
public health research (Baum and Palmer, 2002) as spaces that help to foster interpersonal 
relationships and promote a sense of self, community and connection. The therapeutic 
qualities of third places facilitate health, healing and restoration as places that ‘remedy or 
prevent emotional loneliness, not just through companionship, but more importantly 
through personal and emotional support’ (Glover and Parry, 2009, p. 104). Furthermore, 
these places, situated on peoples’ everyday maps offer a temporary escape from the 
stressors of everyday life that can provide a sense of emotional relief and regulation. 
Overwhelmingly, participants express difficulty in developing and maintaining social 
bonds and interpersonal relationships with friends and family. The following reflects, not 
only, the magnitude of social and public spaces that people with social anxiety deem ‘out 
of bounds’, but the specificities of individual experience that render certain interactions 
and performances associated with these spaces as inherently distressing.  
Practices of shopping, purchasing items, engaging with supermarket workers and shopping 
centre/supermarket spaces all presented as considerable sources of anxiety for participants 
(Figure 16). Feminist geographers have paid considerable attention to the associations 
between women’s fear and experiences of panic in the context of consumer spaces 
(Bankey, 1999; Bondi and Davidson, 2003; Davidson, 2001, 2000b) to uncover how 
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spaces with no discernible danger present a considerable loss of control to bodily and 
spatial boundaries (Davidson 2000). 
CONSUMER SPACES 
 
Figure 16: Feelings of Safety in Shopping Centre 
They have continued to highlight how consumer spaces are very much part of women’s 
spatial experience as women identify themselves with particular products and patterns of 
consumption. Davidson (2001, p. np) argues that consumer spaces present ‘grave dangers’ 
for agoraphobic women as they enter a ‘feminised’ space, which constructs ‘feminised’ 
identities, or more accurately ‘ideals’, which they are expected to assume through 
consumption. Yet, similar to accounts of social anxiety, women became intimately aware 
of ‘our-selves’, critically so. Consumer spaces, whether shopping malls or supermarkets, 
are inherently contradictory as ‘marketing strategies often make extensive use of ideas 
about gender, simultaneously addressing women as consumers and objectifying women’s 
bodies’ (Bondi and Davidson 2008). 
Hickinbottom-Brawn (2013, p. 737) suggests that consumer culture and the psy-disciplines 
have enabled social phobias and anxieties to flourish by ‘shap[ing] self-understandings and 
promot[ing] regulative ideals for living.’ Hickinbottom-Brawn (2013) uncovers a much 
wider socio-cultural progression of social anxiety in the era of ‘neoliberal enterprise 
culture’ where personal value is shaped and defined by patterns of consumption. Arguing 
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that, ‘shame-based advertising, aimed to heighten awareness of offensive aspects of self’ 
(2013, p. 727) guides consumers towards consumption that leaves no room for unhappiness 
or psychological and emotional distress. In a similar vein, Jackson and Everts (2010) 
approach social anxiety as a ‘social condition’ as opposed to an individual experience, 
exploring how everyday practices of consumption are disrupted in the context of food-
related anxieties. Crucially, they highlight how anxiety manifests through practice, in 
decisions to consume (or not consume) for example, particular food products. The central 
concern raised by Jackson and Everts (2010, p. 2802) is that ‘some of the very practices 
that constitute our everyday lives [are the ones] whose disruption further entrenches those 
anxieties.’ 
Bondi and Davidson (2008, p. 22) report similar experiences by women living with 
agoraphobia where intensely gendered consumer spaces, conveying messages of self-
improvement, ‘stir up troubling emotions and associations for many women’. This 
gendering of space is also evident in experiences of social anxiety as consumer spaces, 
including supermarkets, shopping centres and retail stores, which are strongly associated 
with negative judgements, and episodes of panic and are spaces in which respondents are 
‘overwhelmed by choice, [a feeling of] not being able to escape’ (Anna, QR157) and a 
‘pressure to buy things’ (QR10). Supermarkets can be extremely overwhelming and 
disorientating, with Davidson (2000, p. 31) highlighting the ‘disturbing architecture’ of 
mall spaces. She states that ‘[t]hey are assemblages of numerous and overlaid attempts at 
sensory stimulation which can render the atmosphere excruciatingly intense’: 
 
[My] anxiety peaks in the supermarket (or at the thought of going to the shops). 
It takes weeks for me to build up the courage to go and I’m forced when I’m 
basically running out of food. High ceilings and horrible lighting, I feel 
claustrophobic and get a kind of tunnel vision all at the same time, it’s so 
disorientating. (Claire, QR16) 
I cannot stand being in the supermarket, I cannot stand people being near me 
and find it really hard to cope when it’s busy. I’ll never shop at the weekends 
and will sometimes go out to do a shop at 11 or 12 at night to avoid the crowds. 
(Kerrie, QR22) 
While neither male nor female respondents report feeling ‘very safe’ in shopping centres, 
as a percentage of total respondents only 2.4% of female respondents report feeling ‘safe’ 
compared to 20.5% of male respondents. Equally, participants who discussed anxieties in 
consumer spaces in the online questionnaire and interviews were predominantly female. 
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Karen’s experience is particularly salient in demonstrating how her perceptions of, and 
relationship with, shopping and consumer spaces have changed as her social anxiety 
progressed: 
Before this [anxiety] I was just a normal person who did my own shopping 
every week, took my kids out, paid my own bills, I socialised – I was really 
sociable – with friends, we’d go to town once a month, shop, have lunch. Now, 
the thought of doing any of those things terrifies me … having a panic attack in 
the middle of the shopping centre with people staring at me when I’m freaking 
out and screaming get me out of here! If [the children] need anything – pants, 
socks, new trainers – their Nanny245 takes them ‘cause I can’t do any of that 
anymore (Karen, IR) 
Habit and routines embedded in everyday life help to foster and sustain social relations 
with family and friends as well as shaping identity. Davidson (2000, p. 36) notes the 
difficulty faced by women with agoraphobia entering these ‘feminised sphere[s]’ of life 
highlighting they ‘can neither ‘do’ the shopping (for necessities) or ‘go’ shopping (for 
pleasure, or contact with friends)’. Karen’s routines of shopping and her perceptions of 
herself as ‘normal’ and ‘sociable’ are mutually reinforcing. Later in the interview, she 
expresses a deep sense of failure about not being able to provide adequately for her 
children and her dependence on her mother, who is now her career. She reflects fondly on 
‘the old me’ and, although she ‘cannot understand how [she] got to this point’, her 
anxieties have had a life-altering effect. The panic that Karen experiences in the shopping 
centre now is far removed from the enjoyable, sociable or even mundane associations that 
existed prior to the onset of her social anxiety. The annihilation of this once active sphere 
of life demonstrates not only how anxiety ‘disrupts the flow’ of social and spatial life 
(Jackson and Everts, 2010, p. 2802) but has a significant impact on how she views herself 
as a parent, friend and daughter. 
Winnicott (1971) argues that experience is shaped in ‘potential space’, akin to a ‘third 
space’, where the inner psychical and emotional realities of the individual and their 
external worlds intertwine. Zimmerman (1999), drawing on Winnicottian psychoanalysis, 
views public and civic space as a ‘potential space’. Highly organised and privatised 
consumer spaces, carefully curated as public spaces, provide a platform for entertainment 
and socialising that enable the individual to ‘grow in value and self-regard’ allowing ‘the 
(false) self to blossom as consumer’ (Zimmerman, 1999, p. 570). Echoing Hickinbottom-
Brawn (2013), consumer culture is largely concerned with the building or expanding of 
 
245Grandmother. 
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identities enabling the creation and presentation of a new and improved ‘self’ to the world. 
Yet, for both Emma (QR18) and Priya (QR142), these spaces, where self and social 
identities must blend seamlessly with socially accepted norms and expectations, embody a 
sense of uncertainty, insecurity and anticipation: 
Supermarkets, shops [and] shopping centres, more than any other place[s], 
bring out the worst of my anxiety. I get embarrassed about what I buy and 
anxious that I’ll be judged for my food choices. I won’t buy something if I 
think it makes me look unhealthy or greedy. [It is] all made worse by waiting in 
line to pay and [the] attempts at small talk by the person at the checkout […] 
(Emma, QR18) 
I will not go to places where there will be lots of people—e.g. I avoid going 
into a shop I previously wanted to go in if I see there is a long queue or it is 
busy. I rarely buy things I want in front of friends or parents and have to 
arrange either to get them alone or order them off the internet so I don’t have to 
experience the fear of them watching me and possibly negatively judging me. I 
won’t wear new clothes or t-shirts with words on them for fear of 
embarrassment. (Priya, QR142) 
What is clear is that respondents perceive consumer spaces to have the potential for 
negative attention. Indeed, these encounters make individuals feel noticed and ‘marked’ 
fuelling feelings of self-consciousness and fear of judgment from other people. This is 
evident in anxieties that others will view her as ‘unhealthy’ or ‘greedy’ through her 
shopping habits and Jo’s fear that her personal choices will invite possible scrutiny from 
strangers as well as family and/or friends. Southgate (2016, p. 246) argues that the ability 
to negotiate potential space ‘requires the capacity to tolerate its inherent ambiguity’. Yet, it 
is precisely at this meeting point, between our inner and outer worlds, where anxieties 
emanate from, a place where social expectations, interactions and daily processes collide 
with an intense awareness of ‘I’ and a questioning of self. 
ANXIOUS (IM)MOBILITIES 
By exploring anxious ‘(im)mobilities’ through use of public transport systems and 
walking, I do not intend to reinforce the binary that equates mobility with activity and 
immobility with passivity (Adey 2017). Instead, by focussing on the relational 
contingencies between mobility and immobility I aim demonstrate how travelling between 
destinations is often fraught with difficulty and tension for those who experience social 
space as extremely invasive and complex. In order to contextualise this complexity, it is 
crucial to recognise the personal difficulties that these people face in negotiating transit 
spaces in their everyday routines by unpacking the affective, embodied and relational 
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dimensions of ‘journeying’, while also highlighting the steps taken to mitigate anxieties 
and routine disruption. There are multiple factors that shape and influence the journey, 
including crowded conditions, unfamiliar routes, transfer requirements and uncertain 
interactions, as well as the cognitive and physical aspects of people’s social anxieties. 
Therefore, it is important to consider how the everyday experiences of travelling by public 
transport with proximate others unfolds and the wider implications for an individual’s daily 
and longer-term social geographies. 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
 
Figure 17: Feelings of Safety on Public Transport 
Travelling by public transport is highlighted in the online questionnaire as a situation 
provoking intense social anxieties for participants. Bissell (2010b, p. 277) notes ‘that [the] 
experience of being with others in spaces of public transport’ is particularly ‘uncongenial’, 
as passengers are gripped by a sense of ‘unease’ and ‘foreboding’. Indeed, in an 
increasingly urbanised and busy world, the daily commute is rarely enjoyable for most 
people, as everyday frustrations, irritations and anxieties erupt. While these spaces are felt 
by some respondents to be so unsafe that they ‘avoid public transport almost completely’ 
(Anna, QR157), for others it is an unavoidable yet deeply disruptive component of 
everyday life. The spatial confines of transport spaces arguably mark a near-unique space 
in the public realm, one where people are often confined in an enclosed space in close 
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proximity to unknown others for considerable periods of time246. As Kim (IR40) explains, 
‘I feel very claustrophobic and panicky being in a small space with a lot of people, so the 
idea of being stuck on a crowded bus or train gives me the absolute fear.’ While being 
‘stuck’ is a temporary state between stops, locating spaces of safety is inherently difficult 
while ‘in transit’, resulting in an urgent need to escape which, for practical and safety 
reasons, is impossible. Cara (QR78) writes, ‘there’s times where I’ve asked the driver to 
stop the bus to let me off [between stops] but they can’t, so I just try to get a grip of myself 
and calm down.’ Others, recognising this temporary confinement, state, ‘once I’m on, I 
know I need to ride it out … so to speak’ (Ben, IR32). 
de Certeau (1984, p. 111) describes the conditions of public transportation as a ‘travelling 
incarceration […] A bubble of panoptic and classifying power, a module of imprisonment’, 
in which the movements of passengers are simultaneously mobilised and confined. 
Merriman (2016, p. 250) notes that the ‘freedoms, choices and comforts’ of the average 
passenger are ‘far removed from the experiences of those whose mobilities are enforced or 
severely constrained’, such as transported prisoners and trafficked migrants. Yet he goes 
on to argue that there are interesting ‘parallels between the ordinary and everyday 
incarcerations experienced by passengers on public transport systems and the discourses 
surrounding the ordering and incarceration of dangerous, deviant and vulnerable bodies.’ 
Travel by public transport is indeed a deceptively difficult task for those who perceive and 
experience social space as invasive and threatening. A ‘panoptic bubble’ is created in the 
confines of the bus, one in which individuals perceive themselves to be more visible, thus 
more susceptible to potential judgement and scrutiny by others. Where de Certeau’s (1984, 
pp. 111–113) mobile panopticon refers to how passengers are ‘pigeonholed, numbered and 
regulated […] by the grid-work of technocratic disciple’, in this moment, socially anxious 
passengers may be simultaneously fearful of standing out from the crowd and being 
consumed by it. 
Mia (QR119) provides an account of the internal conflicts and external tensions that arise 
while travelling by public transport, demonstrating how space and its associated mobilities, 
often perceived as ‘banal’ (Binnie et al., 2007), quickly become intolerably distressing: 
I hate having to buy a ticket […] counting out the fare and my brain scrambles 
 
 246 Other confined spaces of significance are elevators. Ben writes, ‘I can’t go into lifts. Being with other 
people in such a confined space is my worst nightmare, ‘all eyes on me’ type of thing, they could 
probably feel me shaking if it was cramped enough, I’d sweat profusely, my face would be beetroot, 
palpitations, the lot.’ 
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because there’s a huge queue behind me and the bus driver is waiting [and] 
everyone is watching as I get on. Then, if someone [is] sitting next to me or it’s 
packed, it gets too hot, I feel trapped to the point I can’t even say ‘excuse me’ 
to get off and then [I] miss my stop. I have a bad reaction to small, closed in, 
packed spaces. I start to sweat [and] panic and then I feel sick and I don’t travel 
well anyway, so I’d usually start feeling really sick [...] Not knowing where to 
get off, having to stand up while the bus is moving, what if I fall? Am I going 
to panic with all these people are watching me? It’s not even worth the hassle. 
Beyond a ‘mere transition zone’ (Hulme and Truch, 2006, p. 47) between origin and 
destination the bus journey is a loaded time-space environment. There are a series of 
overlapping social, spatial and affective dimensions that result in Mia’s reluctance to travel 
by bus, starting with the face-to-face interaction and social performance involved in the 
strikingly ordinary task of purchasing a ticket. There is an implicit pressure to board 
quickly and efficiently, prompting her sense of becoming the focus of others’ attention. 
Bissell (2007, p. 285) argues that ‘there is a tendency to be quite unaware of one’s body’ 
while journeying ‘where the body remains passive and acquiescent’247, but said ‘passivity’ 
is arguably far removed from Mia’s experience of journeying, which not only mobilises 
very particular anxieties about being in close proximity to other people but, also entails 
distressing corporeal awareness of the resulting bodily manifestations of those anxieties. 
Furthermore, the very conditions of travel indicate the ways in which bodies are open and 
responsive to our immediate socio-spatial surrounding. Take the shrinking of available 
space: this particularly salient component produces an atmospheric shift that ‘registers in 
and through sensing bodies’ (McCormack 2003, p. 413). This shrinking, coupled with a 
felt increase in temperature, presses upon the body, giving rise to bodily sensations of 
sweat or panic through which a heightened sense of bodily awareness and the self-in-space 
emerges. In addition, fleeting interactions, in the form of a mumbled ‘excuse me’, are rife 
with anxieties that are further exacerbated by the anticipation of ‘embarrassing’ events – a 
stumble, a flush of panic – that will mark her presence in public space all the more visible. 
Mia finds herself incapacitated by anxieties that register viscerally, rendering her body and 
its meeting with the surrounding environment completely out-with her control. She 
subsequently states that she will often ‘walk for 40 minutes instead of taking a 10 minute 
bus ride’, highlighting the exhausting and time-consuming measures that are put into 
practice in order to mitigate the effects of such anxieties. 
 
247 Overall, Bissell’s (2007, p. 282) aim is to draw attention to the complexity of mobilities by challenging the 
assumed passivity of journeying and/through the event of ‘waiting’, not as a period of inert inactivity but 
as an intensely corporeal experience, one that presses upon the self, instilling a ‘sense of anticipatory 
preparedness’ (see also: Anderson 2010). 
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Transport spaces become a contained microcosm of wider public space, serving to 
heighten already existing anxieties. People feel ‘out of place’ and attune to their anticipated 
and perceived transgressions from socially and culturally constructed ‘norms’. Social 
codes and rituals serve to increase people’s anxieties about ‘disturbing’ others, anxieties 
that are somewhat magnified in enclosed spaces. Callum (IR189), who marked public 
transport as ‘very unsafe’ in the online questionnaire, refers to the public transport ‘code of 
conduct’ and how this further complicates journeys: 
In general, it’s just a painful experience. There’s so many rules about what you 
should or shouldn’t do; the ‘code of conduct’ of the bus or whatever. I 
constantly think about whether I’m invading someone’s personal space like, if 
there’s no spare seats and [I] need to sit next to someone, I’m on the edge of 
my seat248 so I’m not touching them or too close [to them]. Also, I don’t want 
the person sitting next to me feeling offended by [me] (probably blatantly) 
distancing myself from them. 
Maintaining a relative distance from the people around him is important for Callum to 
ensure that he is not encroaching into other people’s personal space (as opposed to other 
people violating his personal space). Goffman ascribes the term ‘civil inattention’ to the 
socially constructed rituals of social space that encapsulate how individuals maintain a 
veneer of privacy by actively disengaging from one another. This ritual addresses the 
transient and fleeting nature of encounters with others as people acknowledge each other’s 
presence through a glance or a faint smile, but then retreat. While Goffman’s focus in these 
types of encounter is specular, Callum’s concern is also one of proximity and whether he is 
seen to create too much distance between him and his co-commuters at the risk of 
appearing rude or causing offence. This distance, what Goffman terms ‘aversion’, is a 
violation of civil inattention, where the individual is considered to be undeserving of even 
the most minimal acknowledgement. Arguably, Callum and others avoid such minimal 
acknowledgements as an act of self-preservation in the face of a debilitating sense of self-
consciousness, rather than as an outright rejection of the other person. Goffman conceives 
the regulation of social encounters as a routine social norm ingrained into the practice of 
everyday life; but Giddens (1987, p. 123) argues that the practice ‘demands a chronic 
attention to detail’ – an understanding that resonates more clearly with the experiences of 
people with social anxiety. In fact, the experience of commuting for most participants is 
only habitual in the sense that it occurs regularly, and most experience journeys with great 
 
248 Grant clarifies his use of ‘on the edge of my seat’ as both literal and metaphorical: ‘Haha! Yes! Literally 
sitting as far away from the person next to me as I possibly can. Metaphorically, skin crawling, wanting to 
run away. Ready to crack!’ 
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trepidation and unease. As a result, people engage in significant amounts of planning, and 
Mia (IR119) explains the mind-set of being able to ‘ride out’ her journeys (mentioned 
above) by referring to the laborious planning engaged in beforehand: 
It takes a lot for me to get on in the first place, hours of planning and thinking 
things through, running through all the scenarios in my head, checking the 
route, how many stops before I get off and just knowing that it’s going to be a 
really uncomfortable and stressful thing. It’s a pure nightmare, I find the whole 
thing really overwhelming and stressful, but I got myself there. 
Up until relatively recently249, Nina (IR) did not use public transport at all and would take 
the more expensive option of travelling by taxi. Now she uses the bus, however, like Sam, 
she goes to great lengths to limit any uncertainty associated with her journey: 
 [I]f I have to travel, because my job involves having to visit people, I plan the 
routes really, really carefully and make sure I’ve got access to maps and 
Google and I know where the bus goes from and where it stops and all that, 
and how long it’s going to take me to get there […]. If, which happens quite 
frequently, if public transports doesn’t turn up or is late [after] the extent I go 
to plan as rigorously as I do […] It happened the other week; it’s just a 
nightmare. 
Spaces of public transport are frequently described as non-social environments, although 
they, like other public spaces of encounter, are primed for ‘potentially integrative events’ 
(Laurier and Philo, 2006, p. 199). Conversational interactions appear to be uncommon, as 
participants rarely mentioned explicit instances where they encountered a problematic 
conversation with other passengers. With the exception of necessary social interactions 
with a driver or the pleasantries involved in negotiating crowded spaces, which are by no 
means insignificant (as is evident in Mia’s narrative above), the interactions on public 
transport are relatively ‘uneventful’. 
As Bissell (2010b, p. 271) notes that, a tension ‘exists between the isolation of travelling 
unaccompanied […] within a collective of other passengers.’ This collective dwelling 
disrupts expectations of rights to privacy in public (Laurier and Philo 2006) and the 
‘proxemic’ rules that dictate how people perceive and organise their social and personal 
space. In an act of self-preservation, passengers attempt to extend the boundaries of 
 
249 Nina previous role as a substitute teacher was temporary and sporadic leading to a lot of job and income 
insecurity. She said that these working conditions, as well as voluntary work on a rape-crisis phone line, 
had a marked impact on her mental health. She quit both when her social anxiety was ‘critical’ leaving her 
relatively housebound. She has recently gained part-time employment as a ‘Befriender’ for a local charity 
where she feels both secure and supported in her role. 
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personal space, creating what Goffman (1971) terms ‘territories of the self’. Where 
creating physical distance is difficult, individuals seek socially and emotionally to 
disconnect from people around them: 
I use Google Maps and sort of follow my journey ‘live’ so I tune out and 
concentrate on my phone. It helps with a fear of getting lost or being stranded 
somewhere […] I always wear headphones, people aren’t likely to start any 
small talk with [me when I’ve got] headphones on and [I’m] zoned out, 
minding my own business type of thing. [The headphones] help to block 
everything out so I can just focus on my phone. 
Passengers habitually fatigued and frustrated by the daily commute strive to be socially 
inaccessible, actively choosing seats in an empty row and using mobile technologies to 
disconnect from their surrounding environments. When there is such a pervasive feeling of 
uncertainty about journeying as described by Craig (and Nina, above), the use of ‘real-
time’ technology such as ‘Google Maps’ enables him to monitor the progress of the 
journey and to pinpoint his exact location on the map, particularly in unfamiliar territory. 
Sound (and the ‘awkward silences’) on public transport are implicit here in producing a 
heightened awareness that permeates individual experience, and so many participants often 
use headphones to dull the sensory experience of public space, creating a protective 
boundary as well as ‘marking’ the body as out of bounds (but not ‘out of place’). 
(Davidson, 2003, p. 120) has compared such tools to Goffman’s (1971) ‘shields’ and 
‘stalls’, employed as a normal yet ‘deliberate defence against social engagement’. 
Although planning is an exhausting and time-consuming practice, part of this preparation 
is about being able to mitigate the effects of unexpected interactions and events. Equally, 
people remain responsive to their surrounding environments and make last minute changes 
in order ‘to sit on a quiet bus, rather than change tubes and battle through busy stations’ or 
when the conditions for travel ‘just don’t feel right’ (Dina, QR151). When considerable 
amounts of time are spent preparing for (even the most habitual of) journeys, there is 
spontaneity in being able to re-direct its course in response to often uncertain and changing 
conditions of travel (Chapter 7). That said, the consequences of altering daily routines 
means that it takes significantly longer to complete everyday tasks. Beth often wakes up 
‘two hours early so my dad can take me to college on his way to work’. Similarly, Greg 
(QR125) writes, ‘I can only get the bus to uni and it’s really problematic250. I tend to avoid 
 
250 Others highlighted issues of accessibility and reliability in relation to service provision, particularly in 
rural areas: ‘I live out in the sticks and public transport is pretty infrequent. I know if something happens I 
couldn’t get home immediately, I’d need to wait for the next bus [and] that could take hours. […] I tend to 
not go very far because of that and stay closer to home’ (Amanda, IR) 
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rush hour but if I finish uni later, the buses are always packed. I usually wait a few hours 
and travel home later or get the night bus that’s quieter.’ Dyck (1995, p. 310) notes that the 
use of ‘transportation, particularly in crowded, rush-hour conditions,’ is problematic for 
women living with chronic illness as they negotiate the social and physical environment 
between home and work. Lisa experiences similar disruptions to her day: 
I take the bus to university mostly every day and I hate it. I find myself 
jumping off and taking the next bus if it gets too busy or claustrophobic, but 
that usually makes me late for class and that makes me panic too. I can’t win! 
While seemingly ingrained into the habitual rhythm of social life, pervasive anxieties 
constitute and unsettle spaces of mobility, disrupting understandings of the daily commute 
as ‘the routine and repetitive transition from place to place’ (Bissell et al., 2016, p. 12). 
Consequently, people spend substantial amounts of energy simply getting to and from 
significant ‘dots’ on their everyday maps. 
Similar to chronic illness, experiences of social anxiety are invariably contingent on 
individual circumstances, environments and situations that cause experiences to rupture 
and flare (Chapter 5), but are, for the most part, invisible (Charmaz, 1995; Moss and Dyck, 
1996). Samuels (2003, p. 248) argues that the focus on visibility by disability theorists 
‘continues to render non visible disabilities invisible while reinforcing the exact cultural 
reliance on visibility that oppresses all of us’. Davis argues that ‘disability is a specular 
moment’ in which the gaze has operative power ‘to control, limit and patrol’ the disabled 
body (Davis, 1995, p. 12). Samuels (2003) critiques the politics of visibility and the focus 
on physical markers of difference prevalent in theories of disability (Chapter 7). The focus 
on the specular not only leads her to ‘question’ whether she, living with a chronic, life-
altering and invisible condition, ‘qualifies’ as disabled, but it also limits our understanding 
of what disability is and further marginalises those whose social identities are 
un(der)recognised, called into question or disputed outright. In order to contextualise the 
‘complexity and multiplicity of social restrictions’ (Mulvany, 2000, p. 585) encountered by 
people experiencing mental and/or emotional distress, it is crucial to draw connections 
between the vaguely visible or invisible presentation of their experiences and their 
everyday use of space. Gail’s narrative is particularly instructive here: 
I found a website, ‘Disabled Travel Advice’, when I was searching for 
information to help me get about with less anxiety. I don’t know what I was 
expecting but it wasn’t all that helpful. It said something like, [‘Don’t be shy 
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about taking a seat at the front of the bus.’ (DTA 2017)]251 I could never, ever. 
I’m 33, I am physically able, you know? What a way to draw attention to 
myself! [...] Sitting on the bus isn’t somewhere I want to start talking to 
someone at all, never mind about my mental health! (Gail, IR95) 
While sitting in ‘priority seating’ would provide her with a little more personal space and 
could help to alleviate some of Gail’s anxieties, she is firmly attuned to the fact that she 
possesses no outward sign of impairment252. Being young and ‘physically able’, the 
socially and culturally accepted ‘markers’ of disability are missing253. The ‘solution’ to the 
problem appears to present more problems than it solves, as sitting in priority seating areas 
is a perceived transgression of the social rules of public transport use. Furthermore, such a 
scenario could incite possible confrontation with others: Gail does not want put herself in a 
position where she has to justify her use of the space and, by extension, her mental health. 
Arguably, the issue of (in)visibility presents further problems in terms justification when 
‘fraudulent’ claims to space or ‘undeserving’ accommodations are made (Lingsom, 2008; 
Samuels, 2003) (also evident in the workplace). 
Gail’s (IR95) anticipated fears are realised in Anna’s (IR157) experience: ‘[I] sat in the 
disabled seats because the bus was really busy and I wanted to be able to get off if I needed 
to, you know? And an older woman called me out on it […] She said I had no right to sit 
there […] I got right off the bus […] It really stuck with me. [Travelling is] difficult 
enough without being called out [on it].’ Anna is one of few participants to discuss face-to-
face confrontations in public spaces, it is particularly poignant as she was challenged and 
publicly reprimanded for occupying ‘disabled spaces’. Unfortunately, the experience has 
stayed with her, invariably influencing her perceptions and use of the public transport 
system as well as her ‘place’ within it. Gail and Anna’s experiences resonate with Thomas’ 
(2007) concept of ‘psycho-emotional dimensions of disability’ that concerns the harmful 
words or actions of non-disabled people towards people with (non)visible impairments. 
Thomas (2007, p. 72) argues that ‘the damage inflicted works alongside psychological and 
emotional pathways, impacting negatively on self-esteem, personal confidence and 
ontological security’, aspects that, for people with social anxiety, are already particularly 
 
251 This is the particular section, quoted from the DTA website, to which Gail is referring to. 
252 Public campaigns to recognise invisible impairments and disabilities, particularly on public transport, have 
been increasing in recent years. In 2016, Transport for London (TfL) launched the ‘Please Offer Me a 
Seat’ pin badge designed to assist people with hidden disabilities, health conditions and injuries by 
alerting fellow passengers to their need for a seat. A similar ‘Baby on Board’ scheme exists for pregnant 
women. 
253 Arguably, visible markers of illness and/or difference are not socially or culturally ‘accepted’ either and 
serve to mark the body as deviant, abnormal or ‘other’ (Garland-Thomson, 2005) See also: (Hall 1999, 
2010; Imrie 2001) 
 
 
 214 
low and vulnerable. 
Several respondents clarified their sense of not feeling safe on public transport spaces as 
overwhelmingly ontological. Sarah (QR18S) no longer travels by public transport as she 
frequently experiences panic attacks when in close proximity to other people. Commenting 
on the response of others to her episodes of panic, she writes: ‘people had no idea what to 
do, they would just stare like I was nuts or blatantly avoid getting involved’. Cresswell 
(1996, p. 22) argues that the ‘occurrence of out of place phenomena leads people to 
question behaviour and define what is and is not appropriate for a particular setting.’ Here 
Goffman’s ‘aversion’ takes on a different meaning, insofar as Sarah is the subject who is 
deemed ‘unworthy’ of acknowledgment as her behaviour does not ‘fit’ with the space. As 
such, she is rendered ‘out of place’ and altogether ignored by her fellow commuters. 
Others also discussed perceived safety in terms of vulnerability and risk of becoming the 
target of harassment. Amanda states that ‘travelling home from work on the night bus with 
groups of drunk people in case they say something or try to get my attention’ causes her 
incredible discomfort. Equally, Paul feels that he is an ‘easy target for young people to 
mock, looking and feeling so awkward that it draws their attention like I’ve got a big sign 
over me’, NS leading him to avoid travel. Feminist geographers have argued that it is 
women’s fear of crime, violence and harassment in the public sphere that overwhelmingly 
contributes to their decisions to avoid public transport (Law, 1999; Valentine, 1989). 
However, Day et al. (2003) further problematises gendered accounts of fear in public 
space, arguing that men’s perceived vulnerability increases when they are placed in 
situations that are uncertain or unfamiliar, particularly where there is the potential for 
confrontation, as experienced by Paul, heightening his sense of negative expectation and 
further disrupting his relationship with the surrounding space. 
Whether these journeys are endured, altered or abandoned; new social routines, practices 
and negotiations unfold between home, work and social spheres of life in bring about a 
sense of stability and to regain control over the self- and body-in-space. While the impact 
of their use is considerable, those who avoid public transport often walk considerable 
distances, rely heavily on family members or remain within the confines of the home 
Chapter 7). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated how sustained experiences of social anxiety play a 
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significance role in regulating, restricting and, as suggested in the opening quotation, a 
shrinking social and spatial worlds (Davidson, 2000b; Driedger et al., 2004; Dyck, 1995b). 
Throughout, this chapter has focused on the relation and embodied encounters between 
self-other-world highlighting the ways in which the ‘fine-grained’ micro-textures of social 
space trigger and sustain anxious experiences. Precarious and uncertain social and 
interpersonal worlds are compounded by an overwhelming fear of humiliation, 
embarrassment and rejection that has the potential to lead to an avoidance of social life and 
sustained experiences of isolation and loneliness. People’s perceptions of social 
interactions and situations impact how they construct meaning from them, often 
exacerbating existing anxieties and fuelling new ones that shape their self-image, identity 
and ability to participate in, and contribute to, social worlds. A deeper examination of 
participant’s social worlds uncovers the complexity in, and limitations placed on, everyday 
social life. While highlighting the broader impact over a life-course as opportunities for 
encounter, both passing and sustained, become increasingly diminished. Next, I examined 
consumer spaces and other public and civic spaces used for social and leisure activities. 
Here, it became apparent that the availability of spaces deemed ‘safe’ for social contact, or 
to simply navigate through, become increasingly limited leading to further erosion of 
already restricted social and geographical worlds. Finally, I attend to the various ways 
everyday mobilities are disrupted and re-negotiated in response to the temporally and 
spatially contingent nature of anxiety. Individuals encumbered by uncertainty, perceived 
visibility, the potential for social interactions with others, and the levels of social 
performance involved in, for example, buying a ticket or crossing the street, public space, 
for many participants, is full of intolerable disruptions to their daily geographies. 
Consequently, social, spatial and temporal adjustments are made to the practice of 
everyday life that sees routes disrupted, journeys (re)negotiated and bodies (re)mobilised in 
creative but time-consuming ways. The disrupted and disruptive geographies explored 
throughout this thesis have unearthed a dialectic in the relation between self and space.   
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CHAPTER 9  
CONCLUSION 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has sought to examine the social and anticipatory geographies of social anxiety 
by placing under geographical scrutiny the sites, settings and encounters in and through 
which everyday experiences are lived. By exploring the day-to-day realities and 
consequences of living with social anxiety, this thesis offers a uniquely geographical 
approach to the disciplinary landscape of social anxiety research and complements existing 
research on experiences of mental and emotional distress (Butler and Parr, 1999; 
Chouinard, 2012; Davidson, 2000a; Segrott and Doel, 2004) and chronic illness and 
impairment (Crooks, 2007; Dyck, 1995a; Lucherini, 2016; Smith, 2012). Interrogating 
lived experience specifically through geographical and psychoanalytic lenses has aided in 
unearthing the social meaning and something of the underlying psychic structure of 
participants’ anxious experiences. Psychoanalytic geographies, in particular, offer to enrich 
our understanding of participants’ subjectivities as intimately bound up with their self-
other-world relations. In ending this thesis, I provide a summary of each chapter before 
reflecting upon the wider theoretical and empirical threads mapped over the course of this 
thesis, before finally offering suggestions about both the practical application of the 
findings and possible strands of future research. 
Chapter 1 set the overall tone of the thesis by foregrounding the ‘voices’ of research 
participants, before charting the histories of and controversies surrounding the 
classification of social anxiety as a mental ‘disorder’. The latter move – with a clear critical 
edge – did not intend to reduce or to negate the accounts of individual distress and 
suffering in the chapters that follow, particularly from those who subscribe to such 
classifications, but rather to disrupt existing diagnostic and classification systems and 
thereby to widen the lens through which social anxiety is viewed. Chapter 2 mapped the 
existing disciplinary landscape of social anxiety, highlighting the extent to which it 
remains dominated by biomedical, cognitive and behavioural models, but also 
encountering smaller pockets of inquiry into social anxiety where cultural, social, 
psychoanalytic and interpersonal matters of concern do arise, sometimes anticipating the 
more geographical considerations central to this thesis. Then, situated within the context of 
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critical approaches to geographies of health and illness and guided by the just-mentioned 
social, interpersonal and psychoanalytic perspectives, I advanced towards a social model of 
social anxiety. Chapter 3 developed this model – or a term like ‘sensitising framework’ 
might be more appropriate – and in so doing laid the conceptual groundwork for working 
with a situated and psychoanalytic account of social anxiety. In particular, threads were 
drawn out here from four subfields of theoretical concern from the wider orbit of human 
geography: psychoanalysis/psychoanalytic geographies, anticipatory geographies, 
embodied and affective geographies and, finally, what has very recently been called 
habitual geographies. 
In Chapter 4, I offered an in-depth reflection on the politics, process and practice of 
researching the lived experience of social anxiety and carefully considered how online 
approaches can be implemented to enrich such geographical inquiry. Methodologically, I 
sought to design an inclusive research process that, not only, acknowledged the ‘voices’ of 
people with sustained experiences of mental (ill) health, but also sought to build ethical 
research agendas and relationships with my participants. Throughout this discussion, I 
considered layers, rather than labels, of vulnerability so as to identify the various ways in 
which people with social anxiety may (or may not) be considered vulnerable in the 
research encounter. This chapter marked the close of the ‘set up’ for my project – its 
literature, conceptual and methodological coordinates – and comprised the bridge across 
into the substantive heart of the thesis, the four empirically-facing chapters where the 
‘voices’ of experience from my in-depth primary research came to take centre-stage, albeit 
always with a variety of routes explicitly traced back into the literature and concepts (and 
on occasion with new reference and ideas being introduced that relate to the specific 
contents of each chapter). 
In Chapter 5, unravelling the anticipatory geographies of social anxiety, revealed the 
complex temporalities, spatialities and potentialities that manifest relentlessly – with what 
often seem unbearable ‘intensities’ – in the everyday social and spatial lives of the 
individual. This chapter laid the emotional and affective platform for the remaining 
empirical chapters by highlighting the intense, cyclical and persistent nature of social 
anxiety. It dug deeply into the socio-psychic dynamics undergirding how, through 
anticipatory processes, themselves often triggered by particular spaces and places, past 
memories and experiences are continually being projected forward onto future events with 
present and persistent consequences. 
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Chapter 6 then cast a critical eye over the formal agencies, ‘biomedical’ authorities and 
informal spaces that legitimise and provide crucial sources of support – or, occasionally, 
non-support – for people with enduring mental health problems. It highlights considerable 
tensions for many between the social understanding and experience of distress and the 
biomedical understanding. It also demonstrates how medical encounters and spaces speak 
an exacerbation of distress through the struggles and uncertainties involved in obtaining a 
diagnosis and the on-going management of mental health and illness. Engaging with online 
spaces highlighted the various ways in which the Internet is utilised in the management of 
health-illness, examining social and health-seeking behaviours online, the consumption of 
health information online and critical sources/spaces of online support in the form of 
online forums. This chapter uncovered not only how and why people obtain a diagnosis –
formal, or otherwise – but how they ‘live through, with, against and beyond’ (Callard, 
2014, p. 530) a diagnosis of social anxiety. 
Collectively, Chapters 7 and 8 illuminated a fine-grained set of routines, knowledges and 
practices fostered in response to the unpredictable nature of social and spatial life for 
people with social anxiety, and also explored the intricacies of various interactions, 
situations, movements and encounters habitually experienced as distressing. Chapter 7 
addressed the spatial contingencies of living with social anxiety and its impact on the 
formative spaces of home, work and education, disclosing a simultaneously disrupted and 
disruptive set of geographies. I argued here that conceptualisations of home as an 
inherently safe and bounded space are deeply contested in this context, with the boundaries 
of home for people with social anxiety in a constant state of flux as everyday interactions, 
objects and practices in/of home create uncertainty. I also argued that education and 
workplace environments are anxiety-provoking due to cultures of competition, pedagogical 
practice, performance expectations, and power relations/dynamics between peers, 
colleagues and superiors. Chapter 8 delved deeper into precarious and uncertain social 
and interpersonal worlds of people with social anxiety that are perpetually marked by 
feelings of inadequacy and self-criticism, vulnerability, social isolation and loneliness, the 
aim being to understand better the various sites and settings in which social anxiety 
manifests. 
ENHANCING AWARENESS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Throughout the thesis I have sought to work with the complex layering of socially anxious 
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experiences in order to capture the spatialities and temporalities of social life as they are 
lived and, at times, endured by participants. The next section discusses the impact of 
experiential knowledge on the inter-related domains of mental health research, practice and 
education, the limitations of this research and directions for future research. 
Current research into social anxiety, normally configured here as a ‘social anxiety 
disorder’ (SAD), is indeed dominated by biological, psychological and cognitive-
behavioural frameworks, which, with rare exceptions, omit the finer details of a person’s 
social and spatial life while focusing on the symptoms of ‘disorder’ as the pathological 
basis of illness. In order to avoid reproducing the reductive tendencies of these 
frameworks, social anxiety is understood in this project and thesis to be a common, 
meaningful and interpretable response to emotional, interpersonal and social-
environmental circumstances, experienced in varying degrees and intensities; not an 
innately pathological entity, but rather reflective of broader social and cultural conditions 
and part of the rich diversity of the human condition. The disciplinary landscape of social 
anxiety is dominated by research that focuses on causative factors and treatment 
approaches/outcomes, with very little attention paid to lived accounts and the everyday 
contexts in/through which anxieties are experienced, understood, negotiated and/or 
managed254. In reaction, this research has communicated an embodied, relational and 
situated understanding of social anxiety; one that is habitually recurring, anchored in 
various social sites and settings (e.g. home, workplaces, and shopping centres) and 
structured by social practices, norms and relationships. Prioritising personal experience as 
an important source of evidence and knowledge aims to provide meaning, context and 
perspective to the lived experiences of social anxiety. My framing sensibility here has 
offered a biographic and socio-spatial context of illness experience as well as an 
understanding of strategies of negotiating, coping and managing ill-health and wellbeing. 
Prior research on social anxiety has not reached out to or utilised user-led online 
communities specifically set up to help individuals understand, discuss and manage their 
mental health. This research, on the contrary, employed an innovative approach to the 
study of social anxiety using online methods, enabling access to an existing, active and 
flourishing knowledge base within online communities of people with social anxiety. The 
use of Internet technologies allows the unfolding of a whole new set of research 
possibilities with such communities through chat rooms, blogs and web-forums. The thesis 
 
254 McCarthy (2014) is an exception, here although she focuses on participants’ recovery journeys rather than 
living day-to-day life with social anxiety. 
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also highlights the importance of practising inclusive research, in that face-to-face and 
verbal interactions may present insurmountable hurdles to those experiencing social 
anxiety and so, ‘traditional’ research methods are unsuitable or must be strategically 
negotiated. People with social anxiety do not want their experiences to be masked and 
neglected; they have a voice and a story to share. This research engages with these voices 
in order to create greater awareness and understanding of what it is like to live with social 
anxiety by prioritising the events, encounters and experiences that are inherent to everyday 
life.  
Given the general lack of professional and public understanding of social anxiety, the 
findings of this research, and stories therein, could prove to be a valuable resource for 
General and Mental Health Practitioners for considering the personal meanings of, the 
daily activities that are disrupted by, and the social difficulties that have contributed to, the 
mental and emotional distress in-built to social anxiety: 
I don't think SA is particularly well known, so I think it's important to try and 
let people know what it is and how they can help/support people they know 
who might have it. (Nicole, QR63) 
 
The public aren’t really aware of social anxiety the same way they are with 
other mental health problems and doctors aren’t equipped to deal with it, I 
don’t think they are really aware either. (Kerrie, QR22) 
In order to map the foundations and contours of the social and anticipatory geographies of 
social anxiety, this research has sought to work with a wide scope of social interactions, 
sites and settings that were experienced by participants as (un)conducive to their mental 
health and wellbeing. As such, future research could build on these foundations and narrow 
the focus of investigation to the social-spatial dynamics of particular spheres of life as 
experienced by people with social anxiety; for example, employment, education, online 
and interpersonal spheres.  
In terms of policy, the few suggestions I have fall mainly within the realm of healthcare 
services and how people with social anxiety can be supported in health-care pathways. 
People experiencing social anxiety demonstrate a resilience in their health-seeking 
practices and self-management practices but this often increases anxieties and isolation: 
One significant suggestion I have in this area is the development of policy and practice 
guidelines aimed at contextualising mental health experiences and treatment plans that 
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would see GPs working in conjunction with and supporting patients with social anxiety in 
seeking further treatment if required. 
IMPACT AND KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE 
Throughout the course of this research, I have engaged in knowledge exchange and public 
engagement activities in order to increase the impact of this research. The Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC, 2018, p. n.p.) define the link between knowledge 
exchange and impact as the ‘two way exchange between researchers and research users 
[i.e. industry, policy, practice and the public] to share ideas, research evidence, experiences 
and skills’. In October 2016, I was invited to take part in a live radio interview about my 
research with Roundhouse Community Radio in Vancouver, British Columbia, and the 
interviewer was with the cultural geographer Minelle Mahtani (University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver). This interview provided an opportunity to talk about my research 
to a public and international audience. In 2018, I was invited write a piece for the 
Wellcome Trust’s ‘Living with Buildings’ exhibition, which examined how the 
environment affects our physical and mental health. In the first week, the article, which 
was published as part of their online collection, received over 2,000 views with people 
spending on average 12 minutes on the webpage, which hopefully demonstrates significant 
engagement with the article255.  
Alongside these activities, it is important to consider the impact of the research on those 
who participated. Research participants were incredibly supportive of, and enthusiastic 
about, a research project that was solely about their, largely neglected, lived experiences, 
one that worked with their anxieties both practically, in terms of non-face-to-face methods, 
and conceptually, by viewing social anxiety through a more personal lens. The opportunity 
to discuss personal mental health experiences – and to have someone listen attentively with 
genuine care and interest – may be empowering and cathartic, allowing a certain 
repossession of experiences that are so often dismissed, ignored or marginalised. In 
addition to being ‘listened to’, these participants are also motivated by the prospect that 
sharing their experiences will help others living with social anxiety, and their family 
members, friends and colleagues, understand the often uncertain and distressing aspects of 
social life. Thus, the kind of ‘therapeutic work’ afforded by attention and representation 
should not be considered ancillary to treatment and/or recovery, but rather serve as a 
 
255 Figures communicated by the Wellcome Trust’s online editorial team one week after online publication. 
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central strategy to understanding how social and spatial life is lived, endured and managed 
at various times and in various places by people living with social anxiety. 
Acknowledging, on the one hand, the often diminished social worlds of those living with 
social anxiety and, on the other, the tendency of people to internalise and ruminate over 
negative social interactions as well as to criticise and socially isolate themselves, mental 
health experiences ‘externalised’ and ‘made object’ through written word can be an 
effective way of reconvening and then dealing with mental and emotional suffering (Rian 
and Hammer, 2013, p.678). At the end of the questionnaires and during the interviews, 
participants often told me that they had enjoyed participating in the research, and indeed 
were grateful that someone was interested in, listening to and working with their ‘voices’ 
of experience:  
[The questionnaire] made me ask myself a lot of questions I wouldn’t normally 
ask myself because of my lack of positive self dialogue. (Jane, QR90) 
I appreciate the questionnaire’s inclusion of anecdotal information. It has been 
useful to reflect. It has helped me to identify what is a problem that I had 
identified before as belonging to other areas of my life, so thank you. (Hannah, 
QR77) 
It’s been really nice talking to you knowing you understand and aren’t judging 
me. Thank you for doing this work. It’s so important! (Lucie, IR28) 
It’s been really helpful for me. It’s actually given me a fresh perspective on my 
anxiety, I’m going to take a copy of this interview to my therapist next week 
and talk it through with her. (Jo, IR41) 
These impacts may seem small but, for me, they are the most significant for highlighting 
the importance of this research and the need to uncover the causes and consequences of our 
‘disordered’ lives. If not for participant’s willingness to discuss often difficult-to-articulate, 
deeply personal and emotional aspects of their mental health, my efforts to humanise and 
capture the intensity and uncertainty of socially anxious worlds would not have been 
possible. I hope in some small way, therefore, that this research does justice to the stories 
so readily shared with me.  
FINAL THOUGHTS 
Disclosing intimate details and personal narratives of mental health and illness is often an 
onerous task. Living with social anxiety further complicates this act of ‘opening up’ as 
anxieties are about interacting with others and deeply tied to everyday social and physical 
environments. The uncertainty of social encounters is extremely distressing, physical 
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spaces are imbued with certain ideals, norms and expectations that an anxious person 
‘fails’ to meet, and face-to-face interactions are risky, exposing a person to potential 
judgement, scrutiny, embarrassment, ridicule and shame. There is also a subtle but 
compelling power dynamic at play concerning perceptions of authority and feelings of 
inferiority in relation to others. The research encounter is a social encounter, which 
embodies all of these complexities, and this required careful navigation through a critically 
reflexive and relational research practice (Chapter 4). 
Lived knowledge provides social insight and a deeper level of understanding to the 
minutiae of anxious subjectivities, my own experiences of which helped shape the research 
design and methodological approach. The level of distress caused by social anxieties is 
often dismissed. Therefore, it was a priority to design a project that, not only, fostered 
participation but also enabled people to define the nature and limits of their participation. 
In this context, it meant employing multiple methods void, as far as possible, from the 
stressful dynamics of social encounters mentioned previously. This research – with is 
principally online character – encouraged faceless, voiceless, bodiless and anonymous 
research encounters through an online questionnaire and online semi-structured interviews. 
By removing elements linked to social evaluation, participants accustomed to expressing 
themselves in written form in online environments.  
The findings and, most importantly, the words of those who participated in this research all 
reinforce the need to re-examine and re-frame the narratives about social anxiety and to 
create a broader story that looks beyond the symptoms of ‘disorder’ towards more messy, 
complex and situated realities. The human sciences have provided a discourse of normal 
versus abnormal to understand our inner worlds. Crucially, Lacanian psychoanalysis offers 
the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings through which to reframe normal/abnormal in 
relation to mental health and associated distress256. As highlighted in Chapter 3, his works 
critically assesses the perceived (and, he would argue, unobtainable) stability of the self. 
We are subjects who lack. The emergence of social anxiety as a ‘disorder’ is a prominent 
example of how the nuances of human suffering and distress, as a response to an 
increasingly interconnected and neo-liberal world, are pathologised and medicalised. 
Going forward, there is a need to continue to challenge the dominant biomedical model, 
which is seen to play a powerful role in structuring attitudes towards, and often 
 
256 Unfortunately, within the scope of this thesis, a complete, psychoanalytically-informed re-mapping of 
social anxiety (or madness and distress, more generally) is not possible. It certainly opens up exciting 
potential for future work.  
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perpetuating the stigma associated with, mental health, illness and distress. 
By centring experienced-centred knowledges this thesis contributes to existing bodies of 
research that disrupt, challenge and nuance the dominant biomedical model of mental 
health and illness. In unearthing experiential accounts that speak to the intensities of our 
most inner geographies, that of (un)conscious psyches and bodies, but also simultaneously 
speak about the external geographies of social and spatial governance, I address not only 
how social anxiety is experienced but also how it is understood, constructed, managed and 
negotiated. Living with and through social anxiety is often full of contradictions as 
simultaneous feelings of isolation and exposure are compounded by overwhelming 
(un)certainty and (un)predictability about bodily reactions, self and social expectations, 
social spaces and other people. Social anxieties rupture the fabrics, places and spaces of 
everyday life and are fundamentally geographical, bound up in an intimate social 
geography of experience where anxiety, fear, embarrassment and shame occur across a 
range of social settings. Over the course of this thesis, such ‘intensities’ and modes of 
‘governance’ are re-situated back into the sites and settings of daily life, bringing to light a 
little-known social geography of social anxiety, a geography otherwise anxiously hidden to 
the detriment of many. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Case number 
and 
Pseudonym 
Gender Age 
Self-diagnosed 
(SD) or 
Formally-
diagnosed (FD) 
Interview (I), 
Questionnaire 
(Q), 
Questionnaire-
Interview (Q-I) 
respondent 
Notes 
 
1 Karen Female 29 FD I 
No questionnaire recruitment via 
AnxietyUK. Telephone interview.  
2 Nina Female 53 FD I 
No questionnaire recruitment via 
AnxietyUK. Telephone interview.   
3 #01 Dawn Female 29 SD Q   
 
4 #02 Female 16 SD Q   
 
5 #03 Male 29 SD Q   
 
6 #04 Female 24 SD Q   
 
7 #05 Female 29 FD Q   
 
8 #06 Female 28 FD Q   
 
9 #07 Rachel Female 19 SD Q   
 
10 #08 David Male 39 SD Q   
 
11 #09 Female 37 FD Q   
 
12 #10 Female 18 SD Q   
 
13 #14 Sol Male 29 SD Q   
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14 #15 Sean Male 36 FD Q   
 
15 #16 Claire Female 33 SD Q   
 
16 #18 Emma Female 22 SD Q   
 
17 #19 Female 38 SD Q   
 
18 #21 Male 23 SD Q   
 
19 #22 Kerrie Female 23 SD Q-I Online interview. 
 
20 #23 Female 47 SD Q   
 
21  #24 Eve Female 25 FD Q   
 
22 #25 Emily Female 21 FD Q   
 
23 #27 Amber Female 20 FD Q   
 
24 #28 Lucie Female 29 SD Q-I Online interview. 
 
25 #32 Ben Male 25 SD Q   
 
26 #33 Marta Female 28 FD Q   
 
27 #37 Sophie Female 20 FD Q-I Online interview. 
 
28 #38 Male 36 SD Q   
 
29 #40 Kim Female 34 SD Q-I Online interview. 
 
30 #41 Jo Female 28 FD Q   
 
31 #42 Molly Female 44 FD Q   
 
32 #43 Female 31 SD Q   
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33 #48 Female 48 SD Q   
 
34 #54 John Male 26 FD Q   
 
35 #57 Marcie Female 25 FD Q   
 
36 #58 Male 43 SD Q   
 
37 #59 Female 52 FD Q   
 
38 #60 Female 16 FD Q   
 
39 #62 Male 27 SD Q   
 
40 #63 Nicole Female 32 FD Q   
 
41 #67 Male 44 FD Q   
 
42 #77 Hannah Male 55 SD Q   
 
43 #78 Cara Female 23 FD Q   
 
44 #79 Female 31 FD Q   
 
45 #81 Female 68 FD Q   
 
46 #82 Female 16 FD Q   
 
47 #85 Female 17 FD Q   
 
48 #87 Kirsty Female 16 FD Q-I 
Online interview. Kirsty is the youngest 
participant.   
49 #88 Jess Female 19 FD Q-I Online interview. 
 
50 #90 Jane Female 21 SD Q-I Online interview. 
 
51 #91 Eilidh Female 47 SD Q   
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52 #92 Female 34 SD Q   
 
53 #95 Gail Female 24 SD Q-I Online interview. 
 
54 #96 Kathryn Female 19 FD Q   
 
55 #100 Female 21 FD Q   
 
56 #103 Amelia Female 17 FD Q   
 
57 #107 Female 37 FD Q   
 
58 #111 Female 29 SD Q   
 
59 #112 Female 20 SD Q   
 
60 #114 Female 28 FD Q   
 
61 #115 Daniel Male 24 SD Q-I Online interview.  
 
62 #116 Female 20 SD Q   
 
63 
#117 Female 51 FD Q 
  
 
  
64 #118 Male 48 SD Q   
 
65 #119 Mia Female 24 SD Q-I Online interview. 
 
66 #120 Male 26 FD Q   
 
67 #122 Female 18 FD     
 
68 #123 Tina Female 48 SD Q   
 
69 #125 Greg Male 48 FD Q   
 
70 #136 Male 48 FD Q   
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71 #137 Male 29 FD Q   
 
72 #138 Female 45 FD Q   
 
73 #142 Priya Female 16 SD Q   
 
74 #143 Lisa Female 25 FD Q Online interview. 
 
75 #144 Leanne Female 26 FD Q   
 
76 #147 Josh Male 35 FD Q-I Online interview. 
 
77 #148 N/A 20 SD Q   
 
78 #149 Female 19 SD Q   
 
79 #150 Female 18 FD Q   
 
80 #151 Dina Female 29 FD Q   
 
81 #153 Female 16 SD Q   
 
82 #155 Female 37 FD Q   
 
83 #157 Anna Female 29 SD Q-I Online interview. 
 
84 #159 Female 44 SD Q   
 
85 #160 Female 43 SD Q   
 
86 #166 Female 41 FD Q-I 2 x onlline interviews 
 
87 #168 Male 33 SD Q   
 
88 #169 Male 39 FD Q   
 
89 #171 Male 42 SD Q   
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90 #177 Male 38 SD Q   
 
91 #179 Lauren Female 18 FD Q   
 
92 #180 Male 30 SD Q   
 
93 #182 Moira Female 48 SD Q-I Telephone interview. 
 
94 #183 Female 20 FD Q   
 
95 #187 Olivia Female 24 FD Q Online interview.  
 
96 #189 Callum Male 32 FD Q-I Online interview. 
 
97  #191 Female 47 FD Q   
 
98 #194 Female 47 FD Q   
 
99 #196 Female 27 SD Q   
 
100 #197 Female 18 FD Q   
 
101 #199 Female 24 SD Q   
 
102 
#202 Male 36 SD Q    
 
 
103 #203 Male 31 SD Q   
 
104 #204 Harriet Female 25 SD Q   
 
105 #211 Simon Male 55 FD Q   
 
106 #212 Anya Female 37 FD Q-I Online Interview. 
 
107 #214 Female 27 FD Q   
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108 #215 Gillian Female 31 SD Q   
 
109 #216 Carol  Female 65 FD Q Carol is the oldest participant.  
 
110 #217 Male 44 FD Q   
 
111 #218 N/A 47 SD Q   
 
112 #219 Female 37 SD Q   
 
113 #220 Female 18 FD Q   
 
114 #221 Male 38 FD Q   
 
115 #222 Female 20 FD Q   
 
116 #223 Female 27 SD Q   
 
117 #224 Female 24 SD Q   
 
118 #225 Female 34 SD Q   
 
119 #226 Female 27 SD Q   
 
120 #14S Male 45 FD Q-I Online interview. SA Scotland participant. 
 
121 #18S Sarah Female 32 FD Q SA Scotland participant.  
 
122 #26S Male 38 SD Q SA Scotland participant.  
 
123 #21S Female 21 SD Q SA Scotland participant.  
 
124 #39S Female 21 SD Q SA Scotland participant.  
 
125 #41S  Male 50 SD Q-I Online interview. SA Scotland participant.  
 
126 #45S Male 25 FD Q SA Scotland participant.  
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127 #49S Female 36 SD Q SA Scotland participant.   
128 #51S Female 39 SD Q SA Scotland participant.   
129 #54S Female 45 FD Q SA Scotland participant.   
130 #57S Male 33 FD Q SA Scotland participant.   
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Appendix 4 
 
 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this research project. Please read the following information carefully. 
 
Invitation I would like to invite you to take part in a research project about living with Social Anxiety Disorder 
entitled 'The social geographies of Social Anxiety Disorder in on- and off-line worlds'. Before you decide to 
participate, it is important for you to read the research information sheet on the following page carefully. Do not 
hesitate to contact me if there is anything that is unclear or if you would like more information on this project. My 
name is Louise Boyle and I am a PhD research student from the University of Glasgow. This project is funded by 
the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), which is a higher education funding body. The project will run 
from October 2015 to October 2017. The research has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the College of 
Science and Engineering, University of Glasgow, under approval number 300140175. 
 
Confidentiality Your contribution will be anonymous. The research will not ask you to disclose any identifiable 
information (e.g. your name/online usernames) and you will be assigned a false name if your responses are used in 
any research-related outputs. Information will be stored on a secure computer. What is the purpose of the study? As 
someone who lives with Social Anxiety Disorder, I have noticed a significant lack of research that includes the 
voices of people who experience Social Anxiety Disorder. This project aims to increase public and academic 
understandings of what it is like to live with Social Anxiety Disorder, through your day-to-day experiences. The 
research explores several themes including, your daily life, your diagnosis and the impact of your surrounding 
environment. The project will also investigate your use of the Internet and online experiences. 
 
Your role You will be asked a series of questions relating to your experiences. There are 7 sections covering a range 
of topics including introductory questions, your everyday experiences, physical symptoms, online communities and 
wider perceptions of social anxiety. It would be useful for you to provide information about your personal 
experiences in as much detail as you are comfortable with. Please share what comes to mind there are no right or 
wrong answers. The more information I can gather, the better. There is no recommended time for completing the 
questionnaire. If you need some time to gather your thoughts, you will be able to save your answers and come back 
at a later date to complete the questionnaire by selecting resume later at the bottom of the screen. You can skip 
questions that you do not feel are relevant to your experience or that you do not feel comfortable answering. 
 
What will happen to the information I collect? The results of the research will be written up in my PhD thesis and 
in academic journals, as well as for dissemination via websites and other public engagement activities to increase 
both academic and public awareness about Social Anxiety Disorder. The material collected could be useful for 
academic studies, service-users, charities and in wider policy-related contexts. Above all else, the research will 
contribute to raising awareness about Social Anxiety Disorder through the voices of people who experience it; 
challenging mental-health related stigma by sharing these experiences. 
 
Other information You may contact me for more information about the project at any time. Your participation is 
entirely voluntary and you can withdraw your consent for me to use your answers any time without having to give a 
reason. Submission of this questionnaire will be considered as you providing consent for me to use your responses in 
the thesis and other outputs.  Thank you for taking the time to read this information. To download a copy of this 
information sheet CLICK HERE. 
 
Yours sincerely, Louise Boyle 
School of Geographical and Earth Sciences University of Glasgow, G12 8QQ 
Project supervisors Prof. Chris Philo E-mail: christopher.philo@glasgow.ac.uk Dr. Cheryl McGeachan E-mail: 
cheryl.mcgeachan@glasgow.ac.uk 
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If you feel you require immediate support, please contact Samaritans www.samaritans.org 
Provide a 24-hour service offering confidential emotional support to anyone who is in crisis. 
Helpline 08457 909090 (UK), 1850 609090 (ROI); e-mail: jo@samaritans.org  Anxiety UK 
Anxiety UK is a registered UK charity and user-led service for people with anxiety. They work 
to support individuals living with anxiety disorders and provide a range of information and 
services Breathing Space (Scotland) www.breathingspacescotland.co.uk Breathing Space is a 
free and confidential phone line service for any individual, who is experiencing low mood or 
depression, or who is unusually worried and in need of someone to talk to. The phone line is 
open 24 hours at weekends (6pm Friday - 6am Monday) and from 6pm to 2am on weekdays 
(Monday - Thursday) 0800 83 85 87. 
 
TO CONTINUE TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE PLEASE CLICK NEXT 
 
A note on privacy This survey is anonymous. The record of your survey responses does not 
contain any identifying information about you, unless a specific survey question explicitly asked 
for it. If you used an identifying token to access this survey, please rest assured that this token 
will not be stored together with your responses. It is managed in a separate database and will 
only be updated to indicate whether you did (or did not) complete this survey. There is no way of 
matching identification tokens with survey responses. 
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Appendix 8 
 
Opening blurb 
▪ Statement about overall aims of the project (previously sent to participants) 
▪ Statement about confidentiality, anonymity and how the information will be used 
(previously sent to participants) 
▪ Confirmation of informed consent  
▪ Statement making participants aware of their rights to terminate interview/take a 
break/not answer questions they are uncomfortable with. 
 
Example of Semi-Structured Interview Schedule 
 
Possible themes to explore regarding obtaining a diagnosis (or not) and significance of 
this: 
 
Onset 
 Can you tell be about the period when social anxiety first became part of your 
life? 
 
Key points: 
▪ Can you describe your first experience or any particular memories that stand out 
relating to the first time something happened - thinking about what, when, where, 
when, how you felt. 
▪ What factors do you think have played a part in you developing social anxiety? [get 
a sense if anxiety developed over-time and of perceived causative factors – 
potentially sensitive] 
▪ How did you understand what was happening and how did you interpret the signs 
and symptoms of your mental health? 
▪ Did you speak to anyone about what you were experiencing at that time – what was 
their reaction/how did that make you feel? 
▪ [If formally diagnosed] What encouraged you to seek advice from a healthcare 
professional?  
 
 
[END OF EXAMPLE] 
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Consent Form 
 
Title of Project: The social geographies of Social Anxiety Disorder (SAnD) 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Research Information Sheet for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving any reason. 
 
3. I understand that my participation will be anonymous and I will not be identified by 
name in any publications arising from the research. 
 
4. I understand participation or non-participation in the research will have no effect on 
current and/or future relationships with the University of Glasgow. 
 
I agree / do not agree (delete as applicable) to take part in the above study. 
 
Name of Participant: _________________ Date: ___________________ 
 
Please don’t hesitate to contact me with any questions or queries. 
 
Many thanks, 
Louise Boyle (Researcher) 
E: L.boyle.1@research.gla.ac.uk  
 
If you have any further questions or queries regarding this research. Please contact my 
supervisor:  
 
Prof. Chris Philo 
E: Christopher.philo@glasgow.ac.uk  
 
[END OF CONSENT FORM] 
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Appendix 11 
Information Sheet 
Social Anxiety Disorder Research Project 
 
SCHOOL OF GEOGRAPHICAL AND EARTH SCIENCES East Quadrangle, University 
of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Scotland, UK Departmental Office: 01413304782 / 5436; 
Fax: 0141 3304894 / 4817; University Switchboard: 0141 339 8855 
 
Introduction  
I am contacting you as you recently completed an online questionnaire for a research 
project about living with Social Anxiety Disorder and expressed interest in discussing your 
experience further. Before you decide to participate, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please read the following 
information regarding this project carefully. Do not hesitate to contact me if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. My contact details are 
below. Please take as much time as you need to decide whether you would like to 
participate. Participation is entirely voluntary.  
 
My name is Louise Boyle and I am a PhD research student from the University of 
Glasgow. This project is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), 
which is a higher education funding body. The project will run from September 2015 to 
October 2017. This project has been approved by the College of Science and Engineering 
Ethics Committee, University of Glasgow (Approval Number: 300140175).  
 
Confidentiality  
If you choose to participate, your contribution is completely anonymous and no one will be 
able to identify that you took part in the research project. The information you provide may 
be used in my PhD thesis and related reports and papers, but you will be assigned a false 
name to ensure anonymity.  
 
What does this involve?  
As you expressed interest in discussing your experiences further, I would like to invite you 
to take part in an informal and friendly interview. The interview will be conducted online 
using the service ‘ChatStep’ on a time and date that suits you. The interviews will last 
approximately 1 hour. In the interview we will cover a variety of topics that were raised in 
the questionnaire you completed and some other topics relating to your experiences with 
Social Anxiety Disorder. The topics will include: your experiences across different 
situations and in different environments for example, social interactions, performance 
situations or situations where you are being observed; how you manage your experiences 
with anxiety in certain environments and there will also be a focus on your use of the 
Internet as a space for communicating, socialising, sharing/gathering information about 
Social Anxiety Disorder.  
 
What will happen to the information I collect?  
All the interview responses remain anonymous. I will type up the information you have 
provided and extract what seems like the most important points and themes. Information 
will be stored on a secure computer. Any tape recordings will be destroyed once I have 
typed up the conversation. Your name will not be used in any of these outputs.  
The materials collected could be useful for academic studies, service-users, charities and in 
wider policy-related contexts. Above all else, the research will contribute to raising 
awareness about Social Anxiety Disorder through the voices of people who experience it, 
challenging mental-health related stigma by sharing these experiences. The results of the 
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research will be written up in my PhD thesis and in academic journals, as well as for 
dissemination via websites and other public engagement activities to increase both 
academic and public awareness about Social Anxiety Disorder.  
 
What are your rights? 
You have the right to contact me, or the project supervisor (contact details below) for more 
information about the project. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can 
withdraw your participation at any time. You can change your mind about whether you 
want to be interviewed at any stage. After you have given the interview, if you decide you 
no longer want the information you have provided to be included in the project, you have 
the right to withdraw consent for me to use it at any time without having to give a reason.  
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. Please contact me with any 
questions or queries.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
Louise Boyle  
School of Geographical and Earth Sciences  
East Quadrangle, University of Glasgow  
University Avenue  
Glasgow, G12 8QQ  
Email: L.Boyle.1@research.gla.ac.uk  
 
Project supervisor:  
Professor Chris Philo  
School of Geographical and Earth Sciences  
East Quadrangle, University of Glasgow  
University Avenue  
Glasgow, G12 8QQ  
Email: Christopher.Philo@glasgow.ac.uk  
 
[END OF INFORMATION SHEET] 
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Appendix 12 
Table 7: Gender of Participants 
Gender n % 
Female 93 71.54 
Male 35 26.92 
Transgender 0 0 
No Answer 2 1.54 
Total 130 100% 
 
Table 8: Participant Age Groups 
Age Range n 
16-25 47 
26-35 37 
36-45 27 
46-55 17 
56-65 1 
66-75 1 
Total 130 
 
Table 9: Highest Level of Education Achieved 
Education n 
Secondary 22 
Additional Training 36 
Undergraduate 46 
Postgraduate 18 
No Formal Qualifications 8 
Total 130 
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Table 10: Living Situation of Participants 
Living Situation n 
Alone 23 
Partner/Spouse 30 
Parents 41 
House-share 11 
Other 8 
Total 130 
 
Figure 19: Sexual Orientation of Participants 
 
 
Figure 20: Likelihood of Anxiety when Speaking to Authority Figures 
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Figure 21: Likelihood of Anxiety while Being Observed 
 
Figure 22: Likelihood of Anxiety – Giving a Presentation 
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Figure 23: Likelihood of Causing Anxiety – Speaking on the Telephone 
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